# NATO Bad---BFHR 22---Wave 1

### Notes

Thanks to Hank Sanchez, Zoey Walsh, Owen Williams, and Jack Young for their work on this file. You’ll have to read the internal link to a 1ac’s ‘NATO cohesion’ impact to establish that NATO collapses/the US significantly pulls back in the wake of a disjointed NATO. Please email [khirn10@gmail.com](mailto:khirn10@gmail.com) if you have any comments or concerns.

## Link---‘Cohesion’ Impact

### Link---‘Cohesion’ Impact---1NC

#### Concede “no NATO cohesion absent the plan”---that ensures NATO collapses and the US withdraws

Ellehuus ’21 [Rachel; July 21; deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.; “NATO Futures: Three Trajectories,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-futures-three-trajectories]

Trajectory 3 (Negative): Dissolution of NATO

OVERVIEW

NATO becomes defunct due to death by a thousand cuts. The gradual erosion of the cohesion, political will, credibility, military capability, and relevance of the alliance described in our baseline scenario is accelerated by several factors. These include an economic downturn, increasing nationalism and protectionism, the absence of U.S. leadership, divergent interests, and threat perceptions, and a disregard for common values and interests. Defense budgets in the United States and Europe decrease, and countries prioritize national defense needs over multilateral solutions. These tensions lead to open conflict among several Allies, including Greece and Turkey who regularly challenge one another over their respective activities and rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. They hold hostage NATO defense plans, training and exercises, and missions. Still, other allies appear willing to do China’s bidding, for example, by limiting access to key ports and railways. Finally, adversarial actors calculate that NATO lacks the political resolve and military capability to fulfill its core tasks, testing this with several incidents. These include a cyberattack that takes out the electric grid in several NATO countries; while there is intelligence that Russia is behind the attack, not all allies deem it credible, and NATO fails to respond. In another incident, Russia claims that temporarily breaching Lithuania’s territorial integrity is necessary to defend Belarus. Though disturbed, most allies overlook the incident to avoid escalation; NATO fails to invoke Article 5, and a subset of allies respond in Lithuania’s defense outside the alliance’s framework.

THREAT AND OPPORTUNITY ENVIRONMENT

Migration, terrorism, climate change, and growing nationalism emerge as the primary concerns of European NATO allies. These emanate from growing instability along Europe’s periphery and a severe economic downturn, particularly in southern Europe. While allies recognize the aggressive nature of some Russian and Chinese behavior, they elect to try to manage this through a combination of diplomacy, economic leverage, and avoiding provocative actions. The security environment in Afghanistan deteriorates rapidly into the tribal and ethnic fragmentation of the 1990s, with regional actors supporting competing militias. This increases regional instability and causes an outflow of refugees to NATO countries, especially Turkey. NATO’s plans to train Afghan civilians and the Afghan National Security Forces fall apart as allies fail to stand by their financial commitments or to provide the necessary trainers due to force-protection concerns. The Taliban retake the country, and there is an embarrassing scramble to evacuate the Kabul International Airport and any remaining NATO civilian or military personnel. NATO’s credibility is weakened even further, both for “abandoning” the Afghan government and for leaving the country in essentially the same position as it was when NATO went in in 2003.

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AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SECURITY PARTNERS

The European Union proves a more effective actor than NATO in countering the security challenges that most concern European NATO allies (i.e., migration, terrorism, climate, and nationalism). Thanks to some European allies’ efforts to limit NATO’s role in cybersecurity and defense, building resilience, and managing emerging and disruptive technologies, the European Union has also become a viable security actor in these areas. European allies move away from hedging their security bets between NATO and the European Union to prioritizing EU defense and security arrangements outside of NATO. Perceiving the alliance’s loss of relevance even among its own members, like-minded Indo-Pacific partners disengage with NATO in favor of the European Union or select EU member states.

ADVERSARY INFLUENCE

Sensing NATO’s weakness and U.S. disengagement, China mounts a new charm offensive to secure access to European markets. Looking to boost their own struggling economies through trade with China, European countries are receptive. Russia, sensing its moment to secure sanctions relief and undercut NATO’s raison d’être, behaves more agreeably toward allies that seek a more cooperative relationship with it in order to reduce their security burden. This lulls many Europeans into a false sense of security, and they calculate that—with the United States disengaging and disinvesting from NATO—the time is ripe for a “grand bargain” with the Kremlin that involves dissolving the alliance in exchange for a new, more comprehensive security arrangement. This arrangement precipitates U.S. military withdrawal from Europe.

SHARED IDENTITY, VALUES, AND INTERESTS

It becomes evident that the notion of a NATO based on shared identity and values has been an illusion for some time. Populist and nationalist tendencies that were present when the economy was good accelerate with the economic downturn. Within NATO and the European Union, democratic backsliding goes unchecked and creates societal vulnerabilities, such as corruption, that adversaries exploit. NATO’s attractiveness to new members and credibility as a force for good is damaged by the perception that it is unable to keep its own house in order. National interests are pursued at the expense of the collective good.

U.S. LEADERSHIP

The United States decreases its defense budget even as it faces a more demanding security environment outside of Europe. It loses patience with European allies’ failure to assume their share of the burden, stand up to Russia and China, or allow NATO to adapt to address new and emerging security threats. The United States comes to view NATO not as a force multiplier for U.S. influence and interests, but rather as a burden and constraint; it withdraws significant forces from Europe and reduces its financial, force, and capability contributions to NATO.

RESPONSIBILITY SHARING

The economic fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic brings an end to consecutive years of growth in NATO defense spending. Only countries with sizeable domestic defense industries (i.e., the United States, France, and United Kingdom) maintain higher levels of spending, and the majority of this is directed not to meeting NATO requirements but rather to sustaining their own industries. As a result, China and Russia outpace most allies with respect to emerging defense technologies like that make use of innovations in artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Angered by the lack of progress on arms control and shocked by the escalating cost of nuclear modernization programs, Congress refuses to fully fund nuclear modernization, undermining extended deterrence and forcing the United States to reconsider its nuclear posture in Europe.

NATIONAL DYNAMICS

In response to the economic downturn, countries become more nationalist and protectionist. National leaders searching for a scapegoat for their economic and social woes blame multinational organizations, claiming that they unnecessarily constrain countries’ freedom of action—such as to limit the number of immigrants or to manufacture beyond emissions limits. Some walk away from their international treaty commitments (including on climate action, arms control, and human rights) or ignore their obligations to intergovernmental organizations (such as NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization), further damaging the credibility of these institutions.

Conclusion

As ever, the key to NATO’s continued survival will be its ability to adapt to a changing external security environment in keeping with the security needs of its members. Merely raising the level of ambition without ensuring political cohesion and adequate resources will only undermine the alliance’s credibility and relevance for the next decade.

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An examination of the above potential trajectories can assist NATO allies in effecting the future they wish to see. While the future is inherently unpredictable, keeping the alliance on the positive trajectory will require more equitable burden sharing within NATO; leveraging the competencies of other capable actors, such as the European Union and like-minded global partners; investing in innovation to maintain NATO’s technological edge; and building resilience to counter adversaries’ attempts to divide the alliance. Conversely, if unity of purpose and shared values are lost, the security burden is carried by only a few allies, internal resilience is unaddressed, and U.S. leadership is absent, NATO will find itself on the negative trajectory. And while the status quo of “muddling through” may seem good enough for now, it will likely also land NATO on the negative trajectory over time.

### Link---‘Cohesion’ Impact---2NC

#### Insufficient NATO cohesion ensures the US will recalibrate away from NATO

Shifrinson ’21 [Joshua; Jan 28; Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations; Quincy Brief no. 8, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/#2f8176e0ee4a]

The United States requires a course correction. U.S. policy toward NATO now injects a large degree of instability and unsustainability into the region, which ironically possesses the preconditions for an unprecedented degree of stability thanks in part to prior U.S. efforts. In consequence, the Biden administration should consider proceeding along four tracks, with the goal of significantly reducing the U.S. security presence via NATO.

Ending enlargement

In coordination with its partners, the United States should credibly renounce further NATO enlargement. Whatever one makes of the merits of America’s post–1945 presence in Europe, the gains from further enlargement are few and the risks substantial. Several pathways exist to develop a policy of ceasing enlargement. Most directly, the U.S. government could simply declare it will not support the alliance’s further growth; thanks to NATO’s “one state, one vote” procedures, this would be enough to scuttle a further expansion push. Less unilaterally, U.S. planners could attempt to craft an intra–NATO consensus that expansion is no longer worth the costs. Given that many alliance members have long been skeptical of the merits of expansion — German policymakers, for example, were famously ambivalent over the Bucharest Declaration of 2008, which embraced Ukraine’s and Georgia’s interest in NATO membership — forging a broad front on this agenda ought not be difficult. Along the way, U.S. and allied diplomats should also seek to dampen the membership aspirations of those states still outside the alliance.

Cutting troop commitments

Second, the U.S. government should forgo permanently stationing combat forces in the Eastern European states admitted to NATO since the Cold War. Amid mounting calls to bolster the alliance’s presence along the so-called “eastern flank” due to collapsing relations with Moscow, the U.S. government should encourage European NATO members to bear primary responsibility for defense obligations east of the Oder–Neisse line. Not only have NATO’s European members taken an active role in the alliance’s ongoing “Enhanced Forward Presence” in Poland and the Baltic States; there is more than enough latent military capability in the European portion of the alliance to see this task through.17 For example, the former members of the Warsaw Pact (excluding Albania and the Baltic States) that have joined NATO since 1995 have nearly the same gross domestic product ($1.55 trillion, measured in 2010 dollars) as Russia ($1.76 trillion). Their population, 92 million people versus Russia’s 144 million, is also significant. Add in the other European members of NATO, and the numbers shift decisively against Russia. Although non–U.S. military investments in NATO remain underwhelming, even limited growth in non–U.S. NATO defense capabilities could thus provide a significant force able to take the lead in Eastern Europe. The United States should promote this result, with the goal of shifting the defense burden in Europe to the highly capable states in the area to reduce U.S. defense obligations.

Rebalancing trans–Atlantic politics

The United States ought to prepare for a broader recalibration of political responsibilities in Europe. Precisely because the United States has other domestic and international obligations, and because NATO’s European members are increasingly disenchanted with U.S. predominance, conditions are ripe to empower the European allies. The objective should be to strengthen intra–European solidarity and cooperation while the United States steps back from active management of European security. The United States should pivot toward becoming the pacifier of last resort rather than the manager of early squabbles.

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There are reasons to believe this result is attainable. Many of NATO’s major European players, especially France and Germany, have deepened cooperation in both NATO and non–NATO contexts such as the EU over the past several decades. Disenchantment with U.S. dominance and lingering concerns about Russia provide incentives for sustained cooperation even with a significantly reduced American presence. The United States ought to lean into these trends, returning to its vision of the early postwar years by reducing, limiting, and making more conditional the U.S. presence in the alliance. Over time, such steps could lay the foundation for a comprehensive American withdrawal, providing that Europe remains stable and open to U.S. influence when U.S. interests are involved. Nor would such a retrenchment sacrifice long-term U.S. interests: Should intra–European tensions spike without an American pacifier, America’s lingering connection to the alliance would enable the United States to reengage as needed.

Reengaging with Russia

The United States needs to find a path toward engaging Russia and stabilizing bilateral ties and NATO–Russia relations. This will prove no small feat. Any opening to Russia will inevitably encounter vigorous domestic political opposition in the wake of Russian meddling in U.S. electoral politics. Nevertheless, there is much to be gained from engagement. Russia remains the most significant state against which the United States might feel compelled to go to war on NATO’s behalf. The irony cannot be overstated: The Russian threat to European and American security is miniscule unless the United States and Russia are actively engaged in a shooting war. Given Europe’s peacefulness, and its interest in sustained cooperation without American oversight, the United States can promote allied interests and serve its own security requirements by finding a way forward with Moscow. To be sure, the failure of President Obama’s attempted “reset” with Moscow urges caution as to how much can be accomplished with Russia.18 Nevertheless, given the risks of continued tensions to both countries, the stabilization of flashpoints such as the Ukraine crisis over the last several years, the limits of deterrence and defense on NATO’s eastern flank, Russia’s mounting economic pressures, and America’s evident desire to devote increased attention to Asia, U.S. outreach to Moscow is timely and could prove fruitful.

Conclusion

It is easy to get wrapped up in the rhetorical shifts and policy particulars of the moment, but the United States has consistently approached NATO through a combination of opportunism and geopolitics. Since the alliance’s creation in the late 1940s, the United States has attempted to strike a balance between its own contradictory impulses. Going forward, the question is whether this balance is sustainable in practice, if not in declared intent, given the emerging shape of international politics. It is not defeatist to be skeptical. Alliance commitments tend to change when new threats appear and strategic priorities shift. As America’s attention moves toward Asia, its longstanding attitudes toward European security should be reevaluated and accorded lower strategic priority.

Lucas ’22 [Edward; June 7; nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Liberal Democratic candidate for the British Parliament, a former senior editor at The Economist; Foreign Policy, “NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/]

Is NATO brain-dead or back in business? Less than three years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron famously diagnosed “the brain death of NATO.” Rhetoric aside, his point was fair at the time: Europe’s dearth of strategic thinking combined with the unpredictability of U.S. policy under then-President Donald Trump spelled serious trouble for the Cold War-era alliance.

Now, all talk is of NATO’s revival and resurgence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has given an urgent new relevance to the bloc’s core mission of territorial defense. NATO members appear to have found a new unity of purpose, supplying Ukraine with weapons, reassessing the threat from Russia, hiking defense budgets, and bolstering the security of the alliance’s eastern frontier. But the “honeymoon,” in the words of Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, was brief. As the war drags on, strains are showing, and the alliance is still shaky.

It’s true that NATO has come a long way. Only 14 years ago, the alliance’s top-secret threat assessment body, MC 161, was explicitly prohibited by its political masters from even considering any military danger from Russia in its scenarios. The pressure came not only from notorious Russia-huggers such as Germany but also from the United States, which was eager to keep east-west ties friendly. The Kremlin, the conventional wisdom insisted, was a partner, not an enemy. As a result, NATO’s most vulnerable members—Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—remained second-class allies. They were in the bloc, but only on paper. There were no significant outside forces on their territory, and the alliance expressly refrained from making contingency plans to reinforce or even defend them in the event of attack. Poland demanded such plans and was told that they could be drawn up to defend the country against an attack by Belarus—but not by Russia.

Since Russia’s first attack on Ukraine in 2014, NATO plans and deployments have become more serious. There are 1,000-strong tripwire forces in the three Baltic states and a larger U.S. force in Poland. Since the start of the invasion in February, that presence has increased sharply. Moreover, two of the most advanced smaller military powers in Europe, Finland and Sweden, are banging on the alliance’s door. Assuming objections from Turkey can been smoothed out, they will be members by year’s end. That will fundamentally change the military geography of northeastern Europe.

Still more important is the stiffening of spines among the members. Trump’s much publicized distaste for NATO was based, in part, on the European members’ chronic underspending. At one point, the exasperated U.S. leader even tried to present a bill to his German counterpart, Chancellor Angela Merkel. Now, defense spending is rising across the alliance. That makes NATO an easier sell in Washington, especially as the case for U.S. engagement in European security is bolstered by the war in Ukraine.

Germany, the most notorious laggard, is suddenly splurging money on its decrepit armed forces—tanks that can’t trundle, ships that can’t go to sea, and soldiers who exercise with broomsticks instead of guns. It has agreed to meet NATO’s defense spending benchmark of 2 percent of GDP, set in 2006 and largely ignored thereafter. The latest country to announce a big hike in defense spending is Spain, currently lagging at barely 1 percent of GDP. The prime minister announced that this will double by 2024. That sets the scene nicely for the NATO summit in the Spanish capital later this month.

Yet look a little more closely, and the picture is far less rosy. Notwithstanding its apparent unity of purpose since the start of Russia’s war, NATO looks out of shape and out of date. In the run-up to their summit, the allies have been furiously haggling over the language in their new strategic concept, which will frame the alliance’s mission for the coming years and will be unveiled in Madrid. What will it say about Russia? About China? What sacrifices and risks are the member states really willing to accept? Are they willing to pool sovereignty in order to streamline decision-making?

Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a semi-authoritarian state that flirts with Russia and fumes at what it considers European meddling over human rights. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is taking a different but downward path, fusing wealth and power into a new system of control at home and undermining U.S. and European attempts to put pressure on Russia and China. Macron’s relentless posturing and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s foot-dragging create constant obstacles and distractions. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: Scholzen is a German neologism for “dither,” while makronic in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.”

Macron and Scholz corrode decision-making with their foibles and thus place a big question mark over the alliance’s credibility and cohesion. Any threat or provocation from Russia is unlikely to be clear or conveniently timed. More likely it will be something deliberately ambiguous, such as a Russian drone that “accidentally” strays onto the territory of a front-line state and hits a target. Some countries would favor a tough response. Others would fear escalation and want dialogue. Still others would take the ambiguity as a convenient excuse to do nothing. Would the 30—soon to be 32—national representatives in the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s deliberative body, really make a speedy and tough decision on how to react? More likely, some of them would plead for delay, diplomacy, and compromise. Those actually facing the possibility of attack would be far more hawkish, preferring a sharp military confrontation to even the smallest Russian victory. “Not one inch, not one soul,” a senior military figure from one of the Baltic states, speaking anonymously, told me. “We have seen what they did in Ukraine.”

The political weaknesses are matched by military ones. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. The U.S. security guarantee to Europe—with its threat of devastating conventional and, if necessary, nuclear response to any attack—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet the result of this is a colossal dependence on U.S. capabilities, ranging from ammunition and spare parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) to military transports that move forces quickly and efficiently over long distances. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, they will not change the fact that only U.S. armed forces can move with the scale and speed necessary to defend territory from a country like Russia.

Conversely, the countries that most need defending—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. They need advanced weapons, particularly for air and missile defense, that they cannot afford themselves. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint.

Yet NATO command structures and planning do not fully reflect the imbalance of forces between the United States and Europe. They rely on the fiction that the European allies are more or less equal partners. Even military lightweights need to have important-sounding jobs and installations, making the North Atlantic Council the military version of a parliament dividing out the pork.

The resulting command structure is like a tangled pile of spaghetti. In the Baltic region alone, NATO has several multinational headquarters, one divisional headquarters split between Latvia and Denmark, another divisional headquarters in Poland, and a corps headquarters at a different location in Poland. Overall responsibility for the defense of Europe is divided between three Joint Forces Command headquarters in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Norfolk, Virginia. But the top U.S. military commander in Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A maritime strategy for the Baltic Sea region has yet to be decided—which is just as well, because NATO has yet to create a naval headquarters for the region. Nor has the alliance drawn up real military plans for the reinforcement and defense of its northeastern members, let alone decided who would actually provide the forces and equipment in order to make them credible. Military mobility is meant to be the responsibility of Joint Support and Enabling Command, headquartered in Ulm, Germany, and originally set up as part of the European Union’s own defense policy.

A further problem is exercises: NATO does not conduct fully realistic, large-scale rehearsals of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that these are costly and disruptive. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also lacking are detailed plans for fighting a war against Russia, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, countering a Russian attack, regaining any temporarily occupied territory, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat.

To be fair, NATO is working on these problems, and all of them are fixable. But that does not mean that they are anywhere near being fixed. Wishful thinking remains the alliance’s besetting sin.

Worse, NATO is unprepared for the changing nature of modern warfare. Russia’s old-style assault on Ukraine is all too familiar. But the artillery bombardments and missile strikes that are grinding down Ukraine’s defenses are only part of the Kremlin’s arsenal. Its most effective weapons are nonmilitary: subversion, diplomatic divide-and-rule tactics, economic coercion, corruption, and propaganda. The most burning current example of nonmilitary warfare is Russia’s weaponizing of hunger. By blocking Ukraine’s grain exports, Russia has raised the specter of famine over millions of people, including in volatile and fragile countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Mass starvation is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but its consequences include political unrest and mass migration, a direct threat to Europe. Yet NATO is ill-equipped to deal with this. It cannot mandate more economical use of grain—for example, by feeding less to livestock and stopping grain’s conversion to fuel. It has no food stockpiles to release to a hungry world. It cannot build new railways to ship Ukrainian grain through other routes. Nor can it insure merchant vessels that might—for a price—be willing to run Russia’s Black Sea blockade. NATO has little in-house expertise in countering Russian disinformation and almost zero influence in African and other countries susceptible to Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the food shortages that are already starting now.

NATO could acquire these capabilities. Or it could regain them: During the Cold War, the alliance had an economic warfare division and ran a program called the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls to prevent the Soviet bloc from acquiring sensitive technologies. But in the strategic timeout that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, these agencies and their skill sets shriveled and died.

But as with NATO’s military shortcomings, identifying the problems is not the same as solving them. And given the bloc’s unwieldy structure and issues with key members, it might be wise to lower expectations about NATO returning to Cold War levels of consistent readiness and effectiveness. A more realistic vision for the alliance would be to treat it as a framework for the most capable and threat-aware members to form coalitions of the willing. These groupings already exist: The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, for example, is a 10-country framework for military cooperation, chiefly aimed at enabling very rapid deployments to the Nordic-Baltic region in the event of a crisis. France has a similar venture, the European Intervention Initiative. The five Nordic states have their own military club, called the Nordic Defence Cooperation, while Poland has close bilateral ties with Lithuania. A similar network of bilateral and multilateral ties would greatly strengthen the alliance’s floundering presence in the Black Sea and other regions, including North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. These groupings would not supplant NATO but improve action and interoperability on top of the alliance’s established structures and mechanisms.

The difficult and underlying question here is the role of the United States. Europe is, in theory, big and rich enough to manage its own defense. But its persistent political weakness prevents that. The paradox is that only U.S. involvement makes NATO credible—yet overdependence on the United States also undermines the alliance’s credibility, while stoking resentment in France and elsewhere. The task for Washington is to encourage European allies to shoulder more of the burden and start thinking strategically again, even as it retains the superpower involvement that gives the alliance its decisive military edge. That is entirely doable. But don’t expect it to happen in Madrid—or anytime soon.

#### The US can quit the alliance easily and quickly

Anderson ’22 [Scott; March 18; David M. Rubenstein fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution, senior editor for the online publication Lawfare, and previously served as an attorney-adviser with the U.S. Department of State and as the legal advisor for the U.S. Embassy in Iraq; Defense One, “Congress Still Needs to Protect America’s NATO Membership,” https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/congress-still-needs-protect-americas-nato-membership/363354/]

Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has given the world a visceral reminder of the value of NATO. But it’s easy to forget just how close the United States recently came to quitting the alliance—and how uncertain the future of U.S. participation will remain unless Congress takes steps to protect it.

Former National Security Advisor John Bolton two weeks ago said that President Donald Trump almost withdrew the United States from NATO at the 2018 summit, over the objections of Bolton and Trump’s other senior advisors. Bolton also predicted that, had Trump been re-elected, he would likely have gone through with it.

Trump may yet get another chance, as he continues to hint that he will run for the 2024 Republican presidential nomination. Even if Trump is never re-elected, some of his political allies, and even other potential presidential candidates like Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, have adopted a similarly skeptical or even hostile view of European alliances that might lead them to consider it.

The threat of a president pursuing NATO withdrawal over the objections of Congress and the American public is not empty. While the Constitution is silent on the issue, the mainstream legal view is that the president has the authority to withdraw the United States from treaties pursuant to their terms, without any input from Congress. Trump acted on this authority multiple times, as did several of his predecessors. Efforts to challenge these withdrawals in court have failed on technical grounds, leaving the president’s claim of authority undisturbed.

In NATO’s case, Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that a member state may withdraw one year after its government gives notice to the United States, which would inform the other member governments. This means a future president could initiate withdrawal and complete it within a single term in office.

#### Policy decisions by the federal government shape NATO’s future---

Goldgeier ’20 [James and Garret Martin; September 3; Robert Bosch senior visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of international relations at American University’s School of International Service; senior professorial lecturer at American University’s School of International Service, and the co-director of the Transatlantic Policy Center at American University; War on the Rocks, “NATO’S NEVER-ENDING STRUGGLE FOR RELEVANCE,” <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/natos-never-ending-struggle-for-relevance>]

NATO’s Future and U.S. Leadership

Although NATO seems perpetually in crisis, it has shown a remarkable ability to pursue strategic goals and maintain operational effectiveness even after its original mission of containing the Soviet Union disappeared. It has incorporated 14 new members from across Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War. It contained and reversed Serbian aggression in the western Balkans in the 1990s. It sustained a long-term presence in Afghanistan. It has delivered humanitarian assistance in far-flung locales such as Indonesia. It demonstrated solidarity in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine. And it continues to be viewed favorably among most member states.

While maintaining its deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia will remain alliance’s raison d’etre, the COVID-19 pandemic and the longer-term challenges posed by China will present stern tests for NATO. The alliance is well-equipped to handle crises and could even emerge stronger from the pandemic, but part of that will depend on developments in Washington.

If a new American president takes office in January 2021, his administration has an opportunity to rethink burden-sharing and redefine national security to include resilience in the face of disruptive shocks. These include not only the immediate shock of the pandemic but longer-term disruptions that will be posed by issues like climate change and artificial intelligence. A first step would be to shift from talking about the need for members to meet the 2 percent threshold on defense spending to talking about how NATO — working with the European Union — can bolster the security of the citizens of its member states by increasing capacity to manage a range of threats. And while NATO is less suited as an institution to foster toward China the type of common strategy it has maintained vis-à-vis Russia, it can play a role as a forum for discussion.

Core to NATO’s future is its standing as an alliance of democracies, particularly given that its principal strategic competitors are China and Russia, major authoritarian powers. That has been put to the test by illiberal trends in countries like Turkey, Hungary, and Poland. NATO does not have provisions for suspending or expelling members, but member states can speak loudly on behalf of democratic values and use their bilateral relationships to pressure authoritarian rulers.

To address all of these issues, however, rebuilding democratic norms and institutions in the United States will be a key initial step. Any prescriptions for NATO’s future depend first and foremost on a U.S. president who believes in democracy and alliances. Without one, NATO risks having no future at all.

### No Cohesion Now---2NC

#### NATO is disunified now – Trump-era ideals are cemented in government and Europe is too economically integrated with Russia.

McTague 3/24 – Tom McTague is a staff writer at The Atlantic based in London. 3-24-2022, “Biden Can’t Paper Over the West’s Disunity,” The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/03/biden-nato-summit-russia-invasion-ukraine/627598/> – OBERTO

As Joe Biden meets with European counterparts in Brussels today, the leader of an ostensibly reunited free world, it is worth recalling another NATO summit just five years ago, held under very different circumstances, with a very different U.S. president.

In 2017, ahead of talks with Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, Donald Trump arrived in the Belgian capital. He was on the rampage over European free riding, German double-dealing, and European Union tariffs on American companies, at one point getting his national security adviser, John Bolton, on the line. “Are you ready to play in the big leagues today?” Trump asked. The president said he would threaten to leave NATO unless every country in the alliance committed to spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense and Germany scrapped a pipeline deal with Moscow.

In Trump’s mind, the United States was being asked to defend Europe from Russia, while Europe enriched Russia by buying its oil and gas. At the same time, the EU was to him a protectionist trade bloc competing with, and making life difficult for, American firms. Where was the U.S. national interest in continuing this charade? After he took his seat at the summit, Trump summoned Bolton over to his table. “Are we going to do it?” he asked. Bolton urged him not to. “I returned to my seat not knowing what he was going to do,” he writes in The Room Where It Happened.

The president ultimately did not follow through on his plan, and the alliance held. With his successor now in town to discuss the Western response to Russia’s [invasion of Ukraine](https://www.theatlantic.com/category/russias-invasion-ukraine/), an assault that has suddenly reinvigorated NATO, it is easy to forget the disharmony of the Trump years, all that led up to it, and the very real prospect that Trump or one of his ideological acolytes could be back in the White House by 2025. Trump, after all, was far from the first American to complain about Europe’s lack of commitment to Western security: Barack Obama had criticized NATO members for being “free riders,” while Europe and the U.S. had split badly over Iraq.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, and Germany’s revolution in its foreign policy—finally putting on hold the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and committing to the 2 percent defense-spending target—it can appear as though Putin has succeeded where Obama and Trump failed. And so, after the years of Trumpian disorder, all is well, right? The West, thanks to Russian aggression, has finally reunited and rebalanced, ready to challenge authoritarians everywhere. Don’t bet on it. The problems in the Western alliance run far deeper than technocratic complaints about defense budgets and gas pipelines, or even the brooding figure of Trump himself.

When faced with an invasion, as we are seeing in Ukraine, NATO members have found unity to be easy: Core national interests are at stake. But as the current sense of shock and disgust gives way to the usual pressures of political and economic cycles, does the West agree on what lessons should be drawn from this crisis? Does it collectively know what it stands for—and whom it stands against?

During the Cold War, these questions had relatively clear answers. The West was the free world, standing for democracy, and opposed to communism. Its leading power was the U.S.; its principal enemy was the Soviet Union. There wasn’t much trade between East and West, and so the basic obligation of being part of NATO was straightforward: to come to the aid of any other member attacked.

Today, the same structure remains, but the world is more complicated. Since the end of the Cold War, the West has helped build a global economy based on the notion that trade is not political—that economics can be separated from foreign policy and national security. This belief has been undergirded by the idea that by building this world, Russia, China, and others would automatically become more liberal and democratic, resulting in a harmonious world in which everyone benefited.

This analysis turned out to be completely wrong. Trade with Russia has not made it any less threatening to European security. Trade with China has made it richer and more powerful, but not more liberal or democratic. As Hillary Clinton [wrote](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/02/republicans-ukraine-putin-xi-trump-democracy/622898/) recently, China—not Russia—is now “the greatest long-term challenge to the future of democracy.”

In Washington, Clinton’s view is part of the mainstream. But does Europe see it that way? If it does, surely there has to be a shared approach to the threat, creating closer economic unity within the West to reflect the new reality that trade cannot be separated from geopolitics. If it does not, a future President Trump or one of his followers will pose the same set of questions Trump posed about Russia in 2017: Why are we defending these guys if they are not on our side in the main fight?

Right now, despite the impressive unity within the West over Ukraine, we can see the limits to how much pain Europe is prepared to endure to pressure Russia. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has warned that he will not agree to a total ban on Russian energy imports, which, he said, would mean “plunging our country and all of Europe into a recession.” If disengaging with Russia is this hard, imagine how difficult it will be to find a Western consensus to oppose China, a far more powerful and economically important country.

Ideological incoherence is the main threat to the Western alliance, but a close second can be found in the West’s imperial center—the U.S. And here, again, we return to Trump. The essence of his complaint about Europe was not simply that it was not contributing enough; it was that he didn’t really believe in the U.S.-led order itself. Trump believed the whole structure was unfair to the U.S.: Why should it shoulder most of the burden of policing the world? But the thing with orders—liberal, “rules-based,” or any other—is that they need ordering, and this is the job of the hegemon. Burdens can be better shared, and Europe can do more to free America for its contest with China, but ultimately the U.S. either guarantees European security or it doesn’t.

Biden will undoubtedly speak a familiar language to European leaders—one of liberal values and the defense of democracy, and that will be comforting to them. But the question that nevertheless troubles European politicians, diplomats, and officials is whether instead of Trump being an eccentric one-off, his instinctive antagonism to the obligations of global leadership represents a trend in American public opinion more generally. The question that follows is whether the U.S. has the political will to be the hegemonic power it has been since the end of the Second World War, the basis on which the Western world functions.

As one former NATO insider put it to me, the alliance’s strength is its strategic capability, and this is possible only because the U.S. dominates it. An alliance of lots of similar-size states would not be the same: It would be the European Union—a worthwhile political and trade bloc, but not a capable military grouping. What happens if Washington decides it no longer wants the role of leader?

One somewhat counterintuitive conclusion from the past 20 years is that, if anything, America’s relative dominance over Europe has grown, not declined. After the financial crash, it was the Federal Reserve that stepped in to become the global lender of last resort, while Europe descended into a set of rolling crises. The fundamentals of U.S. economic strength remain extraordinary: the dollar, Silicon Valley, America’s universities, Wall Street. Europe lags behind on all of these, and Germany’s sudden commitment to additional defense spending will do little to bridge the yawning security gap.

The reality is that the West functions as an American-led alliance, but it is not clear that Europe entirely agrees on America’s principal strategic threats. Whether Trump returns to the White House or Biden is the one who returns to some future NATO summit, there will come a point when Europe and the U.S. must decide whether and how to renew their alliance for the next challenge—be that Russia, or China, or something else entirely. And if they do, it will take far more than a small uptick in defense spending and a change in energy policy to keep them united.

### Cohesion Link---2NC

#### Political cohesion is NATO’s last straw – a lack of cohesion opens the door for Russia, allows multilateralism, and impedes NATO military tasks.

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Why Political Cohesion Matters

NATO is a community of sovereign states, each with its own geography, interests, and political outlook. In this respect, it is no surprise that complete harmony is impossible, and that the alliance has experienced periods of tension and divergence. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, NATO faced a test of its values as it debated how to deal with growing authoritarianism in Portugal and Greece and multiple coups in Turkey. Ultimately, members decided not to address the problem, instead **prioritizing**[**cohesion and geopolitical interests**](https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-deal-with-authoritarianism-inside-nato/) in that tense Cold War period. Yet for several reasons, the situation is different this time and should be dealt with urgently.

First, an inattention to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law in a member country creates [societal vulnerabilities](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/) that competitors can exploit. Russia, for example, preys on the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities in NATO member countries in order to weaken national-level governance and cohesion. Likewise, a compromised media environment allows [disinformation campaigns](https://www.csis.org/analysis/mind-gaps-assessing-russian-influence-united-kingdom) to flourish, while [corruption](https://www.csis.org/features/kremlin-playbook-2) opens space for Russian networks to operate and gain influence. Even allies with strong democratic institutions, such as Germany, are increasingly targets of [Russian disinformation campaigns](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-russia-germany/germany-is-main-target-of-russian-disinformation-eu-says-idUSKBN2B11CX). In these ways, a deficit in internal values quickly becomes an external security threat.

Second, waning attention to NATO’s core values has resulted in some allies moving away from upholding the North Atlantic Treaty [commitment](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) to promote “peaceful and friendly international relations.” In practice, this means member countries are more willing to pursue national decisions even when they run against NATO’s collective interests. Examples include Turkey’s invasion of Northeast Syria without the consultation of allies and its acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system even though it can undermine NATO integrated air defense.

Finally, lack of respect for NATO principles has empowered member states to bring bilateral disputes into the alliance, as was the case in 2019, when Hungary accused NATO partner Ukraine of mistreating ethnic Hungarians living in western Ukraine based on Ukraine’s introduction of a restrictive language law. Rather than tackling the issue bilaterally, Hungary brought it into the alliance, blocking Ukraine’s NATO Membership Action Plan and cancelling meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Internal tensions can also negatively affect NATO’s military tasks, as recently witnessed when [Turkey blocked](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-turkey-exclusive/exclusive-turkey-holds-up-nato-military-plans-over-syria-dispute-sources-idUSKBN1Y01W0) a defense plan for the Baltic States and Poland on the grounds that NATO did not recognize the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as a terrorist organization.

### Collapse Inevitable---2NC

#### NATO action fails because nobody’s committed to security and countries cheat with Russia BUT lone U.S. protection solves.

Berry 19 – Oscar Berry, Staff Writer @HarvardIR. 11-6-2019, "Empty Meetings and Broken Promises: How NATO is Failing to do its Job," Harvard International Review, a quarterly international relations journal published by the Harvard International Relations Council at Harvard University. https://hir.harvard.edu/empty-meetings-and-broken-promises-how-nato-is-failing-to-do-its-job/, accessed 6-20-2022 – OBERTO!

Ever since its foundation in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has had a straightforward strategy to maintain peace in Europe: “keep the Soviet Union out, the United States in, and the Germans [down](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm),”. For the past 70 years, this strategy has been incredibly successful, preventing interstate wars between its member nations, forcing the United States to maintain a large military presence in Europe, and keeping the Soviet Union isolated, eventually leading to their total collapse. However, in recent years, NATO has been suffering from a crisis of purpose, and many of its members are no longer convinced of the value of being in the alliance. While the most inflammatory example of this has been President Donald Trump’s position that NATO has become “[obsolete](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/world/europe/trump-nato-summit-latvia-baltics.html)”, the truth is that the organization is facing serious structural problems that are inhibiting its ability to ensure European security.

In 2014, the pro-Russian Ukrainian government was toppled by a massive protest movement. In the chaotic aftermath, Russian special forces seized the strategically significant state of Crimea and helped two eastern states break off and form an independent pro-Russian [nation](https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know). Ever since, Ukraine has been engaged in a protracted “soft war” against militias and secret military units, supplied and armed by Russia, that has lead to the deaths of tens of thousands and been a constant source of instability in [Kiev](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/ukraine-is-fighting-a-war-and-an-internal-battle-against-corruption). While Ukraine is not a member of NATO and is therefore not subject to its protections, Russia’s aggressive actions have made neighboring nations fearful of being next on the target list, consequently dividing the military alliance on how to secure it’s eastern front from it’s old enemy.

Case in point, Germany was once the frontline against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, with the dissolution of the USSR, it is now separated from its successor state Russia by nations such as Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, and it no longer faces a direct physical threat from the Red Army. As a result, Germany has slashed its spending on [defense](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/world/europe/germany-nato-spending-target.html), disbanded dozens of brigades, and resisted calls by the US and those same former-Soviet nations to provide concrete military support to shore up NATO’s new front line in the east from recent Russian [aggression](https://www.dw.com/en/poland-more-aligned-to-us-than-to-european-partners/a-50232484). Although the two are not consistently cooperative allies, Germany’s economic growth and subsequent need for more markets have driven it to engage in more long-term cooperation with Russia. For example, while it has sanctioned Russia over its invasion of eastern [Ukraine](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/germany-s-real-role-ukraine-crisis), it has also partnered with Moscow to build a massive new pipeline in[Nord Stream 2](https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-russian-gas-and-geopolitics/av-49292113), which would compound Europe’s energy dependence on the east, and has continually tried to negotiate to remove those same sanctions on [Russia](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-eu/eu-divisions-over-russia-mount-as-france-germany-seek-peace-in-ukraine-idUSKCN1WL04D). NATO members France, Italy, Hungary and Turkey, just to name a few, have also shown themselves to be hesitant to categorize Russia as an[enemy](https://time.com/5564207/russia-nato-relationship/) and blocked moves within the organization to mobilize more resources and forces to counter the perceived threat from the east.

On the other hand, ever since Russia’s 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine, NATO members[Poland](https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/06/10/in_poland_a_fixed_us_presence_will_warrant_a_russian_response_113034.html) and[Romania](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-romania-russia/nato-member-romania-warns-of-increased-russian-activity-in-black-sea-idUSKCN1MK2EP) have been front and center in trying to resist Russian pressure imposed on former Soviet nations. While NATO nations have joined together to condemn and sanction Russia for its actions as well as rotate more troops into Poland and the Baltic countries for training exercises, these eastern nations have long been demanding something more concrete: [permanently stationed armed brigades](https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/10/14/on-the-borders-of-putins-baltic-fortress-lithuania-cheers-the-build-up-of-us-forces-in-the-baltics/). These nations believe that current NATO actions are wildly insufficient to counter the growing Russian threat, and have become increasingly exasperated at the lack of concerted action taken by the alliance. The United States is also in agreement and has continually been frustrated by NATO members’ lack of military preparedness and investment in their own [defense](https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/14/politics/nato-defense-spending-target/index.html). Even though the old days of the Cold War are long gone, US foreign policy still identifies Russia as an enemy to be contained, and has been [eager](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-usa-defence/deploying-u-s-troops-in-poland-wholly-defensive-ambassador-says-in-riposte-to-russia-idUSKCN1TI1KL) to support former-Soviet nations defending themselves against Putin’s ambitions. However, as all matters of policy and military deployment have to be made by [consensus](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm) from NATO’s 29 members, and with wildly divergent priorities from all sides, members have increasingly taken to simply bypassing the NATO decision-making process entirely and pursuing bilateral or trilateral negotiation.

In the face of increasing Russian pressure and a lack of concerted action by NATO, Poland has reached out to the United States directly for protection. After a relatively short negotiation period, the US has deployed two new infantry brigades to Polish bases, strengthened its armored contingent in the region, and agreed on a plan to build a new forward-deployment base in Poland which would house an additional[1,000 US troops](https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/06/10/in_poland_a_fixed_us_presence_will_warrant_a_russian_response_113034.html). With the speed at which these decisions were taken, other nations have fallen into a similar pattern of negotiations.

Just last month, Romania [announced](https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-rebuild-mihail-kogalniceanu-military-base) that it was going to build a new military base close to the Black Sea Coast to serve as a forward deployment point for US troops stationed nearby. Like Poland, it fears Russian attempts to restore its prior control over the region, such as its covert invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. Bulgaria too is building up its military forces, partnering with the US to invest in expanding one of its major bases and purchasing a large number of tanks and missile systems from the United States. Lithuania has agreed to host a rotating US motorized brigade and purchased new US military equipment to train [with](https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/10/14/on-the-borders-of-putins-baltic-fortress-lithuania-cheers-the-build-up-of-us-forces-in-the-baltics/). Yet it is significant that these decisions were made between Romanian and Bulgarian and US defense [officials](https://balkaninsight.com/2018/08/30/us-air-force-to-spend-40-million-on-base-in-transylvania-08-27-2018/). Just like so many other security decisions these days, they were made outside, not inside, the NATO framework, further demonstrating its debilitating ability to galvanize concerted action.

All of this is not to say that NATO is or is not obsolete, merely that, in its current structure, the alliance is failing to provide on its guarantee of security and protection. While the current discussion over the purpose of the alliance may have been inflamed by Washington, the source of NATO’s problems run far deeper and are routed in its failure to adequately defend against the threat of a seemingly resurgent Russia. It is therefore no wonder that many are increasingly questioning the purpose of the alliance to their respective nations, and it is a question that must be addressed seriously if NATO wants to survive.

#### NATO’s falling apart – Russia, internal division, Afghanistan, and everyone wants out.

Clark 2/4 – Dave Clark, 2-4-2022, "Stoltenberg To Leave NATO After Battle To Keep US In And Russia Out," No Publication, https://www.barrons.com/news/stoltenberg-to-leave-nato-after-battle-to-keep-us-in-and-russia-out-01643980808, accessed 6-20-2022 – OBERTO!

NATO's outgoing leader Jens Stoltenberg will leave the alliance late this year after a diplomatic battle to hold it together against outside threats and the clashing egos of its national leaders.

From December, the 62-year-old economist will again wrestle with balance sheets in his new role as head of Norway's central bank, after eight years of high international drama.

Stoltenberg's extended mandate presiding over the alliance has not been an easy period for NATO since he took over in 2014, and independent observers credit the former Norwegian prime minister with holding the alliance together.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin has mobilised a huge force to try to force the alliance to drop its open door to eastern and central European members, which during the Cold War had been held in Moscow's orbit.

But -- even as he kept an eye on external threats from Russia and Afghanistan -- Stoltenberg has also had to tread carefully to keep rival leaders within the Atlantic alliance on board.

Former US president Donald Trump, who resented what he saw as European freeloading in an alliance dominated by the big-spending American military, famously declared NATO "obsolete".

Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan dismissed his allies' protests and bought a Russian air defence system incompatible with Western equipment -- while engaged in a maritime standoff with NATO ally Greece.

And France's Emmanuel Macron, frustrated by resistance to his push for greater European autonomy and sovereignty, snapped that the alliance was experiencing strategic "brain death".

Before coming to Brussels, when he served as Norway's prime minister, Stoltenberg was known for having good relations with Putin and Russia's former prime minister Dmitry Medvedev. During his decade in power, the two countries -- which share a narrow Arctic border -- signed agreements on the their frontier in the Barents Sea and on visa exemptions for their border populations. An economist by training, the former Labour Party head had never shown any particular fondness for defence or security matters -- but his experience left him with a strong international network. Before he joined government there was little to suggest he would lead a military alliance. In Brussels, he is known for his strait-laced appearance and unsmiling didactic style -- but as a long-haired teenager in the 1970s, he threw stones at the US embassy in Oslo in reaction to the Vietnam War. Born into a political family -- his father was minister of defence and then of foreign affairs, his mother a deputy minister -- the married father-of-two also devoted the majority of his career to politics. After entering parliament in 1991, he rose rapidly, becoming minister of energy and then of finance, before being named the country's youngest prime minister in 2000, the day after his 41st birthday. Stoltenberg won international respect with his measured response to Norway's worst peace-time massacre. When right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people on July 22, 2011, he called for "more democracy" and "more humanity". When it came time for him to seek the NATO job, he was backed by centrist heavyweights German chancellor Angela Merkel and then US president Barack Obama. In Brussels, cynical observers often quip that any NATO secretary general's core task is to "Keep the Russians out and the Americans in" -- and for a while that was Stoltenberg's main challenge.

Trump came to the December 2019 NATO summit in Watford, England, ready to break up the alliance that Washington had led since it was formed in 1949.

It was Stoltenberg who talked him down, experts say.

According to Jamie Shea, a former senior NATO official turned think tank expert, Stoltenberg convinced Trump that his demands for Europe to shoulder more of the financial burden were paying off.

"He kept Trump in NATO, which was far from certain. He was one of the few European leaders that Trump was positive about," Shea told AFP, crediting the Norwegian with moving on from an "existential situation".

Stoltenberg also deftly managed the prickly Erdogan, having decided -- in Shea's words -- it was better to "keep the family together even if it meant having to deal with an authoritarian".

Trump's departure lifted one threat, but NATO's next challenge again showed the strains in the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Amid the debacle of the rushed departure of the remaining US and NATO troops from a collapsing Afghanistan last year, European capitals and Stoltenberg's NATO headquarters found themselves left in the dark by American decision-making.

"It is the Afghan affair that dominates the mandate and it cannot be said to be a success," Elie Tenenbaum, an analyst at the French Institute of International Relations.

But this year's crisis, with Putin deploying more than 100,000 troops to Russia's Ukraine border, to occupied Crimea and to Belarus to intimidate Kiev has again given NATO a central role in events.

Moscow clearly wanted to split the allies, disregarding European nations and the European Union to demand direct talks with Washington. But Stoltenberg's NATO ended up marshalling a tough diplomatic response.

NATO members united behind a stern reply to Putin's demands, dismissing calls to block future membership bids.

#### NATO is dissolving now – Anti-NATO conservative ideologies are spreading domestically AND abroad.

Saletan 4/12 – William Saletan American writer for The Bulwark, B.A. with highest honors in philosophy from Swarthmore, 4-12-2022, "Putin Wants to Break NATO. Republicans Want to Help Him.," Bulwark, https://www.thebulwark.com/putin-wants-to-break-nato-republicans-want-to-help-him/, accessed 6-20-2022 – OBERTO!

Vladimir Putin’s central objective in Europe isn’t to capture Kyiv, the Donbas, or any other part of Ukraine. It’s to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], which protects most of the continent against him. And in that longstanding campaign, Putin scored two significant victories this week.

One was in France, where Marine Le Pen, a [Putin sympathizer](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/world/europe/marine-le-pen-of-france-meets-with-putin-in-moscow.html), finished a close second to Emmanuel Macron in Sunday’s French presidential election. Le Pen is running [almost even](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/macron-faces-tough-fight-france-votes-sunday-2022-04-10/) with Macron in polls for the April 24 runoff. She has said that if she wins, she’ll [withdraw France](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220304-ukraine-war-puts-france-s-nato-sceptic-presidential-candidates-in-a-tight-spot) from NATO’s command structure.

The other victory was in the United States, where 63 House Republicans, nearly a third of the GOP conference, voted [against a resolution of support](https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2022/roll115.xml) for NATO.

The House vote, taken on April 5, is a warning sign. Putin may be losing ground in Ukraine, but he’s gaining ground in the U.S. Congress. Three years ago, [22 House Republicans](https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/201944) voted against pro-NATO legislation. That number has nearly tripled.

The “Putin wing” of the House GOP—useful idiots such as Madison Cawthorn and Marjorie Taylor Greene, who [openly spout](https://www.wral.com/us-rep-madison-cawthorn-calls-zelensky-thug/20180199/) Russian [propaganda](https://twitter.com/RepMTG/status/1512126723164409867)—is only a tiny fraction of the Kremlin’s target audience in Congress. They’re joined by a larger crowd of Ukraine bashers, hardcore isolationists, and right-wingers who say we shouldn’t worry about anyone else’s borders until we “secure” our own. Together, that coalition adds up to [more than 20 lawmakers](https://www.thebulwark.com/whos-soft-on-russia-meet-the-republican-anti-ukraine-caucus/).

That’s a problem. But when you combine them with the NATO skeptics who voted against last week’s resolution—another 40 or so House Republicans who don’t trust alliances and who view Europeans as America’s rivals or adversaries—the problem gets a lot bigger.

The GOP’s turn against NATO is particularly worrisome because Congress has been warned, explicitly and repeatedly, about Putin’s goal of dissolving the alliance. In March 2017, after a U.S. intelligence report [confirmed](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf) that Russia had interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs—which was then, like the rest of Congress, under Republican control—held a hearing on this subject. The hearing was titled, “[Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20170309/105674/HHRG-115-FA00-Transcript-20170309.pdf).” Analysts and former officials explained to the committee how Russia had, in the words of one witness, persistently funded propaganda in the West to “fracture allied security, stoke public distrust against democratic institutions, and discredit the alliance structures that defend Europe.”

Over the next two years, other reports documented the same problem. The European Council on Foreign Relations noted Russia’s efforts to undermine support for NATO in [Finland, the Czech Republic, and other countries](https://ecfr.eu/publication/controlling_chaos_how_russia_manages_its_political_war_in_europe/). Foreign policy journals and articles in the American press noted [rising alarm](https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/2/251/2996077) in Europe at President Donald Trump’s threats to withdraw U.S. troops from the continent or to abandon the American commitment to defend NATO allies.

On January 14, 2019, the New York Times reported that “several times” in 2018, Trump had “[privately said he wanted to withdraw](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html)” from the alliance. The article said Trump had “told his top national security officials that he did not see the point of the military alliance, which he presented as a drain on the United States.”

A few days after the Times report, House Democrats filed and brought to the floor the [NATO Support Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/676), which [reaffirmed](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/676/text) that the U.S. was “solemnly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s principle of collective defense as enumerated in Article 5.” The bill couldn’t completely bind Trump, but it expressed the sense of Congress that “the President shall not withdraw the United States from NATO” and that American policy was “to reject any efforts to withdraw the United States from NATO.” It also prohibited the use of federal funds “to take any action to withdraw the United States” from the alliance.

Every Democrat voted for the bill; 22 Republicans [voted against it](https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/201944).

One of the 22 Republicans, Rep. Scott Perry, explained why he and other self-styled hawks had voted no. In a [statement to constituents](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2184564228306520&id=376801102416184), he complained that “the bill prevented the U.S. from ever leaving NATO . . . unless Congress first voted to repeal this would-be new law.” Perry wanted Trump to be free to pull America out of NATO, on his own.

Perry also argued that Trump should be free “to negotiate better terms for the United States in NATO,” as though the alliance were a trade deal. And he warned that “an ally of ours today may not be an ally tomorrow.”

That’s how Perry and [many](https://twitter.com/chiproytx/status/1088080295608365057) of his [colleagues](https://www.nwfdailynews.com/story/special/special-sections/2019/01/23/gaetz-explains-vote-on-nato-resolution/6218256007/) viewed the world. They saw alliances as entanglements and burdens. They worried that even friendly countries couldn’t be trusted. They believed that America should hedge its commitments because our allies might screw us.

And that was all Putin needed. He didn’t need American lawmakers to love him the way Trump did. He just needed them to constrain or withhold support from NATO.

Perry’s defection was a particularly good sign for Putin. The congressman wasn’t just an Iraq war veteran. He had also chaired part of the 2017 hearing on Russia’s strategy to undermine NATO. So he must have known he was doing what Putin wanted.

But he did it anyway, because he thought he was protecting America from Europe.

In the three years since that vote, Congress has seen even more evidence of Russia’s operations to sabotage NATO.

In April 2019, the Justice Department released the [Mueller report](https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download). It detailed how Russia had lobbied Trump campaign officials against NATO; how the Trump campaign, according to one of its own former co-chairs, had shifted away from “the NATO framework”; and how the Trump team had blocked Republican platform language that would have endorsed “providing lethal defensive weapons” to Ukraine.

In October 2019, the Senate Intelligence Committee released an analysis of [Russian propaganda techniques](https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf). The report showed how the Kremlin had sought to “drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO.” One of Russia’s tricks, the report noted, was “discouraging United States support” for accepting eastern European countries into NATO by portraying those countries as “free riders.”

In August 2020, the Senate committee issued a report that showed how Kremlin sympathizers had [lobbied the Trump campaign against NATO](https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf). The report found that in April 2016, then-New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie had advised Trump to affirm in a speech that “our commitment to our NATO allies in Eastern Europe is absolute” and that “we need to stand up to Russian aggression together.” The Trump campaign had rejected this language.

In September 2020, New York Times journalist Michael Schmidt reported that during Trump’s presidency, his then-chief of staff, John Kelly, had [struggled to stop Trump from pulling out](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/03/us/politics/trump-nato-withdraw.html) of NATO. In July 2021, Washington Post reporters Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker revealed that Trump had told advisers he would [abandon the alliance in his second term](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/13/book-excerpt-i-alone-can-fix-it/). And last month, Trump’s former national security adviser, John Bolton, told the Post that “[Putin was waiting](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/04/bolton-says-trump-might-have-pulled-us-out-nato-if-he-had-been-reelected/)” for Trump to do just that.

After all these warnings, and after Putin’s latest invasion of Ukraine, one might have expected the congressional caucus of NATO critics to shrink.

Instead, it multiplied.

Why did so many Republicans vote against the latest pro-NATO resolution?

Some openly reject the alliance. “[NATO is a relic of the Cold War](https://twitter.com/RepThomasMassie/status/1511515988843499523),” said Rep. Thomas Massie. “Why should Americans pay for Europe’s defense?”

Others said the U.S. should be wary of overcommitment. “[We shouldn’t say that our support for NATO is unconditional](https://americasvoice.news/video/cQko2gFlWCIB3aZ/),” said Rep. Warren Davidson.

But others, including Perry, complained that the resolution threatened American sovereignty. In a video statement, Perry told his constituents that the resolution “politicizes NATO” by saying “[if you’re not supporting socialism, then we’re going to use NATO against you](https://www.facebook.com/repscottperry/videos/429791295614916).”

This is a bizarre misrepresentation. The resolution [affirmed](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-resolution/831/text) that NATO was “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” Those words are literally in [the alliance’s founding treaty](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm). The resolution also called for “unwavering support to the people of Ukraine.” And it endorsed a project, [jointly proposed](https://turner.house.gov/press-releases?ID=04A29990-6F5C-4465-BE92-6C6C7CF0E8C6) by [Democratic and Republican lawmakers](https://connolly.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=4509), to build “NATO’s capacity to strengthen democratic institutions within NATO member, partner, and aspirant countries.”

To make sure nobody misconstrued that language as an attack on sovereignty, the resolution stipulated that any NATO monitoring of “challenges to democracy” within member states would be undertaken only “when requested.”

Perry ignored that stipulation and caricatured the resolution. So did several of his colleagues. Representative Chip Roy described the resolution as “[empowering international organizations to target the internal activities of sovereign nations](https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives/).” Davidson described it as “[using NATO to try to undermine America’s sovereignty](https://americasvoice.news/video/cQko2gFlWCIB3aZ/).”

Some members who opposed the measure also expressed hostility toward Europe. Davidson said “global commitments” to accords on climate, banking, and other issues were forcing the U.S. to adopt the “inferior system” of “the Europeans.”

Roy fretted that NATO, empowered by the House resolution, would subject Americans to “[the leftist orthodoxy that now unfortunately permeates most of Western Europe](https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives/).”

These lawmakers think they’re patriots. They think that by voting to limit NATO and America’s commitment to it, they’re protecting us. And that’s what makes their subversion of the alliance, from Putin’s point of view, so delicious.

It’s so much easier to serve evil when you think you’re doing good.

#### Turkey is throwing a wrench in NATO – They won’t leave BUT they won’t stop being a problem.

The Economist 6/19 – Economist, 06-19-2022, "Is Turkey more trouble to NATO than it is worth?," https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/16/is-turkey-more-trouble-to-nato-than-it-is-worth, accessed 6-23-2022 – OBERTO!

The received wisdom is that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has breathed new life, and a new sense of purpose, urgency and unity into NATO. Someone forgot to tell Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Over the past month the Turkish president has blocked NATO enlargement, warned of a new offensive against American-backed Kurdish fighters in Syria and stoked tensions with Greece, also a member of the alliance. A few pundits, in the West but also in Turkey, are once again debating whether NATO and Turkey should part ways. This time, they are not alone. “Leaving NATO should be put on the agenda as an alternative,” Devlet Bahceli, leader of a nationalist party in Mr. Erdogan’s coalition, recently said. “We did not exist because of NATO and we will not perish without NATO.”

Frustration is also mounting in Western capitals, and in Kyiv, over Turkey’s willingness to accommodate Russia. Many in those places had hoped that the war in Ukraine would force Mr. Erdogan to reconsider his romance with Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. Opportunism has prevailed instead. Turkey has sold armed drones to Ukraine and closed access to the Black Sea for Russian warships, but it opposes Western sanctions against Russia and openly courts Russian capital. According to a report in the Turkish media, dozens of Russian companies, including Gazprom, are planning to move their European headquarters to Turkey.

Aside from a few words of condemnation at the start of the war in Ukraine, Turkey has remained on good terms with Russia throughout. When Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, visited Ankara this month his Turkish counterpart kindly suggested that the West should ease sanctions against Russia if Russia relaxed its blockade of Ukrainian ports. When Mr Lavrov repeated his claim that Russia had invaded Ukraine to liberate it from neo-Nazis, his host said nothing.

Mr. Erdogan’s move to block Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO has further damaged Turkey’s standing in the alliance. The strongman has signaled that he wants the Nordic countries to extradite several members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an outlawed armed group, and to drop a partial arms embargo against his country. He may also be shopping for concessions from America in exchange for withdrawing his veto, or from Russia for doing the opposite. Mr. as Erdogan occasionally sounds hostile to NATO enlargement a matter of principle. In a recent guest column for The Economist, he went as far as to blame Finland and Sweden for adding an “unnecessary item” to NATO’s agenda by asking to join the alliance.

Mr. Erdogan may have reasoned that a couple of foreign crises were needed to distract Turkish voters from their fast-diminishing circumstances, as galloping inflation, officially measured at over 70%, devours their savings and wages. In late May he warned of a new military offensive against Kurdish forces in Syria. Forced to shelve such plans, presumably because of opposition from Russia or America or both, he has since lashed out against Greece, demanding that it demilitarize Greek islands hugging Turkey’s western coast. He has also suggested that American bases in Greece pose a threat to Turkey (which hosts American forces itself). This might be bluster, and blow over. But obstructing Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership while war rages in Europe is bound to have consequences, even if Mr. Erdogan backs down. Sweden had been one of the few countries keeping alive Turkey’s hopes of membership in the European Union. That support has now gone.

That may seem a price worth paying to Mr. Erdogan if the row fires up his nationalist base. Mainstream Turkish politicians, as well as many humbler Turks, see the PKK purely as a security threat, and have long criticized the West for not taking their concerns about the group seriously. They have bristled especially at America’s decision to team up with the group’s Syrian wing to bring down Islamic State’s caliphate. Westerners, meanwhile, tend to believe that Turkey bears much of the blame for the PKK’s emergence by refusing to grant the country’s Kurds the rights they demand. They have also concluded that Mr. Erdogan cannot be trusted to decide who is or is not a terrorist. By applying the label to thousands of people, including bureaucrats, academics, peaceful protesters and Kurdish politicians, and often throwing them into the same prisons as armed militants, Mr. Erdogan has cheapened the term as badly as he has Turkey’s currency.

Turkey and the West will never see eye to eye on the issue, and Mr. Erdogan’s antics, as well as his habit of suggesting that the West, and not Russia, is the biggest threat to his country, will only make matters worse. Already, 65% of Turks say they do not trust NATO, according to a recent survey, although 60% support membership of the alliance.

None of this spells doom for the relationship between Turkey and NATO. Western countries will try to work round Turkey’s veto by providing Finland and Sweden with security guarantees. This may leave Turkey sidelined within the alliance. But its departure or eviction from NATO is still fantasy. Turkey is on the front line of the war in Syria and close to other conflicts in the Middle East; it controls access to the Black Sea, which has been central to all of Russia’s recent wars; and it serves as a corridor for trade between Central Asia and Europe, especially in energy, notes Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe. “I don’t even want to think of NATO without Turkey,” he says.

Especially in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Turkey also has no interest in surrendering the power of deterrence that NATO membership offers. “I don’t believe it will ever happen,” says Tacan Ildem, Turkey’s former permanent representative to NATO. There is no credible alternative, he says. Turkey will probably remain a headache for the alliance, even when Mr. Erdogan is out of the picture. But it is a headache NATO will have to live with.

## Russia War

### Russia War---1NC

#### Effective NATO operations ensure US-Russia war

Doug Bandow 04-04-2022 [Senior fellow at the Cato Institute, The Cato Institute, “Russia’s Aggressive War Illustrates Importance of US Foreign Policy: Ukrainians Are Latest Victims,” https://www.cato.org/commentary/russias-aggressive-war-illustrates-importance-us-foreign-policy-ukrainians-are-latest//ZW]

Russia’s attack on Ukraine turns uglier by the day. Moscow’s forces have compounded aggression with attacks on civilians, and apparently personal atrocities as well, conduct which will make an eventual peace settlement, as well as reintegration of Russia into the international system, much more difficult. Vladimir Putin and his ruling coterie are responsible for the unjustified and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Western policy toward Moscow since the Soviet collapse was foolish, even reckless, but that in no way justified the Russian attack. The Putin regime is responsible, and its crime will prove disastrous for the Russian as well as Ukrainian people. Yet blame for the tragedy now befalling Ukraine — thousands of dead, millions of refugees, major cities bombarded, economy disrupted, society ravaged — is shared by the U.S. Washington again has demonstrated that its policies matter to the world. Usually in a horrifically negative way. As has been oft detailed in recent days, the U.S. and European states blithely ignored multiple assurances made to both the Soviet Union and Russia that NATO would not be expanded up to their borders. The allies also demonstrated their willingness to ignore Moscow’s expressed security interests with the coercive dismemberment of Serbia, “color revolutions” in Tbilisi and Kyiv, and especially support for the 2014 street putsch against Ukraine’s elected, Russo‐​friendly president. Whether such actions *should* have bothered Moscow isn’t important. They did, and perceptions are what matter. In this case, perception was reality. Indeed, Washington would never have accepted equivalent behavior by Russia in the Western hemisphere — marching the Warsaw Pact or Collective Security Treaty Organization up to America’s borders, backing a coup in Mexico City or Ontario, and inviting the new government to join the military alliance. The response in Washington would have been explosive hysteria followed by a tsunami of demands and threats. There would have been no sweet talk about the right of other nations to decide their own destinies. True, this might not be the only factor influencing Putin’s decision on war. He has articulated strong, though distorted, views of Ukrainian nationhood and Kyiv’s proper relations to Russia. However, security concerns have always loomed largest. He and other officials criticized NATO expansion early, when the alliance began its move eastward. Most famously, he raised the issue in his talk to the 2007 Munich Security Conference. His position reflected Russia’s perspective but was serious both in substance and delivery. Putin said the U.S. had “overstepped its national borders in every way,” that its “almost uncontained hyper use of force” was “plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.” This was after America’s endless war in Afghanistan and disastrous invasion of Iraq; Libya, Syria, and Yemen were yet to come. He also observed that “NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we…do not react to these actions at all.” He continued: “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: ‘the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.’ Where are these guarantees?” If allied behavior was not a sufficient cause for Moscow’s invasion, it certainly was a necessary cause. Putin might believe Ukraine should be part of Russia, but for the last 22 years did not attempt to conquer the country. His more limited attacks in 2014 were triggered by the Western‐​backed ouster of a friendly government. Whatever Putin’s view of reconstituting the Soviet Union, after two decades all he has managed to do is retake Crimea and extend Russian influence over the Donbass, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. A repeat of Adolf Hitler he certainly is not. Again, this does not excuse Moscow’s latest conduct, which is grotesque, criminal, and immoral. However, it offers a terrible reminder that U.S. intervention has consequences. Consider Iran. Tehran is a repressive dictatorship and plays a malign role in the region. Fear of Iran now consumes much of the U.S. foreign policy community, which seems to imagine Tehran as an intimidating superpower and America as a threatened middling power. Response to Iran now dramatically distorts Washington’s Mideast policy. Most tragically, Washington has made Tehran the excuse for backing the mass murder of Yemeni civilians by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, Iran did not come by its malicious role naturally. Washington famously promoted the 1953 coup that ousted the elected government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and for a quarter century supported Iran’s shah, who created a brutal police state which was justifiably overthrown by his own people. Tragically, the new regime proved equally tyrannical, while also determined to spread Islamic revolution. The war in Yemen has consumed almost 400,000 civilian lives. Internal strife always has been common in that relatively new nation, but Saudi and Emirati intervention in what was just another internal fight expanded and intensified the conflict. Although they could continue the war without U.S. consent, they could not do so effectively without U.S. support. American companies not only provided the planes but service them today. The U.S. also provides munitions and intelligence, and in the war’s early days refueled Saudi and Emirati planes as well. This backing has been vital for the operation of the royal air forces and has contributed to many thousand Yemeni deaths. Nor is America a favored target of terrorism because of random selection or its virtuous reputation. Washington has routinely interfered in the affairs of other nations — backing dictatorships, supporting oppressive occupations, meddling in elections, and intervening militarily. A vivid example was Lebanon in 1983, in which the U.S. joined the latter’s bitter civil war. An American highlight over the last two decades has been droning, bombing, invading, and occupying other lands. Michael Scheuer, onetime CIA counter‐​terrorism analyst, cited aid to authoritarian Arab governments, support for Israeli occupation over Palestinians, Washington’s long economic and military campaign against Iraq, and U.S. military units based in Saudi Arabia as grievances. Osama bin Laden said after 9/11: “it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind — and that we should destroy the towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted, and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children.” The would‐​be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, thought similarly. His sentencing judge asked Shahzad about his reasoning, reported ABC News: “Shahzad said the judge needed to understand his role. ‘I consider myself to be a Muslim soldier,’ he said. When [Judge Miriam] Cedarbaum asked whether he considered the people in Times Square to be innocent, he said they had elected the U.S. government. ‘Even children?’ said Cedarbaum. ‘When the drones [in Pakistan] hit, they don’t see children,’ answered Shahzad. He then said, ‘I am part of the answer to the US killing the Muslim people’.” Bad, even criminally aggressive, U.S. policies don’t justify attacks on civilians, but they help explain terrorism. For peoples and states without missiles, air wings, and carrier groups, terrorism is the most effective and perhaps only method of responding. That is, terrorism is war by other means, which is why it also has been waged in Sri Lanka (by separatist Tamils against the Sinhalese‐​dominated government), Israel (over its maltreatment of Palestinians), Spain (by Basque separatists), and many other nations, including the old empires of Russia and Austro‐​Hungary. In the latter an assassination by a Serbian terrorist triggered World War I. Perhaps the most pernicious U.S. intervention was entering that conflict. Washington had no stake in the imperial slugfest and Woodrow Wilson’s formal justification for intervening, to defend the right of Americans to book passage on a belligerent power’s reserve cruisers carrying munitions through a war zone, was eloquent nonsense. Alas, America’s entry allowed the imposition of the infamous Versailles Treaty Diktat, which became one of the grievances that aided Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Whatever the details of the compromise peace that otherwise likely would have resulted, it could hardly have yielded a worse result than World War II. Now the Russo‐​Ukraine war adds another example to Uncle Sam’s history of foreign policy malpractice. The conflict is not strictly America’s fault, since Moscow made an independent decision to attack its neighbor. For that, the Putin government bears responsibility. However, the U.S. and its European allies set the stage for the war, engaging in behavior that clearly yet needlessly antagonized Russia. For contributing to the horror now engulfing Ukraine, Washington should be held responsible and its officials held accountable. Otherwise more people will keep dying because of Uncle Sam’s foolish hubris.

#### Commitment trap---no amount of reassurance can surmount interest asymmetries---try-or-die for minimizing NATO’s footprint

Shifrinson, Joshua, Prof of IR @ BU, 17, “Time to Consolidate NATO?” *The Washington Quarterly,* Vol. 40, Issue 1.

The credibility of the U.S. commitment to its NATO allies has long been unclear. At root, credibility hinges on the perception in the minds of foreign decisionmakers that a state has sufficient interest in a given issue that it is willing to pay a certain—potentially large—cost to obtain or secure that objective. Owing to the exorbitant prospective costs of a U.S.–Soviet nuclear exchange during the Cold War, regular transatlantic crises revolved around the question of whether the United States would trade “Boston for Bonn” in the event of a general European war.8 So long as the United States retained sole control of NATO’s decision to escalate past the nuclear threshold, U.S. policymakers faced a real problem in making Soviet policymakers and American allies alike believe that they would willingly take the nuclear plunge if events dictated.9 As Thomas Schelling noted long ago, it is inherently difficult to convince other actors that the United States will commit suicide for other states.10 Still, this problem was at least plausibly manageable during the Cold War.11 Despite the prospective costs, the United States retained a large and pervasive interest in keeping Western Europe’s economic and military potential beyond Soviet control. These objectives, in fact, heavily shaped the United States’ Cold War commitment to European security as the United States moved (1) to defend Western Europe from potential Soviet machinations, and (2) to deter Soviet adventurism against the area in the first place.12 The alternative was clear: if the Soviet Union were to dominate Europe’s war-making strength, it might tip the balance of power against the United States, requiring a potentially ruinous counter-mobilization and global competition that an isolated United States might be unable to win. Geography reinforced this imperative, as failure to deter or defend against a Soviet assault across the inner-German border meant the USSR could quickly overrun the region. The result was a concerted effort by the United States to make its promise to defend its NATO allies as credible as possible by forward-deploying large military force and seeking ways to escalate a contest with the USSR should it prove necessary.13 Today, the situation is reversed. The grand bargain in which Washington kept its finger alone on the nuclear button remains intact; if the United States is to fully honor its treaty commitments, it must ultimately be willing to engage in a nuclear exchange with Russia for the sake of its allies. However, where the United States could plausibly claim to trade Boston for Bonn prior to 1991, no amount of reassurance can make the promise to trade Toledo for Tallinn credible today—the stakes of the game are too low. Alliances function when states decide that their mutual preservation adds to each side’s national security and can be attained at a cost proportional to the benefit. For better or worse, NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement altered this equation by notionally committing the United States to defend a host of states in Eastern Europe of questionable relevance to U.S. security. Indeed, those states most immediately threatened by Russia—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, followed by Poland—are among the least important allies in crude geopolitical terms. The three Baltic states combined accounted for only 0.13 percent of total NATO defense expenditures and 0.26 percent of NATO members’ GDP as of 2016; Poland represented 1.17 and 1.54 percent, respectively.14 American exchange with these states is similarly limited: trade with the Baltic states as a whole came to less than $3 billion in 2015 against over $3.75 trillion in total U.S. trade.15 Baldly stated, these states could disappear without compromising the United States’ economic security or NATO’s military viability. The questionable value of these states alone thus renders the U.S. commitment to their defense highly contestable.16 The American public, meanwhile, seems to recognize this very dynamic at some basic level, with 37 percent of U.S. citizens in a 2015 Pew Global Attitudes survey expressing reluctance with aiding a NATO ally threatened by Russia.17 Political geography further compounds NATO’s problems. Not only can countries threatened by Russia be lost without compromising NATO’s ability to defend the rest of Europe, but even an expanded Russia would be poorly placed to dominate the continent. Belarus and Ukraine, after all, lie across any Russian advance into Central Europe, while simply retaining control of a unified Germany affords NATO a defense-in-depth it never enjoyed during the Cold War. Add in the reality that Russia is an economic, political, and military pygmy compared to the Soviet Union everywhere except in the nuclear realm, and the United States’ intrinsic interest in those states most immediately threatened by Russia is substantially less than during the Cold War.18 Simply put, unlike the situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Russian dominance over the Baltic states, Poland, and other new(er) NATO members would not result in the United States’ eviction from Europe and concomitant loss of the region’s economic or military strength. Military pressures reinforce these dilemmas. Whereas a conventional defense of Western Europe was at least a possibility prior to 1989–1991, distance, reinforcement rates, and force-to-space ratios mean a conventional defense in Eastern Europe is not a realistic option today.19 War games by the Rand Corporation highlight the problem in the Baltics context. To be sure, forces stationed in Eastern Europe can serve as a tripwire to deter Russian aggression by seemingly promising to bring NATO members’ collective strength to bear.20 If deterrence fails, however, and short of committing nearly all of NATO’s conventional ground and air power to the theater, even heavily-armored NATO forces can only slow down a Russian assault and promise a lengthy East–West conflict. Yet here, NATO again faces real limits to fighting in and around NATO’s East European members.21 Though the United States can threaten conventional escalation, it cannot credibly commit to fighting for states of low strategic value if doing so risks a strategic nuclear exchange. Nevertheless, the United States would undoubtedly face calls for precisely such steps that might lead to nuclear escalation in any losing conventional fight. Moreover, since any sustained effort to defend or retake the Baltics requires NATO conventional operations close to the Russian homeland, it risks attacks (accidental or otherwise) on Russian territory that invite an escalatory response. Russian antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) assets used against reinforcements flowing into the region—to say nothing of direct attacks on Poland—may also result in strikes on Russian-owned Kaliningrad, generating a similar escalation problem. In short, NATO cannot readily defend its Eastern flank through conventional means, faces implausibly large strategic risks if it tries, and so confronts an insoluble credibility crisis.22 Indeed, that Estonia is now preparing to wage a lengthy guerilla war against a prospective Russian occupying force, while Lithuania is slowly moving to reinstate a military draft suggests vulnerable states recognize the United States’ credibility dilemma and are hedging their security bets as best they can.23 If anything, the main function of NATO deployments has been to antagonize a Russia that has far more at stake in Eastern Europe for geographic and historical reasons than the United States.24 To be clear, NATO expansion in and of itself did not cause East–West relations to deteriorate.25 However, U.S.-backed efforts to expand NATO eastward and subsequently deploy military forces to the region have been met with Russian pushback—Russian overflights of NATO airspace, diplomatic obfuscation, and military deployments have all accelerated in recent years.26 Assuming NATO efforts in Eastern Europe continue, Russian leaders are prone to respond with further bellicosity that generates further strains in NATO–Russian relations.27 Paradoxically, the resulting insecurity spiral increases the likelihood that efforts to deter Russia will result in deterrence failure.28 Combined with the possibility that a NATO–Russia crisis may see Russia escalate the confrontation in order to de-escalate the situation, the risk of miscalculation is clear.29 Collectively, this situation simultaneously invites Russian actions designed to discredit the United States in the eyes of its allies, gives threatened allies incentives to force events with Russia to tie American hands and deepen the United States’ involvement, and increases the risk of an action-reaction cycle.30 The net result is a dangerous standoff. To deter aggression, NATO relies on a collective security promise ultimately capped by the pledge that the United States will risk its own survival by putting its nuclear forces to use on behalf of its allies. For the Baltic states, Poland, and— potentially in the future—NATO’s other post Cold War additions, this pledge is no longer realistic on strategic or military grounds. The steps the United States and its allies are taking to reassure the most vulnerable members of NATO, however, increase the odds of a NATO– Russia crisis. Yet if and when a crisis erupts, the clarifying effect of a prospective nuclear exchange is apt to cause cooler heads to prevail and encourage U.S. efforts to restrain the dogs of war—revealing that American security guarantees to Eastern Europe were not credible in the first place. The more the United States continues pretending that its commitment to all NATO members is created equal, the more it risks creating a situation that will reveal the shibboleth of the U.S. commitment.

#### U.S-Russia war goes nuclear---doctrine, eroding knowledge, and new tech

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Increased Incidence of War Involving U.S. and Russian Proxies The potential for conflict between the United States and Russia is growing largely due to the increased prevalence of limited war involving proxies of the nuclear superpowers. Russia has risked limited war against Georgia and Ukraine, countries aligned to varying degrees with the United States and NATO. The United States and Russia have also engagedin a limited but increasingly bloody war in Syria, on whose oil Russia maintains a military base.9 Given the potential for accidents and miscalculation and the lack of a functioning forum for discussion and resolution of disputes, there are real, if limited, risks that conflict between proxies or allies of the United States and Russia might escalate to regional or general conflicts between the United States and Russia, which could eventually escalate to nuclear war. Local conflicts, of course, need not escalate to general or nuclear war. Indeed, according to the stability-instability paradox, limited war involving allies or proxies of the nuclear superpowers on opposing sides may be facilitated by relatively high confidence that such wars will not escalate to nuclear wars.10 The occurrence of local wars, without escalation to direct confrontation between the superpowers,might thus mistakenly be viewed as evidence that there is little risk of nuclear escalation and,hence,that strategic stability is high. However, the prevalence of local war is evidence only that strategic stability is judged to be high by those who engage in such wars. This does not mean that strategic stability is in fact high, because the judgments ofthose who engage in such wars may be wrong. The prevalence of local war involving nuclear powers is thus at best an ancillary indicator of overall strategic stability. Increased Risks of Escalation Even acknowledging the increased prevalence of conflict, the argument could be made that strategic stability is unchanged because most of the current points of tension between the United States and Russia are in the unconventional and conventional arenas. This would be amistake, however, because the escalatory potential of contemporary conflict has increased due to developments in doctrine and technology since the 1990s. For one, increased ambiguity in Russian nuclear doctrine has generated escalatory pressures on the United States—contrary to the stated intention of that doctrine. Inaddition, the growing importance of space and, especially,cyber warfare generates additional escalatory pressures for several reasons. Finally,the erosion of knowledge about strategic nuclear weapons may also add to escalatory potential. Ambiguity in Russian Nuclear Doctrine Russian leaders have made it clear that they view their nuclear arsenal as a guarantee of their security and continue to view it as an equalizer that compensates for U.S. conventional overmatch. Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to nuclear attacks against Russia or “when the state’s very existence has been threatened,” regardless of whetherthe threat is nuclear.It is worth quoting Russian doctrine more fully: The Russian Federation shall reserve for itself the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and/orits allies of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with use of conventional weapons when the state’s very existence has been threatened.11 More specifically, Russian doctrine discusses the possibility of first nuclear use in response to a massed conventional attack on Russia.12 It is thus clear, according to Russia’s stated doctrine, that Russia is prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons if its vital interests are threatened. For example, nuclear use might begin with a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) detonation or limited tactical nuclear use against amilitary targetforthe purpose of signaling resolve and demonstrating stake, under circumstances when Russian conventional forces are judged to be overwhelmed and the existence ofthe Russian state is thus under threat. What is less clear is what else Russia might consider to be a vital interest important enough to justify nuclear first use (i.e., beyond the circumstances that are clearfrom its stated doctrine). Such imminences as a direct threat to the regime or the destruction or disabling of a major part of Russia’s military apparatus might, for example, fall in to this category. Russia has chosen, however, to leave some ambiguity as to the size, extent, and geographical location of the threat that it would consider a vital interest that calls for the use of nuclear weapons. This ambiguity has raises U.S. and European concerns that the nuclear taboo may be weakening in Russian strategic thinking. The possibility that Russia might detonate a nuclear weapon to underscore its commitment and stake during an offensive conventional attack on NATO is very remote but, for these reasons, cannot be ruled out. The most widely discussed scenario involves a nonlethal Russian nuclear detonation at the outset of a conventional Russian attack on the Baltic States or possibly quickly after the Baltic States have been seized to deter a NATO response. In this case,the nuclear detonation would aim to cow European publics, divide NATO, and thus undermine U.S. will for a military rejoinder.

### Russia War Internal---2NC

#### Let NATO die—commitments are inevitably non-credible—nobody believes we’ll trade Toledo for Tallin, which makes abandonment of eastern allies inevitable, but the only way to make that posturing credible is escalation threats that make nuclear conflict inevitable by transforming low level tensions into a full scale war with Russia—it’s an insecurity paradox that causes symmetric overreactions between the US and Russia—that’s Shifrinson

#### Restoring legitimacy is impossible—BUT struggling against the light causes brinksmanship or credibility collapse when Russia calls our bluff—both scenarios turn case

Shifrinson 17 [Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs with the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University, where his research interests include international security, U.S foreign policy, and diplomatic history, The Washington Quarterly, “Time to Consolidate NATO?,” 2017, p. 118-9]

For nearly 30 years, American policymakers pushed NATO enlargement as a way of consolidating the United States’ Cold War victory. They did so seemingly convinced that the United States would never have to do that for which NATO was originally intended—fight a war against an adversary capable of hurting the United States.44 Today, a variety of changes render war a possibility, calling into question the credibility of American pledges undertaken at the height of the post-Cold War era. Though many analysts seek means to make the American promise to all NATO members credible, there are good reasons to doubt whether any American pledge to commit national suicide for allies of dubious importance will truly be viable. Instead of struggling against the reality, a sounder course would recognize NATO’s two-tiered status and accommodate U.S. diplomacy to this situation. The key is not necessarily to preventively change formal American security commitments. Instead, the United States must prepare politically and diplomatically for the possibility that some state might call the American security bluff, while accepting the constraints this risk imposes on American foreign policy. Carrying out these steps will, in turn, require both careful coordination throughout the U.S. government and foreign policy establishment, alongside efforts to sustain relationships with those states deemed vital to American interests. If successful, this course may ultimately allow for a more cohesive American policy vis-à-vis Europe and Russia, while reducing the dangers of brinksmanship and crises in the first place. Trading Toledo for Tallinn is not credible—but U.S. strategists can still minimize the fallout from three decades of NATO enlargement that has left the United States exposed in an increasingly conflictual Europe.

#### NATO makes Russia war structurally inevitable - militarization drives an escalation spiral

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Realism holds uncertainty to be a fundamental condition of the international system, a condition that, contrary to the expectations of global optimists, was not resolved with the end of the Cold War. This uncertainty and attempts by states to alleviate threats through various measures lead to the security dilemma.18 Decision-makers can never fully understand the plans and intentions of the other side (the “other minds” problem), nor can they predict how weapons might be used against them, since few weapons systems are purely offensive or defensive. Each state, in enhancing its power, increases the insecurity of its rival.19 A security dilemma interpretation of Russian-American relations is not solely an argument for a “blame-free” analysis, and it does not enlighten every facet of the relationship, but it does direct our attention toward distinct perceptual variables that shape policy. As Robert Jervis observed, psychological factors play a major role in the security dilemma, with perceptions and misperceptions contributing to a spiral of mutual hostility potentially leading to war.20 States may develop hostile images of each other, which was clearly evident throughout the Cold War and has been the case over the past decade or more of Russian-American relations.21 Under these conditions, a power imbalance on one side fuels insecurity on the other. Arms buildups and modernization programs are interpreted as aggressive rather than defensive behavior, while similar behavior on the part of the self is held to be benign.22

The complexity of Russian-American ties leads both sides to misread each other’s intentions and overreact to potential threats. Relations have been described as a “wicked problem” — that is, an extremely complex situation comparable to the period before World War I that could easily spiral into conflict.23 Russian and American leaders, and publics, have powerful perceptions and beliefs that are fundamentally different. Russian political elites believe that “the purpose of U.S. policy is to cause damage to Russia,” and that Washington pursues this policy through NATO expansion, promoting color revolutions, conducting information campaigns, deploying troops in Eastern Europe, and imposing economic sanctions.24 As Andrej Krickovic has argued, Russia’s internal vulnerabilities — weak institutional legitimacy, national identity issues, and contested borders — constitute a domestic dimension of the security dilemma. Authoritarian leaders fear destabilization by hostile democratic powers and affiliated nongovernmental organizations promoting change. These domestic insecurities lead to aggressive behaviors that generate fears in Washington about Russian intentions, which then lead to countermeasures.25

American officials for their part tend to discount or simply do not recognize the threat that democracy promotion and human rights advocacy pose to authoritarian elites. Russia can justify destabilization measures against Ukraine, the Baltic states, and other post-Soviet states, together with cyber attacks and the development of new weapons systems, as defensive measures in response to U.S. policies, but in Washington they are perceived as offensive actions threatening American interests. Leaders in Congress and the executive branch point to Russian meddling in elections, Moscow’s nuclear modernization programs, the annexation of Crimea and stoking civil war in Ukraine, support for rogue regimes in Syria and Venezuela, alignment with China, and the poisoning of Kremlin opponents in the West. Washington’s response is to attempt to change Russian behavior largely through economic sanctions, which allow the regime to blame the West for Russia’s economic troubles and stoke nationalism. Sanctions increase distrust of the United States and support Putin’s anti-Western narrative but ultimately have failed to alter Russian behavior.26

Shiping Tang’s analysis of the security dilemma provides a useful framework for analyzing the U.S.-Russian relationship. Of the eight “aspects” he identifies, three are central: “anarchy (which leads to uncertainty, fear, and the need for self-help for survival or security), a lack of malign intentions on both sides, and some accumulation of power (including offensive capabilities).”27 Tang argues that a security dilemma exists only within the framework of defensive realism, based on the assumption that neither side has malign intentions, but that each is merely seeking to enhance security through various means. From this position, states have conflicts of interest that may be reconcilable or irreconcilable and may be objective or subjective. Tang singles out seven material regulators of the security dilemma: “geography, polarity, military technology (that is, the objective offense-defense balance) … the distinguishability of offensive and defensive weapons … asymmetric power, external actors (allies), and concentration or mixing of ethnic groups.”28

Historically, Russia’s geographic vulnerability has made establishing buffer zones critical to national security. Erosion of the buffer, as in NATO expansion eastward, is viewed by the Kremlin as a threat to vital security interests and may result in attempts to reestablish a more secure perimeter (as in Ukraine). Regarding the second regulator — polarity — Moscow has criticized the unipolar post-Cold War order as destabilizing and a threat to Russian interests. Russia’s “drifting authoritarianism” and domestic problems, however, prevent reaching a bargain with its adversaries on a new, more favorable international order.29 Third, Russia is counting on recent advances in military technology to offset perceived American superiority in conventional and offensive weaponry.

Fourth, the two sides are fundamentally at odds over whether the European ballistic missile system is defensive (the U.S. and NATO position) or offensive (the Russian claim). Russian insecurity derives from American and NATO superiority in conventional weaponry, which has led Moscow to stress its nuclear and retaliatory capabilities, thereby fueling Western insecurity. Fifth, the United States wields asymmetrical advantage through the NATO alliance. Russia has attempted to compensate for its relatively isolated position with the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, but neither of these constitutes a security alliance comparable to NATO. Finally, the ethnic dimension has factored into Russian aggression against Ukraine and the frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. Defense of Russian compatriots could be used against NATO member states Estonia and Latvia, heightening insecurity among Washington’s NATO allies.

While all seven regulators of the security dilemma are relevant to U.S.-Russian relations, geography and fundamentally contrasting geopolitical perceptions are critical and influence each nation’s security beliefs and commitments.30 Historically, Russian security has been shaped by its vulnerability to invasion, resulting in centuries of expansion and the creation of buffer zones to slow or deter aggressors.31 Geographically, the United States has a defensive advantage comparable to that of an island nation, though treaty commitments to NATO and defense of liberal international norms have created an American perception of pervasive threats beyond the North American continent.

Russian and American leaders each believe the other side holds malign intentions and has acted aggressively (that is, attempting to change the status quo). But is that really the case? Ascertaining malign intent is no easy task. The most visible evidence comes from states’ military doctrines and capabilities, though it is almost always debatable whether weapons are primarily offensive or defensive. Perceptions of necessity are predicated on the worst-case scenario, to ensure against potentially catastrophic threats. Other indications of offensive intent may be the forcible acquisition of territory, forming coalitions, or arms buildups.32 In the context of anarchy and mutual mistrust, perception is more salient than objective reality.

The security dilemma does not come into play when one or both states act offensively and seek to change the status quo, but as Jervis has observed, “Few states are completely satisfied with the status quo.”33 To treat satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status quo as a dichotomous variable obscures a range of motives. Hitler’s revisionism in attempting to conquer Europe was quite different from Putin’s revisionism to regain control of Crimea and destabilize Ukraine. Moves perceived by one side as offensive, such as controlling buffer territories or engaging in provocative actions, may be viewed by the other actor as defensive. Jervis notes that Soviet forces were arrayed in an offensive posture in Europe, but the motive was to enhance security rather than initiate a war. He concludes that while the East-West conflict was essentially a clash of social systems, it did contain elements of the security dilemma.

After the Cold War ended, both Russia and the United States, following an initial period of uncertainty and confusion, sought to revise the European security order.34 In this context, though, it would have been difficult for either actor to favor the status quo. The entire continent was in flux, and the long-term outcome of this transformation was in doubt. Deep ideological divisions no longer existed between the United States and Russia, however, and national interests moved to the fore in official calculations. Revisionism for a hegemonic United States meant expanding and consolidating liberal democratic and market economy gains resulting from the collapse of communism, a goal that encouraged NATO expansion. Revisionism for a severely weakened Moscow consisted of reestablishing spheres of interest befitting a great power along Russia’s periphery and securing recognition as Washington’s coequal in European affairs. Neither side may have been acting from offensive motives, but responses by each to this new and uncertain security environment in some instances led to a security dilemma spiral of mistrust.

There is some evidence that Russia is motivated by revisionist, even imperialist, goals and seeks to expand territorially beyond the gains already made in Ukraine and Georgia. There is also considerable evidence that Moscow is acting defensively and has simply exploited a limited number of opportunities to strengthen its position along the periphery. Russian history may be employed to support the claim for imperial expansion, or it may be used to justify Moscow’s preoccupation with threats from Europe and the need for buffer zones.35

If the security dilemma approach has explanatory value, then we should observe frequent tit-for-tat responses on both sides to perceived threatening moves by the other. Russia and the United States have objective conflicts of interest, but mutual hostility in recent years has expanded the number of both real and perceived (that is, subjective) disputes, and has minimized the number of shared interests. If subjective conflicts of interest are perceived as irreconcilable, the potential for conflict is likely, albeit avoidable.36 While it may be debatable that neither the United States nor Russia has malign intentions (a necessity for the security dilemma to operate), it is certainly the case that each side reads hostile intent into the other’s actions. The following sections attempt to sort out the central perceptions on both sides shaping the security dilemma, recognizing that it is extremely difficult to assess intentions accurately.

#### Emboldenment---waning unipolarity creates a moral hazard for states to cash in on the alliance

David M. Edelstein, Foreign Studies @ Georgetown, and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, IR @ BU, 18, “IT’S A TRAP! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment” in *US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,* Routledge.

What of unipolarity, where one power is dominant, as is the case with the United States today? Prima facie, entrapment should be extremely rare in unipolarity. Allies are unlikely to materially affect the unipole’s security given the presumed material predominance of a unipolar power; hence, the sole great power around does not need to go to war on its allies’ behalf. If pressed, a unipolar power can simply cut the ally off and treat it as any other state.

On further investigation, however, the uniquely advantageous strategic situation that unipoles find themselves in can paradoxically increase the likelihood of entrapment. Because unipolarity is such an advantageous position for a state, a unipolar power has a powerful temptation to roam the system and prevent other great powers from rising and winnowing down its position. Assuming the unipole will not itself engage in preventive wars to stop future competitors, it can either ally with local actors in order to use them as proxies against a future threat, or ally with a prospective challenger itself in order to influence it (Gavin 2015; Ikenberry 2008). Such behavior may be particularly characteristic of waning unipoles that are increasingly wary of the threat posed by other rising great powers.

Both options allow the unipole’s allies to gain leverage over its foreign policy, and therefore risk entrapment. In the first case, the unipole may need to back up allies in their disputes with other relatively small states in order to ensure their help against the prospective challenger. In the latter case, the unipole may need to work at the prospective challenger’s behest to keep the potential challenger from opposing the unipole’s dominance. In either case, shifting power can lead to a unipole’s entrapment. On one level, shifting power dynamics can increase an ally’s leverage over a unipole’s foreign policy. In particular, if a unipole is on the verge of seeing its dominance disappear altogether, allies take on a growing importance in helping slow or stop the rise of new peer competitors. Hence, any given ally can threaten to defect from the unipole’s coalition and hinder the unipole’s ability to address the looming threat unless the waning unipole fights on behalf of the ally. Put differently, a prospective challenger’s threat of defection may undermine a unipole’s dominance, making costly sacrifices for an ally more attractive than would otherwise be the case. The more a unipole seeks to prevent the rise of new great powers – something most unipoles want – the greater the risk of entrapment (Monteiro 2014).

Shifting power also increases the risk of moral hazard – a situation in which an actor behaves recklessly, knowing that they have an insurance policy that will cover any losses they incur. In the case of alliance politics, smaller allies may act aggressively if they know that their more powerful ally will come to their aid. Because some allies are uniquely powerful or important to their partners, many security commitments can end up being disproportionate to the threat they address. Though any alliance can face moral hazard problems – witness American concerns over European recklessness during the Cold War – they are likely to be particularly problematic in unipolar settings. Because unipoles are uniquely powerful, the security commitments they hold exist in the absence of a compelling military threat to the unipole itself. However, the same may not apply for the unipole’s allies. For them, the international system remains a competitive environment in which other states may challenge their security and other interests. This asymmetry is asking for trouble. For a unipole’s allies, the best way to guarantee victory in any conflict is to ensure the unipole enters the contest on their behalf. In this sense, an alliance with a unipole is the best kind of insurance policy, Allies of a unipole have strong incentives to lie, cheat, and steal to convince a unipole to come to their aid. Because the unipole itself may see through the smokescreen, they also have incentives to manipulate events to force a unipole’s hand.

In turn, shifts in power increase the unipole’s exposure to moral hazard. Because power shifts can also work to the disadvantage of a unipole’s allies and – crucially – are likely to affect their security earlier than they affect a unipole’s security, the risks of an ally seeking to cash in the unipole’s insurance policy loom large. That is, since a unipole’s allies are unlikely to want to wait for a power shift to occur before the unipole comes to their aid, they have reason both to try to convince the unipole that a rising state endangers international security and to create a situation that buttresses this line of reasoning. The goal of such efforts is to increase the value of the alliance to the unipole and short-circuit the unipole’s own calculations regarding the distribution of power. Moral hazard and power shifts can thus create a vicious cycle.

The United States, the unipolar era, and the risk of entrapment

The preceding discussion (summarized in Table 2.1) has large implications for the United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity constrained the importance of allies, limiting the risk of entrapment. Moreover, the prospect of nuclear war discouraged risky behavior by the superpowers and their allies. Today, however, the risk of entrapment born of moral hazard and states’ search for security is larger and possibly increasing. As long as the US continues to make commitments overseas and fear the emergence of a peer competitor, American partners will be tempted to act in risky ways, expecting that Washington will feel compelled to come to their rescue should they get into trouble.

Insofar as the United States opposes Chinese or Russian aggression, smaller states will be tempted to provoke China or Russia to garner growing American support. If the United States is opposed to the emergence of great power peer competitors, then it may well opt to come to the aid of smaller states threatened by those potential competitors. This also means that countries that have limited or no explicit security commitments from the United States may try to profit from the insurance policy offered by the United States by provoking conflicts and expecting the United States – whose interests are clear – to ride to their defense.

#### Status dilemma---symbolic recognition is necessary to avert warfare and prompt Russian realignment

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Despite multiple official declarations of non-adversarial intentions issued by the United States and Russia over the past quarter-century, both sides have been unable to avoid repeated bouts of conflict escalation. This “unnecessary rivalry” can be explained in part as a “status dilemma”—a concept modeled on the better-known notion of “security dilemma.” In the groundbreaking volume Status in World Politics (T.V. Paul et al., 2014), status is defined as “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes,” such as ”wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, [or] demographic position.” Status is assumed to consist of two main components: “honor” and “authority.” The former derives from symbolic recognition of a given state’s place in a certain hierarchy, while the latter is the commonly accepted right of that state to use its power or have a say on a range of issues that arguably affect its interests. A status dilemma is a situation in which an actor is seeking status upgrades that other actors could concede at an acceptable cost to their security, but instead—because of the uncertainty surrounding the status-seeker’s intentions—these other actors develop unnecessary fears of an attack being prepared against them and begin responding. Failure to recognize the status dilemma can lead to material consequences, such as heightened tensions, arms races, or even open conflict. Indeed, unresolved status dilemmas, that is, unwillingness of the sides to confer authority or honor on each other, have led to the growing rivalry between Russia and the United States over the last quarter-century. At the same time, opportunities exist for a virtually cost-free accommodation of mutual status aspirations; this, in turn, could open up new avenues for cooperation between the two sides. The Quest for Status in US-Russia Relations The author of the status dilemma concept used it to account for the spike in U.S.-Soviet tensions that occurred in early 1980s. In subsequent decades, status aspirations have remained a key driver of Russia’s policy toward the United States. Moscow has been looking for both symbolic recognition of a “great power plus” status and, more importantly, agreement by the Western powers to accept as legitimate and accommodate Russia’s statements of interest on a broad range of international issues relevant to Moscow. Russia’s demands for “honor” and concurrent emotions have included: - expressions of gratitude to Moscow by the West for agreeing to end the Cold War; - abstention by the West from raising legitimacy issues about various aspects of Russian politics; - symbolic trappings of an “equal partnership,” such as high-profile bilateral meetings between top Russian and U.S. leaders; and - “alliance jealousy”—attempts to outbid NATO and the EU in attracting members to Russian-led blocs. For the last point above, “alliance jealousy,” the discussion between Russia and the West about NATO’s alleged non-expansion pledge (whether issued or not) is driven by status politics. From today’s perspective, the eventual accession of all Warsaw Pact countries to NATO paints Russia as the loser in the Cold War—a snub to Gorbachev and his successors who sought the status of co-victors in the Cold War or, at least, co-beneficiaries of its termination. A country usually seeks “honor” to satisfy the need of its leaders to identify with their referent counterparts in other states (usually the world’s most powerful). In addition, a leader may value symbols of respect or other special treatment by foreign counterparts because these symbolic acts can easily be leveraged to raise the leader’s domestic political profile. It has been argued that the inability or unwillingness of the West to give enough “honor” to Russia usually instigates Moscow’s frustration, and even fear of material reprisals being (covertly) prepared against the aspiring actor. However, unmet honor aspirations alone cannot fully account for conflicts of status. Symbolism in status politics lacks the power to trigger a serious clash. Honor only becomes relevant to the parties involved when bigger issues are at stake, such as the shaping of the broad normative framework of international governance or mutual recognition of great powers’ spheres of influence. This has been the case in U.S.-Russian relations. Moscow’s grievances usually surged when the United States and its allies were “adding injury to insult,” that is, deploying capabilities or developing doctrines that the Kremlin perceived as material threats. In both the early 1980s and 2000s, these were the U.S. missile defenses (which threaten to diminish the status-endowing role of Russia’s nuclear weapons) and capabilities suitable for prompt decapitation of the adversary, such as intermediate-range missiles in Europe or conventional high-precision long-range missiles. Later, Moscow’s fears were stirred up by solidarism doctrines (applied by the West in the former Yugoslavia) and regime change policies (tested in Iraq and Libya and contemplated, the Russian government is convinced, toward Syria and even Russia itself). For its part, Washington has been seeking Moscow’s recognition of the United States’ status as a “democracy guru” and a security provider to the smaller powers. Moscow’s efforts to deny those roles to the United States have added acrimony to the bilateral relationship and reinforced suspicions about mutual intentions. Breaking Out of the Status Dilemma? Regardless of the difficulties of obtaining status satisfaction, some authors in Status in World Politics have suggested that aspiring nations can sometimes be granted status accommodation by the leading powers without the security of the latter being undermined, the foundations of the international legal order shattered, or the core hierarchy significantly changed. According to that logic, in order to break out of their status dilemma, the United States and Russia would be advised to look for ways of such accommodation short of compromising their security. Russia’s role in its neighborhood and nuclear arms control stand out as the two tracks in the U.S.-Russian relationship that are richest in status-elevating opportunities for Moscow. However, reassuring Russia of its privileged rights in the post-Soviet neighborhood or forswearing missile defenses has proven difficult for the United States without undermining the credibility of NATO or compromising the idea of progress in defense technology. Two other potentially fruitful areas for status signaling between Russia and the United States are cyberspace and the Arctic. In cyberspace, simply by negotiating with Russia, Washington could acknowledge Moscow’s comparable capabilities in the cyber domain. It would not be politically difficult for the U.S. government to engage Russia in this sphere. However, the lack of basic trust, undermined by controversies such as the release of the hacked Democratic National Committee emails in July 2016, presents a serious obstacle. So far, Moscow and Washington have only signed one agreement covering cyberspace terminology (2013) and endorsed a consensus report prepared by the United Nations Group of Government Experts in ICT (2015). While important, these documents fall short of placing Russia on an equal footing with the United States as a shaper of the norms of behavior in cyberspace. As a circumpolar nation on par with the United States, Russia can claim an equal status when negotiating Artic issues. Before the sanctions regime set in, Moscow was presenting the Arctic as a key region where synergies were being achieved by matching Russia’s natural resources with advanced Western technology—a variation of the “grand bargain” that Russia has been seeking with the West. However, the problem with receiving status signals from the United States on the Arctic is that Washington is reluctant to acknowledge the importance of Arctic politics as such and therefore to engage in it actively. In its turn, by militantly refusing to acknowledge the role of the United States as an authority on democratization and market reform, Moscow may be losing an opportunity to accommodate U.S. status concerns. Acknowledging the United States as the sole superpower and a “force for good” in international politics would hardly turn away any of Moscow’s significant partners and it could help it win many more of them. The importance Washington attaches to the acceptance of these signs of status by other powers was demonstrated by the outsize media coverage and response to President Vladimir Putin’s seemingly low-profile statement recognizing the United States as the sole superpower in his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2016. In fact, a number of “honor” signals between the sides allowed them to build trust and engage in cooperation on key security and economic issues. Former president George W. Bush’s positive assessment of Putin as a leader in June 2001 no doubt facilitated the decision of the latter to help the former in his anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan. The symbolism of the “reset” policy announced by Washington in March 2009 generated a strong momentum for U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations and cooperation in curbing Iran’s nuclear program. Challenges to Status Accommodation Despite the presence of status reassurance opportunities, the obstacles to making full use of them are significant. Analogies drawn between the traditional security dilemma and the status dilemma do not extend to ways of overcoming the two types of dilemmas. The status dilemma is easier to resolve because opportunities are usually available to block the demands of a status-concerned state without engaging in material escalation in the form of an arms race or brinkmanship behavior. Russia’s quest to raise its status vis-a-vis the United States has been met with a number of challenges. First, in order to compel its counterparts to recognize Moscow’s status, the Kremlin has often had to undertake risky policy maneuvering. For example, Moscow sought a “strategic alliance” with China, and launched a military campaign in Syria to defeat President Bashar al-Assad’s enemies to a significant extent in order to beef up Russia’s profile in the eyes of the West. These are not classical balancing acts because the United States was not directly challenged by either of these Russian moves. Russia was trying to show that it was an indispensable actor in areas of interest to the United States and that Moscow has strategic options other than alignment with Washington (and its allies). However, once Moscow’s partners—China, Syria, and Iran—understood that Russia’s aspirations were status-focused, they began to question Russia’s commitment to their shared goals. Beijing, Tehran, and Damascus all balked at Russia’s attempts to harness them in pursuit of the Kremlin’s own agendas. China is clearly not interested in precipitating a showdown with the United States over their manifold contradictions and does not rule out an eventual mutually-beneficial compromise. Iran made a public case in August 2016 of denying the Russian Air Force permanent basing rights on Iranian territory despite Moscow’s earlier announcement that an agreement to that effect had been reached. In his turn, Assad implicated Russia in an aerial campaign to bomb eastern Aleppo in October 2016, a move that led to a major conflagration between Russia and the West (costing, at the very least, the extension of U.S./EU sanctions on Russia beyond January 2017). Second, it turned out to be easy for Russia’s rivals to inflict a substantial amount of pain on Kremlin policymakers by simply ignoring Moscow. As long as negotiation with an aspiring nation is usually seen as a status-conferring signal, refusing to engage in negotiation works as a status-diminishing signal. Such blackballing tactics proved to be almost cost-free, but effective in exerting psychological pressure and pushing Moscow toward costly, risky, and at times erratic maneuvers. Third, even when Russia’s counterparts have been willing to accommodate its status demands to a certain extent, Moscow has usually found it difficult (or unnecessary) to signal the scope of its status aspirations. These aspirations could range from symbolic and moderate (bilateral negotiations and handshakes) to authority-based and virtually limitless (recognized right to have a say on every problem of significance). Uncertainty generates strong balancing behavior vis-a-vis the state that seeks an elevated status because its counterparts become concerned that, under the guise of status pursuit, Moscow could obtain clout incommensurate to its actual resources and responsibility. For example, one of the key goals of Moscow’s Syria campaign has been to elevate Russia’s global status by presenting it as a diligent great power committed to eradicating the Islamic State. However, the U.S.-led coalition has remained reluctant to confer that status on Russia by cooperating with Moscow in Syria because the coalition feared that what Russia actually was to harness coalition forces into eradicating all rivals to the Assad government that would then become Moscow’s dedicated client in the Middle East. Fourth, breaking the rules is a powerful means of a quick elevation of status under an acute “status thirst.” Russia has regarded as a major sign of high status the ability to break the rules that it dislikes (and introduce its own rules and norms). However, rule-breaking behavior triggers a stronger negative response than rule generation. Russia is finding it difficult to achieve “status upgrades” by building new normative structures—for example, in governance of outer space or cyberspace. When Russia went the way of a rule-challenger vis-a-vis the Ukraine conflict, it triggered stronger resistance from the West than it expected. Finally, the quest for “honor,” which is typical of Russia’s status aspirations, can sometimes adversely affect other aspects of status. For example, membership in a prestigious international organization raises a country’s status, but the need to observe the corresponding norms limits that country’s freedom of action. If entry into clubs is pursued by an actor with a view to elevating its status, that actor will need to assess the balance between membership and the ensuing normative constraints. Characteristically, Russia seemed to be prepared for expulsion from a number of clubs as it was embarking on a risky course of action toward Ukraine in 2014. Moscow valued assertion of its “right” to break the rules as a sign of status more than membership in the G8 or in the Council of Europe—mostly because the Kremlin felt that the prestige-to-constraint balance was unfavorable for Russia in those Western-dominated institutions. At the same time, Russia attached disproportionate value to participation in other institutions that do not entail many constraints but which can contribute to national self-esteem. Take, for example, the Rio Olympics, where Moscow took the banning of many Russian athletes with more pain and resentment than Russia’s expulsion from the G8 in 2014. Conclusion Status aspirations play a significant role in U.S.-Russia relations. They may even play a bigger role in generating the persistent rivalry between the two nations than do traditional security considerations. Mutual status accommodation by both sides, while hypothetically possible, has been difficult even in areas where it could occur without damaging either of their material interests. Each side has generally preferred to block each other’s status aspirations, at times pushing each other toward risky behavior, which can lead to a serious escalation of tensions and even an armed conflict.

### Russia War Impact---2NC

#### Low level clashes risk inadvertant escalation

George Beebe 19 {George Beebe is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for the National Interest. He spent more than two decades in government service as an intelligence analyst, diplomat, and policy advisor, including service as director of CIA’s Russia analysis and as Special Advisor to Vice President Cheney for Russia/Eurasia and Intelligence Programs. 10-7-2019. “We’re More at Risk of Nuclear War With Russia Than We Think.” https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/07/were-more-at-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-russia-than-we-think-229436}//JM

The first is that American policymakers think that because neither side wants nuclear war, then such a war is very unlikely to occur. Russia would be foolish, we reason, to cross swords with the powerful U.S. military and risk its own self-destruction, and many Americans find it hard to imagine that modern cyber duels, proxy battles, information operations and economic warfare might somehow erupt into direct nuclear attacks. If the Cold War ended peacefully, the thinking goes, why should America worry that a new shadow war with a much less formidable Russia will end any differently?

But wars do not always begin by design. Just as they did in 1914, a vicious circle of clashing geopolitical ambitions, distorted perceptions of each other’s intent, new and poorly understood technologies, and disappearing rules of the game could combine to produce a disaster that neither side wants nor expects.

In fact, cyber technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced hypersonic weapons delivery systems and antisatellite weaponry are making the U.S.-Russian shadow war much more complex and dangerous than the old Cold War competition. They are blurring traditional lines between espionage and warfare, entangling nuclear and conventional weaponry, and erasing old distinctions between offensive and defensive operations. Whereas the development of nuclear weaponry in the Cold War produced the concept of mutually assured destruction and had a restraining effect, in the cyber arena, playing offense is increasingly seen as the best defense. And in a highly connected world in which financial networks, commercial operations, media platforms, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked in some way, escalation from the cyber world into the physical domain is a serious danger.

#### Even limited nuclear use triggers an uncontrollable cycle of escalation

Daryl G. Kimball 20. Executive director of the Arms Control Association. Former executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. Former director of security programs for Physicians for Social Responsibility. "No One Wins an Arms Race or a Nuclear War". Arms Control Association. March 2020. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-03/focus/one-wins-arms-race-nuclear-war

The move comes as the administration is proposing to increase spending to more than $44 billion next year to continue and, in some cases, accelerate programs to replace and upgrade all the major elements of the bloated U.S. arsenal. Unless curtailed, the plan, which departs in important ways from long-standing U.S. policies, will accelerate global nuclear competition and increase the risk of nuclear war. As if to underscore the dangers of the administration’s strategy, the Defense Department led an exercise last month simulating a limited nuclear war. “The scenario included a European contingency…. Russia decides to use a low-yield, limited nuclear weapon against a site on NATO territory,” and the United States fires back with a “limited” nuclear response, according to the Pentagon. The U.S. response presumably involved the low-yield sub-launched warhead, known as the W76-2. The exercise perpetuates the dangerous illusion that a nuclear war can be fought and won. The new warhead, which packs a five-kiloton explosive yield, is large enough destroy a large city. It would be delivered on the same type of long-range ballistic missile launched from the same strategic submarine that carries missiles loaded with 100-kiloton strategic warheads. Russian military leaders would be hard pressed to know, in the heat of a crisis, whether the missile was part of a “limited” strike or the first wave of an all-out nuclear attack. Nevertheless, Trump officials insist that the president needs “more credible” nuclear use options to deter the possible first use of nuclear weapons by Russia. In reality, once nuclear weapons of any kind are detonated in a conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries, there is no guarantee against a cycle of escalation leading to all-out global nuclear war. Lowering the threshold for nuclear use by making nuclear weapons “more usable” takes the United States and Russia and the world in the wrong direction.

### NATO Causes Nuclear Escalation---2NC

#### Any new conflict with Russia increases risk of escalation.

WolfgangRichter 03-2022 [Retired Colonel and former Head of the military section of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna. Senior Associate in the International Security Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs; SWP Comment, No. 16/2022, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin; “NATO-Russia tensions: Putin orders invasion of Ukraine. With the European security order in shambles, further escalation must be prevented”//ZW]

The End of the Security Order of Paris With Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin has deliberately destroyed these chances for negotiated solutions, and with them the cooperative European security order of Paris. The NATO-Russia Founding Act, the European Security Charter, and the Minsk Agreement are obsolete. Putin’s new narra­tive of a non-existent Ukrainian nation and its historic impetus of returning to Russia the territories of a former empire now seems to superimpose security concerns in order to justify the use of force for domestic consumption. However, the Russian president has ob­viously underestimated the Ukrainian deter­mination to resist and the resolve of the West. He will now achieve what he wanted to avoid, namely a more united Ukrainian nation, a more united and stronger NATO and EU, and an unprecedented military strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank. In addition, he will have to face significant economic, financial, and political isolation with serious long-term effects. If Russian forces get bogged down in nasty and time-consuming street fighting in Ukraine’s cities while their losses mount, Putin will also face a dramatic loss of repu­tation internally, with unpredictable con­sequences. At the dawn of a new era, there seems to be little prospect for any new agreements. As long as the future of Ukraine is unclear, the outlines of a future inclusive European security order, its principles, borders, and spheres of influence will not appear. How­ever, a new military confrontation between Russia and the West along a fortified con­tact line will carry high risks of military incidents, miscalculations, and further escalation. Therefore, stabilizing measures such as direct communication between mili­tary headquarters, tight rules for in­cident prevention, as well as de-escalation, transparency, and restrictions of military movements will be needed even more urgently to prevent the worst. This will require new talks and security arrangements once the fog of war has cleared.

#### Ukraine sets a brink--- any NATO action could trigger escalation.

Ted Galen Carpenter 02-28-2022 [Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice-president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011; The Guardian, originally appearing in 19fortyfive; “Many predicted NATO expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored;” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine//ZW]

Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine is an act of aggression that will make already worrisome tensions between Nato and Moscow even more dangerous. The west’s new cold war with Russia has turned hot. Vladimir Putin bears primary responsibility for this latest development, but Nato’s arrogant, tone‐​deaf policy toward Russia over the past quarter‐​century deserves a large share as well. Analysts committed to a US foreign policy of realism and restraint have warned for more than a quarter‐​century that continuing to expand the most powerful military alliance in history toward another major power would not end well. The war in Ukraine provides definitive confirmation that it did not. Thinking through the Ukraine crisis – the causes “It would be extraordinarily difficult to expand Nato eastward without that action’s being viewed by Russia as unfriendly. Even the most modest schemes would bring the alliance to the borders of the old Soviet Union. Some of the more ambitious versions would have the alliance virtually surround the Russian Federation itself.” I wrote those words in 1994, in my book Beyond Nato: Staying Out of Europe’s Wars, at a time when expansion proposals merely constituted occasional speculation in foreign policy seminars in New York and Washington. I added that expansion “would constitute a needless provocation of Russia”. What was not publicly known at the time was that Bill Clinton’s administration had already made the fateful decision the previous year to push for including some former Warsaw Pact countries in Nato. The administration would soon propose inviting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to become members, and the US Senate approved adding those countries to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1998. It would be the first of several waves of membership expansion. Even that first stage provoked Russian opposition and anger. In her memoir, Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s secretary of state, concedes that “[Russian president Boris] Yeltsin and his countrymen were strongly opposed to enlargement, seeing it as a strategy for exploiting their vulnerability and moving Europe’s dividing line to the east, leaving them isolated.” Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state, similarly described the Russian attitude. “Many Russians see Nato as a vestige of the cold war, inherently directed against their country. They point out that they have disbanded the Warsaw Pact, their military alliance, and ask why the west should not do the same.” It was an excellent question, and neither the Clinton administration nor its successors provided even a remotely convincing answer. George Kennan, the intellectual father of America’s containment policy during the cold war, perceptively warned in a May 1998 New York Times interview about what the Senate’s ratification of Nato’s first round of expansion would set in motion. “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” Kennan stated. ”I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else.” He was right, but US and Nato leaders proceeded with new rounds of expansion, including the provocative step of adding the three Baltic republics. Those countries not only had been part of the Soviet Union, but they had also been part of Russia’s empire during the Czarist era. That wave of expansion now had Nato perched on the border of the Russian Federation. Moscow’s patience with Nato’s ever more intrusive behavior was wearing thin. The last reasonably friendly warning from Russia that the alliance needed to back off came in March 2007, when Putin addressed the annual Munich security conference. “Nato has put its frontline forces on our borders,” Putin complained. Nato expansion “represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?” In his memoir, Duty, Robert M Gates, who served as secretary of defense in the administrations of both George W Bush and Barack Obama, stated his belief that “the relationship with Russia had been badly mismanaged after [George HW] Bush left office in 1993”. Among other missteps, “US agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries was a needless provocation.” In an implicit rebuke to the younger Bush, Gates asserted that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into Nato was truly overreaching”. That move, he contended, was a case of “recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests”. The following year, the Kremlin demonstrated that its discontent with Nato’s continuing incursions into Russia’s security zone had moved beyond verbal objections. Moscow exploited a foolish provocation by Georgia’s pro‐​western government to launch a military offensive that brought Russian troops to the outskirts of the capital. Thereafter, Russia permanently detached two secessionist‐​minded Georgian regions and put them under effective Russian control. Western (especially US) leaders continued to blow through red warning light after a red warning light, however. The Obama administration’s shockingly arrogant meddling in Ukraine’s internal political affairs in 2013 and 2014 to help demonstrators overthrow Ukraine’s elected, pro‐​Russia president was the single most brazen provocation, and it caused tensions to spike. Moscow immediately responded by seizing and annexing Crimea, and a new cold war was underway with a vengeance. Could the Ukraine crisis have been avoided? Events during the past few months constituted the last chance to avoid a hot war in eastern Europe. Putin demanded that Nato provide guarantees on several security issues. Specifically, the Kremlin wanted binding assurances that the alliance would reduce the scope of its growing military presence in eastern Europe and would never offer membership to Ukraine. He backed up those demands with a massive military buildup on Ukraine’s borders. The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s quest for meaningful western concessions and security guarantees was tepid and evasive. Putin then clearly decided to escalate matters. Washington’s attempt to make Ukraine a Nato political and military pawn (even absent the country’s formal membership in the alliance) may end up costing the Ukrainian people dearly. The Ukraine tragedy History will show that Washington’s treatment of Russia in the decades following the demise of the Soviet Union was a policy blunder of epic proportions. It was entirely predictable that Nato expansion would ultimately lead to a tragic, perhaps violent, breach of relations with Moscow. Perceptive analysts warned of the likely consequences, but those warnings went unheeded. We are now paying the price for the US foreign policy establishment’s myopia and arrogance.

#### Conventional weapons don’t matter--- post-Ukraine Russia uses nukes.

Eric Gomez 06-09-2022 [Director of Defense Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Cato Institute; “The Bad ‘Ol Days: Where Russia’s Nuclear Strategy Goes After Ukraine;” https://www.cato.org/commentary/bad-ol-days-where-russias-nuclear-strategy-goes-after-ukraine//ZW]

The war in Ukraine could produce a more aggressive Russian nuclear strategy than the one it had prior to the conflict. The poor performance of Russia’s conventional forces are creating a mix of structural conditions that is similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Based on Russia’s approach in the post‐​Soviet period, it will likely place greater emphasis on limited nuclear options and have a lower threshold for nuclear first use. A more aggressive Russian nuclear doctrine would have serious implications for U.S. extended deterrence in Europe, especially as Sweden and Finland call for NATO membership. During the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia’s conventional military was large but of generally poor quality, and a weakened economy meant that rapid improvements in military technology were going to take time. Moscow opted to make up for its conventional weakness by increasing the prominence of nuclear weapons for national security and adopting more aggressive doctrines of nuclear use. Without viable, conventional means to protect against NATO’s more advanced military forces, Russia would reach for limited nuclear options early in a conflict to demonstrate resolve and the risks of continued aggression. As Russia modernized its conventional military forces during the 2000s and 2010s it improved its ability to deter conflict and control escalation without crossing the nuclear threshold. These improvements were correlated with changes in nuclear doctrine that set a comparatively higher bar for nuclear weapons use. To be clear, Russian strategy still allows for nuclear use in a wide variety of circumstances, including if a conventional war threatens “the very existence of the state.” However, compared to the nuclear strategy it adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s current nuclear strategy is relatively less aggressive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is creating three consequences and conditions that will likely lead Moscow to rely more on its nuclear forces going forward. First, the war in Ukraine demonstrates the limitations of Russia’s conventional military modernization. Russia’s military has significantly underperformed in Ukraine, despite employing many of its most potent capabilities. Western military aid keeps flowing into Ukraine despite Russian warnings of consequences and the weapons being sent to Ukraine do not represent the most advanced capabilities that NATO could bring to bear in a direct conflict with Russia. Russian military power, while capable of inflicting a great deal of damage, still lags behind NATO. The United States should tread very carefully on the issue of NATO expansion. Second, Russia will face significant hurdles in correcting this conventional imbalance because its economy is reeling from economic sanctions imposed because of its decision to attack Ukraine. The exposed weaknesses of the Russian military are therefore likely to persist for an extended period. Adjusting nuclear strategy is an attractive option for Russia because it can be done quickly and on the cheap. Third, the likely addition of Finland and Sweden to the NATO alliance will push on Russia’s high threat perceptions. In early April, Russian officials warned that admitting the two countries to the alliance would lead to Russian countermoves, including greater deployments of nuclear forces in the Baltic region. Adding Finland to the alliance would greatly improve NATO’s ability to target Russia’s Zapadnaya Litsa naval base, which hosts ballistic missile submarines, and nearby strategic nuclear weapons storage facilities. Putin brought this situation upon himself by invading Ukraine. Still, it is within the United States’ interest to reduce the likelihood of Russia adopting a more aggressive nuclear strategy. Failing that, the United States should reduce nuclear danger stemming from a potential shift in Russian strategy. The United States should tread very carefully on the issue of NATO expansion. Sweden and Finland’s rush to join the alliance is understandable but because of Russian threat perceptions, U.S. extended nuclear deterrence becomes more complicated. If Sweden and Finland’s admission to NATO is a foregone conclusion, the next best way to reduce nuclear risk would be for the alliance to refrain from deploying missile defense and long‐​range conventional strike systems on the new members’ territory. Moscow has repeatedly cited both types of capabilities as especially threatening to the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. A NATO deployment of long‐​range conventional strike weapons to Finland would be especially threatening given the proximity of the nuclear submarine base at Zapadnaya Litsa. Russia’s nuclear strategy is likely heading to a bad place. Its invasion of Ukraine is laying bare the shortcomings of conventional force modernization while also encouraging NATO expansion and worsening Russia’s general security environment. The United States should be aware of the long‐​term risks and consequences of a more aggressive Russian nuclear strategy. Restraint could help lessen the blow.

#### US involvement in NATO increases risk of conflict with Russia.

Ted Galen Carpenter 01-08-2022 [Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, The Cato Institute, “NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies,” https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-security-dependents-are-not-useful-allies//ZW]

SINCE THE end of World War II, U.S. officials have had an unduly expansive concept of what constitutes worthwhile strategic allies for the United States. In too many cases, the “allies” that Washington touts are small, weak, often militarily useless dependents. Worse, some of them are on bad terms with more powerful neighboring states. Under those circumstances, the so‐​called allies are major liabilities rather than assets to the United States. Indeed, they are potential snares, ones that can entangle America in unnecessary military confrontations. Washington would do well to become far more selective about which nations it includes in its roster of allies, and U.S. leaders should stop elevating security dependents to the status of allies. When U.S. officials described the regimes that Washington installed through military force in Afghanistan and Iraq as allies, it became clear that they had lost even minimal understanding of the concept. That point became abundantly evident when their Afghan client collapsed almost overnight in the face of the Taliban military offensive. It’s time for U.S. policymakers to do better. TROUBLING PROMISCUITY about acquiring weak U.S. security partners was evident even during the Cold War, and the tendency has become even more pronounced in the post‐​Cold War era. As the fiasco in Afghanistan (and its ugly predecessor in South Vietnam) confirmed, that problem with U.S. foreign policy has existed in multiple regions. However, the defect has become most acute with respect to Washington’s campaign to expand NATO into Eastern Europe. Since the mid‐​1990s, U.S. administrations have worked to add a menagerie of new NATO members, and it has done so with even less selectivity and good judgment than some people use to acquire Facebook friends. Many of those new members have very little to offer to the United States as security partners. Indeed, some are mini‐​states, bordering on being micro‐​states. Such lightly armed Lilliputians would add little or nothing to Washington’s own capabilities—especially in a showdown with another major power. As economic assets, their importance is decidedly limited, and militarily, they are even less valuable. It’s hard to see how new NATO allies such as Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia enhance America’s power and security. That point should be apparent based on size of population alone. Albania’s 2.87 million, North Macedonia’s 2.1 million, and Slovenia’s 2.07 million people put those countries squarely in the mini‐​state category, while Montenegro’s 628,000 barely deserves even that label. It doesn’t get much better with respect to either annual gross domestic product or size of military forces. Even Slovenia’s $52.8 billion GDP puts that country only eighty‐​sixth in the global rankings. Albania’s $15.2 billion (125th), North Macedonia’s $12.26 billion (135th) and Montenegro’s $4.78 billion (159th) are even less impressive. The military forces that our new NATO allies can field are not likely to strike fear into Russia or any other would‐​be aggressor. Albania’s armed forces consist of 8,500 active‐​duty personnel, Slovenia’s consist of 8,500, and North Macedonia has 9,000 available. Montenegro’s active‐​duty force totals 2,400. In comparison, the Austin, Texas, police department has 2,422 people in its ranks. Granted, the Cold War edition of NATO also had some mini‐​states as members, most notably Luxembourg and Iceland. However, those members were located within a stable, democratic Western Europe. Their defense also was geographically inseparable from Washington’s mission of protecting important military and economic players, such as West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, from what appeared to be a totalitarian superpower with expansionist ambitions. That situation was qualitatively different from Washington’s gratuitous post‐​Cold War decision to manage the security of quarrelsome mini‐​states in the chronically volatile Balkans. Since the mid‐​1990s, the United States has entangled itself in the region’s parochial spats, but giving some of the countries NATO membership intensified America’s exposure to needless risks and burdens. THE RISK-BENEFIT calculation is even worse with respect to some of the other small nations that have joined NATO in the post‐​Cold War era. Those partners are not merely irrelevant from the standpoint of U.S. security; they are potentially dangerous tripwires that could trigger a conflict between the United States and a nuclear‐​armed Russia. That point underscores one very important difference between individuals casually amassing Facebook friends and the United States promiscuously adding new security mendicants. Facebook friends do not have the ability to entangle anyone in armed conflicts; irresponsible security dependents definitely can do so. Indeed, there are multiple examples throughout history of such clients snaring their patrons into devastating, unnecessary wars. One notable example was how Tsarist Russia’s fateful decision to give strong backing to Serbia in the latter’s escalating quarrel with Austria‐​Hungary following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand helped ignite World War I—and caused the utter ruin of the Russian empire. The United States is flirting with a similar danger today regarding its small clients in Eastern Europe. President George W. Bush’s decision to support the NATO membership bids of the three Baltic republics was—and remains—highly provocative to Russia. One crucial way to reduce the danger of armed clashes between great powers is to show mutual respect for respective spheres of influence. Washington has repeatedly violated that principle by pushing NATO to expand right up to Russia’s border. The addition of the Baltic republics in 2004 was the most dangerous step in that process. As in the case of the subsequent addition of the small Balkan nations to NATO, the three Baltic countries have little to offer in terms of military capabilities. Estonia’s 6,700 troops, Latvia’s 5,500, and even Lithuania’s 20,500 wouldn’t be much of a factor if war broke out between NATO and Russia. However, the drawbacks of making the Baltic republics U.S. security dependents go far beyond their irrelevance as military players. Those three countries were once part of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, and substantial ethnic Russian minorities still live in both Estonia and Latvia. The Kremlin has complained on numerous occasions since the Baltic republics became independent at the end of 1991 that the Russian population suffers discrimination and other mistreatment. Indeed, that allegation emerged long before Russian president Vladimir Putin became Russia’s leader. Relations between the Kremlin and its former territories remain tense because of that issue. Perhaps even more troubling, Washington’s Baltic allies now are feuding with Moscow’s principal client in the region, Belarus. In the summer and autumn of 2021, Latvia and Lithuania (along with the European Union) accused Belarus of trying to use a flood of Middle East refugees as a form of “hybrid warfare.” The Lithuanian government even told its border guards to use force if necessary to prevent the continued entry of the migrants. A short time later, Latvia imposed a state of emergency to deal with the same issue. A few weeks earlier, Lithuania had augmented its border barrier by erecting a fence with razor wire. Latvia soon followed suit. A new round of large‐​scale, Russia‐​Belarus military exercises (held every four years) in September made tensions even more acute. By virtue of both size and location, the Baltic republics are not credible strategic assets for the United States. Indeed, they would be virtually helpless if Russia made a military move against them. A 2016 RAND Corporation study concluded that a Russian offensive would overrun their defenses in approximately three days. Such countries are not U.S. “allies” in any meaningful sense; they are vulnerable dependents that could trigger a war between NATO (primarily the United States) and Russia. Washington’s patron‐​client relationship with the Baltic republics is risky, and U.S. leaders were unwise to push for their inclusion in NATO. However, beginning with George W. Bush’s administration, officials have engaged in even more reckless conduct regarding possible alliance membership for two other countries, Georgia and Ukraine. They have done so despite repeated warnings from the Kremlin that making either country (especially Ukraine) a NATO member would cross a red line that Moscow cannot tolerate. BUSH CONDUCTED a veritable geopolitical love affair with both Georgia and Ukraine, portraying them as models for emerging democracies and repeatedly referring to them as U.S. allies in the most glowing terms. Only firm French and German opposition thwarted Bush’s lobbying effort to get NATO to grant Tbilisi and Kiev membership. Berlin and Paris were troubled by evidence of endemic political and economic corruption in both countries, but they were even more worried that further NATO expansion would create a crisis with Moscow. Their continued opposition has thus far prevented the addition of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO’s ranks, even as the alliance added multiple Balkan mini‐​states. However, U.S. actions have increasingly made the issue of formal membership a distinction without a difference, and the outcomes indicate that even unwise informal security relations with client states can cause serious trouble. Bush encouraged Georgia to take a firmer stance against the continued presence of Russian “peacekeeping troops” in two breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In addition, the United States was busily equipping and training Georgian military forces. Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, apparently read too much into Washington’s expressions of support. In August 2008, his forces launched an attack on Russian units in South Ossetia, and Moscow responded with a full‐​scale offensive that soon overran much of Georgia. When Saakashvili begged for U.S. and NATO help to repel the Russian “aggression,” Bush expressed firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty, but he also indicated that U.S. troops would not be coming to Tbilisi’s rescue. A U.S. client had tried to create a military confrontation between NATO and Russia for its own parochial goals, but it had misread Washington’s signals. Clumsy U.S. policy, though, was at least partly responsible for that dangerous episode. Unfortunately, the actions of subsequent foreign policy teams with respect to Georgia, and even more so with respect to Ukraine, indicate that U.S. leaders learned nothing from the mistakes in 2008. Officials in both the Trump and Biden administrations have treated Kiev as a de facto NATO member and a crucial U.S. military ally. Trump’s administration approved multiple weapons shipments to Kiev, sales that included Javelin anti‐​tank missiles that Russia considers especially destabilizing. Such transactions have continued since Joe Biden entered the White House. Worse, Washington’s security relationship with Kiev goes far beyond arms sales. Over the past five years, U.S. forces have conducted multiple joint exercises (war games) with Ukrainian units. Washington also has successfully pressed NATO to include Ukraine in the alliance’s war games. Indeed, Ukraine hosted and led the latest version, Rapid Trident 21. It is no secret that such exercises are directed against Russia. In early April 2021, Biden assured Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Washington’s “unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s ongoing aggression.” Such a pledge places the United States in a very dangerous situation. Kiev seeks to regain Crimea, which Russia annexed following U.S. and European Union backing for demonstrators who overthrew Ukraine’s elected, pro‐​Russian president in 2014. Indeed, Zelenskyy and other Ukrainian officials have expressed that intention repeatedly and in diverse settings. Kiev’s behavior also has become disturbingly bellicose. In early April 2021, both the Zelenskyy government and NATO complained loudly when Russia moved some 80,000 troops and heavy weaponry closer to Crimea and other areas along the border with Ukraine. What they did not mention, and most Western press accounts also ignored, was that Kiev had previously executed its own military buildup, amid statements of a determination to regain Crimea. In any case, an extremely tense confrontation between NATO and Russia ensued, which was not resolved until Russia pulled back its forces in late April. Given the size of its territory and population, Ukraine is not in the same category as the Balkan and Baltic mini‐​states or Georgia. However, it has an even greater potential to entangle the United States and the rest of NATO in a perilous war. The April 2021 episode was a classic case of a security client behaving in ways that could trigger an armed conflict. For all of Kiev’s boasts about regaining Crimea, the outcome of a military clash between Russia and Ukraine would be a foregone conclusion. Ukraine would have no chance of prevailing without massive outside assistance. Even disregarding the crucial difference that Russia possesses a strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal, while Ukraine does not, Russia’s advantages in conventional forces are massive. Legislation that the Ukrainian parliament approved in July 2021 will increase Kiev’s armed forces to 261,000, but Russia fields more than 1 million active‐​duty personnel. Moreover, although U.S. aid has improved the quality of the hardware available to Ukraine, Russia’s troops are equipped with some of the most sophisticated weapons in the world. U.S. leaders should be deeply concerned when a security dependent suffering from such quantitative and qualitative disadvantages makes empty boasts about retaking lost territory. It is even more worrisome when that client engages in provocative military gestures toward its powerful neighbor. That is precisely the way that a rogue dependent can entangle its great power protector in a disastrous war. U.S. leaders should want no part of such a risky patron‐​client relationship. THE TEST of whether a specific country is a worthwhile U.S. ally or a useless, perhaps dangerous, dependent should not be terribly difficult. A key question that must be asked is: Does that country substantially add to America’s own economic and military capabilities without creating significant new dangers or vulnerabilities? Only if that question can be answered with an unequivocal “yes,” should the country be considered a beneficial ally. Otherwise, it is either a useless or (even worse) a dangerous security client. U.S. leaders badly need to learn the difference. As a result of NATO’s expanded membership and mission, the United States has acquired a worrisome number of both types.

### NATO Causes Russia War---2NC

#### Russia perceives NATO action as detrimental to national security.

Wolfgang **Richter 03-2022** [Retired Colonel and former Head of the military section of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna. Senior Associate in the International Security Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs; SWP Comment, No. 16/2022, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin; “NATO-Russia tensions: Putin orders invasion of Ukraine. With the European security order in shambles, further escalation must be prevented”//ZW]

Moscow’s Strategic Goals Russia sees its security being threatened above all by NATO’s expansion to the east. Moscow already demonstrated in 2014 that Ukraine has a key role to play in this. The annexation of Crimea was less about “pro­tecting Russian compatriots” than about securing the bases of the Black Sea Fleet. In the Donbas, by contrast, the Kremlin, while strengthening the rebels, had been sticking to the Minsk Agreement for the past eight years. Moscow had assumed that the vic­torious Maidan movement would seek Ukraine’s rapid accession to NATO – a goal that now has constitutional status. Moscow is fixated on the US as the lead­ing NATO power. With it, Russia maintains a nuclear strategic balance based on a mutually assured destruction capability. It is anchored in bilateral arms control trea­ties, most recently in the New Start Treaty, which both sides extended by five years in February 2021. It limits the number of those nuclear weapons and carriers with intercontinental range that can be used to threaten targets in the territories of the two potential adversaries from their own terri­tory or from submarines. The agreed bal­ance is intended to guarantee the nuclear second-strike capability of both sides and thus deter a strategic nuclear attack (“first strike”). The agreed “strategic stability” has been threatened by recent developments. These include new delivery systems not governed by the New Start Treaty, long-range con­ventional precision and hypersonic weap­ons, strategic missile defense, and anti-satellite weapons. Both sides fear that the combined application of this potential could undermine second-strike nuclear capabilities and enable a disarming first strike. This is being discussed in bilateral strategic stability talks. From Washington’s perspective, moreover, China’s growing nuclear capabilities have altered the strategic balance and the regional balance in the East Asia-Pacific region. They challenge the “extended deter­rent” of the US that benefits its East Asian allies. Washington therefore wants to engage Beijing in arms control. With the US far from the theater of con­flict in Europe, Moscow finds itself at a dis­advantage, that is, it is facing additional security risks in Europe. These include the nuclear weapons of France and the UK, as well as the deployment of US sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe and NATO’s conventional forces on Russia’s borders. Moscow also fears a future threat from new US intermediate-range weapons in Europe. They could reach strategic targets in the European part of Russia should Washington and NATO partners decide to deploy them. NATO’s expansion has created more poten­tial deployment areas in Central and Eastern Europe. For the Kremlin, therefore, NATO is primarily an instrument of the US to advance geopolitical interests to the detri­ment of Russia’s security. To this end, according to Moscow, the West had broken earlier agreements and now wants to rem­edy this with new draft agreements. The West sees the drafts as an attempt by Moscow to change the European security order. It counters this by invoking the right of states to freely choose their alliances. How­ever, European security arrangements are more complex. They also bind alliances.

#### Russia always reacts to NATO decisions--- especially ones that are introduced by the US.

Ahmad Jansiz, Mustafa Tarin, Samira Talebi 08-25-16 [Jansiz is in the Political Science, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran. Tarin and Talebi are Independent Researchers on International Relations, Rasht, Iran; Canadian Center of Science and Education, Asian Culture and History Vol. 8 No. 2. 2016; doi:10.5539/ach.v8n2p135//ZW]

8. Eurasian Orientation: The Motive for a New Cold War The collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant milestone in changing the dominant pattern of the international system, and consequently, changing the dominant attitude in Russia’s foreign policy. Although at the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the prevailing view was to follow the hegemony and Russia considered friendship with America and following Washington as its nature and identity, but when Putin got into power, the pragmatic policy of Putin and, subsequently, all attentions were directed at Eurasian Orientation and the self-confidence created by the improving economic conditions and the rising energy price convinced Russia to redefine itself and not only to avoid following the hegemony but oppose it and restore the role and identity of the original Russia to the land broken into pieces. With such as view and the presence of theoreticians such as Dugin, Russia’s major concern was to define and determine certain policies and perspectives based on Eurasianism and its view of the region. Therefore, after Russia became relatively powerful and following the improved conditions in this country, its offensive policies expanded in the regional and at the international level. There are two different views about the change of the competition between America and Russia into the Cold War: According to one view, the competition between Russia and America will not turn into another cold war. The reasons provided for this claim are the signs of the relationship between the two countries after the Cold War; their post-war relations has gone through a process that is indicative of cooperation and interaction rather than confrontation and competition despite the ups and downs. This cold-war approach to the relations between America and Russia pays little attention to some of the global trends requiring the development of regional cooperation, the need for a dynamic interaction in the process of world economy and also the dominance and development of liberal democracy values. Finally, it can be stated that the improved internal conditions and the rising price of the energy resources created a self-confidence in Russian leaders for more serious confrontation with the anti-Russia provocations in Caucasus. Extensive military intervention by Russia in Southern Eurasia is not only indicative of Russia’s geopolitical reappearance in Caucasus but also a deterrent strategy and a serious warning and threat to the regional countries to reconsider their anti-Russian attitudes (Ebrahimi and Mohammadi, 2011, 17). However, with the emerging developments and changes in Ukraine and Crimea's secession to Russia and America’s and Russia’s interferences in the region supported the view that another cold war is happening. The differences and conflicts between Russia and Ukraine had a great impact upon the social status of the country members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine has the largest population and the highest economic and political capacity in CIS after Russia. Accordingly, it has always attracted the attention of Russia, on the one hand, and the West, on the other. A part of their conflicts and differences is concerned with determining the status of the Crimean peninsula. This peninsula, which was separated from Russia and attached to Ukraine during Khrushchev’s run, has a special position and significance in the Black Sea. The largest Soviet Navy is at the Port of Sevastopol at the coast of the Black Sea. Furthermore, another aspect of the differences and conflicts between the two countries is motivated by economic issues. Ukraine claims to have a share in the Soviet assets abroad, which Russians have taken over with the excuse that they are the legal successor to the Soviet. The relations between Russia and America in the last years of Putin’s presidency had a particular quality. In this period, taking an offensive pragmatist approach, Putin adopted the policy of “Direct Resistance” against the expansionism of the West and, particularly, America imperceptibly from 2006 and obviously from the beginning of 2007 considering the self-confidence he had built up by the achievements and successes in the political and military fields and particularly the unexpected inflow of dollars from oil resources into the Russian economy. The point of departure for this trend, which Derek Averre refers to as Putin’s Munich doctrine, was his speech in Munich Security Conference in which he severely criticized America’s unilateral approach (Koulayi, 2007, 213). Russia is the heart of the Soviet Union and many of the social and structural features of the Soviet can be seen in the political and strategic foundations and components of this country. Its competition with the United States goes back to the 19th century. These competitions were initially formed in the framework of balance of power in the international policies. America and the Soviet Union formed the bipolar international system from 1945 to 1991 and, currently, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar international system, Russia has been still following the strategic policies of those times and claims to be fighting with the unipolar system. The most important areas of conflict between Russia and America are the security issues. Russia is totally opposed to the development of NATO and the growing unilateralism being followed by the United States and always shows reactions to them. The examples of this strategy and approach can be observed in its disagreement with America’s missile defense plan and criticism of America’s strategic policy and intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (Koulayi, 2007). Russian politicians believe that great powers need great enemies. A superpower needs another superpower that stands against it. The more powerful and the greater the enemy is, naturally the more glorious it will be to stand against it. Therefore, it is only America which has the competence and capability to be an enemy to the United States. Russia needs a totally new identity that can replace the identity and ideology of the time of the Soviet Union. With this new identity, Russia can determine its position in the world and among the great powers. This country is defining itself in a new promised land. The Western model, which had been considered as a desirable pattern for Russia at the beginning of Yeltsin’s run, has faded into insignificance both from the Russian people’s and politicians’ perspective. The Missile Defense Shield raised some points with regard to the future and prospect of the relations between Russia and America for the macro-level analysis. He first referred to the existence of two trends of thought in Russia, i.e., Atlanticism (West-orientation) and Eurasianism. There are both extremist and moderate groups within each thought trend. The West’s sanctions, which seemed totally inefficient at the beginning, is now having a very negative effect on Russia’s economy. Above all, the significant decline in oil prices over the past few months, has greatly affected Russia leading to a sharp drop in its export earnings and the value of Ruble. Eastern Ukraine has also turned into a dangerous region for Russia at the present time due to the killing of Russian soldiers involved in war. In the same way, the West’s disagreement with and even fear of Russia has increased and European economic and political leaders have become less inclined to makes investments in Russia and help Moscow and cooperate with Putin (Katz, 2014). The Ukraine crisis can also become an excuse for intensive geopolitical competition between America and Russia all over the world, but the commonalities such as moderated nuclear weapons can increase the areas of cooperation between the two countries. Otherwise, if this competition is not moderated, it can lead to a significant hidden competition in international relations, which influence many other issues. Today, half of the Russian population believes that if we put aside and ignore Russia’s frustration in Afghanistan, during the former Soviet Union, the international conditions have been more stable, reliable and in favor of and to the advantage of Russia. Only 5% of the Russian people believe Russia had a good position in the international arena during Yeltsin’s rule. Russia needs a foreign enemy in order to find and determine its direction. When Putin refers to enemy, the Russian people realize that, if he does not mention the name of this enemy, he is referring to the United States, which dropped with anger the first nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, destroyed Vietnam with different types of poison and, more importantly, has put in all its efforts to destroy the glory of their native land, i.e., Russia. Russian people, however, like Europe in contrast with the United States. According to the Russian people, Europe is a praiseworthy entity that nobody is definitely afraid of. 80% of the Russians believe in the existence of positive and warm feelings between the Europeans and the Europe. Nevertheless, Russians still credit their Asian origin. 50% of the Russians do not consider themselves as European and believe that Russia has never been European. This group of Russian people are proud of Russian traditions and values. Europe and, particularly, European countries are too small, in the Russians’ eyes, to count as an enemy and play the role of an enemy (Der Stürmer, 2011, 291). Considering the conflict with the West over the establishment of missile defense shield and with the end of the period of building trust between the two countries, Put wanted the West to reform its wrong behavior at the peak of distrust between the two countries under “Moderate Eurasian Orientation” despite the fact that he believed in creating a balance between their view of and relations with the East the West. The relations with America has always had ups and downs in Russia. However, these relations can be divided into two periods: the first period started from the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued until September 11th, 2001 and the second period started with the attack on the twin towers of the World Trade and has continued up to now. In the first period, the ideological competition between the two countries had ended due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and security policies and America’s military doctrine, which was founded upon opposition to and inhibition of communism, was intrigued by strategic confusions and ambiguities, but America still views itself superior to Russia considering the new unipolar structures. In the second period, Putin’s accession to power and the September 11th events were two important factors that made the relations between America and the Russian Federation step into a new stage. Putin had improved the undesirable conditions in Russia to a large extent. On the one hand, he showed a cooperative orientation towards fighting terrorism and , on the other hand, exercised power within the country. But, overall, none of the players could ignore the other side. Thus, the competition for gaining more benefits and interests continued (Ebrahimi & Mohammadi, 2011, 8). Generally, the measures taken by Russia in its new confrontation with America and NATO include the following: The massive sale of weapons to the countries challenging America and Europe, Carrying out a 200-billion project for empowering the Russian army, An attempt to establish the rule of Russia over some regions of the North Pole, The resumption of flights of strategic bombers in distant areas, The suspension of Russia's membership in the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Expulsion of English diplomats from Russia, Testing new ballistic missiles, Suspension of cooperation with NATO until further notice (Ebrahimi & Mohammadi, 2011, 16). Activation of Russian diplomacy in the Middle East, encouraging the Middle East governments to have security cooperation within the region in the framework of Shanghai Organization instead of the models of mutual military-security agreements with America and measuring its success, turning the Western (under the leadership of America) and Eastern (by facilitating a coordination between China and Russia) conflict into an identity conflict, and Putin’s clear disagreement over NATO’s unilateral actions under the leadership of America for solving the crises in Europe and particularly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are all examples of these measures. Despite that, it seems that the world is passing and moving to a new plan of polarization. Russia’s worry about its primary security circuit increased with the West’s and particularly NATO’s increasing presence after the September 11th events. America’s intrusion into the traditional area of influence of Russia in the middle of the 1990s caused a threat to the Russian interests, but the peak of this progressive movement by America was after the September 11th events. After these events, the United States had direct presence in the region deploying its forces to the bases in the regional countries. At this time, Russians showed a passive reaction watching the growing presence of the Americans in the Caucasus and the Central Area and were not very pessimistic about this presence. After the initial shock of the initial horrific events subsided and America’s strategic goals for having presence and establishing military bases and also creating and fomenting color revolutions in the Central Asia countries and Caucasus as a direct result of the issues were revealed, Russians felt an looming threat and their way of interaction with America greatly changed. They used different strategies as a lever to challenge this country’s (i.e., America’s) desired order in the region and drive and force America away from their geostrategic area. Among the strategies and reactions shown by Russians were their absolute rejection of America's plan to operate a missile shield in Eastern Europe, considering the preparation and establishment of new nuclear missile sites in Petersburg and announcing the use of the fleet of long-range nuclear patrol aircraft. These measures reached their peak by establishing the Shanghai Treaty Organization. Shanghai Treaty was the result of America’s encroachment upon Russia’s and China’s geopolitical area bringing these two countries together (MojtahedZadeh and RashidiNejad, 2011, 14). In fact, Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East as a country that claims to be reviving its lost power in the international arena can be evaluated and examined with respect to this claim and in terms of its position towards the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the nuclear issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Syria, Palestine and the countries experiencing Islamic awakening. On the whole, Russia has always been opposed to America’s presence in the Middle East both overtly and covertly. This opposition has been much stronger particularly when this presence has been along with military operation or has not been approved and supported by the United Nations. Russia was opposed to America’s attack on Iraq from the very beginning such that some experts talked about the likely veto of this plan by Russia in the Security Council before America started the attack. Russia’s measures were, in fact, also the beginning for a new polarization after the Cold War. In line with that, an opposing power is emerging and developing against a power that seeks to establish a hegemonic order. The anti-hegemony power is being formed with Russia’s initiative. Although Russia is not as powerful as America, the polarization trend against America can, at least, create a challenge for the power of America (Talebi Arani, 2007, 23). Based on the mentioned principles, Putin believed in lack of confrontation and gaining advantage until the threshold of tolerance topples. An evidence for this is Russia’s support for the war in Afghanistan, the initial not-so-serious oppositions to the war in Iraq and lack of serious disagreement and opposition to the military cooperation between America and Georgia (Harutyunyan, 2007, 11). By replacing the concept of “multilateralism” with the concept of “multipolar system”, Putin made an attempt to replace the components of competition and tension in the idea of multipolar system with the components of competition and cooperation in the concept of multilateralism. In the concept of multilateralism, Russia defined a positive role for itself in the cooperation with the West and even America and considered itself as an international strategic arrangements partner particularly in the security issues (Koulayi, 2010, 217-219). Taking the Eurasian Orientation policy by Russia and standing against America instead of following and complying with it, has had different effects on Russia and its status in the area of international relations and at different regional levels. In addition, at the internal level it led to gaining trust and the promotion of the position of Putin inside Russia and introduced him as a national hero and the symbol of powerful and modern Russia and saving Russia from the mire of problems and establishing its position in the international system became a major strategic goal. Furthermore, Russia offensive stances in the international arena has created internal solidarity and with the change of Russia’s policy from ‘following’ and Atlanticism to Eurasian Orientation has helped to resolve Russia’s identity issues to some extent. Therefore, it seems that offensive policy and the Eurasian Orientation are directly related. There is also a positive and a negative view of the Eurasian Orientation policy at the regional level. According to the positive view, Russia can justify some of its interferences in some of the policies of the regional countries that are related to America and justify them in the framework of its confrontation with America. But, on the other hand, this can have negative consequences such that some of the regional countries feel insecure due to Russia’s interferences in their affairs which, accordingly, can cause some conflicts at the regional level leading to the weakening and decline of Russia. However, the new policy taken by Russia, i.e., Eurasian Orientation, in the framework of the offensive realism theory, which originates from Putin’s doctrine and has anti-American symbols, has had different consequences for Russia’s reputation in the international arena. First, this policy challenged the unipolar system and America-centeredness and introduced Russia as a powerful player against America. This claim is raised in framework of the multipolar system theory. Second, the existence of such a phenomenon is indicative of the fact that America is not an eternal great power and the appearance of another polar may challenge the nature of hegemony. Third, challenging America at the international level is the cause of importance of Russia in the region and, in fact, from the perspective of the enemies of America, Russia is their hero and supporter in the international decision-makings. This attitude has also posed a challenge to the order desired by the United States in the sensitive and critical regions. In addition to the regional countries, Russia considers the presence and enmity of any other power as an obstacle and threat to its security and interests. As a result, fighting America and preventing the development of NATO in the region originates from Russia Eurasian Orientation and, consequently, indicative of its offensive approach that tries to nip any feeling of insecurity in the bud. The collapse of the Soviet Union, in fact, changed the conditions in the international system making America a hegemony that rules over the world and spares no effort to keep and preserve the status quo. In contrast, Russia is still thinking of realizing its old dream, i.e., gaining control over the whole world or at least, at the present time, domination and control over Europe and Asia. Therefore, it is not content with the existing situation can use the domino of attaching the regional countries such as Crimea to Russia to realize this dream.

#### Any surprise decision from NATO makes Putin lashout.

Samuel Charap 03-02-2022 [Senior political scientist at RAND; The RAND Blog; “Ensuring Russia’s War with Ukraine Doesn’t Morph into Direct Conflict with NATO;” https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/ensuring-russias-war-with-ukraine-doesnt-morph.html//ZW]

Russia has launched an unprecedented act of aggression against Ukraine. The United States and its allies must respond forcefully. But as they do, they should take into account the possibility of triggering a spiral of escalation that could lead to the only outcome worse than the invasion of Ukraine itself: a hot war between Russia and NATO. Neither Russia nor NATO wants to go to war with the other. But history is rife with examples of states ending up in a war without initially having intended to fight, as well as cases of smaller conflicts sparking broader wars. And the circumstances of the Russian invasion create particularly significant escalation risks. Russia has launched the largest military operation in Europe in at least a generation in a country that borders four NATO allies on land—Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania—and shares a maritime boundary with another—Turkey. With major operations now ramping up, the risk of an accident, such as a Russian military aircraft straying into NATO airspace while conducting combat operations, has grown. Russian cruise missiles have reportedly already hit targets close enough to the Polish border to set off sirens on the other side. A targeting error leading to a strike on NATO territory is far more plausible in the fog of war. The Russian armed forces, now conducting a near-existential struggle, could misinterpret NATO efforts—completely justified under the circumstances—to reinforce frontline allies as an attempt to mount an intervention against them in Ukraine, and might well respond accordingly. If its nuclear forces are really now on a higher alert status, as President Vladimir Putin claims, further guardrails against rapid escalation have been lowered. Ongoing efforts to help the Ukrainians resist Russia's aggression run risks as well. There were reports this week that Ukrainian pilots were to travel to Poland to retrieve gifted Soviet-made jets and fly them back to the fight. Once it became public, the plan set off alarm bells, and was quickly scrapped. But the understandable desire to help—and fast—will persist, and could lead to other similarly risky ideas. Russia's war in Ukraine, in short, raises the risks of an accident, incident, or miscalculation that spirals into a NATO-Russia war. The paranoid nature of Putin's personalistic, autocratic regime further complicates matters. There is little question that he sees the sanctions as part of a campaign to overthrow his government. Fear that such a campaign is ramping up could lead him to retaliate directly. Russian cyber attacks against Western financial institutions could create pressure in the West to escalate, adding to the spiral. Concern about escalation should not stop the West from responding forcefully to Russia's actions. But steps can be taken that might mitigate the risks. First, the U.S. and NATO military chiefs should maintain the channels of communication they have with their Russian counterparts. While many existing consultative mechanisms with Moscow have rightly been severed, these links are essential to avoid miscalculation. Second, during the phase of active Russian combat operations, these channels could be used to provide additional transparency—so long as doing so does not undermine operational security—about the nature of U.S. and NATO force movements to the allied states bordering Ukraine. It is in U.S. and allied interests that the Russian military, at a time when it is operating under extreme pressure, not be surprised by NATO activity and misinterpret a deployment to an ally as an intervention in Ukraine. Third, the West could leverage some sanctions to push Putin to abandon his core war aim of decapitating the Ukrainian government and installing a pro-Russian puppet. Using relief of the central bank sanctions, for example, to compel a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement would not only minimize human suffering in Ukraine, it could also signal the limits of Western intentions, making clear the sanctions are not about overthrowing Putin's regime. Fourth, assistance to the Ukrainian military should be coordinated among allies, carefully calibrated, and conducted outside public view. U.S. and allied military leaders should factor in escalation concerns when deciding what to deliver and how to deliver it. This will be an extremely difficult needle to thread, but it is essential. Putin has led his country into an unprovoked, murderous war with its neighbor. As the West imposes costs, it should do so in a way that avoids a broader war that would cause even more death and destruction.

#### **Putin responds harshly to expansion of military infrastructure.**

Guy Faulconbridge 05-26-2022 [Writing for Reuters, Reuters, “Putin sees no threat from NATO expansion, warns against military build-up,” https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-calls-finland-sweden-joining-nato-mistake-with-far-reaching-consequences-2022-05-16///ZW]

LONDON, May 16 (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin said on Monday that there was no threat to Russia if Sweden and Finland joined NATO but cautioned that Moscow would respond if the U.S.-led alliance bolstered military infrastructure in the new Nordic members. Putin, Russia's paramount leader since 1999, has repeatedly cited the post-Soviet enlargement of the NATO alliance eastwards toward Russia's borders as a reason for the conflict of Ukraine. But Putin, who has in recent months rattled Russia's nuclear sabre at the West over Ukraine, made an unusually calm response to Finland and Sweden's bids to join NATO, the biggest strategic consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine to date. read more "As to enlargement, Russia has no problem with these states - none. And so in this sense there is no immediate threat to Russia from an expansion (of NATO) to include these countries," Putin told the leaders of a Russian-dominated military alliance of former Soviet states. Putin, though, laced his newly found tranquillity on NATO with a warning. "But the expansion of military infrastructure into this territory would certainly provoke our response," Putin said. "What that (response) will be - we will see what threats are created for us," Putin told the leaders of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Kremlin chief's remarkably serene response to one of Russia's most sensitive geopolitical worries - the post-Soviet enlargement of NATO - contrasted to some tougher language from his foreign ministry and senior allies. Before Putin spoke, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said the West should have no illusions that Moscow would simply put up with the Nordic expansion of NATO. Those comments were still being played up on state television. One of Putin's closest allies, former President Dmitry Medvedev, said last month that Russia could deploy nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad if Finland and Sweden joined NATO. read more **NO PROBLEM NATO** Speaking in the Grand Kremlin Palace, Putin read a short speech that touched on NATO and scolded the United States for creating biological laboratories in the former Soviet Union. Putin said Russia had evidence that the United States had been trying to create components of biological weapons in Ukraine, a claim Washington and Kyiv have denied. Besides NATO's "endless expansion policy", Putin said the alliance was reaching far beyond its Euro-Atlantic remit - a trend he said that Russia was following carefully. Moscow says NATO threatens Russia and that Washington has repeatedly ignored the Kremlin's concerns about the security of its borders in the West, the source of two devastating European invasions in 1812 and 1941. Putin says the "special military operation" in Ukraine is necessary because the United States was using Ukraine to threaten Russia through NATO enlargement and Moscow had to defend against the persecution of Russian-speaking people. Putin says assurances were given as the Soviet Union collapsed that the alliance would not expand eastwards toward Russia, a promise he says was a lie. The United States and NATO dispute that such assurances were given explicitly. Kyiv and its Western backers say the claim of persecution of Russian speakers has been exaggerated by Moscow into a pretext for an unprovoked war against a sovereign state. The West says NATO - an alliance of 30 countries including former Warsaw Pact republics such as Poland and Hungary as well as nuclear powers such as the United States, Britain and France - is purely defensive.

#### NATO existence trades off with united Europe--- stability is impossible.

Dylan Donnelly 06-23-22 [Writing for Express, Express, “Putin lashes out at NATO for creating ‘division’ among Europe – ‘Made for confrontation’,” https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1453311/vladimir-Putin-news-nato-europe-division-Crimea-Ukraine-world-war-2-russia-ont//ZW]

The Russian President wrote in the German newspaper Die Zeit to mark 80 years since the Nazi's invaded the Soviet Union. While saying Russia wants to foster relations with a "united" Europe, Mr Putin attacked NATO as a "relic of the Cold War". NATO , also the North Atlantic Alliance, is a military union between 30 European and North American countries that implements the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4, 1949. Mr Putin claimed NATO has dashed any hopes of a united Europe, and stated the body was "created for confrontation". Referencing NATO's expansion, he said: "We hoped that the end of the Cold War would be a common victory for Europe. "But a different approach has prevailed based on the expansion of NATO, a relic of the Cold War. "Since 1999 there have been five more "waves" of NATO expansion, 14 other states joined the alliance, including former Soviet republics, which de facto dashed all hopes for a continent without dividing lines." Referencing efforts to embrace countries like Ukraine, Mr Putin added NATO is responsible for increasing tensions on the continent. He wrote: "The whole system of European security has now degraded significantly. "Tensions are rising, and the risks of a new arms race are becoming real. "We simply cannot afford to carry the burden of past misunderstandings, hard feelings, conflicts, and mistakes. "Our common and indisputable goal is to ensure security on the continent without dividing lines, a common space for equitable cooperation and inclusive development for the prosperity of Europe and the world as a whole." The Russian President also argued many European countries are faced with an "ultimatum" to work with Moscow or the West. Mr Putin sensationally claimed the US and other Western countries "aggressive policy" led to the 2014 Ukraine revolution, which resulted in Russia annexing Crimea. The Ukrainian crisis was sparked when President Viktor Yanukovych suspended preparations for greater integration within the EU, leading to mass protests, in an effort to maintain economic ties to Moscow. In his opinion piece, Mr Putin argued the US's actions in the Ukraine and the EU states support of the protestors led to the annexation of the Crimea from the Ukrainian state. It comes after Mr Putin attended a summit with US President Joe Biden earlier in June. Speaking after the summit, the Russian President said Mr Biden "doesn't miss anything" and informed reporters the talks were productive. But Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Moscow expected the US to keep trying to "contain" Russia, and added: "The [Russian] president's words about the constructive mood during the summit do not indicate that we have moved away from a sober assessment of our bilateral relations with the United States. "Pragmatism and sobriety are most important in these relations. And both suggest that the constructive, positive results of the summit absolutely do not indicate that the United States will abandon its policy of containing Russia." The US and other NATO countries were enraged by Russia's build-up of troops on the border of Ukraine earlier this year. Moscow deployed two armies and three airborne formations to border Ukraine, claiming it was part of readiness drills that would continue for two weeks. Russia's defence minister Sergei Shoigu also said at the time Moscow's exercise was provoked by what he said were efforts by the US and its NATO allies to beef up their forces near Russia's borders, "threatening" Russia. NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg described the deployment as "unjustified, unexplained and deeply concerning".

#### NATO is a cold war relic in Russia.

Nataliya Vasilyeva 06-22-22 [Russian Correspondent, The Telegraph, “Vladimir Putin uses 80th anniversary of Nazi invasion to lash out at Nato,” https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/06/22/vladimir-putin-uses-80th-anniversary-nazi-invasion-lash-nato///ZW]

Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, has used the anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union to lash out at Nato’s expansion in Europe in a clear message to Ukraine. The Russian leader, in an opinion piece published by Germany’s Die Zeit newspaper on Tuesday, exactly 80 years after Nazi troops invaded the Soviet Union, criticised the expansion of Nato as threatening Russia’s security and fostering “Cold War-era dividing lines” in Europe. Moscow has been rattled by the fact that former Soviet allies such as Poland and even ex-Soviet republics including Latvia have become members of the Euro-Atlantic military alliance since the fall of the Soviet Union. Mr Putin lauded Europeans for putting their differences aside after the end of the Second World War and expressed his frustration with what he saw as the West’s attempts to contain Russia. Mr Putin’s article came out the day after Armin Laschet, the frontrunner to become Germany’s next chancellor, gave an interview to the Financial Times calling on the West to “establish a sensible relationship with Russia” and praised Joe Biden, the US President, for reaching out to Mr Putin. Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy, which culminated in the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 and the Kremlin’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, has damaged ties between Russia and the EU. However, Mr Putin blamed Nato’s westward expansion as “the main reason behind a surge in mutual distrust in Europe”. Russia amassed an unusually high number of troops at the border with Ukraine this spring, which was seen as a threat of invasion, but Moscow said it was a response to Nato’s military drills in Europe. Ukraine, which has lost more than 14,000 people in the armed conflict in the country’s east, has been pressing the West for a timeline for its possible accession to Nato, seeing it as the only way to ward off Russian aggression. Mr Putin struck a conciliatory note, apparently inspired by his meeting with Mr Biden in Geneva last week when the two leaders agreed to focus on the few areas of cooperation including arms control that they share to overcome the crisis in their relationship. Mr Putin insisted that security and economic growth in Europe is possible only if all European nations including Russia - which he described as a country that shares “a close cultural and historic bond with Europe” - pull together. "Russia stands for restoring a comprehensive partnership with Europe... and we can't afford to keep on dragging the baggage of frustrations, conflicts and mistakes with us,” he said. “I'm convinced we all have to admit our mistakes and rectify them." Despite coronavirus restrictions, Mr Putin on Tuesday led a ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall to honour the memory of the fallen in the war which killed 27 million people in the Soviet Union.

### AT: Black Sea---2NC

#### NATO’s black sea presence is hollow --- doesn’t fool Russia, assure allies, or constrain behavior --- but Turkey won’t rock the boat and there’s no scenario for tensions emerging

**Istomin 20** [Igor Istomin, “Stepping Up NATO's Presence in the Black Sea Region: Causes and Consequences,” Jan 21, 2020, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/stepping-up-nato-s-presence-in-the-black-sea/]

Returning to the general situation in the Black Sea region, it is worth emphasising once again that NATO’s build-up of military activity is largely symbolic and in essence does not change the balance of power. In military and political terms, the key change in the strategic situation in the region came in 2014: the entry of Crimea into the Russian Federation, among other things, provided an additional impetus for modernisation and the build-up of Russian forces on the peninsula. The geographical location of Crimea itself provides Moscow with a fairly comfortable position in terms of ensuring the military aspects of national security in the Black Sea. In this regard, there is no real reason to reassess Romania’s attempts to stimulate some kind of NATO activity on the southern flank.

An important circumstance, which also corresponds to Russian interests in the Black Sea, is the increased independence of Ankara’s position. Despite the fact that the latter remains a member of NATO, it has distanced itself from the Western allies, especially after the attempted military coup in 2016. Despite the fact that the partnership between Russia and Turkey is saddled with a number of serious contradictions, for Ankara it is not advantageous to aggravate relations with Moscow in a situation where it sees in the Euro-Atlantic partners as almost the main threat to its political regime.

In the current conditions, it is difficult to count on the resumption of the plans for the development of Black Sea cooperation that were born in the 2000s, but the risks of the bloc confrontation spreading in this region should not be overestimated.

#### Lack of NATO and EU coherence blunts effectiveness of deterrence and undermines credibility – US presence is destabilizing, and Russia doesn’t have an incentive to stop meddling.

Grant 20 [Glen Grant, Lt Col (Retd) Glen Grant, formerly British Army, works as a defense and reform expert in Ukraine for the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, 9-9-2020, "The Black Sea region: politics and policy discord," <https://www.mei.edu/publications/black-sea-region-politics-and-policy-discord> //bdom]

I have the good fortune of living in the Baltics and working in the Black Sea region. Compared to the positive NATO effort in the Baltics, the Black Sea region as an operational space is a dangerous conceptual mess for both NATO and the EU. A lack of clarity of purpose confuses countries in the region that really need support in their fight against Russian interference. Neither organization appears to have clear regional policies. They certainly do not have any apparent coordination or even perhaps realistic plans. An added challenge is that the US is driving ideas and organizational change regionally much faster than the NATO Black Sea allies can follow, thereby unbalancing the political military equation. This confusion makes things worse for Ukraine and Georgia.

There is no question as to the threat facing the region: Russia, Russia, Russia. Former US European Army Commander General Ben Hodges summarizes the problem well in an article in War on the Rocks calling the Black Sea the “’launching pad’ for destabilizing operations in Syria and naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Only a foolish pundit would suggest Russia will stop meddling further in the Mediterranean after relative success in Syria and increased deployments into Libya. President Vladimir Putin will happily increase the numbers of African refugees heading to Europe, an act that former SACEUR General Philip Breedlove called weaponizing immigration to destabilize European cohesion. In the popular Russian newspaper Argument Weekly, Serhii Riazonov, a deputy from the Samara Duma and United Russia party, stressed the importance of the Black Sea to Russia. He also drew the conclusion from the recent announcement by NATO of Enhanced Cooperation Partnership for Ukraine that it was not designed to benefit Ukraine, but rather that NATO’s real aim was to secure Ukrainian troops to fight inside Russia. This sort of comment should force NATO and EU planners to sit up and realize that they must concentrate seriously on warfighting in the region, rather than relying on deterrence. After all, without a credible warfighting capability, deterrence is undermined.

Russia is today using the sea as a major theater of war against Ukraine. The Black and Azov Seas are maritime lifelines for Ukraine, allowing it to ship steel and agricultural products to the world. Russia squeezes Ukraine by controlling shipping through the Kerch Strait into the Sea of Azov. Vessels flying NATO and EU member state flags are also affected but these countries are allowing Russia to act with impunity. This both encourages Russia to risk more against them, and gives a clear impression that what she does to Ukraine is politically allowed. Russia has stolen gas rigs on the Black Sea shelf belonging to Ukraine. Most significantly, Crimea is now militarized and serves not only as a stepping-stone into Ukraine, but also as a missile base threatening not only Black Sea countries but much of Europe as well.

The challenge is that the Black Sea, like the Baltic Sea, has no joint commander for peace and war — someone who is focused on thinking about countering Russian challenges in the region. Nor are there suitably placed and focused regional joint headquarters for either the EU or NATO. NATO must create a supreme allied commander (SAC) for both regions — a SACBaltic and SACBlack Sea. The current absence of allied commanders has severe consequences. For the EU, having no military commander means a total abrogation of the collective responsibility for defending its eastern border and for developing a political, or at some point even a military, response to the costly and humiliating shipping problem. The EU today relies totally on sporadic and uncoordinated responses from NATO or individual countries to manage Russian aggression.

There are some EU military programs. Germany provides framework nation divisional support to Romania, while France and Germany are cooperating with other nations in Eurocorps. This soothes the EU, German, and French consciences. In reality, collecting small tactical groupings together may do plenty for the interoperability of those who take part. However, in terms of preparing for warfighting, the constant ‘penny-packeting’ and regular rotation of forces has little benefit for the overall security of the Black Sea or Baltic regions. Arguably, it merely wastes precious resources. The lack of a full-time NATO regional commander in peace and war leaves the US as the primary buffer, responsible, by default, for leading multilateral and bilateral activities. The likely move of a US Stryker brigade into Romania unbalances this equation even more. It diverts NATO and national focus away from the need to improve national contributions both here and likely in Bulgaria also.

Responses from Germany and France do not help. As the two major European military powers on the continent, they benefit from the strong likelihood that their territory will not be invaded by Russia. But their activities against Russia are muddled. Both countries have provided tactical contributions to NATO forces in the Baltics and both are engaged through the Eurocorps with countries in the Black Sea region. But they must develop a more strategic warfighting answer against Russian aggression — tactical responses will only bring grief. As a Baltic country, Germany — which is creating a NATO 2-star Generals command in Rostock — should arguably focus north. France with her vast and recent operational experience should direct her attention eastwards toward the Black Sea, bringing NATO and EU contributions into some sort of operational alignment.

Another key challenge in the Black Sea region is that countries affected by Russia are offering individual tactical solutions — not just in terms of activity, cooperation, and mini-alliances, but also in terms of defense organizations and procurement. This limits Black Sea operational coherence. National development plans are dominated by national political and defense ambitions that are at best coordinated with NATO through administrative processes, but almost never with the EU. Countries certainly do not co-ordinate with their neighbors — relationships that in some cases are on frosty terms outside of NATO exercises. Planning departments within defense ministries are often overwhelmed by the combination of NATO programs, NATO requirements, EU programs, Allied operations, UN operations, bilateral programs, and multinational programs, not to mention grand national procurement ambitions. US support is welcomed and needed, but the cost of having an in-country US presence and dealing with US gifts or defense sales is often completely destabilizing for defense budgets. Most countries still retain ageing Soviet style administrations and lingering Soviet-type officer corps. They lack the human capacity to negotiate complex budget and programming dynamics, not to mention shifting priorities.

The regional approach today is “strategy light.” Responding to Russian, and increasingly unexpected Turkish actions, assumes that deterrence happens through ad-hoc exercises and activities. This systemic incoherence does not help solve, or even improve, the weak and discordant political responses of Ukraine. Diplomatic efforts by NATO and EU countries in Kyiv (and likely Tbilisi also) are devoid of overall unity aimed a common goal. It is little wonder defense issues do not take higher priority in domestic political debates.

Without operational guidance, every Black Sea state is attempting to solve commonly shared problems on their own. Ukraine remains highly vulnerable to Russia with an all-but-non-existent navy and is completely overshadowed by the Russian Black Sea fleet. The US has provided small ships, but Ukraine has no weapons of substance to take aboard, let alone a modern targeting capability. Ukraine’s political and senior military leadership appears increasingly pacifist, seemingly encouraged by European diplomats to be that way. NATO has provided regular support with exercises and port visits, especially from 6th Fleet. The US has taken the Ukraine-Russia situation more seriously than most, providing support with missile ships and training, and recently even air cover from Italy and Romania. UK is now also increasing training support. But from a regional defense and Ukrainian perspective, support still appears sporadic and uncoordinated.

With limited operational focus against Russia, it is unclear what NATO forces such as the 6th Fleet should do when they arrive in the Black Sea region. The program appears to be a public relations exercise, rather than having clear strategy. Progress in regional operational capability is not linear. Regional activities organized by NATO, as well as multilateral and bilateral activities, are lauded by participants as deterrence. While some do strengthen warfighting ability, they are less successful in directly challenging the activities of Russia. Operational dysfunctionality within the EU and NATO continues, helped only in part with improvements to US regional support. The US flag has had no visible deterrent effect on Russian ambitions. Pressure on Donbass, Azov, Moldova, and Georgia strengthens while Russian attempts to pull Turkey into its orbit continue, further confusing the situation.

The lack of clear NATO political and operational guidance in the Black Sea leaves countries with incoherent and usually unbalanced development plans for individual forces. They are at odds over priorities and how their limited budgets should be spent. The NATO mantra is to treat members and partners as “sovereign nations.” They all seek to develop expensive gold standard systems but with seemingly no grasp of cost or often relevance. As Gen. Hodges noted “NATO needs a joint, three-star command in the Black Sea region ... where they wake up every morning smelling Black Sea air ... and can maintain an 'unblinking eye' on the region. ... Speed of recognition of RUS activity is essential to deterrence ... and coord ops”.

#### Defense of the Black Sea isn’t credible, and countries veto proposals to bulk up presence.

Flanagan and Chindea 19 [Flanagan, Stephen J., Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, and Irina A. Chindea, Ph.D. in international relations, Tufts University; M.A. in international relations, Tufts University; B.S. in business administration, ASE Bucharest, Romania. Political scientist with the RAND Corporation, Russia, NATO, and Black Sea Security Strategy: Regional Perspectives from a 2019 Workshop. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF405.html>. //bdom]

The differing and sometimes divergent interests of countries in the Black Sea region make it difficult to frame a unified, sustainable Western strategy to protect common interests and counter malign Russian influence and intimidation. Romania is looking more to what is happening to the north and northeast in Ukraine and Moldova, while Bulgaria is more concerned about developments to the south, including what is happening in Turkey, migration from Syria, and a resurgence of the radical Islamist threat. Nevertheless, most participants agreed at a conceptual level on the importance of crafting and implementing a coherent common strategy, even though there was limited agreement on what the actual elements of such a strategy should be.

The main impediment to defense cooperation among states in the region is the lack of a common threat perception similar to the one the Baltic and other northern European states share. For example, Bulgaria was not supportive of the Romanian proposal in the run-up to the 2016 Warsaw Summit to expand NATO naval exercises in the Black Sea. For its part, Turkey insists on maintaining the status quo in the region, acting as if it is still Russia’s peer in the naval power. In contrast, Ukraine and Georgia are more acutely concerned about the Russian threat, welcomed the Romanian proposal, and support Romania’s advocacy of an increased NATO military presence and expanded regional defense cooperation. Thus, the policy preferences of these two NATO partners (Ukraine and Georgia) are more aligned than are the stances of the three allies (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) in the region.

Furthermore, even as the Baltics and Poland have benefited from a relatively broad EU and NATO acceptance of the looming Russian threat to northern Europe, key EU and European NATO governments show little interest in Black Sea security. Several participants argued that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are more focused on current policy crises such as Brexit, migration, and stabilizing conflict areas in the Middle East and Africa than on the concerns of southeastern European countries.

This lack of a common threat perception translates in NATO force levels in the Black Sea region that most participants felt are inadequate for a credible deterrence. NATO’s tailored forward presence is quite limited, and the more capable European governments seem uninterested in contributing troops to the multinational brigade in Romania or augmenting the NATO maritime presence; the U.S. military presence in Romania is largely a bilateral arrangement.

The lack of common threat perception also stems from the divergent views among Western European nations as to whether the Black Sea region is an integral part of Europe and the European Union or is merely in the EU’s “neighborhood.” Those governments that see the Black Sea region as part of Europe and the EU support policies that promote stability, prosperity, and security in the region, while those that view the region as being only in the “neighborhood” focus on policies limited to stability and avoid pushing back on provocative Russian activities. The latter approach could actually promote long-lasting instability in the region by encouraging Russian assertiveness and outright aggression.

Another hurdle to achieving a common Western strategy concerns the East-West divide in military capabilities. Most of the former Eastern Bloc countries in the Black Sea area have dated military equipment with capabilities that are not on a par with those of Western NATO members.

#### That’s reverse goldilocks

Beauchamp 16 [Zack Beauchamp, senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on foreign policy and international relations, 11-10-2016, "Donald Trump needs to clarify his position on NATO before something scary happens," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/2016/7/21/12247074/donald-trump-nato-war> //bdom]

The nightmare scenario, though, is that Putin’s confidence in NATO is undermined even though the United States under Trump remains committed to defending its treaty allies. That’s the scenario under which misperceptions potentially escalate into an actual war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

#### No impact --- Black Sea tensions only risk escalating if Ukraine tries to coerce the US into opposing Russia --- strategic restraint prevents escalation

**Carpenter 18** [Ted Carpenter, CATO, “Ukraine Doesn’t Deserve America’s Blind Support,” Nov 28, 2018]

In reality, the Kerch Strait incident involves a complex mixture of factors. They include the tense Russian‐​Ukrainian bilateral relationship, Kiev’s broader foreign policy objectives, and Ukraine’s volatile domestic politics.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko had to know that a decision to send three naval vessels through the Kerch Strait would be disruptive. The strait, which connects the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, separates Russia’s Taman Peninsula from the Crimea Peninsula. Despite Moscow’s annexation of the latter in 2014, Kiev still considers Crimea to be Ukrainian territory, a position that the United States and its allies back emphatically. Moreover, passage through the strait is the only oceanic link between Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and those on the Azov. Kiev, not surprisingly, views the strait as international waters. Russia, however, regards the waterway as its own territorial waters and viewed the attempted transit by the three Ukrainian ships as a violation.

Whatever the legal merits of the competing positions regarding sovereignty over Crimea and the status of the Kerch Strait, the reality is that Russia controls that peninsula and is unlikely to ever restore it to Ukraine, despite Western demands. Poroshenko had to know that his attempt to send warships through a narrow passage between what the Kremlin insists are two portions of Russian territory was certain to cause an incident. Why did Kiev risk (if not avidly seek) such a confrontation? And why now? There are several likely motives.

Kiev wants to increase pressure on NATO, and especially the United States, to take a harder stance against Moscow. Despite their official position that the Kremlin must disgorge Crimea and end support for pro‐​Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, Western policy looks increasingly stale and ineffectual. Some European officials even muse that it may be time to reconsider (weaken) the economic sanctions that the West imposed on Russia. President Trump has stated that Russia should be re‐​admitted to the G-7 group of leading economic powers.

Such talk is potentially quite threatening to Ukraine’s interests. Creating an incident that reminds Kiev’s Western supporters (and the rest of the world) of Moscow’s aggressive tendencies makes any prospect of even a limited rapprochement between Russia and either NATO or the European Union less likely.

Ukrainian leaders are especially determined to nurture greater bilateral strategic cooperation with the United States. The notion that the Trump administration has pursued a “soft” policy toward Russia, much less one that amounts to appeasement, has always been overstated. Trump’s initiatives are actually more hardline than those Barack Obama’s administration embraced. That is especially true regarding Washington’s relationship with Kiev. Whereas Obama consistently refused to provide weapons to Ukraine, the Trump administration has approved two major arms sales, one of which included sophisticated anti‐​tank missiles. U.S. troops have participated in joint military exercises with Ukrainian forces, and Secretary of Defense James Mattis concedes that the United States is training Ukrainian units at a base in western Ukraine.

Poroshenko and his associates want to encourage and intensify those trends. They hope that creating a new incident underscoring aggressive Russian conduct will lead the Trump administration to boost arms sales and other forms of bilateral military cooperation. Even if Trump proved reluctant to adopt that course, domestic and international pressure might leave him little choice. Indeed, Western news media outlets excoriated Trump for not immediately condemning Russia as an outright aggressor in the Kerch Strait incident.

Poroshenko thus has ample foreign policy reasons for taking the actions he did in the Kerch Strait. He also has significant political and ideological incentives. His government did not announce the official date for Ukraine’s 2019 presidential election until two days following the naval clash; it is now set for March 31. To say that the timing of the announcement was suspicious is an understatement.

No candidate in the extremely crowded field is likely to exceed the 50 percent mark needed to avoid a runoff, but recent surveys have indicated that Poroshenko is in surprisingly poor political shape. Most polls showed him receiving between 8 and 15 percent of the first‐​round vote. The leading candidate is former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, with Poroshenko running in third. Corruption scandals continue to bedevil his administration, making his re‐​election (or even his ability to make the runoff) far from certain.

In addition to creating a “rally around the flag” effect, thereby boosting Poroshenko’s status, Russian seizure of the Ukrainian vessels gave the president a justification to impose outright martial law in 10 regions of eastern Ukraine—areas likely to be especially hostile to his political prospects. It could also serve as a basis for tightening Ukraine’s already worrisome restrictions on freedom of expression.

That track record should trouble Kiev’s backers in the West. To wage war against eastern separatists, Kiev early on not only instituted military conscription, it arrested critics of that action. Authorities jailed television journalist and blogger Ruslan Kotsaba and charged him with treason for making a video denouncing the conscription law. Kotsaba become Amnesty International’s first “prisoner of conscience” in Ukraine since the 2014 so‐​called Maidan revolution.

The vagueness of the applicable laws (and the absence of any meaningful independent review or right of appeal) has been especially alarming. Indeed, it seems that anyone who disputes the government’s account of the Maidan revolution (especially those who dare to mention the role of ultranationalist, neo‐​fascist elements) or the conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to be silenced.

Bogdan Ovcharuk, a spokesperson for Amnesty International’s Kiev office, expressed the concerns of many proponents of freedom of expression when he told the BBC: “This is a very slippery slope indeed. It’s one thing to restrict access to texts advocating violence, but in general banning books because their authors have views deemed unacceptable to politicians in Kiev…is deeply dangerous.” The consequences of such a campaign, he warned, were certain to damage the fabric of liberty.

Yet the Kiev government’s restrictive policies continue unabated. In September 2015, Ukrainian authorities issued an order banning 34 journalists and seven bloggers from even entering the country. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that the newly publicized list was merely part of a larger blacklist that contained the names of 388 individuals and more than a hundred organizations that were barred from entry on the grounds of “national security” and allegedly posing a threat to Ukraine’s “territorial integrity.”

Human Rights Watch criticized the Kiev government in September 2017 for imposing yet more restrictions on journalists, especially foreign correspondents. The Poroshenko government even pushed through legislation barring criticism of Ukraine’s past, including the role that ultra‐​nationalist guerilla leader (and Nazi collaborator) Stepan Bandera and his followers played in World War II. Censorship provisions and other media restrictions may become even more widespread and arbitrary with Poroshenko’s new declaration of martial law.

Ukraine’s Western admirers typically ignore such evidence of authoritarian conduct, since it does not fit with their portrayal of the country as an enlightened member of the democratic community. The reality is that Ukraine epitomizes what CNN analyst Fareed Zakaria has aptly described as an “illiberal democracy.” The Poroshenko regime certainly does not warrant unquestioned Western backing. Kiev is not above engaging in provocations to serve either its political leadership’s domestic agenda or its foreign policy objectives. The United States does not have vital strategic or moral interests at stake in the overall Ukraine‐​Russia quarrel, much less the latest parochial spat in the Kerch Strait. A cautious, restrained posture is appropriate.

### AT: Ukraine---2NC

#### Expansion of NATO contributed to the war in Ukraine.

Thomas L. Friedman 02-21-2022 [Foreign Affairs Op-Ed Columnist, The New York Times, “This is Putin’s War. But America and NATO Aren’t Innocent Bystanders,” https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/21/opinion/putin-ukraine-nato.html//ZW]

When a major conflict like Ukraine breaks out, journalists always ask themselves: “Where should I station myself?” Kyiv? Moscow? Munich? Washington? In this case, my answer is none of these. The only place to be for understanding this war is inside Russian President Vladimir Putin’s head. Putin is the most powerful, unchecked Russian leader since Stalin, and the timing of this war is a product of his ambitions, strategies and grievances. But, with all of that said, America is not entirely innocent of fueling his fires. How so? Putin views Ukraine’s ambition to leave his sphere of influence as both a strategic loss and a personal and national humiliation. In his speech on Monday, Putin literally said Ukraine has no claim to independence, but is instead an integral part of Russia — its people are “connected with us by blood, family ties.” Which is why Putin’s onslaught against Ukraine’s freely elected government feels like the geopolitical equivalent of an honor killing. Putin is basically saying to Ukrainians (more of whom want to join the European Union than NATO): “You fell in love with the wrong guy. You will not run off with either NATO or the E.U. And if I have to club your government to death and drag you back home, I will.” This is ugly, visceral stuff. Nevertheless, there is a back story here that is relevant. Putin’s attachment to Ukraine is not just mystical nationalism. In my view, there are two huge logs fueling this fire. The first log was the ill-considered decision by the U.S. in the 1990s to expand NATO after — *indeed, despite —* the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the second and far bigger log is how Putin cynically exploited NATO’s expansion closer to Russia’s borders to rally Russians to his side to cover for his huge failure of leadership. Putin has utterly failed to build Russia into an economic model that would actually attract its neighbors, not repel them, and inspire its most talented people to want to stay, not get in line for visas to the West. We need to look at both of these logs. Most Americans paid scant attention to the expansion of NATO in the late 1990s and early 2000s to countries in Eastern and Central Europe like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, all of which had been part of the former Soviet Union or its sphere of influence. It was no mystery why these nations would want to be part of an alliance that obligated the U.S. to come to their defense in the event of an attack by Russia, the rump successor to the Soviet Union. The mystery was why the U.S. — which throughout the Cold War dreamed that Russia might one day have a democratic revolution and a leader who, however haltingly, would try to make Russia into a democracy and join the West — would choose to quickly push NATO into Russia’s face when it was weak. A very small group of officials and policy wonks at that time, myself included, asked that same question, but we were drowned out. The most important, and sole, voice at the top of the Clinton administration asking that question was none other than the defense secretary, Bill Perry. Recalling that moment years later, Perry in 2016 told a conference of The Guardian newspaper: “In the last few years, most of the blame can be pointed at the actions that Putin has taken. But in the early years I have to say that the United States deserves much of the blame. Our first action that really set us off in a bad direction was when NATO started to expand, bringing in Eastern European nations, some of them bordering Russia. “At that time, we were working closely with Russia and they were beginning to get used to the idea that NATO could be a friend rather than an enemy … but they were very uncomfortable about having NATO right up on their border and they made a strong appeal for us not to go ahead with that.” On May 2, 1998, immediately after the Senate ratified NATO expansion, I called George Kennan, the architect of America’s successful containment of the Soviet Union. Having joined the State Department in 1926 and served as U.S. ambassador to Moscow in 1952,Kennan was arguably America’s greatest expert on Russia. Though 94 at the time and frail of voice, he was sharp of mind when I asked for his opinion of NATO expansion. I am going to share Kennan’s whole answer: “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war. I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the founding fathers of this country turn over in their graves. “We have signed up to protect a whole series of countries, even though we have neither the resources nor the intention to do so in any serious way. [NATO expansion] was simply a lighthearted action by a Senate that has no real interest in foreign affairs. What bothers me is how superficial and ill informed the whole Senate debate was. I was particularly bothered by the references to Russia as a country dying to attack Western Europe. “Don’t people understand? Our differences in the Cold War were with the Soviet Communist regime. And now we are turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history to remove that Soviet regime. And Russia’s democracy is as far advanced, if not farther, as any of these countries we’ve just signed up to defend from Russia. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are — but this is just wrong.” It’s EXACTLY what has happened. To be sure, post-Cold War Russia evolving into a liberal system — the way post-World War II Germany and Japan did — was hardly a sure thing. Indeed, given Russia’s scant experience with democracy, it was a long shot. But some of us then thought it was a long shot worth trying, because even a less-than-democratic Russia — if it had been included rather than excluded from a new European security order — might have had much less interest or incentive in menacing its neighbors. Of course, none of this justifies Putin’s dismemberment of Ukraine. During Putin’s first two terms as president — from 2000 to 2008 — he occasionally grumbled about NATO expansion but did little more. Oil prices were high then, as was Putin’s domestic popularity, because he was presiding over the soaring growth of Russian personal incomes after a decade of painful restructuring and impoverishment following the collapse of communism. But across the last decade, as Russia’s economy stagnated, Putin either had to go for deeper economic reforms, which might have weakened his top-down control, or double down on his corrupt crony capitalist kleptocracy. He chose the latter, explained Leon Aron, a Russia expert at the American Enterprise Instituteand the author of “Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life,” who is now writing a book about the future of Putin’s Russia. And to both cover and distract from that choice, Putin shifted the basis of his popularity from “being the distributor of Russia’s newfound wealth and an economic reformer to the defender of the motherland,” Aron said. And right when Putin opted for domestic political reasons to become a nationalist avenger and a permanent “wartime president,” as Aron put it, what was waiting there for him to grasp onto was the most emotive threat to rally the Russian people behind him: “The low-hanging fruit of NATO expansion.” And he has dined out on it ever since, even though he knows that NATO has no plans to expand to include Ukraine. Countries and leaders usually react to humiliation in one of two ways — aggression or introspection. After China experienced what it called a “century of humiliation” from the West, it responded under Deng Xiaoping by essentially saying: “We’ll show you. We’ll beat you at your own game.” When Putin felt humiliated by the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, he responded: “I’ll show you. I’ll beat up Ukraine.” Yes, it’s all more complicated than that, but my point is this: This is Putin’s war. He’s a bad leader for Russia and its neighbors. But America and NATO are not just innocent bystanders in his evolution.

#### Failure in Ukraine has made Putin a loose-cannon.

Jeff Seldin 03-23-2022 [Jeff Seldin serves as VOA’s National Security Correspondent tracking developments in intelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber since March 2015, following a stint covering the Pentagon, Voice of America, “NATO Fears Russia’s Failures in Ukraine Making Putin More Dangerous,” https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-fears-russia-failures-in-ukraine-making-putin-more-dangerous/6498217.html//ZW]

WASHINGTON — Senior Western officials are increasingly alarmed that Russia's losses in Ukraine are making President Vladimir Putin more dangerous, some going as far as to compare him to a caged animal ready to lash out. The warnings, from Washington and Brussels, come as new intelligence estimates suggest that up to 20% of Russian troops sent into Ukraine have been killed, wounded or captured as Ukraine fights Moscow to a near standstill. "I don't know if you can go as far [as to say] stalemate, but it's clear that after one month, Russia has achieved almost none of their strategic objectives," said a senior NATO official, who spoke to reporters Wednesday on the condition of anonymity in order to discuss intelligence. "They are stalled in Kyiv. They are stalled in Kharkiv. They are stalled in Chernihiv," the official said. And in a break with some U.S. defense officials, who have declined to talk about Russian casualties in Ukraine because of “low confidence” in the estimates, NATO officials say the price on the battlefield has been high. NATO on Wednesday estimated that between 7,000 and 15,000 Russian troops have been killed in battle, basing the assessment on intelligence from Ukraine and its own observations, including information accidentally released by Moscow. When wounded, captured and missing soldiers are factored in, the number of Russian troops taken off the battlefield is between 30,000 and 40,000, the alliance believes. But Western officials warn that rather than pull back, Putin has decided to respond to failure with even greater brutality and tactics reminiscent of a previous era. "They are achieving more results in the south, but the price of it is absolutely horrendous," the senior NATO official said, accusing Moscow of trying to carpet-bomb the Ukrainian city of Mariupol into submission. "What they do is World War II, 70-year-old techniques," the official said. "To reach this extreme, you need to be cornered and you need to be pushed to break all moral human rules to go to such brutality." The official further warned that Russia's failure to quickly subjugate Ukraine is feeding into Putin's already deep hatred of Western values, increasing the chances he may choose to expand the conflict beyond Ukraine. "The alliance is absolutely at risk," the official said. There is growing concern that Putin may turn to weapons of mass destruction, whether they be nuclear, chemical or biological. "Russia must stop its nuclear saber rattling. This is dangerous and it is irresponsible," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters in Brussels Wednesday, ahead of an extraordinary meeting of alliance heads of state. "Any use of nuclear weapons will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict," Stoltenberg said. "NATO is there to protect and defend all allies, and we convey a very clear message to Russia that nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought." Putin put Russia's nuclear deterrence forces on high alert just three days after Russian tanks first rolled into Ukraine, and some Russian officials have floated the idea of using tactical nuclear weapons if necessary. "If it is an existential threat for our country, then it can be used in accordance with our concept," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told the U.S.-based cable news channel CNN on Tuesday. U.S. defense officials said earlier this week that so far, they had seen no movement by Russia that would cause them to change Washington's own nuclear deterrence posture. But the U.S. has expressed growing concern about the possibility Russia will use chemical weapons. "I think it's a real threat," U.S. President Joe Biden told reporters Wednesday in Washington before leaving the White House to attend the NATO summit in Brussels. While not downplaying the danger, a senior U.S. defense official cautioned Wednesday that, at this point, a Russian attack using chemical or biological weapons does not appear to be looming. “We haven't seen any imminent signs that there's going to be a chem-bio [chemical or biological] event caused by the Russians,” the official told reporters, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information. NATO officials, however, said the alliance has reason to believe an eventual attack is not out of the question and that they are preparing for two equally frightening scenarios. "One is what is openly called a false flag operation — this would be an accident on a chemical plant," the senior NATO official said, pointing to the large amounts of ammonia, nitrates and other agricultural chemicals in Ukraine. "If you have a massive release of those agents, it is very dangerous for the population," the official added, warning that chemical clouds could then put other countries in the region at risk. But NATO is also worried Russia could throw caution to the wind and use missiles or shells to target Ukraine with highly lethal neurotoxins. "When you use them, they are so characteristic that the attribution is immediate," the official said, adding that the biggest question for Western defense officials is whether Russia is going to want to stay below the threshold of attribution for the weapons it unleashes.

### Cyber Link---1NC/2NC

#### NATO cyber control causes escalation.

Robert M. Lee and Thomas Rid 11-04-14 [Robert M Lee was an active-duty USAF Cyber Warfare Operations Officer who has led multiple cyberspace operations programmes in the Air Force and US Intelligence Community. Currently he is CEO and co-founder of Dragos, a global technology leader in cybersecurity for industrial controls systems, Thomas Rid was a professor in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Currently he is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The RUSI Journal, “OMG Cyber! Thirteen Reasons Why Hype Makes for Bad Policy,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2014.969932#b0001//ZW]

Eleven: Hype Escalates Conflict Government, military and industry leaders are consequently able to make wild claims without providing evidence. This has an escalatory effect. ‘We're in a pre-9/11 moment, in some respects, with cyber,’ said John Carlin, assistant attorney general for national security in the Justice Department in Aspen, Colorado in July.25 He did not provide concrete details to back up his claim. Just weeks after Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), USAF General Philip Breedlove, made comments about Russia's use of cyber in doing so. He told the *New York Times* that cyber-warfare had been used to isolate the Ukrainian military on the Crimean peninsula.26 A month later he revisited these claims, stating that cyber was a critical part of Russia's actions. To quote Breedlove:27 When they [Russia] took Crimea, cyber was a part of a well-planned, total decapitation of Crimea from the command and control structure of Ukraine. Ukraine was absolutely disconnected from being able to do anything with their forces in that area. Cyber was one of three tools used, and used quite exquisitely. Consequently, the Atlantic Alliance is updating its cyber-defence policy – a point confirmed at the recent NATO summit in Wales. A very serious cyberattack, some in the Atlantic Alliance seem to suggest, should be treated like an invasion. ‘For the first time we state explicitly that the cyber-realm is covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the collective defence clause’, said Jamie Shea, NATO's deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, in June.28 At first glance, this statement appears to be meant as a deterrent. However, deterrence does not seem to apply: to deter, a statement needs to be clear and backed by credible threat of punishment. So far, NATO is doing the reverse: ‘We do not say in exactly which circumstances or what the threshold of the attack has to be to trigger a collective NATO response,’ Shea said, ‘and we do not say what that collective NATO response should be’.29 A vague but high bar for cyber-attacks also implicitly legitimises ongoing espionage attacks as acceptable and minor. Moreover, the vast majority of cyber-attacks also do not fall into NATO's remit in the first place: espionage and cyber-crime are problems for intelligence agencies and law enforcement, not for a military alliance. For militants and the Kremlin, the subtext is clear: cyber matters; better up your game. NATO – among others – is escalating a problem that *someone else* will have to solve.

#### Emerging tech---specifically cyber and space--- increases the risk of miscalc with Russia.

Caitlin Talmadge 08-22-2019 [Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University, as well as Senior Non-Resident Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 42, “Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for today,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631811//ZW]

Implications for the future Building on the findings from the Cold War cases, this section examines how emerging technologies such as precision, stealth, remote sensing, cyber, and other forms of electronic warfare might influence intra-war escalation risks today.48 The analysis suggests that emerging technologies could under some circumstances contribute to the perception of first-mover advantages, potentially generating inadvertent pressures for conventional or even nuclear escalation, as in the first causal chain. Overall, however, this danger seems unlikely to arise spontaneously as a function of technology alone. Rather, technology seems likely to be an intervening variable that could enable or accelerate escalatory pressures originating elsewhere, particularly in state policies or military doctrines that intentionally seek to manipulate escalatory risk. This possibility, outlined in the second causal chain, does not mean that concerns about new technologies are unwarranted, but it does suggest that the causal role of technology may be weaker than often claimed. The digital networks on which great power militaries increasingly rely represent one of the most worrisome current developments.49 Now usually referred to as ‘cyber,’ these capabilities reflect a long line of developments in electronic warfare that are powerful in their own right but also support other important capabilities such as precision and remote sensing. In combination, these developments could in the future prompt inadvertent intra-war escalation because of the advantages that would accrue to the side that prevented its adversary from using these networks as early as possible in a war. The heart of the issue is that states such as Russia, China, and the United States increasingly have or will have the ability to precisely target or operate weapons systems from ever-longer distances, e.g., missiles that can attack targets over the horizon (OTH), or integrated air defense systems (IADS) that can detect incoming aircraft long before they reach their intended targets. The most efficient way to counter these threats is to rapidly destroy or disable the C2 networks and related assets that enable them to operate, which was the basic premise of the much-criticized US Air-Sea Battle concept.50 The potential danger is that the sort of extended range engagement envisioned by Air-Sea Battle or similar concepts might unavoidably expand the geographic scope of warfare – a form of horizontal escalation. It also could raise risks of vertical escalation in the nuclear or conventional domains, as efforts to limit an adversary’s long-distance strike capability might also hinder the adversary’s other conventional capabilities or even its nuclear force. For example, in a future US-China conflict, the United States is very likely to want to attack the radars, bases, launch sites, and C2 networks that enable China to precisely launch missiles within and beyond the first island chain, even if the conflict begins well away from mainland China, over Taiwan or in the East or South China Seas.51 The earlier in the war the United States attacks China’s long-range strike capability, the better off it will be, especially given that China would likely be trying to conduct reciprocal attacks on US capabilities. Of course, China’s anticipation of this dynamic only further incentivizes it to launch as much as it can as early as it can. A war at sea could thus quickly become a war on land, potentially even raising risks of nuclear escalation if the US starts to erode capabilities relevant to China’s nuclear arsenal – simply because of improvements in long-range conventional precision targeting on both sides.52 The United States could face a similar situation with respect to potential adversary air defenses. Imagine that the United States was seeking to roll back Russian aggression in the Baltics. As Russian air defenses are able to track and target US aircraft at increasing distances, US incentives to destroy key nodes in the Russian IADS as early as possible in a war will increase – even though those nodes are likely to be located in Russia (including the enclave of Kaliningrad).53 The United States may face the difficult choice of not controlling the airspace above an ally it is trying to defend, or expanding the conventional war to include attacks on Russian territory.54 The former would be suicidal, but the latter would be highly escalatory. Moreover, the United States will likely feel pressure to take such steps as early as possible in the war, on the assumption that Russia will be engaged in a reciprocal effort to disable US networks. Even if Russia did not then escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks on its territory, Russia might launch attacks on NATO member states or on major NATO military assets that it might otherwise have avoided.55 Of course, US efforts to destroy Russian ground-based radars relevant to Russian air defenses also could deny the Russians early warning of potential attacks on their nuclear forces. This situation could heighten pressures for Russian nuclear escalation as well.56 Nevertheless, these sorts of actions by themselves would be unlikely to lead automatically to nuclear escalatory pressure on adversaries, as the stronger claims about technology would have it. In the future, as in the Cold War, other variables, such as the presence of broader, deliberately developed US counterforce capabilities, would be necessary as well. In the face of well-documented US advances in precision, remote sensing, and computing, adversaries’ confidence in the security of their residual nuclear forces is likely to decline substantially, rendering the potential nuclear implications of conventional attacks much more worrisome. As US capabilities continue to improve – and in particular as satellite imaging using synthetic aperture radar enables the United States to better track land-based mobile targets, including transporter erector launchers, with increasing accuracy and over wider swaths of territory – this insecurity on the part of adversaries is likely to grow.57 Improved US counterforce technologies also could intensify pressures on adversaries to pursue destabilizing new conventional capabilities that could then have their own inadvertent escalation implications. For example, if countries such as China or Russia anticipate that the United States might use space-based assets to conduct a counterforce campaign in the midst of a conventional war, those countries will have stronger incentives to develop anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Adversaries’ acquisition of those capabilities could in turn generate pressure back on the United States to conduct any conventional attacks reliant on space-based assets – even those having nothing to do with counterforce – as early as possible in a conflict.58 The result could be a war with much greater prospects for vertical escalation even below the nuclear threshold. These inadvertent dangers notwithstanding, great powers could use any of the technologies just discussed to pursue intentional escalation as well. For example, states could deliberately leverage the ability to short circuit adversary C2 networks and/or to degrade adversary nuclear capabilities as a means of coercion in wartime. States might believe that by conducting conventional military operations in ways that have these additional effects, they could force their adversaries to capitulate more rapidly than otherwise would be the case. Moreover, they might believe that the prospect of such leverage could convince opponents not to initiate conflict in the first place. This sort of thinking may in fact have undergirded aspects of the US Air Sea Battle concept. Indeed, it is telling that the United States has embraced more escalatory and expansive concepts for conventional warfare despite the availability of alternative concepts that might stand a better chance of keeping conflict limited.59 Similarly, China and Russia could structure their military forces in ways that reduced the linkages between conventional and nuclear forces, but they both seem to be doing the opposite. For example, despite a recent force reorganization that afforded opportunities to better separate its nuclear and conventional missile forces, China continues to intertwine them, including developing a new missile that likely can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.60 Likewise, Russia continues to station air defense assets in Kaliningrad.61 All three states seem to be making efforts, both technological and otherwise, to convince opponents that there is no ‘safe’ way to fight a conventional war against a state with nuclear weapons. This behavior again casts technology as more of an intervening enabler than an independent driver of escalatory danger. If the past is any guide, then, emerging conventional technologies could make future inadvertent intra-war escalation more likely in cases where technologies create the perception of first-mover advantages. However, past cases also demonstrate that new technology often merely enables intentional escalation that states would undertake in some other form even in the absence of technology, in which case technology should not be considered the key driver of escalatory behavior. It may be necessary for escalation in some instances, but far from sufficient, and in some cases it is likely to be neither necessary nor sufficient. Rather, the strategic and political contexts in which new technologies are adopted would be most pivotal, and even the same technology could have quite different implications for escalation depending on these factors and the stakes involved. This finding does not mean that concern about new technologies is unwarranted but does imply that controlling or limiting technology will not necessarily control or limit escalation.

### Yes Lashout/Miscalc---2NC

#### Putin decline in power causes lash out.

Łukasz Kulesa 2018 [Research Director at the European Leadership Network. Previously, he worked as the Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, 02-2018, The European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17437.pdf//ZW]

SCENARIO 2: Internal legitimacy crisis of the regime This might involve the initiation of a “small victorious war” for national consolidation purposes or come as a result of a deepening internal political or economic crisis. Yet, the depth of the internal crisis which would force Russia to attack NATO would need to be enormous to make it an appealing option. With regards to the manufacturing of a “small victorious war”, Russian history (and the Russo-Japanese war specifically) might advise against such a course of action, as it might end in humiliation rather than victory. There would also be other, weaker opponents to engage if the current or a new leadership sought legitimacy through successful military operations abroad, with the Syrian intervention as an example. One development to watch might be the emergence of a “party of war” within the Russian leadership at the end of the Putin era or in the post-Putin period which might push for a more assertive military confrontation with the West.

#### Miscalc increases the risk of war.

Alan Whitehorn 05-2022 [Alan Whitehorn is an emeritus professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada, The Centre for International and Defence Policy, “Reflections on Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Foreign and Military Policy: Exploring Motivations, Factors, and Explanations,” https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/sites/cidpwww/files/uploaded\_files/OP69-Whitehornweb.pdf//ZW]

For two decades, Putin had sought to reverse the Western drift of Kyiv, particularly the eastern extension of NATO, and most recently demanded the demilitarization and the so-called “de-Nazification” of Ukraine.66 For Moscow, the latter meant removing the role of Ukrainian nationalists. He threatened war if the Zelensky government did not yield, but the youthful and previously untested Ukrainian leader stood firm, despite the hundreds of thousands of Russian troops assembled on the border in February 2022. Putin, an aging, increasingly isolated, and angry totalitarian ruler, unleashed a military assault on the Ukrainian democratic state. The initial twin goals of a coup and installing a compliant puppet regime failed. Subsequently, Putin opted for a slower and more brutal three-pronged invasion campaign from the North, East, and South. Increasingly, the aggressive Russian battle plan has targeted the Ukrainian civilian population with massive artillery and aerial bombardments, cutting off electricity, fuel, and food. It is a war of aggression and involves war crimes against civilians. It even put at grave risk Europe’s largest nuclear power station and raised the nightmarish spectre of a continental environmental disaster. His bellicose threat of nuclear weapons escalation is chilling. Putin’s initial territorial goals included expanding the strategic Crimean naval outpost of Sevastopol that dominates the northern shores of the Black Sea, re-asserting full military control over the Sea of Azov, and providing land bridges east to Russia and west to Transnistria, the breakaway Russian-dominated Moldovan state. In so doing, Putin sought to reduce Ukraine to a landlocked and increasingly vulnerable regime. It seems his “real-politik” aim was at least to bifurcate Ukraine into two halves, divided by the Dnipro/Dnieper River. In so doing, Putin would greatly expand upon his Donetsk and Luhansk puppet states. Ultimately, if he cannot control Ukraine or at least turn it into an unarmed, neutral buffer state, it seems he would prefer to make it a wasteland. Echoing Stalin in the 1940s, Putin seems to have set his sights on establishing a new Russian bloc, ranging from Belarus in the North to Crimea and Abkhazia in the South. In a challenge and response international relations dynamic, NATO has been re-energized, re-unified, and re-armed. Germany’s geo-political posture towards the East reoriented and military expenditures greatly increased. Ironically, Putin has fostered a stronger and more determined adversary. There is a growing gulf and increasingly polarized military divide between the US-led NATO countries in the West and Moscow and its satellite states in the East. It seems like the beginning of a new Cold War or even a “clash of civilizations,”67 if we do not rapidly escalate into a hot war, either by design or by accident.68 It seems the “Bloodlands” of Europe continue to be a focus of inter-state rivalry, tensions, and conflict.

#### Russia would pre-emptive strike.

Łukasz Kulesa 2018 [Research Director at the European Leadership Network. Previously, he worked as the Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, 02-2018, The European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17437.pdf//ZW]

SCENARIO 1: Perceived necessity of a preventive strike This might come as a consequence of the Russian leadership concluding that either a particular development or a totality of developments in different domains will result in the West gaining a decisive strategic advantage over Russia, opening the way for Western coercion, attack, or the initiation of “regime change”. Such developments might include the rise of a powerful internal opposition movement or regional irredentism, a major concentration of forces or a qualitative upgrade of NATO offensive potential directed at Russia, or the perceived emergence of a direct challenge to Russian command and control or nuclear deterrence potential. A Russian siege mentality and the level of paranoia of the leadership, fuelled by memories of Kosovo and Libya and strengthened by a selective information feed, could play a role in forming a picture of an inevitable conflict and push Russian leaders towards “preventive” action. The conditions for reaching such a conclusion would however be extreme. It would probably come only after the leadership concluded that other measures for countering Western advances have been exhausted.

#### “Escalate to win” doctrine ensures pre-emptive strike.

Anya Loukianova Fink and Olga Oliker 2020 [Anya Loukianova Fink is a Research Analyst at CNA and a Research Associate at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). She holds a Ph.D. in international security and economic policy from the University of Maryland, College Park, Olga Oliker is Director of the Europe and Central Asia Program at the International Crisis Group and an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 2020, “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More,” https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/149/2/37/27311/Russia-s-Nuclear-Weapons-in-a-Multipolar-World//ZW]

Are there scenarios for Russian nuclear use short of a large-scale strategic exchange? Russia, after all, maintains a significant arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It includes a number of dual-capable systems, such as the aforementioned precision-strike cruise missiles and air/missile defense systems that could perform nonstrategic nuclear missions. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, Western analysts have pointed out statements made by Russian officials that seem to highlight the dangers presented by Russian nuclear weapons, and noted increased Russian exercises, potentially with nonstrategic nuclear weapons.18 Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons are a topic of extensive debate among the Western analytical community, and even the authors of this essay diverge on this issue. A number of prominent Western analysts, including Brad Roberts in this volume of Dædalus, argue that Russia envisions a fruitful first-and-limiteduse of nuclear weapons, an approach they describe as an “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” doctrine. These analysts are especially concerned about the prospect of Russian territorial aggression against a NATO ally, followed by a limited nuclear strike to prevent the United States and its NATO allies from coming to the ally’s rescue. They argue that the United States currently does not have limited nuclear options that are sufficiently flexible, tailored, or survivable to deter Russia from engaging in this behavior.

### AT: Deterrence/NATO Readiness Solves---2NC

#### Increasing NATO readiness causes inadvertant escalation.

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SCENARIO 3: Inadvertent conflict This may be the most likely scenario for the breakout of conflict. The probability of an inadvertent conflict is greatly increased not only by the close proximity of Russian and NATO forces, but also by the fact that Russia and NATO have been adapting their military postures towards early reaction, thus making rapid escalation more likely to happen. There are multiple ways in which both sides can misread or misjudge the developments and actions of the other side during a crisis. This may be made more likely by the high level of mistrust and also the fear of losing a confrontation. Russia might be afraid of the internal consequences of a display of weakness and loss of face if it backed down during a crisis. For NATO, a perception that it was outsmarted by Russia because it did not show enough resolve could have fateful consequences for the future of the Alliance. That in itself is likely to stiffen NATO’s resolve. While NATO might be more willing to pause and re-assess the situation, it would be under severe pressure from some Allies, and also its military commanders, to increase the readiness of its forward deployed forces and move reinforcements in before Russia denies NATO such an option. “There are multiple ways in which both sides can misread or misjudge the actions of the other side during a crisis.” Also, while Russia and to an increasing extent NATO are trying to coordinate cross-domain actions for maximum effect, the dynamics of cross-domain escalation will be difficult to control. Thus, caught in an action-reaction dynamic to which they have contributed but are not able to control, the sides could decide to move to the level of a military conflict. Even more worryingly, such a passage from crisis to conflict might be sparked by the actions of regional actors or military commanders at local levels or come as a consequence of an unexpected incident or accident As a consequence, both sides can, in the “fog” of a crisis, end up attributing more malign intentions to limited or inadvertent actions by the opponent, assuming the opponents’ goals to be more extensive than they appear, and extending their own objectives as the crisis expands.

#### Inadvertent escalation can’t be deterred.

Forrest E. Morgan et. al 2008 [Forrest E. Morgan has been a lecturer at the Carnegie Mellon University Institute for Politics and Strategy since 2017, Karl P. Mueller is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Evan S. Medeiros is a senior advisor to the China program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Kevin L. Pollpeter is an author for the RAND Corporation, and Roger Cliff is Research Professor of Indo-Pacific Affairs at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, Chapter 2 of Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century, RAND Corporation, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg614af.9//ZW][

Inadvertent escalation cannot be deterred (though the actions that could lead to it might be), because it is not the result of decisionmakers choosing to escalate but, rather, failing to realize that there is a choice to be made. Thus, to reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation, the adversary does not need to be frightened but, instead, enlightened— or, more accurately, it must first be enlightened, after which deterrence may or may not still be required, depending on whether the action still holds appeal once its escalatory potential is made clear. Several factors make this more problematic in practice than it may appear at first glance, however. One is that an inadvertent escalation risk may not be recognized in advance by any party in a conflict. In 1950, the United States did not recognize the likelihood that China would intervene in Korea if UN forces continued advancing north; but Beijing, which had tried, too subtly as it turned out, to communicate its intention to enter the war, did not realize that the situation was not understood in Washington. In 1914, no one other than the German army could have explained to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg that mobilizing to invade France meant that its troops would march into Belgium. In other cases, no one at all on either side may realize that a course of action (COA) is potentially escalatory until it is carried out, especially if it is a less-than-obvious possibility beforehand. Another common obstacle to such strategic explanation is that it may appear to be risky to announce or acknowledge one’s political or military vulnerabilities. It was a relatively straightforward matter for a U.S. political scientist to warn that conventional war in Europe might leave the Soviet Union vulnerable to a nuclear first strike to a degree that could make Moscow dangerously insecure. However, it would have been unthinkable for Soviet leaders to make the same suggestion. Given these challenges, minimizing the risks of inadvertent escalation as a result both of one’s own actions and those of the adversary potentially involves several elements. One is working to recognize in advance the paths by which inadvertent escalation might occur in a particular situation, which depends on collecting and, especially, analyzing intelligence about the adversary’s capabilities and possible behavior, as well as analyzing one’s own possible actions with attention to their potentially escalatory effects. Another is sensitizing leaders, strategists, and planners to the possibility and nature of inadvertent escalation in general and its potential risks in specific contingencies so that they will take these considerations into account when making decisions and plans. Finally, there is the problem of warning adversaries about inadvertent escalation risks they may not have recognized.

#### Russia won’t de-escalate.

Łukasz Kulesa 2018 [Research Director at the European Leadership Network. Previously, he worked as the Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, 02-2018, The European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17437.pdf//ZW]

Conflict termination Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not survive the first hours of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the other side’s willingness to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs, especially once both sides start committing their political capital and resources and the casualties accumulate. “Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not surivive the first hours of an actual conflict.” With regards to Russia, Moscow would most likely be approaching the conflict with a clearer concept of its war aims and thus develop better-formed views on conflict termination. It would seek to establish escalation dominance and confront NATO with a binary choice of either accepting defeat or further intensification of fighting. Such intensification might involve a move to the nuclear level, but Russia would also have conventional escalation options, such as conventional deep strikes. At the same time, it should be highlighted that Russia is unlikely to start a conflict which involves a high degree of uncertainty about its final outcome and carries a risk of military defeat. Russia cannot safely assume that US-led NATO would act with restraint, nor could it be sure that the Alliance would be ready to surrender and terminate a conflict early. For internal reasons Russia cannot afford to lose a “big war”, so the most prudent option would generally be not to initiate such a conflict in the first place. Such logic could, however, get lost in some of the hybrid scenarios and scenarios of an inadvertent outbreak of a conflict. On the NATO side, conflict termination has not been the focus of close attention, as the Alliance has concentrated in recent years on strengthening deterrence and probing the issue of defence. As one of the workshop participants put it, “NATO is in the deterring Russia business not in the winning a war with Russia business”. This is not a new problem. War termination proved to be a difficult subject for the Alliance in the Cold War, as it involved delicate questions about maintaining NATO’s political cohesion and dealing with the consequences of major nuclear exchanges. Nevertheless, NATO’s ability to persevere in a conflict should not be underestimated. Opinions that NATO would collapse following a Russian first strike seem to be based more on stereotypes about the weakness of Western democracies than on any insight into how Alliances actually operate during wartime, especially when fighting a defensive war that is perceived as just. Still, it may be assumed that NATO would have major difficulty in setting and implementing any conflict termination strategy based on the intensification of military pressure on Russia, especially beyond the immediate theatre of operations. Individual Allies, first and foremost the US, might have to take a lead in that.

## Europe

### Nuclear Umbrella---1NC

#### Absent NATO, France’s nuclear umbrella extends over Europe

**Macron 20** President of the Republic of France, Submarine Collector(Emmanuel Macron, 2-7-20, "Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy," France, <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy.en> Translated by Google Translate)HS

Nuclear deterrence has played a fundamental role in maintaining peace and international security, particularly in Europe. I am firmly convinced that our deterrence strategy maintains all of its stabilizing virtues, a particularly valuable asset in the world which we see before us, one of competition between powers, disinhibited behaviors and the erosion of norms. The fundamental purpose of France's nuclear strategy, the doctrinal bases of which I have just set out, is to prevent war. Our nuclear forces are not directed towards any specific country and France has always refused that nuclear weapons be considered as a battlefield weapons. I hereby reaffirm that France will never engage into a nuclear battle or any forms of graduated response. Furthermore, our nuclear forces have a deterrent effect in themselves, particularly in Europe. They strengthen the security of Europe through their very existence and they have, in this sense, a truly European dimension. On that point, our independent decision-making is fully compatible with our unwavering solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and their defense is the natural expression of our ever-closer solidarity. Let's be clear: France's vital interests now have a European dimension. In this spirit, I would like strategic dialogue to develop with our European partners, which are ready for it, on the role played by France's nuclear deterrence in our collective security. European partners who are willing to walk that road can be associated with the exercises of French deterrence forces. This strategic dialogue and these exchanges will naturally contribute to developing a true strategic culture among Europeans. Our nuclear forces also significantly contribute to the overall strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance's overall deterrent, alongside the British and American forces. France does not take part in the Alliance's nuclear planning mechanisms and will not do so in the future. But it will continue to contribute to political-level discussions aiming to strengthen the Alliance's nuclear culture. Since 1995, France and the United Kingdom, Europe's only nuclear powers, have clearly stated that they can imagine no circumstances under which a threat to the vital interests of one would not constitute a threat to the vital interests of the other. I want today to formally reiterate that assessment. The high level of mutual trust, enshrined in the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010, the 10th anniversary of which we celebrate this year, is reflected in our daily and unprecedented cooperation on nuclear issues. We will steadfastly maintain this cooperation and Brexit will have no impact at all in this regard.

#### US nuclear umbrella fails to deter Russia because of US decision making and domestic politics-UK and France are the only credible deterrent

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A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies,” took a small step in a rather surprising direction. The title captures its main theme perfectly: To discourage its allies from acquiring their own nuclear weapons, the United States needs to counter doubts raised during the Trump administration and reassure its allies about the strength of the United States’ commitment to their security.

Given that the report was written by a multinational group of well-known foreign-policy insiders, most of their findings and prescriptions are unproblematic. But the following recommendation caught my eye:

“Europe needs to build up the nuclear dimension of its defense efforts, including by retaining and modernizing capabilities for existing NATO nuclear missions and by France and Britain working together to extend their nuclear deterrents to their European allies.”

Why is this statement so intriguing? Because it shows the authors of this report recognize that Europe as a whole might be more secure if it could rely on a locally based deterrent instead of continuing to shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And if that is true for the nations of Europe, then it might well be true for others. Although the report’s authors are opposed to new states joining the nuclear club (Britain and France are already members), their statement clearly implies that deterrence would be strengthened if states facing serious external threats had a nuclear guarantee that didn’t depend on Uncle Sam.

This is hardly a new issue. Since fairly early in the nuclear age, the United States has used nuclear weapons to “extend deterrence” and shield some of its allies. It sought to convince potential adversaries that the United States might use its formidable nuclear arsenal if these allies were attacked, even if the United States was not. Of course, there was always some chance that a war involving one of the United States’ allies might escalate to the nuclear level, either by accident, through inadvertence, or via deliberate decision, no matter what U.S. leaders said in advance. Even so, Washington went to considerable lengths to make its nuclear umbrella credible, partly to discourage enemies from attacking but also to convince its allies not to get nuclear weapons themselves.

Accordingly, U.S. leaders made lots of public statements linking the U.S. arsenal to its core alliance commitments, and NATO drew up various plans and doctrinal pronouncements designed to reinforce perceptions of a reliable U.S. guarantee. The United States also deployed thousands of warheads on some of its allies’ territory, along with dual-key arrangements that gave those allies some say in how, when, or if these fearsome weapons got used. Lastly, and very importantly, the United States kept trying to achieve a meaningful degree of nuclear superiority to make a possible first use of nuclear weapons to defend allies more credible. Instead of acquiring a “minimum deterrent” (i.e., retaliatory forces that could survive any possible attack and then inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor), U.S. war plans and weapons decisions always focused on trying to come out on top in the awful event of an actual nuclear war.

Why did the United States do this? In good part because convincing people you might use nuclear weapons to defend an ally isn’t easy. One might imagine a U.S. president using nuclear weapons to retaliate against a direct attack on U.S. territory or to deter the extremely unlikely prospect of a conventional invasion that threatened U.S. independence. This is the one thing nuclear weapons are good for: deterring existential threats to their possessors’ independence or autonomy. This form of deterrence (sometimes termed “basic” or “Type I”) works because the deterring side will almost certainly care more about preserving its own independence than a potential attacker is likely to care about trying to take it away. Because the balance of resolve favors the defender, even much weaker nuclear powers can deter enemies from attacking them directly. If you don’t find this argument persuasive, remember the U.S. attacked non-nuclear Iraq in 2003 and non-nuclear Libya in 2011, but it leaves nuclear-armed North Korea alone.

By contrast, deterring a conventional or a nuclear attack on an ally by threatening to go nuclear—and convincing your allies that you really mean it—is more challenging. It is one thing to threaten to use nuclear weapons to keep one’s own country from being subjugated but quite another to do so to save an ally from defeat or domination. Or, as people used to wonder back in the Cold War, would a U.S. president really risk Washington or Chicago to save Paris or Berlin? Long after they had left office, a few former U.S. officials suggested the answer was almost certainly “no.” Extended deterrence could still work because potential attackers can’t be sure about any of this, but it still isn’t as credible as deterring attacks on one’s own territory.

The solution to this conundrum—if one can call it that—is to achieve overwhelming “nuclear superiority.” If you could wipe out an adversary’s entire nuclear force in a first strike, you wouldn’t have to fear its retaliation, and using nuclear weapons to defend an ally would be much more credible. Even if a splendid first strike were not possible, perhaps you could convince a potential attacker that it will end up even worse off than you are at the end of a nuclear war to convince it not to put so much as a toe on the first rung of the escalation ladder.

Thus, the perceived need to extend deterrence is one of the reasons why the United States has long sought nuclear superiority. It’s not the only reason: A genuine first strike capability could limit damage in the event of an actual war. A few commentators have also tried to argue—not very convincingly—that superiority would enable the stronger side to coerce weaker states in crises. Chasing the holy grail of a first-strike advantage was also popular with defense contractors and parts of the armed services because it requires spending billions of dollars annually on more and more accurate weapons, more efficient and destructive warheads, improved surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and lots of other shiny objects.

Interestingly, a number of sophisticated scholars have recently claimed that technological advances have put the United States on the brink of a true first-strike capability. Perhaps in theory, but certainly not as a usable option. To see why, ask yourself what you would do if you were president and facing a serious crisis with a nuclear-armed adversary. You’ve put the armed services on alert, and there is some danger that force might be used and fighting could escalate. Suppose your military advisors and intelligence experts tell you if you order a first strike now, you can almost certainly destroy the enemy’s entire nuclear arsenal, leaving the United States unscathed and in an ideal position to resolve the dispute on favorable terms.

Being a sensible person, you’d undoubtedly ask them: “Can you guarantee that? Are you absolutely, 100 percent sure the enemy will have zero usable weapons left, and therefore, we won’t even get our hair mussed?”

“We are highly confident of success,” you are told. “But there is a slim chance that a few enemy weapons would survive and reach U.S. soil. No more than one to three.”

Even if you weren’t troubled by the moral issues involved in ordering an attack that would kill untold numbers of people (and you ought to be), would you do it? Of course you wouldn’t, because you wouldn’t want to risk losing New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, or any other major U.S. city, which is what might happen if that first strike you authorized turned out to be just a tiny bit less effective than your advisors predicted. To issue a launch order, you’d have to believe the proposed attack would work perfectly the very first time it was executed (simulations and exercises aren’t the same), almost all of the missiles and bombs that have been sitting in silos or storage facilities for years would work as designed, and the other side wouldn’t have dispersed its own forces or hidden some extra weapons in places you had failed to detect. Based on everything the United States’ knows about complex military operations and the limits of intelligence, you’d be a fool to roll the dice in this way.

One more thing: As first-strike capabilities improve, adversaries may respond by keeping forces on higher alert or adopting “launch-on-warning” procedures that increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent war. No matter what U.S. forces are capable of in theory, in short, it’s hard to see how any president would be willing to use nukes first even if the probability of “success” was extremely high. This reality casts further doubt on the whole idea of extended deterrence, insofar as it is based on the threat to deliberately escalate to the nuclear level if a key ally is in danger of being conquered.

Extending a protective umbrella over allies in Europe and Asia may have made good sense during the Cold War, both to protect them and to discourage proliferation. But the nuclear weapons environment has changed: The number of nuclear-armed states has crept upward, and several countries (India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom) are increasing the size of their own arsenals (though they remain far lower than U.S. or Russian levels). Moreover, the United States is not as tightly coupled to some of its traditional allies as it was during the Cold War, and serious rifts may continue to grow despite the Biden administration’s efforts to restore alliance solidarity and reassert U.S. leadership.

Which raises the obvious question: Does it still make sense to shield allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Using the threat of nuclear use to protect other countries is not cost- or risk-free, and it may even be more dangerous than letting some other states acquire arsenals of their own and encouraging them to rely on “Type I” deterrence provided by their own national capabilities.

This view has been advanced before—most notably by Kenneth Waltz in a controversial Adelphi Paper 40 years ago. Waltz was not advocating giving other states the bomb or arguing that the rapid spread of nuclear weapons would be desirable; his central point was that trying to prevent the slow spread of these weapons was not without costs of its own and that in some cases, as he put it, “more may be better.” The question is: Is that becoming the case today?

To be sure, folding the nuclear umbrella might well have some negative effects. It might make states long accustomed to U.S. protection question its commitment (though there’s no logical reason for them to do so if it is still in the United States’ interest to aid their defense in other ways). It could also reduce U.S. influence or leverage if certain allies were no longer as dependent on U.S. protection, though folding the umbrella would not eliminate their reliance on other elements of U.S. power. Removing the U.S. nuclear guarantee might encourage a few states to pursue nuclear arms of their own, but it is not obvious that acquisition by Japan or Germany would be a terrible outcome from a purely U.S. perspective.

Moreover, even the possibility that these states might take over responsibility for deterring attacks on their own territory could have a sobering effect on a rising China and a recalcitrant Russia. In particular, it would remind Beijing and Moscow that their own behavior will affect the strategic calculations that their neighbors make in the near future, including decisions about nuclear arms. If China doesn’t want to face more nuclear weapons states in its immediate region, for instance, then its leaders should start asking themselves what they can do to make those neighbors feel less need for additional protection. The obvious answer: Stop harassing them in various ways, drop the sharp-elbowed approach to diplomacy, stick to agreements previously reached, and do more to resolve existing disputes on a fair-minded basis.

Whatever Washington ultimately chooses to do with its nuclear umbrella, the more important task is to move beyond the tendency to see nuclear weapons as potent signs of status, indispensable tools of statecraft, or powerful sources of leverage. Nuclear weapons are extremely useful for deterring direct and all-out attacks on one’s own homeland but not much else. For that purpose, a great power doesn’t need an enormous arsenal or some hypothetical capability to “fight and win” a nuclear exchange. All it needs is a stockpile that can survive an enemy attack and be able to respond in kind. Properly concealed or protected, they don’t need to be poised and ready to strike at a moment’s notice. Fetishizing the bomb and using it to try to protect others isn’t just expensive; it may also be dangerous

### Nuclear Umbrella---2NC

#### European nuclear deterrent is more credible

**Tertrais 19** Deputy Director of the Paris-based Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Bruno(6-28-19, “Will Europe Get Its Own Bomb?” Washington Quarterly, [https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu. ed](https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.%20ed)u/dist/1/2181/files/2019/06/Tertrais.pdf)

Would it be credible? Some claim that a France and/or UK-based nuclear deterrent would not have the necessary credibility.53 But it is widely considered that a smaller arsenal can deter a major power provided it has the ability to inflict damage seen as unacceptable by the other party. This has always been the premise of “deterrence of the strong by the weak”—and is not connected with the size of the other party’s nuclear arsenal as long as deterrence does not rely on a “counterforce” strategy, or on the ability to destroy the equivalent territory or population of the defender. It is also not connected with the size of the other party’s conventional military capabilities as long as one does not rely on any war-fighting or nuclear defense strategy—concepts that even NATO no longer applies. Most importantly, again, deterrence exercised by a European power might be seen as more credible than when it is exercised by a distant protector; the idea is that “be ready to die for Helsinki” could be a more credible proposition for a European nuclear power than for the United States.

#### Nuclear force upgrade bolster French deterrence

**Wright and Decis 21** \*Research Analyst and Programme Administrator for the Defence and Military Analysis Programme at The IISS, Timothy. \*\*Research Analyst for Defence and Military Analysis. (5-14-2021, "Counting the cost of deterrence: France’s nuclear recapitalisation," IISS, https://www .iiss.org/blogs/mili tary-balance/2021/05/france-nuclear-recapitalisation)HS

Having formally launched the development of its third generation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, France is embarking on a broad renewal of its nuclear forces. The aim is to ensure that its deterrent remains credible into, and beyond, the middle of this century, explain Timothy Wright and Hugo Decis. As the 50-year mark approaches since France commissioned its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN, or SNLE in French), Paris has now formally launched the development of its third generation of SSBNs – a key element in its broader nuclear-forces modernisation programme. The parallel threads of the wider modernisation effort draw together developments to ballistic and air-launched cruise missiles and their respective launch platforms, but will also place a burden on defence expenditure. The first of the four boats to replace the current second-generation Le Triomphant-class is meant to be commissioned by 2035 – the same year in which the successor to the ASMPA ramjet-power nuclear-armed air-to-surface missile, the ASN4G, is expected to enter service. The Le Triomphant successor, presently known as the SNLE 3G, is also associated with the M51.4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which will be a further improvement on the M51 and will likely be required by the early 2040s. The delivery platform for the ASN4G hypersonic cruise missile, the SCAF/Next Generation Fighter (NGF) multi-role combat aircraft, is also planned to enter service at the beginning of the 2040s. Collectively, these projects will renew France’s strategic and sub-strategic nuclear forces but will also be a significant burden on defence expenditure over the next two decades. France’s 2021 draft defence budget earmarked €5 billion (US$6bn) for nuclear-related work, a figure close to 13% of core (excluding pensions) defence funding of €39.2bn (US$47.2bn) for the year. Submarine size and weapons The SNLE 3G is expected to be slightly larger than the Le Triomphant-class, with a submerged displacement of approximately 15,000 tonnes and a crew complement of about 100. As was the case with its predecessor, the SNLE 3G will be fitted with 16 launch tubes and armed with the M51 family of SLBM, as well as with torpedoes and anti-ship missiles (AShMs) for self-defence purposes. The SNLE 3G will, however, have a new sonar suite intended to improve detection and help counter likely increased threats to future submarine operations. The yet-to-be-named class of SSBNs will also be fitted with a new and more powerful reactor, developed from the K15 model which is currently used by both the Le Triomphant-class of SSBNs and the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier. In the interim period before the SNLE 3G enters service, the French Navy will receive an improved version of the M51, the M51.3, which is due to be introduced in 2025. The missile will use the same warhead design, the Tête nucléaire océanique introduced in 2016, but will feature a revised third stage. France’s current SLBM, the M51.2, employs a solid-propellant third stage from the earlier M45 SLBM. The upgraded solid-propellant motor will likely increase the M51.3’s range beyond the reported 6,000 kilometre+ range of the M51.2, although the extent of this increase has not been made public. An M51 missile was tested on 28 April 2021 by the French Directorate of Armaments (DGA), which is responsible for developing and procuring France’s new SLBM. The test launch was conducted from a submerged platform at the DGA’s Essais de missiles site in the Landes region. As for the further planned SLBM upgrade in the form of the M51.4, while there has been little public mention of this upgrade, part of the rationale for its development may be to try to ensure that the SLBM is capable of beating projected ballistic-missile defences. One option to help achieve this aim could include upgrading the M51’s current post-boost vehicle (PBV), which is derived from the earlier M45 SLBM. PBVs are small liquid-fuelled propulsion systems that can be used by missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle payloads to release the warheads during the terminal phase of flight, allowing them to follow separate trajectories and thus to strike at different targets. An upgraded PBV could complicate an adversary’s missile defences through more dispersed targeting options, while providing the submarine-based nuclear force with greater targeting flexibility. Dyad elements The new class of SSBNs will be complemented by the ASN4G from 2035. Initially carried by the air force’s Rafale B and the navy’s Rafale M, the ASN4G missile will also be part of the NGF’s weapons inventory from the 2040s onwards. The NGF is a tri-national effort between France, Germany and Spain to develop a successor to the Rafale and the Eurofighter. France, however, is the only partner to require that the successor be a nuclear-capable aircraft, and that it also be able to operate from an aircraft carrier. Concept work on the ASN4G has been under way since 2014. France is also one of a small but growing number of countries exploring the potential of hypersonic boost-glide technology. Its V-MaX (véhicule manoeuvrant experimental) project began towards the end of the last decade to explore the potential of very-high-speed glide body designs, with the aim of conducting flight-test experiments from 2021. Whether Paris is interested in the potential application of a hypersonic glide vehicle as an element of its nuclear-deterrent force remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that France is embarking on a broad renewal of its nuclear forces with the aim of ensuring that its deterrent remains credible into, and beyond, the middle of this century. The twin objectives of sustaining this impetus and meeting the technical and budgetary demands of the developments now lie ahead.

#### French nuclear umbrella that solves.

**DW 20**, Deutsche Welle is the German public international broadcast funded by the German federal tax budget (6-20-20, "How will Europe guarantee its security without the US?," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/how-will-europe-guarantee-its-security-without-the-us/a-53881805)

Days after US President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of roughly one third of US troops stationed in Germany, the shock still lingers.

Politicians at every level are grappling with the consequences: Mayors in economically weak regions are worried about losing income when the GIs leave, Germany's foreign minister is worried about the further deterioration of relations with the US and military planners in Brussels are pondering the implication for Europe's own security architecture. Germany has been a key component of the US defense strategy in Europe for decades, with US nuclear weapons — to be delivered by German fighter jets in a moment of crisis — stationed here.

But if the roughly 9,500 US soldiers go home rather than head somewhere else in Europe, it will radically shift military relations on the continent. "It is entirely unclear where this journey is heading and what security risks lie ahead," said Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, vice president of the Berlin-based German Marshall Fund, a non-partisan trans-Atlantic think tank.

Kleine-Brockhoff said he can't make out a winner yet, not even neighboring Poland, which can realistically maintain hopes of an increased US troop presence. He told DW the weakening of ties between Germany and the US is damaging to the whole of Europe, and Central and Eastern European countries have taken note.

European security without American might

"Europe will have to take on more responsibility," said Roderich Kiesewetter, a former military officer who is now a parliamentary foreign policy expert for Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union party. That statement echoes demands often made by relevant department heads and by the chancellor herself. Still, when it comes to defining what that new European role might be, German policymakers prefer to leave all of their options open.

Might that mean Germany and Europe would take the burden of smaller crisis regions off American shoulders, allowing the US to focus on Asia and rival China? Or will the German government succumb to years of pressure from the US and NATO to increase defense spending and finally pass massive military budgets?

That latter is exactly the approach backed by foreign policy expert Kleine-Brockhoff. "During the refugee and coronavirus crises the German government has shown it is willing to allocate huge sums of money," he pointed out.

Or is Germany ready for a paradigm shift — working toward a Europe that can protect itself, without the US?

Repeated overtures

Should that final option be the secret desire of German politicians, it would no doubt bring out every last EU political and military heavyweight between Berlin and Paris. And it would also put the spotlight on an uncomfortable issue for the Germans: their stance on nuclear weapons — which are, after all, considered the last guarantor of independent sovereignty.

Germany has been under the protection of NATO's nuclear umbrella — and thus also the US — for decades, and if Europe wants to provide its own security it will have to come up with a replacement shield. As things stand now, France would be the only choice in stepping up to the task. France has not been shy about splurging on its "Force de frappe" nuclear strike force. But French leaders have also been careful to maintain distance to NATO and the US on that front: French missiles have never been integrated into NATO defense planning.Nevertheless, in the past the French have made clear their willingness to allow Germany proximity to its prized arsenal. In the 1990s, President Jacques Chirac even considered the concept of joint responsibility. And during his term, Nicolas Sarkozy is said to have offered Merkel a financial stake in the program. At the time, the Germans thanked the French for their offer but refused, with a nod to the US shield.

Macron's opening

Earlier this year, President Emmanuel Macron made a new proposition, inviting his European partners to take part in a "strategic dialogue" on France's nuclear weapons. Though it was unclear how the offer should be taken, the German Defense Ministry accepted the invitation during a meeting in Paris — though not without stressing the significance of the US umbrella while doing so.

Four months on, the public has yet to see any of the fruits of that meeting. A Defense Ministry spokesman would only go so far as to confirm that "the question of a nuclear deterrent in Europe was addressed within the framework of regular rotating discussions on various strategic issues."

The fact that there have been no public announcements no doubt has to do with the sensitivity of the issue of nuclear deterrence. "When the US umbrella and its nuclear posture in Europe and other places is called into question," said Kleine-Brockhoff, "a lot of small and medium-sized countries will feel the need to become nuclear powers themselves." Uncertainty alone could set off a chain reaction among partners and rivals alike.

Still, the issue of whether or not to create a European nuclear umbrella could well arise should Trump complete a US withdrawal from Europe that started long before he came to office. "I would advise the government to take a two-pronged approach," said Christian Mölling, a security expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations, a Berlin-based think tank. He said they should "keep their option to move to the French system open," but added that such a major shift would take decades.

Weapons system the start of something bigger?

The Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a Franco-German project to develop a complex air-based defense system by 2040 — one that will play a key role in the French deterrence strategy — could prove a good opportunity to deepen trust. "Twenty years to build trust and a shared perspective — that's not a lot of time. At least not for fundamental change in policy direction," said Mölling.

Beyond the obvious technical challenges, a look at both partners also illustrates how disparate mindsets within the cooperation can be: Nuclear deterrent is the heart of France's security architecture, while in Germany some politicians are calling for the withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons.

The one seemingly intractable conflict inherent in the idea of a "European bomb," however, is the question of who would decide to use it when a split-second decision is needed. In France, that duty falls to the president, who is closely followed everywhere he goes by an officer carrying the nation's nuclear codes.

There are no easy answers, but Germany will likely have to get used to the French nuclear mindset in the coming years. Establishing independent European security — if such a thing is possible — would take years to realize. But it's never too early to start thinking about it.

### Turkey---1NC

#### Passivity emboldens Turkey---Erdogan sparks regional conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Grimes ’21 [Demetries; March 3; former U.S. Naval Commander, Aviator, Diplomat, and Deputy Commander at the U.S. base in Crete; Ekathimerini, “Rogue ally,” <https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1156251/rogue-ally/>]

There is talk in Washington, DC about dealing with the “world as it is,” but in reining in rogue ally, Turkey, the United States and European Union continue to do the bare minimum required to address the greatest threat to peace and stability in Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, Middle East and Central Asia. At the recent Munich Security Conference, US President Joe Biden declared, “America is back, the transatlantic alliance is back,” and affirmed America’s unshakable commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance and diplomacy.

French President Emmanuel Macron, however, is the only Western leader with the courage to address the clear and present danger Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions pose beyond Turkey’s borders. France has taken a leadership role in Europe as Germany and the United Kingdom continue to avoid exercising sound judgment and taking appropriate action in European security matters. French President Macron is correct in stating Europe must embrace “strategic autonomy” and take greater ownership of its security interests beyond the framework of NATO. Macron understands.

As the 200th anniversary of the fight for freedom from Ottoman rule and the rebirth of democracy in Greece approaches, Erdogan’s authoritarian government continues to engage in direct acts of passive and active aggression against United Nations member-states, EU member-states, NATO allies and partners and US interests.

Erdogan commands the second largest military force in NATO. His military force of 435,000 is one-third the size of the United States’ 1.3 million-strong force and twice the size of the next largest NATO ally, France, with its 208,000-strong force. The Turkish “allied” force, however, continues to demonstrate it is an adversary with access to NATO’s secrets, codes, communications, tactics and defense plans.

Erdogan is emboldened by the enduring myth of Turkey’s geostrategic importance, greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, and the decades-long failure of the EU, US and NATO to properly address Turkish aggression. Turkey’s decades-long unreliability as an ally, its role as a gateway for foreign jihadi fighters between Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and flirtation with China and Russia in advanced weapons procurements – most recently, the Russian S-400 missiles – affirm Turkey cannot be trusted as a NATO ally.

A significant enough concern for the US State Department and Department of Defense to remove dependents of US diplomats and military personnel assigned to posts in Turkey in 2015.

Failure to rein in Erdogan has destroyed the credibility of NATO, the EU and US. As a member of the NATO Alliance, the US, and other NATO nations, should be outraged by Erdogan’s continued assaults on the EU’s borders in Greece and the Aegean, the Turkish military occupation of a EU sovereign state, Cyprus, claims to EU Economic Zone hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, the desecration of UNESCO World Heritage Christian monuments, and recent attempts to derail the unification of Cyprus.

Erdogan’s hostile acts embody and represent the types of threats the Alliance and United States are committed to deterring and defeating. From the desecration of Christian United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage sites in the conversion of Hagia Sofia and the 1,000-year-old Byzantine Church of the Holy Savior in Chora into mosques, support for the human trafficking of migrants into Europe, violent attacks and oppression of Kurds in Turkey and Syria, to diplomatic security force attacks on US citizens in Washington, DC, support for Islamic terrorists and militias in Syria, northern Iraq and Libya, the issuing of Turkish passports and sanctuary to Hamas officials, violations of EU air space and territorial waters, illegal exploration for oil and gas in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Greece, Cyprus and Israel, illegal claims of sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean, the purchase of advanced S-400 Russian weapons systems, the imprisonment of political opponents and journalists, the enduring illegal military occupation of the northern part of EU member Cyprus, and support for Azerbaijan’s genocidal attack on Armenian Christians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Erdogan’s nationalist “Neo-Ottoman” ambitions are the greatest threat to Western civilization, peace and stability since the rise of communism and the expansionist aims of the Soviet Empire during the Cold War.

Despite the US Congress and Senate’s passing of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, and US-imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in December of 2020 for Turkey’s July 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense system from Russia, Erdogan remains defiant.

He condemned the sanctions as a “blatant attack” on Turkish sovereign efforts to establish an independent defense industry. And political parties representing a large majority of Turkey’s Parliament have issued a joint declaration opposing the US decision. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry has stated Turkey “will retaliate in a manner and timing it deems appropriate.” Erdogan has threatened to close Turkish bases to US military personnel and assets.

Erdogan’s latest moves declaring support for a two-state solution in Cyprus and stating that if Greece declares its borders in the Aegean, per the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it would be considered a casus belli, “act of war,” and affirm Erdogan is committed to continuing his aggression. His rhetoric and actions demand an immediate, clear and concise response.

It is time to show Turkey that the US, NATO, EU and our partners are committed to dealing with “the world as it is” and rein in Erdogan and his destabilizing acts that threaten peace and stability from Europe to the Balkans, to North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and Central Asia.

#### Article 5 draws in Russia---nuclear war.

Rondeaux ’20 [Candace; March 6; Senior Fellow and Professor of Practice at the Center on the Future of War at New America and Arizona State University, M.P.P. in Public Policy from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University; World Politics Review, “NATO is in Denial About the Risk of War Between Turkey and Russia,” <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28583/for-nato-turkey-russia-war-is-a-nightmare-scenario>]

For most close observers, it has long seemed only a matter of time before the long, bloody proxy war between Turkey and Russia for regional predominance in the Middle East would break out into full-scale direct hostilities. That came closer to happening last week, when Russian-backed Syrian forces attacked a Turkish military outpost in Idlib province, leaving more than 30 Turkish soldiers dead. However, few observers would have predicted the utter impotence of Turkey’s ostensible military partners in NATO in the face of what is arguably the gravest threat to the future of the alliance since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In retaliation for last week’s attack, which some initial reports claimed was the work of Russian bombers, Turkey has [pounded Syrian forces with drone strikes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/03/02/idlib-onslaught-turkish-drones-artillery-and-f-16s-just-destroyed-over-100-armored-vehicles-in-syria-and-downed-two-jets/) and taken out the Syrian army’s Russian-made anti-aircraft batteries. Earlier this week, Russian warships in the Black Sea fleet steamed across the Bosporus strait to boost the Russian navy’s presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan flew to Moscow on Thursday for an emergency [summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-03-04/russia-turkey-talks-a-last-chance-to-avert-idlib-calamity) to tamp down tensions. They announced yet another cease-fire in Idlib and joint patrols in a corridor along a strategic highway, but the deal is likely to be temporary and tenuous at best.

To increase his leverage prior to the trip, Erdogan sought support from NATO, including the imposition of a no-fly zone in northwestern Syria. Following an emergency meeting last Friday, the alliance expressed its “full solidarity” with Turkey, but announced no specific measures to assist it.

The question now is whether any of the 26 European members of the alliance realize how pivotal Turkey’s clash with Russia is for the future of NATO and security on the European continent.

As proxy wars go, the ongoing conflict between Turkey and Russia in the Middle East has in many ways hewed closely to script. For nearly a decade, the two have danced on the edge of the escalatory precipice, deploying irregular forces along the narrow corridor of Syria’s northern border. In December 2015, Turkey downed two Russian fighter jets it claimed had entered its airspace, raising fears of direct conflict. But Erdogan and Putin were able to deescalate the situation, and they subsequently arrived at an understanding for operating discretely—and often at cross-purposes—in Syria, while avoiding any more direct confrontations.

More recently, in January, Turkey and Russia’s battle for regional primacy took a sharper turn, as thousands of Turkish-backed Syrian rebel fighters began streaming into Libya to defend the internationally recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli against an ever more aggressive campaign mounted by the forces of Gen. Khalifa Haftar with the support of Russian mercenaries.

Almost from the start of Syria’s civil war in 2011, Erdogan began cultivating a mix of secular and Islamist armed factions fighting to topple President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. On the other side, Russia took incremental steps toward protecting Assad, first deploying Russian warplanes to provide air support, and then Russian private military contractors with the Wagner Group and other cutouts from Russian state enterprises to train up and fight alongside a hodgepodge of Syrian army forces and local militias.

The Wagner Group’s involvement in Syria burst into the spotlight after it suffered serious setbacks in [skirmishes with U.S. forces](https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-puzzle-of-russian-behavior-in-deir-al-zour/) in Deir Ezzor in 2018. By then, its fighters had been [helping Haftar secure oil production facilities](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/29/libyas-war-explained-khalifa-haftar-oil-cuts-uae-airstrikes-and-russian-mercenaries.html) in eastern Libya for at least a year. Three years on, it now seems that the negative feedback loop between the two proxy wars in Libya and Syria has become so intense that years of relatively stable crisis management between Moscow and Ankara may finally be at an end.

The trouble is there are truly no obvious answers for solving the conundrum provoked by Putin’s and Erdogan’s adventurism, and that should scare every one of NATO’s members.

With the U.S. effectively sidelined by a combination of White House incompetence and election year jitters about wading deeper into the Middle East, there is little evidence the most powerful member of the North Atlantic alliance will be willing or able to influence Turkey to deescalate. The European members, meanwhile, are up in arms over Erdogan’s bold and cynical effort to pressure NATO to come to its aid by [opening its border with Greece to Syrian refugees](https://www.bbc.com/news/video_and_audio/headlines/51700885/migrants-clash-with-greek-police-at-the-turkish-border), thereby threatening a repeat of the 2015 refugee crisis.

Since becoming a full member of the North Atlantic alliance in 1952, Turkey has actively supported multiple NATO missions, most critically perhaps by investing millions of dollars in support of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan over the past 19 years. As a result, Turkey was until recently viewed as a rock-solid ally in Washington and Brussels. Its progressive descent into the schizophrenic politics of autocracy, however, has driven a wedge between Erdogan and his American and European allies. That has come back to haunt him now, leaving him with few real friends inside or outside the NATO alliance.

On Wednesday, it appeared that Erdogan was also losing sway domestically, as [fist fights broke out in Turkey’s parliament](https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/04/watch-brawl-in-turkish-parliament-over-military-action-in-syria) over his handling of the military crisis in Syria. This latest political upheaval should give Turkey’s partners in NATO real pause. If Erdogan’s government is unsuccessful in tamping down political fractures over the crisis in Syria, how long before dissent turns into even greater internal instability in Turkey?

Under the circumstances, Turkey’s European partners are faced with a choice between the lesser of two evils. Delivering more humanitarian aid and financial support via the European Union for Syrian refugees already in Turkey might seem like a costly and less than optimal solution to the burgeoning crisis. But at the very least, it would be a show of support for Erdogan, at a time when there is a very real possibility that Turkey will purposely or inadvertently spark an open conflict with Russia. If that happens, NATO would be forced to seriously consider whether an Article 5 declaration of mutual defense would be an appropriate response.

It would be nice to think that NATO’s charter still meant something to its members, and 19 years of mutual defense in Afghanistan following 9/11 certainly suggest that it does. But the Turkish-Russian standoff points up an obvious design flaw in the alliance. When the big players at the table like the U.S. decide to sit out a bad hand, European alliance members who have more at stake but fewer military chits to lay down are unlikely to ante up. Turkey is by far one of the most politically isolated members of the NATO bloc. But if NATO’s assurances do not hold up, that is not a good look for a military alliance.

### Turkey---2NC

#### They’ll capitalize on an indulgent NATO and intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh---that rapidly spirals into great-power war and draws the world into the Southern Caucasus.

Gramer ’20 [Robbie and Jack Detsch; October 6; Diplomacy and national security reporter, studied international relations and European affairs at American University; Pentation and national security reporter; Foreign Policy, “Turkey’s Caucasus Adventure Risks Another Crisis in NATO,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/06/turkeys-caucasus-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-risks-nato-crisis-armenia-azerbaijan/>]

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh has fueled a fresh fight within NATO, with alliance members pushing Turkey to dial back its aggressive foreign policy and support a cease-fire in the Caucasus.

As the conflict over the disputed territory has escalated over the past week, leaving over 200 people dead and hundreds more injured, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called on Turkey to defuse the situation, given its decades of support for Azerbaijan. “We are deeply concerned by the escalation of hostilities. All sides should immediately cease fighting,” Stoltenberg said during a visit to Ankara, the Turkish capital, on Monday. “I expect Turkey to use its considerable influence to calm tensions.”

But Turkey has dug in its heels, defying a joint call from the United States, France, and Russia for an immediate cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh. “We look at the calls coming from around the world, and it’s ‘immediate cease-fire.’ What then? There was a cease-fire until now, but what happened?” said Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on Tuesday during a visit to Azerbaijan.

In crisis after crisis in recent years, Turkey’s relations with many of its NATO allies have frayed, but they’ve never fully collapsed. Turkey has purchased Russian air defense systems and angered Washington. Turkey has squared off with Greece and France in the Eastern Mediterranean, invaded northeastern Syria, and waded into the civil war in Libya. All that came after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s authoritarian turn in the wake of a 2016 coup attempt.

Now, many are wondering where the breaking point is—and how close it might be, especially with a potential U.S. administration under presidential candidate Joe Biden signaling a much tougher line on Turkey than the Trump administration’s coddling.

Turkey’s lurch into the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, including the use of [Syrian mercenaries](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/05/nagorno-karabakh-syrians-turkey-armenia-azerbaijan/) that serve as its proxy army, has put some powerful NATO members in the odd position of coordinating its message with Moscow, which has long sided with Armenia. (Many alliance members are on the other side of Turkey in ongoing conflicts in Syria and Libya.) Analysts fear that the conflict could spiral into wider regional confrontations; both Turkey and Israel have a close security relationship with Azerbaijan, Russia has a defense pact with Armenia, and neighboring Iran is trying to play a role in mediating the conflict.

The latest conflict is already reverberating inside NATO. Canada this week announced it was halting some weapons sales to Turkey after allegations its equipment was used by Azerbaijani forces. Turkey’s foreign ministry quickly [shot back](https://www.jpost.com/international/canada-halts-drone-sales-to-turkey-after-claims-of-use-by-azerbaijan-644666), accusing Canada of “double standards” by continuing to export arms to countries involved in the war in Yemen.

Conventional arm-twisting might not work. Experts say Turkey is honing a style of mercenary-led combat—backed by drones for close air support—that lends itself to flashy propaganda coups, if not guaranteed battlefield successes. Turkish military propaganda could leave a lasting—if outsized—impression of Ankara’s might on the battlefield, as it did during a battle in the contested Syrian province of Idlib earlier this year.

“All you see is the strikes. It’s very powerful imagery,” said Aaron Stein, the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “In Idlib everyone forgets that Turkey lost. All people remember is Turkey kicking Russian ass.”

“It’s lowered the barrier to entry, it’s made combat less risky to them, and it’s highly effective propaganda,” he added.

If bilateral tensions spill over into NATO deliberations, it could hamstring the alliance’s ability to make decisions on other areas of importance, related to Russia, the Middle East, or other threats facing the trans-Atlantic alliance. NATO operates with consensus decision-making, meaning nothing is decided until all 30 members agree.

“We still run a huge risk of bilateral disputes being imported into NATO and … blocking NATO’s ability to do business,” said Lauren Speranza, the director of trans-Atlantic defense and security at the Center for European Policy Analysis. “That’s nothing new, but the combination of Turkey’s latest actions has pushed those discussions to the next level. There are now debates about how to make Turkey recognize the consequences.”

### TNWs---1NC

#### NATO collapse removes TNWs

Williams and Andreasen 15 [Isabelle Williams, Fellow at the Hoover Institution, former member at the Partnership for Global Security; Steven P. Andreasen, Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 2015, “The Future of NATO’s Nukes”, Hoover Institution, March 25, 2015, <https://www.hoover.org/research/future-natos-nukes>]

Historically, “nuclear sharing” has played a key role in reassurance of NATO allies—a highly visible manifestation of the US commitment to the defense of NATO. During much of the Cold War, the United States deployed thousands of TNW on the territory of its European NATO allies. The purpose of these deployments, under the broad rubric of extended deterrence, was to underscore the political link between the United States and Europe and provide a military capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact tank armies poised to invade NATO through Germany. NATO’s first Strategic Concept of 1949 called for insuring “the ability to carry out strategic bombing including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb.” The United States provided the same nuclear protection to its principal Asian allies, assuring these nations of the US commitment to their security. The United States and NATO continue to maintain a “neither confirm nor deny” policy on the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any NATO installation or in any specific country. Moreover, NATO continues to underscore the principle of nuclear burden-sharing, both through the deployment of US nuclear weapons in a number of NATO states and by agreement that, in the event of war, some of these weapons would be transferred to allied forces and delivered by allied aircraft. NATO members have also reaffirmed its nuclear declaratory policy of not ruling out the first use of nuclear weapons.

#### Nuclear sharing in Europe causes nuclear escalation with Russia and heightens the risk of nuclear terrorism—withdrawal strengthens conventional deterrence and boosts alliance cohesion

Andreasen et al 18 [Steve Andreasen is a national security consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Nuclear Security Project in Washington, D.C., and teaches courses on National Security Policy and Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. Hans M. Kristensen, Simon Lunn Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, Ernest J. Moniz Co-Chair and Chief Executive Officer, NTI, Sam Nunn Co-Chair, NTI Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn is co-chair of NTI. He served as chief executive officer of NTI for 16 years, Rose holds a BA in political science from St. Mary’s College of Maryland and an MA in International Science and Technology Policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. , Williams holds a bachelor's degree and master's degree (Hons) in International Studies both from the University of Leeds, UK, “Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture” http://www.nti.org/media/documents/NTI\_NATO\_RPT\_Web.pdf]

The negative political dynamic between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation today is the frame for any discussion of NATO defense policy and posture, including NATO’s nuclear posture. Within this frame, unity within the alliance takes on a special meaning. NATO is averse to taking steps that might create controversy or suggest a lack of cohesion in the face of a newly aggressive Russia, and the United States must be resolute in its commitment to the defense of NATO. This stance especially has bearing today given the uncertainty that has engulfed the Trump administration’s relationships with NATO and with Russia. The principle of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is essential, and any changes to NATO’s defense policy and posture must be seen through that lens; however, the current security environment should not preclude Washington and NATO from reviewing NATO’s nuclear posture. In fact, NATO’s security requires a hard look at and new approaches to NATO deterrence and defense through the prism of reducing the risk of nuclear use. Forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe increase the risk of accidents, blunders, or catastrophic terrorism and invite pre-emption. Given these added risks, it is past time to revisit whether these forward-based weapons are essential for military deterrence and political reassurance. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy of December 2017 commits to this continued deployment without presenting the considered analysis that would emerge from a hard look. The chapters in this report, written by experts and practitioners in European security and nuclear weapons, provide a foundation for that hard look. The report underscores the strong arguments for NATO to move to a safer, more secure, and more credible nuclear posture without forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. The challenge is how to advance current thinking about the military and political dimensions of alternative nuclear postures. Regarding the military side of the ledger, it seems clear that consolidating U.S. nuclear weapons now stored in Europe back to the United States would not diminish U.S. and NATO nuclear capabilities. A number of former senior U.S. officials and military leaders have made the point that U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe have virtually no military utility, primarily because of the extremely demanding scenario for conducting a nuclear strike mission using NATO dual-capable aircraft (DCA). In addition to the complicated procedures for decision making related to nuclear use, any attempt to employ those weapons will be further complicated by the visibility of the many actions required to prepare the aircraft, weapons, and crews for such an attack—all of which undercut their survivability and plausible use. Moreover, those factors make forward-deployed nuclear weapons potential targets in the early phases of a conflict, perhaps triggering a chain of events that the United States and NATO would want to avoid: early nuclear use. In short, forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe have military liabilities, and they may, in fact, increase the risk of nuclear use in a crisis. These dangers also apply to Russia’s forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Taken together, these shorter-range weapons in western Russia and in Europe are a clear and present danger to both Russia and NATO, particularly in an era of tensions, but also in an era of possible nuclear terrorism. What remains true and credible is that the United States has a robust strategic nuclear deterrent that is capable of being employed deliberately anywhere on the globe in defense of U.S. interests and U.S. allies—and it is, and should be, understood by any potential (and rational) adversary to NATO, including Russia, in exactly this way. In any crisis involving NATO, U.S. nuclear capabilities would also be on stage with the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France. Indeed, as NATO has repeatedly stated, “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic forces of the Alliance.” This position has been, and remains, the credible foundation for any plausible scenario for employing U.S. nuclear weapons. On the security side of the ledger, although returning forward-deployed nuclear weapons to the United States would not diminish NATO nuclear capabilities, it would unquestionably reduce the risks from a potential terrorist incident or political instability—both of which are inherent in a posture that stores nuclear weapons at multiple sites across multiple countries. It is a reality that terrorists with global reach seek nuclear capability and have operated at NATO’s border and within some NATO countries as well as Russia. Finally, the financial side of the ledger is harder to calculate, complicated by a number of assumptions related to absolute and marginal costs for Washington and its NATO allies. Any savings that might be accrued by removing forward-deployed B61s from Europe and reducing the overall purchase of B61s present only modest marginal costs for the United States. For NATO allies of the United States, however, the marginal costs of procuring and maintaining DCA—and supporting U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe—may be relatively larger. That said, any reduction in costs associated with the nuclear mission could free up resources for NATO to focus on other urgent tasks, including conventional reassurance and cyber defense, depending on decisions made by NATO member countries about their national defense budgets. One thing is certain: although leadership cannot come from Washington alone, U.S. leadership is the essential prerequisite to a reexamination of NATO nuclear policy, beginning with a compelling reaffirmation by the president of the principle of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Washington must also take steps to work with allies to sustain, adapt, and perhaps enhance NATO’s current procedures for nuclear sharing and consultations, consistent with a safer, more secure, and more credible nuclear deterrent. Such steps will not preclude the B61-12 life extension program (which also has a role in U.S.-based strategic forces) or plans by some NATO allies to purchase F-35 aircraft. Maintaining some dual-capable aircraft and trained pilots in Europe, along with a residual support infrastructure for nuclear weapons, should also be part of the overall NATO nuclear deterrence review. The implications of sustaining or removing U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe are serious. Now is the time and the opportunity to ask whether those weapons are more of a security risk than an asset to NATO and whether they increase or reduce the risk of nuclear use. We hope that this report will help stimulate and inform such a review.

#### American nukes in Europe are strategically useless—they have no credibility and cannot be successfully launched—the current posture inevitably crushes NATO cohesion

Andreasen et al. 18 [Steve Andreasen is a national security consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Nuclear Security Project in Washington, D.C., and teaches courses on National Security Policy and Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. Hans M. Kristensen, Simon Lunn Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, Ernest J. Moniz Co-Chair and Chief Executive Officer, NTI, Sam Nunn Co-Chair, NTI Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn is co-chair of NTI. He served as chief executive officer of NTI for 16 years, Rose holds a BA in political science from St. Mary’s College of Maryland and an MA in International Science and Technology Policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. , Williams holds a bachelor's degree and master's degree (Hons) in International Studies both from the University of Leeds, UK., “Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture” http://www.nti.org/media/documents/NTI\_NATO\_RPT\_Web.pdf]

HOW CREDIBLE IS THE POSTURE? Questions regarding the credibility—in military terms, the sum of capability and intent—of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe should also be central to the debate on the future composition of NATO’s nuclear posture. Deterrence and reassurance are two sides of the same coin, and as such, credibility matters to alliance members.25 As former U.K. defense minister Denis Healey once remarked, “One only needed five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”26 *Alliance Strategic and Conventional Forces vs. U.S. and European Dual-Capable Aircraft* The argument that forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe serve a military function not already addressed by alliance conventional forces or the strategic nuclear forces of the three nuclear NATO members—particularly, the large and flexible capabilities of the United States—has been consistently refuted by current and former defense officials.27 Some U.S. strategic weapons today are highly flexible and accurate, and they possess low or variable yields, making the threat of a prompt, tailored strategic response to a limited nuclear strike highly credible. NATO itself has consistently underscored that the “strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.”28 Indeed, it is possible that the threat of a limited U.S. response with strategic forces would be at least as credible, if not more so, as a response with dual-capable aircraft (DCA) from European territory. The application of strategic forces for extended deterrence is not without precedent. During the Cold War, NATO’s requirements were coordinated with the U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), and NATO targeting was the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). In a crisis, SACEUR was able to call on a number of U.S. strategic warheads carried on U.S. Poseidon submarines and already allocated under the SIOP to fulfill the NATO mission. Today, America’s extended nuclear deterrent in Asia continues to rely solely on U.S. strategic forces. The “Asian model” includes less robust nuclear information sharing and consultation than NATO uses. In a European context, such mechanisms would necessarily be retained.29 In response to aggressive Russian actions in Ukraine, the United States and NATO countries have taken steps to improve and strengthen NATO conventional deterrence through the establishment of programs such as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), both discussed later in this chapter in more detail. Additionally, the United States has supplemented its already formidable conventional deterrence in Europe with the deployment and sale of new capabilities such as the conventional Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile to European allies and partners.30 *“Seven Consecutive Miracles”* It is hard to envision the circumstances under which a U.S. president would initiate nuclear use for the first time in more than 70 years with a NATO DCA flown by non-U.S. pilots delivering a U.S. B61 bomb. Moreover, as Karl-Heinz Kamp and Robertus Remkes argued in 2011, even if ordered, the political and operational constraints involved in carrying out a nuclear strike with NATO DCA make the success of the mission far from certain.31 Kamp and Remkes describe the challenges of nuclear strike planning using NATO DCA. These challenges include (1) surviving a first strike; (2) receiving the orders and authorization from the U.S. president to conduct a nuclear strike; (3) successfully taking off and proceeding to the target; (4) achieving successful command, control, and refueling in flight; (5) surviving air defenses; (6) locating and correctly identifying the target; and (7) carrying out the strike itself with the weapon working as designed. Additionally, once the weapon is delivered, it is far from certain that the strike crews will make it home.32 Despite significant advancements in U.S. and NATO reconnaissance and air strike capabilities, each of these challenges underscores the difficulties created by the visibility of the many actions required to prepare and deliver a nuclear weapon to its target that must take place to claim an effective and credible operational capability. Kamp and Remkes argue NATO cohesion and credibility through information sharing, consultation, common planning, and common execution (including of the nuclear mission) are much more important than the basing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.33 *Consensus for Nuclear Use at 29?* Advocates of maintaining NATO’s existing nuclear posture argue that the DCA’s most useful contribution is the highly visible example of alliance unity and resolve— including allies having operational roles in planning and execution. 34 One former senior U.S. official and member of the U.S. High Level Group delegation noted, “the B61 and DCA fleet is the most strategic capability we have in this strategic environment that does the most potent signaling of our Allies to stand with us.”35 However, NATO is a consensus-based organization of 29 members. It is also highly diverse, with a range of threat perceptions and views on nuclear use among its members. That diversity could potentially be a major source of vulnerability in a crisis, because differences in views could lead to stalled decision making or lack of consensus, thereby undercutting one of the fundamental purposes of the NATO deterrent—to promptly signal alliance unity and resolve in a crisis. A nuclear-use scenario with only partial backing of the member states could lead to visible divisions within the alliance—a condition on which a potential adversary would be certain to capitalize.36 The current DCA posture, reliant in part on burden sharing through delivery by European aircraft, inevitably exacerbates those issues.

### TNWs---2NC

#### Removing American nukes from Europe is stabilizing—nuclear basing encourages pre-emptive strikes and increases the risks of accidental nuclear escalation with Russia while encouraging terrorist attacks on nuclear sites, which escalate to nuclear use. No answer to the terror portion.

#### The status quo solves the case—removing nukes lowers the risk of escalation with Russia because it keeps any conflict conventional, and strategic nukes housed in the US prevent Russian nuclear use.

#### Removing nukes from Europe is key to NPT credibility—they crush support for the treaty

Hall 15—Xanthe Hall, international disarmament campaigner for the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, spokesperson for ICAN Germany (“Time for nuclear sharing to end,” *Open Democracy*, October 8th, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/xanthe-hall/time-for-nuclear-sharing-to-end)

It is a little known fact: Germany (and four other European countries) host nuclear weapons as part of NATO “nuclear sharing”. This means that in a nuclear attack the US can load its bombs onto German (or Belgian, Italian, Turkish and Dutch) aircraft and the pilots of those countries will drop them on an enemy target. This arrangement pre-dates the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which explicitly disallows any transfer of nuclear weapons from a nuclear weapon state to a non-nuclear weapon state, thus undermining the spirit of the treaty. This new nuclear bomb – the B61-12 – is intended to replace all its older versions and be able to destroy more targets than previous models. It is touted by the nuclear laboratories as an “all-in-one” bomb, a “smart” bomb, that does not simply get tossed out of an aircraft, but can be guided and hit its target with great precision using exactly the right amount of explosive strength to only destroy what needs to be destroyed. Sound good? Not to us – a guided nuclear bomb with mini-nuke capability could well lower the threshold for use. And the use of any kind of nuclear weapon would lead to the use of more nuclear weapons – this we know from the policies and planning of all nuclear weapon states. It has already been well established by three evidence-based conferences in recent years on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. This new “magic bomb” is not yet with us. It is still being developed and is planned to be deployed in five years time, if there are no more delays. The development of the B61-12 – euphemistically called a “Life Extension Programme” although it is a full redesign not just an update – has fortunately taken longer than intended, giving us more time to convince European leaders what a bad idea it is to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe. The debate is already under way in the “host” countries, most prominently in the Netherlands where the parliament has already voted not to task the new F35 aircraft with a nuclear role. However, the Dutch government is not listening. The German Bundestag voted in 2010 to get rid of the B61, and the government was nominally in favour, but after the change of government in 2013, Foreign Minister Steinmeier put the decision on ice, quoting the new security situation. Yet the current confrontation between NATO and Russia needs deescalation, not rearmament. Sending a signal to Russia that NATO is modernising its European infrastructure and deploying new high-tech bombs is bound to elicit a reaction. Even as we write, reports are coming in that Russia will respond by withdrawing from the INF-Treaty, basing SS-26/Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad (didn't they already do that?) and targeting Germany with nuclear weapons. And what will be the NATO response to all of those threats? When will this escalation become hysteria and the first ‘shot across the bows’ start a nuclear war? Nuclear deterrence is the archetypal security dilemma. You have to keep threatening to use nuclear weapons to make it work. And the more you threaten, the more likely it is that they will be used. This is the moment where nuclear weapon-free countries need to call out for a ban on nuclear weapons to stop this madness. It is also the right time for nuclear co-dependents, like Germany, to make up its mind to give its nuclear dependency up. Deploying new nuclear weapons is forbidden by the NPT, which obligates its members to end the arms race. The transfer of nuclear weapons from the US to Germany and any plans to do so also undermine the NPT. As a responsible member state of this important treaty, it is time to denounce nuclear weapons and to join the international community of nuclear weapon-free countries that is signing the ‘Humanitarian Pledge’, calling for the legal gap to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons to be closed. Time for Germany to show some real leadership for nuclear disarmament.

#### Removing TNWs solves the next NPT RevCon

Sauer 17—Tom Sauer, associate professor in international politics at the Antwerp University (“Crossroads: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Could Become Obsolete.” *National Interest*, December 8th, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/crossroads-why-the-nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty-could-23576)

There is even a much shorter deadline, namely 2020 when the next Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference will take place. That review conference in all likelihood will fail, and that has not much to do with the Ban Treaty. Except if the nuclear-weapon states get their act together and move quickly, the nonnuclear-weapon states will simply make the review conference fail. That means that for the first time two successive review conference fail. This will undoubtedly further undermine the remaining strength and legitimacy of the NPT, which is already under heavy attack. It is up to the biggest defenders of the NPT for the moment—namely the nuclear-weapon states and their allies—to make the next review conference successful. The only chance to convince the nonnuclear-weapon states that the NPT is worthwhile to keep is to show them that the nuclear disarmament obligations are taken serious by the nuclear-weapon states. That can be done in different ways: in the form of further deep cuts, a public announcement to halt the planned modernization programs, the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, a fundamental change in declaratory policy (e.g. binding negative security guarantees, or no first use declarations), and/or substantial changes in operational policies (such as de-alerting), either unilaterally or multilaterally, ideally in a verified way. To be clear: we are not talking about minor steps such as the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty, the start of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off, let alone an extension of the existing glossary of nuclear-disarmament-related concepts. Substantial changes are demanded at this stage. If not much of this ambitious agenda will be realized or promised before 2020, the odds are that the next NPT Review Conference will be a complete failure, just like in 2005 and in 2015.

### TNWs Bad---Crisis Escalation---2NC

#### The impact turn structurally outweighs the aff. Removing nukes from Europe caps the only plausible risk of nuclear escalation with Russia, which solves the case—the alternative to withdrawing European nuclear bases is highly dangerous new nuclear weapons that drive crisis instability.

Wolfsthal 17—Jon Wolfsthal, senior advisor to Global Zero, a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the former Special Assistant to President Obama for Arms Control and Nonproliferation (“Say No to New, Smaller Nuclear Weapons,” *War on the Rocks*, November 22nd, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/say-no-new-smaller-nuclear-weapons/)

Now, as the Trump administration develops its Nuclear Posture Review, the temptation of small nuclear weapons is back. The review will try to lay out for the American public and the world President Donald Trump’s views on what American nuclear weapons are for, when they might be used, and what kinds of and how many weapons are needed to carry out U.S. strategy. Some respected analysts and nuclear experts have suggested that the review once again consider the pursuit of new, smaller, and more usable nuclear weapons, despite the dangerous experiences with small nuclear weapons in the past and the fact that the United States already has a number of these weapons. These experts, increasingly and understandably concerned about Russia’s nuclear doctrine and its large deployments of tactical nuclear weapons, argue that the United States should enhance deterrence by threatening to use its own smaller nuclear weapons, and to make those threats more credible by building more of these weapons. The thinking is that this buildup will make adversaries believe the United States is more likely to use nuclear weapons, thus reducing the prospects of nuclear use altogether – an admittedly worthy goal. While concerns about Russia’s threats are valid, new nuclear weapons are not the answer and carry with them significant risks and costs that the United States must avoid. Smaller, more usable nuclear weapons will do little to alter adversaries’ calculations or make the United States more successful in a war, and they make America less safe by increasing crisis instability between the United States and Russia. While the specific circumstances may be new, the debate over small nuclear weapons is not. From the effort to develop high-radiation, low-blast neutron bombs in the 1970s to the “flexible response” doctrine that led the United States to produce thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, we have had these debates before. But for all the current discussions and analysis, there is no evidence that Russia’s or North Korea’s willingness to consider first nuclear use is based on the credibility or the size of America’s deterrent. There is, however, a wealth of evidence, ranging from public statements and diplomatic engagement, that Moscow and Pyongyang threaten nuclear first use to compensate for their conventional inferiority. They know they would lose any prolonged conventional conflict with the United States and its allies. Their plans to use nuclear weapons in a conflict are designed to either produce a frozen conflict – akin to Ukraine – or to prevent the United States from bringing reinforcements to the battlefield in defense of its allies. Increasing the range of nuclear response options available to the United States will have no bearing on these countries’ fundamental concerns, and won’t change their willingness to consider the early use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, lowering America’s own threshold for nuclear use could further erode stability and increase the likelihood of the kind of conflict that might lead to nuclear use by enemies. The hard reality of America’s conventional military superiority is that regardless of its nuclear capabilities and even use, adversaries losing a conventional war with the United States may resort to nuclear use. General debates are interesting, but specific scenarios are instructive. John Harvey’s recent article for War on the Rocks posits a hypothetical situation in which Russia, facing conventional defeat in a conflict with the United States and NATO, uses a small nuclear weapon to attack an airfield in a Baltic state, hoping to block America’s ability to bring forces to the battle. If the United States develops new weapons, and chooses to use them despite having conventional alternatives, it is worth considering how these weapons might be employed. One option might be for Washington to counter-attack the Russian base where the nuclear strike originated as punishment. This would require NATO to conduct a nuclear strike against Kaliningrad or Russia proper. The size of the weapon the United States used would not matter: Russia’s leaders would likely view the strike as a major escalation and would be under pressure to respond in kind against the U.S. homeland. This course of action threatens to trigger a massive escalation of a regional conflict and must be avoided, especially since America could still prosecute the war and defeat Russian aggression conventionally. Another response option for the United States and NATO might be to use nuclear weapons in the European theater, perhaps against Russian troops in the Baltics or a third country, although it is not clear what military advantage that would bring. In this scenario the United States would be using nuclear weapons on the territory of sovereign European states, possibly even one of its own allies. This would hardly enhance alliance cohesion or America’s global position in the face of a Russian attack. A needless nuclear response would also keep Washington from gaining broad international support to oppose Moscow’s aggression against a sovereign European nation. Lastly, the United States can reinforce multiple airbases throughout Europe, meaning Russia’s attack would not prevent its eventual defeat by conventional means. The reality is that short of an all-out nuclear war, the United States does not need nuclear weapons to defeat Russia. Smaller weapons are no more usable or relevant than large ones in a regional conflict where Russia has used such weapons itself. In the most likely scenarios, Russia has already attacked a NATO member — either because of miscalculation or as part of a new attempt to use hybrid warfare to undermine states on its periphery. Either Russia has assumed the United States will not protect its NATO interests (a fatally flawed assumption) or events have overwhelmed rational efforts to avoid a military confrontation. Harvey’s concern that the United States should take effective steps to deter Russia from ever getting to this point are valid. But conventional deterrence and close alliance coordination are the proven remedies to such threats — newer small nuclear weapons won’t prevent leaders from making bad choices. They did not stop Putin from invading Ukraine, for example, though Kiev is not covered by U.S. nuclear guarantees. Regardless, building a small nuclear silver bullet to deter potential Russian use is unlikely to prevent the outbreak of such hostilities, and will instead increase the risks of accidental or unintended conflict. So new, small nuclear weapons don’t obviously enhance deterrence or bring any real military utility. We should also consider how Russia and other states would respond to a decision by the Trump administration to pursue new weapons. It will give Russia, China, North Korea, and others easy political cover to continue their own programs. They will likely do so anyway, but why should the United States legitimize these countries’ pursuit of such policies if doing so brings no military or deterrent advantage? Some American allies will also view pursuit of new nuclear capabilities as an admission that Washington doubts its own conventional superiority. Otherwise, why would it need to enhance its position with new nuclear options? Sowing doubt among allies about America’s commitment to defend them will bolster the case within these countries that they need their own nuclear deterrents.

#### TNWs increase the risk of all-out nuclear escalation

Schlosser 18—Eric Schlosser, author of “Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety,” citing Sam Nunn, co-founder of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (“The Growing Dangers of the New Nuclear-Arms Race,” *The New Yorker*, May 24th, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-growing-dangers-of-the-new-nuclear-arms-race)

The return of tactical weapons is the most controversial aspect of Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review. The new policy assumes that American tactical weapons will deter the use of Russian tactical weapons, raising “the nuclear threshold” and making “nuclear employment less likely.” Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services and a co-founder of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, has argued against that sort of thinking for more than forty years. He fears that the chance of accidents, miscalculations, and blunders with tactical weapons—as well as the pressure to “use them or lose them” in battle—greatly increase the risk of an all-out nuclear war. Like so many of the disagreements about nuclear strategy, this one cannot be settled with empirical evidence, and selecting the wrong policy could be catastrophic. As Nunn observed in 1974, after a tour of NATO’s tactical nuclear units, “Nobody has any experience in fighting nuclear wars, and nobody knows what would happen if one were to start.”

### TNWs Bad---Terrorism---2NC

#### Forward-deployed nukes increase the risk of terrorism by presenting insecure, vulnerable targets for attack.

Andreasen et al 18 (Steve Andreasen is a national security consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Nuclear Security Project in Washington, D.C., and teaches courses on National Security Policy and Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. Hans M. Kristensen, Simon Lunn Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, Ernest J. Moniz Co-Chair and Chief Executive Officer, NTI, Sam Nunn Co-Chair, NTI Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn is co-chair of NTI. He served as chief executive officer of NTI for 16 years, Rose holds a BA in political science from St. Mary’s College of Maryland and an MA in International Science and Technology Policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. , Williams holds a bachelor's degree and master's degree (Hons) in International Studies both from the University of Leeds, UK.) “Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture” http://www.nti.org/media/documents/NTI\_NATO\_RPT\_Web.pdf

SECURITY RISKS OF THE POSTURE

At each of the U.S. and NATO air bases that are thought to store U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, a combined force of U.S. and European NATO personnel is assigned to retain custody and provide security of U.S. nuclear weapons. The weapons are stored in underground, hardened storage vaults inside protective aircraft shelters at each storage base. Custody, repair, and improvements to the weapons and the storage vaults are the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force. Perimeter security (fences, monitors, and motion detectors) and controlling access to the storage sites are the responsibility of the host nation. These sites present targets and opportunities for both insiders and outside groups to disrupt or gain access to the facilities and, potentially, the weapons themselves. In 2009 and 2010, an incident occurred that underlines this point. A group of activists entered a suspected NATO storage site in Belgium and walked freely for more than an hour before being detained by base security.18 More recent events have led to increasing concerns regarding the security of NATO bases and European nuclear facilities. The aftermath of the Brussels terrorist attacks in March 2016 revealed what appears to have been a credible threat to Belgian nuclear power plants.19 At about the same time as the Brussels attacks, the Pentagon ordered military families out of southern Turkey, including the Incirlik Air Base, because of ISIS related security concerns.20 Then, in July 2016, following an attempted coup to topple the Turkish government, the Turkish commanding officer at Incirlik was arrested for his alleged role in the plot. If reports are accurate—that Incirlik is a major NATO installation hosting U.S. forces that control one of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons in Europe (see Chapter 5)—this event shows just how quickly assumptions about the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons stored abroad can change.21 Continued political instability over the past year, including mass arrests within Turkey and tensions between Turkey and the United States and NATO, are less than reassuring. Even before these events, deficiencies in the security of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe were cited in a 2008 study by the U.S. Air Force, which concluded that most sites in Europe “require additional resources to meet [U.S. Department of Defense] standards,” and found “inconsistencies in personnel facilities and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation.”22 A former senior NATO official, retired U.S. Air Force Major General Robertus Remkes, who commanded the 39th Wing at Incirlik Air Base and later J5 United States European Command, wrote in 2011 of the ongoing security risks associated with storing U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and the severity of the political and security consequences for NATO of any infiltration of a site, whether or not the attackers gained access to the weapons themselves.23 Although the United States and NATO have undertaken considerable efforts to improve the physical security of nuclear weapons stored in Europe since the U.S. Air Force study, it should be assumed that those weapons remain potential targets for terrorist attacks. Storing nuclear weapons at locations throughout Europe to reassure some allies or as leverage in a future arms control deal with Russia, therefore, comes with the increasing risk of vulnerability to an evolving and deadlier terrorist threat (in contrast, nuclear weapons in the continental United States are secured in central storage facilities that are easier to protect than dispersed underground vaults inside aircraft shelters across multiple bases in Europe). Russia, too, may be vulnerable, with an estimated 1,850 non-strategic nuclear weapons reportedly kept in central storage facilities throughout the country.24

#### Nuclear basing in Europe prompts nuclear terror and undercuts conventional deterrence—poor security heightens the risk of a devastating attack

Andreasen and Williams 16—Steve Andreasen, national security consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Global Nuclear Policy Program, teaches courses on National Security Policy and Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, Isabelle Williams, senior adviser to the Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (“Bring Home US Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Europe,” *Ploughshares Fund*, November 15th, https://www.ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/bring-home-us-tactical-nuclear-weapons-europe)

The issue of whether the United States needs to continue to store tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will be no different. Changing the nuclear status quo in NATO will require the early and sustained leadership of the next US president. Moreover, the clock is already ticking: with the next NATO summit looming in 2017, the next administration will need to take the initiative early in their first term, before the cement of NATO summitry and bureaucracy hardens around their legs for the next four years. Today, there is a compelling case for NATO to move to a safer, more secure and more credible nuclear deterrent — without basing US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. That case begins with a recognition that sustaining NATO’s current nuclear posture is an expense that (a) NATO members need not incur to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent; and (b) will increasingly undercut efforts to sustain credible conventional capabilities across NATO. Furthermore, the security risk of basing US nuclear bombs in Europe — highlighted by the recent terrorist attacks in Belgium and political developments in Turkey — clearly demonstrate the case for consolidating US nuclear weapons in the United States.

#### Security for nuclear weapons storage is expensive and difficult to maintain—even a single breach raises the serious risk of nuclear terror

Blechman and Heeley 16—Barry Blechman, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, Ph.D in international relations from Georgetown University, Laicie Heeley, Fellow with the Stimson Center (“B61 Life Extension Program: Costs and Policy Considerations,” *Stimson Center*, Issue Paper, August 2016, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/B61-Life-Extension-Program.pdf)

Moreover, it is costly to ensure the security of the bombs stored at the European bases, and their presence overseas raises the risk that they could fall into hostile hands or become targets for terrorist attacks. The costs for security cannot be found in unclassified sources, but they likely total in the hundreds of millions of dollars each year. 7 The security issues are serious. Breaches at some of the sites, such as a 2010 incident in Belgium at Kleine Brogel Air Base in which activists climbed the base fence, have illustrated the risk posed by the storage of these weapons. (Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored there.) Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base has been the subject of even greater concern given its close proximity to war-torn Syria. The base is less than 70 miles from Syria’s border, which prompted the evacuation of the dependents of US service members; yet it is also the site of approx - imately 50 US tactical nuclear weapons. 8 During the failed coup in Turkey in July, power to the base was cut off and the Turkish government prohibited US aircraft from flying in or out. Eventually, the base commander was arrested and implicated in the coup planning. Whether the US could have maintained control of the weapons in the event of a protracted civil conflict in Turkey is an unanswerable question.

### EU Army---1NC

#### Ukraine provides a brink for creation of an EU Army, but reliance on NATO stops development. EU Army deters Russia, increases responsiveness to crises, and establishes independence from the US.

**Herr and Speer 22**\*Fellow and Consultant at the Charlemagne Prize Academy, Vincent-Immanuel\*\* Fellow and Consultant at the Charlemagne Prize Academy, Martin(5-18-22, “The European Union Needs Its Own Army” https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/05/18/european-union-army-ukraine/)HS

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced leaders of the European Union to confront an uncomfortable reality: Europeans have neglected their own security for far too long. Europe has for decades been content to be a soft-power superpower — focusing on peacekeeping, democracy and prosperity within the union. It has been all too comfortable delegating its security concerns to the United States, which provides military cover through its NATO commitment.

Now, in response to the war to its east, the E.U. has shifted gears — unanimously approving crippling sanctions on Russia, providing weapons and humanitarian support to Ukraine, and in several cases announcing significant expansions of national defense budgets. It is unclear, however, whether this welcome taking-up of responsibilities will extend to larger reforms of Europe’s notoriously fragmented and uncoordinated military structures, which contribute to the continent’s lack of military potency.

In March, for instance, the E.U. announced that it was authorizing the creation of a 5,000-person “rapid deployment” force, independent of NATO (a move in the works well before the Ukraine conflict). But in discussing that development, the E.U.'s high representative for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, was quick to rule out any bolder moves: “We do not want to create a European army,” he said. “It is not about creating a European army.” But the gravity of the situation in Eastern Europe makes it clearer than ever that is precisely what should happen. Establishing an E.U. military would not only provide important protection from aggression of the sort on display in Ukraine; it would also be a logical next step in European integration.

First, and most important, establishing an E.U. military would provide a degree of security independence from the United States — all the more important, given recent political trends in America. Overreliance on American protection has had catastrophic effects on E.U. security. IRIS, a French think tank, put the point with brutal honesty in a 2020 study: “The European Union is incapable of protecting its citizens or protecting itself as a political unit,” it said, “and even less able to defend itself as a geopolitical actor.” Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, then Germany’s defense minister, made a similar argument the same year: “Without America’s nuclear and conventional capabilities, Germany and Europe cannot protect themselves. Those are the plain facts.” And those assessments remain true two years later. When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the move into Ukraine, he did not seem impressed or concerned with the military forces of the E.U. nations, many strategists noted; he was concerned mostly about American might. Even full-fledged EU members like Finland and Sweden are now upending decades of military non-alignment and seeking to join NATO, recognizing that E.U. membership alone does not provide enough protection from Russian aggression.

President Donald Trump’s disdain for NATO was clear: He even reportedly discussed with aides withdrawing from the alliance. Under President Biden, the United States has reassured partners in Europe and beyond of its commitment to them. But Trump’s example demonstrated to Europe — or ought to have — that the ability to rely on the United States may now vary from presidential election to presidential election. And not all of America’s inattention toward Europe can be blamed on Trump. Before Ukraine erupted, the Biden administration had made clear its desire to shift U.S. focus to China and the Indo-Pacific. Given this state of affairs, the E.U.’s union of liberal democracies would be wise to dramatically increase its military effectiveness as it contends with an imperial Russia, an expanding Chinese superpower, and destabilized African and Middle Eastern neighbors.

The second argument concerns efficiency. Currently, the 27 member states of the E.U. can field an impressive 1.3 million active-duty military personnel, roughly on par with the size of the U.S. armed forces (approximately 1.4 million) and significantly bigger than Russia’s military (850,000). The combined military expenditure of the E.U. states is an impressive $225 billion, more than twice the size of Russia’s military budget of a little over $100 billion and roughly three-quarters of China’s $290 billion. Yet these numbers do not translate to effectiveness. In fact, the planning, development and procurement of defense technology by 27 sovereign countries has produced an enormous amount of inefficiency. While the U.S. military uses just 30 weapons systems, the E.U.’s militaries use some 180, six times as many. While the U.S. armed forces use just one main battle tank, the E.U. fields — depending how you count — 11 to 17 different models. Pointing to facts like these, then-European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker suggested, “We are spending half of the American budget when it comes to defense, so we should be efficient at 50 percent of the U.S. We are only 15 percent as efficient.” Integrating European militaries — and centralizing the procurement and development of technology — would doubtlessly increase E.U. military, budgetary and personnel efficiency.

The third argument concerns responsiveness. When the Afghan government collapsed last summer, NATO states scrambled to get their citizens and Afghan allies out of the country. Only the quick and determined deployment of some 6,000 U.S. troops prevented an already catastrophic situation from becoming even worse. And while some European countries sent their own small troop contingents to evacuate citizens, Europeans largely acknowledged their inability to run such an operation on their own. This assessment was shared by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who remarked, “Only the United States could organize and execute a mission of this scale and this complexity.” Such emergencies are sadly likely to recur, so the E.U. would do well to increase its own capabilities for rapid response on a large scale. While the 5,000-member rapid-response force should help, its modest size will immediately limit its potential use. Only a larger E.U. military under a centralized command could provide both the numbers to react to a variety of threats and the logistics for quick deployment and resupply on the ground.

The last argument concerns the development of a European identity. The E.U. prides itself on its diversity of languages, cultures and histories. This heterogeneity does come at a price, though. Most E.U. citizens define themselves by their country of birth first; few consider themselves Europeans primarily. What’s more, roughly 40 percent of E.U. citizens have never left their home country. The E.U. military could foster the formation of a European consciousness, a necessary condition for a more confident European stance in geopolitics. This would especially be true if there were a period of mandatory service — perhaps six to nine months — for citizens ages 17 to 26. (Many E.U. countries had mandatory military service of some kind during the Cold War.) Such service could take a decidedly European approach: Women and men, after their schooling is complete, could choose to perform their service either as civilians — for example in hospitals, kindergartens or nongovernmental organizations — or as soldiers in the E.U. armed forces. Either way, deployment (civilian or military) beyond one’s native country should be encouraged.

How would such a force be administered? It would be a challenge, but we propose that the E.U. military be overseen by a new E.U. foreign and security council (composed of members of the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, and headed by a new commissioner for defense). This body would have to unanimously agree to any deployment of E.U. soldiers abroad.

However, an attack on any one or multiple E.U. member states should automatically activate the armed forces for defensive operations. To further assure its members, the E.U. could enshrine this automatic mechanism by updating the E.U. Treaty’s Article 42.7, which currently calls somewhat vaguely for a mutual “obligation of aid and assistance” in case of an attack. The E.U. armed forces would thus become the bloc’s first line of defense.

Initially the armed forces could be a separate, 28th military in the E.U. (as others have proposed), supplementing the 27 national armed forces. Over time, it could take on more and more of the duties of those forces (in the long run, perhaps all of them). In the early stages, the force would focus primarily on securing the bloc’s eastern border and on crisis interventions.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and the cruel and inhumane way it is waging this war of aggression — has laid bare the shortcomings of E.U. foreign and security policy. The E.U. response to this crisis must match its gravity. While the first chapter of European integration centered on securing peace and prosperity internally, the next chapter should build up the capability to defend against external threats. An E.U. military could transform the union from a dependent soft power into a sovereign superpower of global relevance. In the words of E.U. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen back in 2018, when she was Germany’s minister of defense: “The time is ripe for an army of Europeans committed to peace on our continent and in the world. Deeds must now follow words.”

### EU Army---2NC

#### Europe has the means for an EU Army but NATO security guarantees prevent support on both sides of the Atlantic

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**Europeans are a moody lot.** Whenever they feel neglected by America — meaning most anytime Washington is busy elsewhere — there is much wailing and gnashing of teeth. And endless demands for “reassurance,” as in additional promises to spend and do even more to defend the continent.

European unease again is on the rise. President Joe Biden’s chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal allegedly without even the pretense of consultation hit Europe particularly hard. There were charges that Biden didn’t coordinate with European governments, which had sizable groups of military personnel and civilians in Afghanistan (The NATO chief denies the alliance wasn’t consulted). It would seem that the continental states have more reason than usual to be upset.

While brickbats tossed Washington’s way aren’t likely to have much effect, Europe’s impotence has spurred renewed interest in expanding the continent’s military capabilities, which could become the most significant consequence of Europe’s involvement in Washington’s 20‐​year Afghan misadventure.

When European defense ministers gathered in late August, their meeting was filled with complaints of a “fiasco” and “debacle.” They were frustrated that they had no ability to act independently but had to rely on America. Of course, none of this should have been a surprise. French President Emmanuel Macron previously called NATO “brain dead,” promoted “strategic autonomy,” and advocated a “true European army,” with no result. Grandiose ideas of an independent European military force have long circulated to no end. More than two decades ago plans were actually made for a 60,000 multinational force, which never appeared. Nor did later proposals for 1500‐​member “battle groups.”

Now Josep Borrell, the European Union’s de facto foreign minister, wants to establish an “initial entry force” of about 5,000 soldiers. He complained: “We Europeans found ourselves — not only for the evacuations out of the Kabul airport but also more broadly — depending on American decisions.” The Afghanistan experience was particularly painful, he observed, showing “that the deficiencies in our strategic autonomy come with a price.” He advocated “new tools like this entry force,” so “The only way forward is to combine our forces and strengthen our capacity and our will to act.”

With an equivalent combined economy and larger population than America, Europe has long had the resources necessary to create such a unit. However, the will was always lacking, even for what would be small ball for America. Has that finally changed?

Significant barriers to action remain. Historically, Washington opposed such an independent European force. U.S. officials feared that separate units would cause penurious Europeans to reduce resources available to NATO. Moreover, past administrations worried that the continent would move toward a more independent foreign and military policy, which is anathema to Washington. The U.S. wants Europe to do more, but only under the former’s control.

Nor has the continent shown any interest in doing more. Despite modest growth in military outlays by a number of European states since 2014, the continent continues to badly lag America’s effort. In a pitifully honest self‐​review, German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp‐​Karrenbauer admitted that “Without America’s nuclear and conventional capabilities, Germany and Europe cannot protect themselves.” She cited estimates that “the United States currently provides 75 percent of all NATO capabilities.”

Only France and the United Kingdom possess capable armed forces of serious size. Germany, Italy, and Spain have sizeable economies but minimal militaries, in theoretical and practical strength. Indeed, the poor readiness of the Bundeswehr, the heir to the once mighty Wehrmacht, would be comical if not so serious. Even countries which claim to fear Russian revanchism, most notably the three Baltic states and Poland, spend little more than 2 percent of GDP, a miserly investment on behalf of their freedom. In the field, noted Rem Korteweg of the Dutch Clingendael Institute, Bosnia and Libya demonstrated “the inability of Europeans to do anything serious without the Americans.”

Although most European leaders formally assent to NATO insistence that they spend more, there is no public support for doing so. Most Europeans do not fear Russia, the only plausible security threat. Those who do expect Washington to shield them. That is why the eastern‐​most members of NATO want the presence of an American military tripwire, to ensure U.S. deaths (not theirs) and trigger automatic American involvement in war on their behalf if attacked by Moscow. Fear of U.S. disengagement might cause more European countries to spend more on their militaries, but so far no one expects the American military to go home. As long as Washington’s security guarantee appears secure, few European nations are likely to make an added investment in a European “initial entry force.”

Indeed, Europeans do not support going to war for their neighbors even while expecting Americans to go to war for them. Last year the Pew Research Center surveyed 14 NATO members. In Poland, which constantly demands more U.S. attention, only 40 percent of respondents agreed that “our country should use military force” in response to a Russian attack on a NATO ally. Just a third in Germany, which was loaded with allied troops during the Cold War. And a quarter in Greece and Italy. Although many governments are more supportive of NATO and military outlays than their publics, at a time of economic difficulty and fiscal stringency they are more likely to curb than expand spending on the armed forces.

President Biden should strongly support European efforts to create more effective militaries, however they are organized. Indeed, he should go further and encourage the continent to move toward military independence.

#### Ukraine solves political and military will, but NATO’s security guarantee prevents development

**Graziano and Braw 22** \*Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Former Commander of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, Claudio \*\*Member of the United Kingdom National Preparedness Commission, Elisabeth(3-20-22, "Is an EU Army Coming?," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/>20 22/03/20/is-an-eu-army-coming/)HS

The war in Ukraine, politicians and pundits agree, is the European Union’s sudden birth as a serious military player. Germany has announced that it will dramatically increase its defense spending and is sending weapons to Ukraine—a previously unthinkable development. The European Union, heretofore mostly known as an outfit that voices concerns about military aggression but does nothing, has already sent Ukraine military aid worth more than half a billion dollars.

But what exactly the EU’s military role should be remains painfully unclear: Member states have widely different opinions on the matter, and European security is of course already being looked after by NATO. What, exactly, can the EU do to grow its military muscle without causing affront to its Brussels neighbor? Severe crises below NATO’s Article 5 threshold, in a way, pose an opportunity for the EU to make a real military contribution. Its Military Committee—composed of member states’ defense chiefs—has the daunting task of mapping a course. At the center sits its chair, Gen. Claudio Graziano.

Graziano, who spent the first part of his career within Italy’s elite Alpini mountain infantry, was previously Italy’s chief of defense and chief of the army. He also served in Afghanistan as commander of the Kabul Multinational Brigade and commanded the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. He assumed his EU post in 2018 after being elected by his fellow EU defense chiefs. The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Elisabeth Braw: The EU has suddenly emerged as a serious actor in the security of Europe, and EU governments are increasing defense spending. Is the EU militarily stronger now than it was two months ago?

Claudio Graziano: Absolutely yes. Russia has brought war back to Europe, which was something so serious and dangerous that it wasn’t even considered possible. Even for people who had read about the risk, it was impossible to believe it would happen. When it did happen, it was a shock of immense magnitude that provoked a huge common response from the European Union.

“A defense union is really the only possible answer to this crisis.”

At the Versailles meeting [on March 10-11], the heads of state and government discussed how the European Union can live up to its responsibilities in this new reality. Doing so requires a clear political will, and now the European Union is more united than ever. This gives an incredible push to building a more concrete and credible European defense union. And a defense union is really the only possible answer to this crisis.

We know that’s a long path, but we know that we have to do it now because later will be too late. As part of this effort, we’ll start developing an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity that will give us the chance to deploy a modular and multidomain force of up to 5,000 troops that can intervene in nonpermissive [hostile] environments.

This force will also have strategic enablers that have in the past normally been provided by the United States—for example, command and control structures, strategic airlift, strategic transport, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, cyberdefense, unmanned air vehicles, space communication assets, electronic warfare systems, anti-missile defense, and I hope in the near future main battle tanks and next-generation fighter jets.

EB: But the EU already has battlegroups that have never been deployed. How can you be sure that this deployable force will be successful when the battlegroups have not?

CG: The EU battlegroups are designed to be used for stabilization management [crises less severe than war], and it’s true that they’ve never been used. That’s because we never reached an agreement among the EU member states on certain issues, such as cost and who was supposed to lead the effort. The other complication was that they shouldn’t compete with NATO. In the past, I served in NATO missions for many years, including in Afghanistan, and NATO does foreign deployments well. It also has at least nine rapid reaction corps, and they’re much bigger than the EU battlegroups. Our new EU Rapid Deployment Capacity is an effort to answer a security need without competing with NATO. But to be a real answer, the Deployment Capacity must also be used in exercises. And having it on the roster will send a message of European unity to Russia and others.

EB: Speaking of unity, Poland wants to give Ukraine its MiG-29 fighter jets but doesn’t want this to be just a Polish initiative. The United States said no because it didn’t want to be drawn into the war in the active way that sending aircraft from Ramstein Air Base in Germany would mean. Can the EU step in to help Ukraine now?

CG: The provision of combat aircraft is currently not on the agenda. But you have to remember that on Feb. 27, only 72 hours after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted an unprecedented aid package to help the Ukrainian armed forces defend Ukraine’s territory and population. This aid package included lethal weapons. That’s a milestone! It’s even more than a historical moment. Remember that in 2013 we weren’t able to provide anything to Mali. [Editor’s note: Despite having monitored the 2012 Islamist takeover of the country’s north closely, the EU failed to intervene militarily. Instead, France launched an intervention in which it was assisted by Germany, Denmark, and other EU member states.]

Regarding lethal weapons, we’re sending whatever the Ukrainians need most—for example, ammunition and anti-tank weapons. This will help the Ukrainians fight for freedom, and their will to do so is the most important surprise in this war. Neither the Russians nor we probably understood how far the Ukrainians would go to defend their freedom. It’s so different from Afghanistan this past summer, when we saw the Afghan armed forces melt away.

EB: What is your own role in this growing military role the EU is taking on? Does the Ukrainian government come to you directly with requests for military assistance?

CG: It works a bit differently. The Ukrainians tell us what they need, the EU member states check what they have and can give to the Ukrainians, and we—through the EU military staff —function as the clearinghouse.

EB: One idea that keeps being floated in every discussion about the EU and its military capabilities is the prospect of an EU Army. It’s clearly not feasible, especially considering that it has taken Germany and the Netherlands years of painstaking work to establish their joint panzer division. Short of complete military integration, what can the EU do to strengthen its military capabilities, beyond increasing defense spending, of course? As we know, countries like to spend money on weapons made by their own companies.

CG: Integrating armed forces really is extremely difficult, but it’s not impossible. It starts with the political will. But what we can do first to strengthen our military capabilities is to improve interoperability. After this war, we need to conclude that life won’t be as it was before and that we’ve made a backward leap of at least 70 years.

How do we improve interoperability? Consider this: The U.S. Army, and even the Russian army, uses only one type of main battle tank. We Europeans operate 17 different kinds. That creates enormous problems of maintenance and supply and of training together. Our navies and air forces have similar problems. We’re talking about a total of 180 different platforms, while the United States has 30. This really is anachronistic and unacceptable, especially considering that we collectively spend more than 250 billion euros [about $276 billion] a year on defense, which is much more than what Russia spends. Yes, we need to spend more, but we also need to spend better by avoiding such duplication.

And it’s not just about money. We have to have a mindset that we want to train together and work together. And when you deploy together, you become credible. When I was a lieutenant, I was part of a NATO war group that did exactly this; we deployed to countries on NATO’s outer edges, such as Norway and Turkey. It was a very well-trained and credible group. Now that we’re going back in history in European security, the EU should be able to do such things, too.

EB: When will the EU be able to deploy forces?

CG: We’ve set ourselves the target of 2025 for the Deployment Capacity to be fully operational. That’s an ambitious term because it means you need to have all the strategic enablers I mentioned earlier. Then again, you have to remember that the EU is not in charge of collective defense. That’s a NATO responsibility. But in the current crisis, we—the EU—responded immediately not just by sending military aid to Ukraine but by providing military assistance to other countries, too. At the moment, aircraft coordinated by the EU are, for example, flying reconnaissance missions over Bosnia and Herzegovina. That sends a message of solidarity to the people of Bosnia and a message to malicious actors that we’re ready to react.

EB: Your fellow army general Oleksandr Sirsky, commander of the Ukrainian ground forces, faces an unbelievably difficult task. What is your message to him?

CG: I want to send him a message of support. Col. Gen. Sirsky is also in charge of the defense of Kyiv, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s original plan was to quickly capture Kyiv. Thanks to him and his troops, that didn’t happen. I want to tell him that we’re on their side, we’ll remain on their side, and that he can count on us.

### EU Impact---1NC

#### US-led NATO makes EU influence impossible---only the plan makes them a credible actor

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Of course, it makes sense for countries to ally themselves with the world’s foremost power, and only for that reason NATO will continue to exist for some time to come. But increasingly, the de facto EU-US-NATO triangle is becoming untenable. On the one hand, sustaining US-led NATO as Europe’s primary security forum at the end of the day runs counter to EU ambitions in the field of foreign and security policy. On the other hand it ties Europe to a more global US security agenda that, deep down, it does not subscribe to and that it is certainly not willing to shoulder financially. Finally, as long as Europe remains a function of US security policy, this will put a curb on its ability to forge comprehensive partnerships with third parties. Revamping the Transatlantic Relationship The transatlantic relationship, North America’s partnership with Europe, is still the world’s most vital economic, strategic and political bond, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The question is, however, whether NATO should remain its ultimate embodiment, or whether this relationship should be remodelled and based on a broad and new strategic EU-US partnership, including provisions on security and defence such as a mutual assistance clause. Such a recalibrated partnership would leave room for differences in approach and be more informal in nature, while not necessarily always involving all 27 EU members, but still important when crises erupt. We have seen examples of this kind of cooperation on Iran, with the EU3 teaming up with the US, and the Middle East, where the EU sits next to the USA, the UN and Russia in the Quartet: both cases that do not allow for direct NATO involvement. Good Old NATO Critics will maintain that we cannot do without NATO’s unique capabilities, in terms of joint planning and interoperability. No other organization but NATO can conduct an operation like ISAF, the argument runs. But in many respects ISAF is a revealing operation. What we really see in Afghanistan is an able and willing coalition that runs the demanding southern and eastern regional commands, and a host of other countries doing something else in the more benign provinces. Out of ISAF’s 46 contributors, non-NATO member Australia seamlessly joins combat operations in the South, while NATO member Germany is carrying out its national stabilization operation in the north, steered by the Bundestag rather than by NATO. None of these countries would be able to sustain their operations without US enablers. So it is rather the US, and not necessarily NATO, which is pivotal within ISAF. Trading NATO for the EU-USA does not mean doing away with the acquis atlantique, but it would mean doing away with a top-heavy alliance that served its purpose well but increasingly stirs unease in Europe, while becoming less relevant to Washington – even if the newest US National Security Strategy routinely speaks of NATO as the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today. NATO, or Europe, is nowhere as central in US security thinking as many Europeans like to believe. When 9/11 occurred, invoking the alliance’s Article 5 only came as an afterthought. Paradoxically, this trend may be reinforced under a less traditionally inclined president Obama, no matter how enthusiastically his inauguration was celebrated in Europe. Moreover, building a new relationship with the USA which is more balanced than it is now would likely stimulate Europe to further boost its post-Second World War integration process. Third Parties Last but not least, a new transatlantic partnership more firmly based on both participants’ autonomy would enable the EU, but also the USA, to review their relations with third parties. Take, for example, Russia. Among other reasons, the EU-Russia relationship, important because of the density of trade, investment and energy links but marred by endless negotiations on a new strategic agreement, is held back because of Moscow’s frustration that it cannot discuss security with the EU, which tends to refer to NATO instead. As long as Europe labels NATO as its primary security organization, Moscow is likely to regard the EU’s neighbourhood policies as affiliated with the alliance’s enlargement agenda, given the expressed synergies between these two ‘EuroAtlantic organizations’. More broadly speaking, the outside world will look at Europe as a more serious interlocutor as it depends less on US security guarantees. Sticking to the Russia example, the US, lacking the economic dimension in its relationship with Moscow, is perfectly capable of concluding deals on strategic issues, such as the recent START agreement on nuclear arsenals. But many, not all, of the bilateral irritants concern Europe and are NATO related. It is probably no coincidence that Russian compliance with START has been made dependent on missile defence developments in Europe.

#### East Asian, African and Latin American conflict coming now---only EU can solve

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Thus, there is a well-rehearsed commitment to the principle of peace and by implication the peaceful resolution of disputes. The bipolar world order established after the Second World War made a mockery of this commitment. The term conflict prevention in this era meant containing the potential for nuclear war between the major blocs. The ideological struggle between those blocs was carried into conflict all over the globe, notably in East Asia (Korea and Vietnam), Africa (the Congo and Angola) and Latin America (Chile and Nicaragua). The international community’s response was generally to insert peacekeeping forces between parties in conflict without necessarily dealing with the root causes of the conflict. Many such conflicts ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but long-suppressed animosities between the constituent republics of that Union and its client states erupted. The international community’s failure to deal with the ethnic/sectarian conflicts in the Caucasus and South Eastern Europe on the one hand and the Rwanda genocide on the other impelled discussion of conflict prevention from academia to foreign policy formation. While the UN and the OSCE had long-standing commitments to conflict prevention, exercise of all possible options was in practice limited by international politics. When it became clear that, as Smith12 put it, the balance of terror of the Cold War would not be replaced by peace and security, the issue of conflict prevention became prominent for the international community.

3. Current Conflict Resolution Practice

Van Waalraven13 explored the conflict policies of a sample of Western countries (Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and found that general conflict policy, as against specific conflict intervention, was embedded in other, mainly development assistance, policies. He found it difficult to identify generic approaches to conflict prevention, although all countries examined used similar language in their descriptions of conflict and its causes, even if there was only vague consensus on what those causes are.

The Council of the European Union, at its June 2001 meeting in Gothenburg,14 endorsed a programme of conflict prevention,15 stating this would “improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action [to prevent conflict]” and that “[c] onflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects.” This document and the European Security Strategy16 provided the foundation for the elaboration of a whole series of policies, including the promotion of mediation in conflict prevention and resolution. It was followed in 2009 by the “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities,”17 which uses the term mediation to encompass improved communication, negotiation, dialogue and facilitation through the offices of a third party, namely the EU. In this document mediation can be directive and coercive. It also notes the EU’s financial power and moral authority as positive factors in a mediation process.

### EU Uniqueness---2NC

#### EU is increasingly fragmented, collapse is inevitable

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(No) Future Europe in the world

In 2030, the European Union (EU) has become irrelevant in international relations. Its ambition to act as a normative and values-based power lies in tatters. The Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP) is anything but common – rather, it is fragmented. The dream of speaking with one voice remains an unattainable ideal. In practice, the EU has little agency. Most decisions on foreign, security and defence issues are taken unilaterally or in ad hoc coalitions – and do not always align with the EU’s aim to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: Preamble). The CFSP/CSDP resembles an uncoordinated patchwork of small state responses to transnational security challenges, such as climate change, digitalization, nuclear proliferation or migration and regional crises and conflicts. This makes it virtually impossible to establish a Union that is a credible actor on the international scene.

In times of complexly intertwined global competition, and growing illiberalism, the EU seems like a relic of bygone times. As Europe cannot act united in CFSP/CSDP matters, questions arise as to what purpose the EU institutions and agencies serve. In 2030, most member states allocate little funding and expertise to EU efforts on CFSP/CSDP, including humanitarian aid, operations and missions. Many high-ranking officials in Brussels, for example, in the European External Action Service and the European Defence Agency, are relocated to national capitals. Many member states withdraw from the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), as these initiatives did not produce the output that participating states initially hoped to achieve.

In 2030, it becomes an inescapable reality that the EU’s CFSP/CSDP is a nonstarter. The most capable European nation-states explore other options to act on the international scene. Especially, the United Kingdom and France are increasingly disappointed by their European allies. The UK’s exit from the EU created a multilayered system of half-hearted security arrangements without access to relevant CFSP/CSDP decision-making bodies; and the French claims of strategic sovereignty for Europe and a ‘true European army’ (BBC, 2018) fell on deaf ears. In 2030, it is too late for soul-searching. Outside of the EU framework, the United Kingdom and France each pursue national ‘Sonderwege’. The United Kingdom launches fora to strengthen its ‘hard security’ ties with Commonwealth countries. France has established a formal strategic dialogue with the Russian Federation to pursue shared interests, that is, related to stability in the Middle East. Caveats expressed by their European partners, especially Germany and Central Eastern European (CEE) states, are ignored, further dividing the continent. Germany, as the main advocate of an inclusive, rules-based and value-centred approach to European integration, cannot keep the EU together. Spain and Italy are particularly unwilling to accept German leadership and instead pursue their national interests, which do not always complement each other. The EU’s fragmentation also limits Germany’s own ability to act. After decades of (rhetorically) promoting an emancipation from the United States, liberal-minded political elites and the majority of the German public have pinned all their hopes on the EU as a means to influence international affairs. Yet this channel of exercising power seems lost.

The EU’s diminishing role in the future is not confined to the CFSP/CSDP – rather, the EU’s failure in this policy area has major negative spillover effects. The EU’s powerlessness results in a state of uncertainty on the continent. The power vacuum is filled by state actors with global ambitions, notably China and Russia, who are intensely involved in European affairs. Asymmetric interdependencies between global players, which make massive investments abroad, and European states are weaponized (cf. Farrell and Newman, 2019). This especially concerns high-tech industries, network technologies, transport logistics and infrastructure. The EU’s economic performance is increasingly dependent on foreign investments and technology transfer. The involvement of external actors makes permanent channels of communication a necessity – and, in doing so, it normalizes a policy of detente vis-à-vis competitors. It becomes evident that this entanglement compromises the EU’s ability to act in international affairs as conflicts and crises in the EU’s neighbourhood draw closer.

Russia continues to project power in the South Caucasus, the Western Balkans and Ukraine while hiding ‘behind a fog of deniability’ (Secrieru, 2019: 2). Hostile actions also reach the European continent: low-level foreign interference, such as disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, unauthorized border crossings, intensifies across Europe, especially in the non-NATO members Sweden and Finland, and this is not countered with credible deterrence and defence. Even though the EU’s solidarity clause (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: Article 222) is triggered after intrusions into Swedish IT systems, the Swedes receive little support in practice. Parallel blackouts hit most European capitals, instability and insecurity spreads, and vital services cannot be maintained. Cross-border turmoil ensues. Paramilitary, predominantly foreign-financed forces gain influence. As the EU fails to provide joined-up action to protect its citizens, it risks losing its raison d’être. NATO, with its drastically reduced US presence, also proves ill-suited to providing security on the European continent. European security is now ‘managed’ by a multitude of stakeholders in the public, private and third sector (e.g. criminal gangs, militia, individual activists, private security companies, NGOs, energy, industry and IT businesses – possibly used as proxy actors). Institutional, strategic and capability-related insufficiencies make the EU a bystander to its own decline. The EU’s failures in the realm of regional security are indicative of larger cracks in the surface, which become irreversible in 2030.

The European idea of being ‘united in diversity’ is not primarily undermined by external pressure; rather, it is hollowed out by internal problems. In 2030, Europe, and especially the EU, is made aware of its inability to provide security. It cannot diffuse democratic values and norms in the world due to internal crises. The EU has not learnt to use ‘the language of power’ (Borrell, 2019) vis-à-vis adversaries; it also missed the opportunity to self-critically address the increasingly important internal–external nexus. In 2030, the EU is a pawn in the hands of the powerful, and unable to make a difference in international affairs.

How did we get there?

We argue that the lack of an effective, coherent and progressive grand strategy for the EU’s engagement with and in the world – closely related to the EU’s failure to deliver results at home and abroad – led to the disastrous situation described above. First, the EU’s performance until 2030 shows little consensus on the ends, ways and means of European integration. Second, as a corollary of this, the EU neither acquired relevant CFSP/CSDP capabilities nor implemented necessary reforms to pursue common objectives in this area (where they existed). This resulted in partial withdrawal and ebbing support of the member states as well as of important strategic allies such as the US and NATO. Third, the CFSP/CSDP failure to meet member states expectations and deliver tangible results affected the EU’s reputation in the world. While, as per the EU Global Strategy of 2019, the ambition was to deliver peace and security in Europe and the world, divergence in member states interests and insufficiently coherent capability planning impeded its achievement of this objective.

Lack of European-wide strategic thinking

Until 2030, the EU continued to rhetorically adhere to the idea of being a ‘force for good’ in the world. In practice, however, national interests undermined common efforts. Most importantly, the EU failed to establish a common policy towards the United States, China and Russia, as well as towards the United Kingdom and smaller states. The lack of an impactful EU strategy in global affairs is inextricably linked to challenges of collective action and intra-European problems. Although France and Germany together with the new ‘geopolitical Commission’ under Ursula von der Leyen pushed hard for a common policy, the approach was flawed: it did not sufficiently integrate the CEE countries, failed to tackle social inequalities and could not effectively bridge the demand of liberal markets with national autonomy (cf. Snyder, 2019; Colgan and Keohane, 2017). During the 2020s, the European continent drifted apart politically. Nationalists and (right-wing/left-wing) populists came into power in many EU states. European citizens felt unrepresented at EU level and the EU institutions were increasingly perceived as illegitimate. Irritations on the ground as well as institutional democratic deficits at EU level were allowed to turn into a profound disconnection.

In the 2020s, the EU faced disillusioned, and in the majority nationalist and illiberal, citizens. The EU’s very existence was called into question and CFSP/CSDP was perceived as irrelevant. As the EU seemed increasingly incapable of managing European affairs, the transatlantic relationship came to the fore: was the United States, especially NATO, capable of defending European ideals and the international rules-based order? In 2030, the answer is no. While an emancipation from the United States was pursued at EU level, especially after a further illiberal turn in US politics in the mid-2020s, most CEE states were reluctant to disengage from their most capable security provider (e.g. in terms of arms procurement). This transatlantic ambivalence resulted in less interoperability, military mobility and information exchange on the European continent.

### EU Impacts---2NC

#### Africa instability escalates

Walter Mead 13. James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College. “Peace in The Congo? Why the World Should Care.” The American Interest. 12-15-2013. <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/>

One of the biggest questions of the 21st century is whether this destructive dynamic can be contained, or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The Congo conflict is a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, in Africa at least, there is potential for this kind of conflict. The Congo war (and the long Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan proper, the wars in what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa (where religious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) are strong indications that the potential for huge and destructive conflict across Africa is very real.

But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence.

Beyond that, rival nationalisms in East and Southeast Asia are keeping the world awake at night.

The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are dynamite, and that the potential for new conflicts on the scale of the horrific wars of the 20th century is very much with us today.

The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts.

That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly.

The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or with trigger wider conflict India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends.

Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one. The weak states that straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us.

#### Latin American conflict goes nuclear---draws in Russia and China

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As noted previously, there is arguably no region (including Asia) upon which the United States is more dependent for its prosperity and security, and with which it is more closely tied through bonds of family, than Latin America and the Caribbean. In terms of trade and investment, from manufacturers to the food Americans put on the table, there is no region for which disruption of commerce with the United States could do more damage to our economy and the everyday lives of Americans. Reciprocally, the region’s proximity to the United States makes it a logical and attractive business partner; there is not another region of the world for which prosperity, healthy infrastructure, and institutions could contribute more to a win-win commercial relationship with the United States. With respect to security, the United States is blessed by the absence of neighbors that pose a direct military threat to the nation, are experiencing conditions of chaos, or permit U.S. adversaries to operate from their territory. Yet, if these fortunate conditions were to change, the resulting threat to U.S. national security could force a significant reorientation of U.S. security initiatives away from its foreign engagements to address the emergent threat closer to home. To use a military analogy, Latin America and the Caribbean is, for the United States, an “unoccupied high ground.” The fact that the United States does not fully leverage the opportunities offered by Latin America, nor suffers a significant immediate security threat from the region, does not make it any less strategic. The Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime in the Region. The activities of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, often characterized as the principle security issue in the region, is more of a strategic challenge to the United States than is commonly understood. On the one hand, the activities of groups such as the Maras in the Northern Triangle and warring cartels in Mexico generate violence and destroy economic opportunity in ways that generate refugee flows toward the United States. Indeed, the 2014 crisis of child migrants from Central America obliged the Obama administration to request an additional $3.7 billion to respond to the situation, eclipsing the $979 million previously spent on the region under the Central America Regional Security Initiative since 2008.2 In addition, the money used to enable transnational criminal activities corrupts institutions, undermining governance, and expanding criminal networks that can be used by terrorist organizations to raise and launder money, smuggle persons and materiel through the region, as well as creating spaces in which they can hide, train, plan operations, and recruit fighters for their global activities. Such threats are magnified further where anti-U.S. governments, such as the “Bolivarian Socialist” government of Venezuela, tolerate and possibly even facilitate the activities of such groups, permitting, for example, the entry of Iranian paramilitary Qods forces into the region through the country.3 The Need for U.S. Scenario Planning to Include the Potential Use of the Region by U.S. Adversaries to Conduct Actions Against the United States. Military professionals in the United States have the responsibility for planning how to fight the nation’s wars if called upon to do so by their elected leaders. In today’s globally interconnected world, it is highly unlikely that a U.S. “near-peer competitor,” such as China or Russia, would allow the United States to engage with them in such a conflict (however undesirable) entirely as an “away game.” U.S. defense planners must expect that in such a conflict, the adversary would employ its full global range of assets, capabilities, and options, including: relationships and access agreements with foreign militaries (however benign) in all parts of the world, knowledge of, and the potential for, staging activities leveraging their commercial operations near the United States, as well as information technology infrastructure built by the adversary’s companies there. Potential U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China may be expected to leverage such assets and relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean, in addition to other regions, in order to undermine U.S. coalition formation in the run-up to a conflict, to conduct operations in the region during the conflict to disrupt the U.S. economy and financial system, and potentially to conduct military operations from Latin America and the Caribbean to attack U.S. deployment and sustainment flows, and to put the U.S. homeland at risk, thus forcing the diversion of U.S. forces from other theaters. While Russia and China have not currently established formal military bases in the region that could be used against the United States, their familiarity with Latin American armed forces through regular military-to-military engagement, their knowledge of regional infrastructure such as ports, airports, and commercial logistics systems, means that they could achieve a functional military capability in the region rapidly in the months leading up to the conflict, if U.S. adversaries in Latin America permitted them to do so.

#### EU credibility prevents North Korean arms racing---goes nuclear

Boris Toucas 17, Visiting Fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “North Korea: The European Union Could Help Break the Diplomatic Stalemate”, Beyond Parallel – CSIS Blog, 1/5/2017, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-the-european-union-could-help-break-the-diplomatic-stalemate/

North Korea’s continued progress on its nuclear and missile programs remains one of the most significant challenges to the international community. This is why the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution that closes an important sanctions loophole and imposes closer scrutiny of North Korea’s diplomatic activities sends a strong, if late, message of unity and international resolve. But what comes next? There are a variety of options: Diplomatic normalization? This could trigger a regional arms race. Military intervention? This could plunge Northeast Asia into chaos. Unfortunately, prospects for negotiations are bleak, and unofficial discussions between North Korea and the United States are unlikely to succeed as in previous rounds.

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. —Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950

I recently argued that North Korea isn’t the only actor responsible for the international community’s fatigue in addressing a dangerous security dilemma. In fact, the Six-Party Talks–only framework may have undermined prospects for exploring other types of negotiations when these talks failed. Such a situation is counterproductive as it convinces North Korea to continue its destructive behavior to achieve a new outcome. By contrast, introducing more actors into the talks could potentially reduce tensions between the main parties and could help Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo reframe the discussion. Mongolia, Singapore, Malaysia or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could be potential participants, but what about the European Union and its member states? While the European Union will never be the main actor in resolving the North Korean crisis, there is an argument for Europe’s increased participation in the debate.

The European Union’s Potential Added-value on North Korea

The European Union’s multiple-layered diplomatic approach represents a unique tool for placing pressure on troublesome countries: besides members states’ bilateral channels, the European Union is also a vehicle aimed at undertaking coordinated action once political consensus has emerged. Twenty-six out of twenty-eight EU members maintain diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), six of which have diplomatic offices in Pyongyang (France only has a humanitarian and cultural office). These bilateral ties are diverse, with some dating back to the Cold War. They are of crucial importance to the North Korean regime, as part of its narrative on legitimacy and its appetite for international recognition, which may be attractive to them. Washington would certainly benefit from having the European Union and its members more proactively using their own diplomatic influence on the regime and its clients.

Furthermore, EU expertise in proliferation crises is often underrated. The European Union was a party to the negotiations with Iran, as was France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Most member states actively take part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), intercepting illicit trade flows across the Mediterranean. Moreover, the European Union has implemented one of the most comprehensive restrictive measures regimes against North Korea, which has evolved into a comprehensive strategy directly targeting the civil and military proliferation chain, as well as strategic economic sectors. Finally, the 2016 decision to put an end to hosting the DPRK’s overseas workers also represents a laudable attempt to tackle financial flows that indirectly support proliferation activities, which sets a precedent for the activities of Russia, China, and several of North Korea’s clients in Africa and the Middle East. However, outreach among the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union on these practices has been limited so far, preventing full harmonization of national policies among the like-minded.

As an external actor to the region, the European Union could play a particular role in unlocking negotiations. First, it has a better record on implementing restrictive measures than, for example, some potential new Asian players, whose stance is more ambiguous. Second, it is a bureaucratic machine that has the unique capacity to build consensus among partners even when their interests are at odds. Paradoxically, the ability to observe North Korea from afar might give the European Union an advantage over the participants of the Six-Party Talks where the six countries have different vital interests at stake. In this regard, the European Union is detached just enough to dare to make innovative proposals.

### EU Climate---2NC

#### EU climate agenda solves extinction---action now is key

Wolfgang Ischinger 20. Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Germany; Former German Ambassador to the United Kingdom from 2006 to May 2008 and to the United States from 2001 to 2006. "Building Back a Better EU Foreign Policy: Climate and Security after COVID-19". Wilson Center. 9-30-2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/building-back-better-eu-foreign-policy-climate-and-security-after-covid-19

After Us, the Floods

Last year’s apocalyptic wildfires in Australia and this January’s devastating floods in Jakarta gave us a glimpse of what is to come if we don’t act now. In fact, for many, the changing climate already poses a massive security threat. In 2019, 24.9 million people were internally displaced as a result of weather-related disasters. Absent drastic measures, such events will become even more frequent and destructive in the future. The World Bank estimates that by 2050, as a result of climate change, more than 140 million people could become internally displaced in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America alone.

These climate impacts can also undermine peace, particularly in fragile states. While the effect of climate change on armed conflict within states has only been modest so far, it is expected to rise with global temperatures. The same holds true for interstate conflicts, as climate change may exacerbate resource scarcity or create new and contested abundance, like in the Arctic. If we continue on the current path, climate change will become one of the most serious—if not the dominant threat—to individual and global security.

The COVID-19 crisis underscores that a 21st century understanding of security needs to include non-traditional threats like climate change and points to the importance of reflecting and integrating this broader concept of security in our domestic and foreign policies. Adapting our definition of national and international security is so important because it decisively influences the way we allocate our resources. Our collective lack of pandemic preparedness—despite ample warnings—has highlighted this fact in the most painful manner.

It is good that the strategic community increasingly embraces the link between security and climate change. Eight years ago, when we started to debate the issue in Munich on a regular basis, many were skeptical as to whether climate change was a relevant agenda item for a conference on security. That is certainly no longer the case, but political action has failed to match the rhetoric. This is particularly evident with regard to the weak implementation of the agreements reached at the UN Climate Change Conferences: rather than limiting global warming to 1.5°C, as governments agreed to in Paris in 2015, the world is currently heading for 3.2°C global warming by 2100. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is the single most effective action we can take to limit climate-related security risks. Yet it is only due to the massive economic shock of a pandemic that 2020 may be the first year in which annual global emissions actually fall by the amount necessary to meet the Paris objectives.

Today, most people understand that no state can address global challenges like pandemics or climate change on its own. However, international efforts are being undermined as multilateral fora and instruments lose support and nationalism gains ground. The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement—and now possibly the World Health Organization—is a stark illustration of this trend. With governments understandably focused on addressing the public health emergency and economic downturn, the COVID-19 crisis has further contributed to the inward turn of many countries and diverted attention from more long-term policy objectives.

In order to offset these developments it is paramount to both strengthen the capacities of international and regional organizations and establish coalitions-of-the-willing that are able and willing to lead the way through the multilateral deadlock. Given their economic and political weight in the world, it is the European Union (EU) and its member states that have a particularly important role to play in this regard.

#### Withdrawal spurs integration---necessity overcomes all issues and there’s no impact to defection outside the “inner six”

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In the three preceding scenarios, the USA has sustained its presence in Europe and support for NATO’s article 5 based on its self-interest that Europe should be whole, free and at peace, as well as in avoiding the reputational damage to other relations that a full US withdrawal from Europe would entail. In this final scenario, the USA neither perceives Russia as a threat nor has any interest in upholding its previous standing in world affairs. The USA thus sees only diminishing returns from its European engagement. Partly **as a result of this US-initiated post- Atlanticism**, the German-French engine **receives a vital fuel injection**, which subsequently leads to **considerable integration in the defence realm**. As the USA backs away from Europe, **the EU is independently able to fill the ensuing security vacuum ahead of Russia and/or China.** While not all EU member states perceive further European integration as the best response to managing a fragmented world order, **most of the members of the eurozone decide to further integrate their military forces**, with the ‘inner six’ founding members of the EU at the forefront of an **‘ever closer union’.** This deepened integration is mainly driven by a renewed French-German axis. While France agrees to support the German vision on eurozone reform (less centralization and greater national fiscal responsibility), in return Germany supports the French vision on a shared defence budget and the creation of an autonomous European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB). At the bilateral level, Germany decides to fund the stationing of French nuclear weapons in Germany as a way to balance out wavering US security guarantees. For France, this further demonstrates its role as the principal de facto leader of European defence. While the previous scenario allowed for considerable levels of differentiation and flexibility, this scenario offers a more fundamental choice of staying on the Franco-German train or getting off. This integration by directorate forces other member states to either leave the EU or integrate to a greater extent than they might prefer. As the EU increases its legal pressure on Hungary and Poland, Hungary eventually chooses to follow in the footsteps of the UK and leave the EU. The other members of the eurozone, however, feel the need to join the enhanced cooperation for the same reasons as joining PESCO – it is simply too costly not to. States outside of this accentuated ‘core Europe’ find themselves with considerably less political weight than before, which pushes some of the ‘semi-periphery’ member states to further deepen political integration with the EU against their will, while others contemplate following Hungary out of the EU. In terms of cohesion, big differences in member states’ strategic cultures remain, but **gradually converge as a result of increased cooperation on military operations** in the southern neighbourhood. The dominance of the French-German axis leads to CSDP missions mainly being focused on former French colonies in North Africa and the Sahel. This tendency worries member states that would have liked to see more EU security efforts in the eastern neighbourhood. In addition, the creation of an autonomous EDTIB further strengthens EU military capabilities. High-end capabilities that are difficult to develop and procure at the national level – such as drones, air-to-air refuelling, strategic bombers and submarines – are developed and fully financed by a coordinated defence planning mechanism between the core Europe member states. In sum, a dramatic **reduction in US engagement in and with Europe**, coupled with a reinvigorated German-French relationship, **unleashes a process** that leads to a semi- federalized defence union among a core membership. Not all the member states or their populations are comfortable with this development. Some voice their concerns, others remain at the periphery and some even choose to leave the EU altogether. However, the increased military capabilities, and a strong political will to use them, lead to a significant increase in the EU’s security actorness. In other words, **both the ambition and the political unity within the CSDP is high.** By increasing its military capabilities and gradually ending its dependence on the USA, the EU becomes a **politically and strategically autonomous actor capable of managing** a limited form of territorial defence and high-end peace enforcement operations. The increase in capability, however, is mostly directed towards the interests of the core group – and its Franco-German leadership in particular. EU member states that abstain from this enhanced cooperation find themselves lacking in both transatlantic guarantees and the benefits of a strengthened EU defence cooperation.

#### New initiatives smooth the transition

Camille De Sutter, Defence Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre, 6-3-20, “Europe’s road to strategic autonomy: Summarising the concrete steps taken,” https://finabel.org/europes-road-to-strategic-autonomy-summarising-the-concrete-steps-taken/

The European Union has already undertaken various concrete steps towards strategic autonomy by creating entities that will work toward achieving this objective.

First, the Capability Development Plan (CDP), where Member States identify priorities in their national defence planning and streamline the objectives into a set that all can agree on while maintaining consistency with NATO’s objectives (EEAS, 2020). The overall aim of the CDP is to enhance cooperation and coherence in Member States’ plans and to define common European priorities in capability development (European Defence Agency, 2020a). To streamline European countries’ objectives in this field, the CDP informs the other instruments described below: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) (EEAS, 2020). As presented above, developing common objectives enhances the Member States’ capacity to act autonomously and as one entity.

CARD is another of the EU’s major defence achievements. This mechanism was created to centralise analysis on the implementation of defence plans at the national level. The European Defence Agency (EDA) gathers all the latest and the most detailed information Member States can provide on the results of their implementation of the CDP to launch the CARD process, which is composed of four steps. First, the EDA analyses all relevant data it has gathered and all material provided – voluntarily – by the Member States. Second, the EDA engages in a bilateral dialogue with each individual participating Member State to validate and potentially consolidate the information. Third, the EDA produces a “CARD Analysis” which “presents aggregate data and [identifies] trends regarding defence spending plans, implementation of priorities”, and cooperation opportunities. Finally, a definitive CARD report drafted by the EDA presents the main findings and recommendations (EDA, 2020b). Such a document will allow Member States to streamline their objectives to identify cooperation opportunities in capability development.

PESCO is a legally binding framework based on Article 46 of the Lisbon Treaty. In Biscop’s (2017) words, it “formulate[s] the level of ambition for the strategic autonomy of a group of European States” who are “capable and willing to do so” (EEAS, 2019a). The PESCO framework now consists of a list of 47 projects to which 25 European states participate; out of EU Member States, only Denmark and Malta do not participate. The aim is to “jointly develop defence capabilities and increase their readiness and availability for EU military missions and operations” (EEAS, 2020). PESCO is designed to be led by a core group of states – in which France and Germany particularly need to have a prominent role – who will take bold and concrete steps to move European defence forward, working in a “he who loves me follows me” way. The aim is for the core groups to lead others into harmonising their capability development plans and to eventually reach a point where all European states act in the same direction.

Finally, the EDF will foster innovation and competitiveness in the European defence market by providing the necessary funding for Research & Development (R&D) and by co-financing approved development projects with a contribution of up to 20% (EC, 2019 & EEAS, 2019b). For research, the level of EDF funding can be up to 100% (EC, 2019). The collaborative aspect of the R&D strand of the EDF combined with the co-financing offered by the capability strand lessens the financial burden that defence and capability development bears on European countries. By alleviating some unnecessary and duplicated costs across the European continent, the EDF initiative contributes significantly to the European journey to strategic autonomy. Through the initiative, the EU will eventually be able to build an autonomous and self-sufficient defence market by developing its capabilities while supporting European industries. Thanks to the savings made through pooling and sharing capacities, European actors can also better afford critical technology for which they still rely on increasingly isolationist non-European powers. By developing its autonomous defence market, the EU therefore significantly expands its ability to “act alone when necessary”, in the spirit of strategic autonomy.

### Democracy/Econ---1NC

#### NATO is an ideological illusion – its expansion greenlights democratic backsliding and collapses the economy through scapegoating. (Don’t read w/ EU CP)

Ellehuus 21 – Rachel Ellehuus is the Secretary of Defense Representative in Europe (SECDEFREPEUR) and the Defense Advisor (DEFAD) for the U.S. Mission to NATO., 7-21-2021, "NATO Futures: Three Trajectories," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-futures-three-trajectories, accessed 6-20-2022 – OBERTO!

SHARED IDENTITY, VALUES, AND INTERESTS

It becomes evident that the notion of a NATO based on shared identity and values has been an illusion for some time. Populist and nationalist tendencies that were present when the economy was good accelerate with the economic downturn. Within NATO and the European Union, democratic backsliding goes unchecked and creates societal vulnerabilities, such as corruption, that adversaries exploit. NATO’s attractiveness to new members and credibility as a force for good is damaged by the perception that it is unable to keep its own house in order. National interests are pursued at the expense of the collective good.

U.S. LEADERSHIP

The United States decreases its defense budget even as it faces a more demanding security environment outside of Europe. It loses patience with European allies’ failure to assume their share of the burden, stand up to Russia and China, or allow NATO to adapt to address new and emerging security threats. The United States comes to view NATO not as a force multiplier for U.S. influence and interests, but rather as a burden and constraint; it withdraws significant forces from Europe and reduces its financial, force, and capability contributions to NATO.

RESPONSIBILITY SHARING

The economic fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic brings an end to consecutive years of growth in NATO defense spending. Only countries with sizeable domestic defense industries (i.e., the United States, France, and United Kingdom) maintain higher levels of spending, and the majority of this is directed not to meeting NATO requirements but rather to sustaining their own industries. As a result, China and Russia outpace most allies with respect to emerging defense technologies like that make use of innovations in artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Angered by the lack of progress on arms control and shocked by the escalating cost of nuclear modernization programs, Congress refuses to fully fund nuclear modernization, undermining extended deterrence and forcing the United States to reconsider its nuclear posture in Europe.

NATIONAL DYNAMICS

In response to the economic downturn, countries become more nationalist and protectionist. National leaders searching for a scapegoat for their economic and social woes blame multinational organizations, claiming that they unnecessarily constrain countries’ freedom of action—such as to limit the number of immigrants or to manufacture beyond emissions limits. Some walk away from their international treaty commitments (including on climate action, arms control, and human rights) or ignore their obligations to intergovernmental organizations (such as NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization), further damaging the credibility of these institutions.

### Sustainability---2NC

#### NATO decline inevitable long-term

#### Illiberalism and Russian Propaganda

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There is also **significant democratic backsliding** among NATO member states. The cast of illiberal characters—who are leading the charge in the wrong direction—includes the recently reelected and empowered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS) Party in Poland, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the ruling Fidesz Party. Each has proven more than willing to repress free media, dismantle checks and balances, demonize political opposition, clamp down on civil society, and diminish the rule of law. America’s democratic system and norms under President Trump are also under duress; as a result, Freedom House downgraded the country’s score on the basis of weakening political rights and civil liberties.

Despite these alarming developments, NATO leaders have relegated democratic backsliding to the backburner. Opponents of making the case for democracy within NATO might argue that pushing Ankara, Warsaw, and Budapest too hard on their commitments to good governance will **exacerbate** already tense **divisions** in the alliance. Others might say that Russia would be the prime beneficiary of a contentious democracy discussion at NATO. Yet this is a counterproductive approach with current and potential costs to NATO’s future. Here are three security-based reasons why the United States and NATO should care about democratic backsliding, and actions the alliance can take to address them.

Russia is already benefiting from and effectively leveraging its relationships with Hungary and Turkey to exacerbate discord within Europe and NATO. Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin see one another as allies in their disdain for the European Union and Orbán has courted Russian financial and political support as he builds an illiberal democracy in Hungary. Russian propaganda also finds fertile ground in Hungarian media. A 2018 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report noted that Russian state-owned media content “by Sputnik and RT is widely referenced by pro-government news sources in Hungary.” The report cited Orbán as the EU and NATO’s most supportive leader of Putin’s worldview and leadership. Acting as the Russian “camel’s nose under the tent,” Orbán is thwarting Ukraine and NATO’s partnership efforts by blocking the Ukraine-NATO Commission from meeting at the upcoming summit.

In Turkey, Erdoğan has rattled the NATO alliance by pursuing a deal to purchase the S-400 missile system from Russia. In addition to hurting NATO’s ability to cooperate on security, the system is also not compatible with NATO’s defenses. Through arms and energy deals, Putin uses Turkey as a wedge to divide NATO. Similarly, Erdoğan might see his deals with Putin as a way to free Turkey from Western leverage, particularly as European states push back on his brand of authoritarian politics by cutting EU pre-accession funds. After winning the recent twin parliamentary and presidential elections, an emboldened Erdoğan will likely become an even more problematic partner for NATO.

Other illiberal and populist governments, including Italy’s new anti-establishment government, could follow suit in enhancing their partnerships with Russia, creating future intelligence-sharing and cohesion problems for the alliance. President **Putin is building ties** with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies, including electoral process and open information spaces.

There is a strong link between democratic governance and security gains. Liberal democracies have historically been less likely to experience intra- and interstate conflict, generate refugees, and harbor violent extremists. They are also better at maintaining transparent institutions, civilian control of the military and intelligence services, and working together on confidence-building measures, all of which are core features of NATO’s ability to collectively defend its members. On the other hand, corruption and insecurity grow under politicized institutions and poor rule of law. This hurts NATO’s renewed efforts to combat terrorism, as military and security communities have long acknowledged the connection between corruption and the existence of criminal networks, traffickers, and terrorists within state borders.

Corruption also opens space for **Russian kleptocratic networks** close to Putin to operate and **gain influence**. For example, in 2014 Orbán awarded Rosatom, a Russian state-owned nuclear company, the sole contract to build two nuclear plants in Hungary in exchange for a 10 billion euro loan from Moscow. The Hungarian parliament, dominated by Orbán’s Fidesz Party, then passed a rushed vote to keep data from the nuclear deal confidential for 30 years in the name of “national security.” The deal diminished transparent economic competition within the European Union and solidified Hungary and Russia’s energy ties.

Distrust among allies hurts alliance interoperability. The PiS Party’s assault on independent media and the Constitutional Court, including efforts last week to summarily force out 27 Polish Supreme Court justices, have isolated Poland from France and Germany, diminishing trust among the European nations. This could make it increasingly difficult for Washington to gain consensus on joint decisions, communications, and operations. If NATO is dedicated to building resiliency along Russia’s periphery by placing multi-national battalions in Poland, then it should not ignore the accountable institutions that would strengthen this joint effort.

What can NATO do to counter democratic backsliding within its ranks? After a troubling G-7 meeting in Canada, the upcoming NATO summit in Brussels may be a hair twisting exercise in alliance management. Muted cohesion, however, is not enough to address the anti-democratic trends **tearing apart the fabric** of Europe and NATO. Strong actions and words are needed to counter this democratic crisis.

First, in fighting for the relevance of NATO’s Article V promise of collective defense, we should not forget about NATO’s other founding articles, including Article II: states’ promise to strengthen free institutions within their borders. We should also recall the central governance requirements that states needed to meet in order to join the alliance, including rules around civilian control of the military, legislative monitoring, and transparency of arms procurements—all democratic foundations that make the alliance stronger.

In practice, NATO needs a new mechanism to hold members accountable when there is democratic backsliding and when the principles of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding document, are violated. Celeste Wallender, President Obama’s special assistant to the president and senior director for Russian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council, argues persuasively for several measures here. As she and others have noted, NATO currently has no options to suspend, expel, or penalize a NATO member, for example Hungary, for violating a core tenet of the alliance’s democratic values. There is not even a proper venue at NATO—for example the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s main decisionmaking body—to raise matters that some consider a direct threat to the alliance’s core principles. The NAC already has over a dozen committees, but none deal directly with democratic backsliding and human rights violations in the alliance.

#### Turkey

**Erlanger 20** Chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times (Steven Erlanger, 8-3-2020, "Turkish Aggression Is NATO’s ‘Elephant in the Room’," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/202>0/ 08/03/world/europe/turkey-nato)HS

BRUSSELS — The warships were escorting a vessel suspected of smuggling weapons into Libya, violating a United Nations arms embargo. Challenged by a French naval frigate, the warships went to battle alert. Outnumbered and outgunned, the French frigate withdrew.

But this mid-June naval showdown in the Mediterranean was not a confrontation of enemies. The antagonists were France and Turkey, fellow members of NATO, sworn to protect one another.

A similarly hostile encounter between Turkey and a fellow NATO member happened just two weeks ago, when Turkish warplanes buzzed an area near the Greek island of Rhodes after Greek warships went on alert over Turkey’s intent to drill for undersea natural gas there.

Turkey — increasingly assertive, ambitious and authoritarian — has become “the elephant in the room” for NATO, European diplomats say. But it is a matter, they say, that few want to discuss.

A NATO member since 1952, Turkey is too big, powerful and strategically important — it is the crossroads of Europe and Asia — to allow an open confrontation, alliance officials suggest.

Turkey has dismissed any criticism of its behavior as unjustified. But some NATO ambassadors believe that Turkey now represents an open challenge to the group’s democratic values and its collective defense.

A more aggressive, nationalist and religious Turkey is increasingly at odds with its Western allies over Libya, Syria, Iraq, Russia and the energy resources of the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s tilt toward strongman rule after 17 years with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the helm also has unsettled other NATO members.

“It’s getting hard to describe Turkey as an ally of the U.S.,” said Philip H. Gordon, a foreign policy adviser and former assistant secretary of state who dealt with Turkey during the Obama administration.

Despite that, Turkey is getting a kind of free pass, analysts say, its path having been cleared by a lack of consistent U.S. leadership, exacerbated by President Trump’s contempt for NATO and his clear admiration for Mr. Erdogan.

“You can’t say what U.S. policy on Turkey is, and you can’t even see where Trump is,” Mr. Gordon said. “It’s a big dilemma for U.S. policy, where we seem to disagree strategically on nearly every issue.”

Those strategic divides are proliferating. They include Turkey’s support for different armed groups in Syria; its 2019 purchase of a sophisticated Russian antiaircraft system over fierce objections by the United States and other NATO members; its violation of the arms embargo in Libya; its aggressive drilling in the eastern Mediterranean; its constant demonization of Israel; and its increasing use of state-sponsored disinformation.

But NATO officials’ general meekness in standing up to Turkey has not helped, analysts say, pointing to the group’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, whose job is to keep the 30-nation alliance together, but who is considered excessively tolerant of both American and Turkish misbehavior.

The last serious discussion of Turkey’s policies among NATO ambassadors was late last year, despite the purchase of the antiaircraft system, the S-400.

Other countries, like Hungary and Poland, also fall short on the values scale, argued Nicholas Burns, a former NATO ambassador now at Harvard. But only Turkey blocks key alliance business.

NATO operates by consensus, so Turkish objections can stall nearly any policy, and its diplomats are both diligent and knowledgeable, “on top of every ball,” as one NATO official said. France has also used its effective veto to pursue national interests, but never to undermine collective defense, NATO ambassadors say. But Turkey has blocked NATO partnerships for countries it dislikes, like Israel, Armenia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

More seriously, for many months Turkey blocked a NATO plan for the defense of Poland and the Baltic nations, which all border Russia. And Turkey wanted NATO to list various armed Kurdish groups, which have fought for their independence, as terrorist groups — something that NATO does not do.

Some of these same Kurdish groups are also Washington’s best allies in its fight against Islamic State and Al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq.

A deal was supposedly worked out at the last NATO summit meeting in December in London, but Turkey created bureaucratic complications, and it was only in late June that Turkey relented — after considerable pressure from official Washington, which has lost patience with Mr. Erdogan and is infuriated by his insistence on buying the S-400.

If deployed, the S-400 would put Russian engineers inside a NATO air defense system, giving them valuable insights into the alliance’s strengths while threatening to diminish the capability of the expensive fifth-generation fighter, the F-35.

The assumption is that Mr. Erdogan, who has grown significantly more suspicious since a failed 2016 coup against him, wants to be able to shoot down American and Israeli planes like the ones his own air force used in the coup attempt.

“Every time we discuss Russia” in NATO, “everyone thinks of the S-400 and no one says anything,” said one European diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter. “It’s a major breach in NATO air defense, and it’s not even discussed.”

Instead, NATO assumes that talks between Washington and Ankara will somehow handle the problem. But Washington is divided, and Mr. Erdogan talks only to Mr. Trump.

Yet the confusion is not simply Washington’s, said Amanda Sloat, a former deputy assistant secretary of state who dealt with Turkey in the Obama State Department and wrote a recent essay with Mr. Gordon. The European Union also has no clear policy on Turkey or Libya, she said.

Turkey has pursued its own national interests in northern Syria, where it now has more than 10,000 troops, and in Libya, where its military support for a failing government helped turn the tide in return for a share in Libya’s rich energy resources.

It was near Libya in June that three Turkish warships confronted the French frigate.

While the European Union has a mission to help enforce the arms embargo on Libya, NATO does not. The frigate, the Courbet, was engaged in a different NATO mission aimed at migration flows, but since Turkey and France support different sides in the Libyan civil war, the confrontation between NATO allies was troubling.

Turkey said the ship was carrying aid rather than arms, and has denied harassing the Courbet. NATO officials say that its military committee is investigating and that the evidence is not as clear-cut as the French suggest.

Still, President Emmanuel Macron of France has used the clash as another moment to assert that NATO is nearing “brain death,” because it seems incapable of reining in Turkey or acting in a coordinated political way.

His first accusation also involved Turkey, when Mr. Trump, after a call with Mr. Erdogan last October, unilaterally decided to pull U.S. troops out of northern Syria, where NATO is fighting the Islamic State, leaving the French and other allies exposed. Ultimately, the Pentagon persuaded Mr. Trump to leave some American troops there.

French-Turkish tensions at NATO date to the 2011 decision to intervene against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, noted Ivo Daalder, who was then the American ambassador to NATO.

France, with its policy of secularism, fears that Mr. Erdogan’s reinsertion of Islam into politics will spread in North Africa, encourage Islamist militias and damage France’s “sphere of influence,” said Soner Cagaptay, the director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “They are quite worried.”

The latest flash point is over Turkey’s demand to share in discoveries of natural gas made in 2015 in the eastern Mediterranean, which led to deals and alliances among Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt.

Maritime claims are disputed, and Mr. Erdogan complained in June that “their aim was to imprison our country, which has the longest coastline in the Mediterranean, into a coastal strip from which you can only catch fish with a rod.”

He then sent survey and drilling ships to explore off Cyprus, prompting European sanctions, and said he would do the same near Rhodes, bringing the Greeks to threaten warfare. Last week, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany got Mr. Erdogan to hold off while talks proceed.

While many looked to Turkey as a moderate democratic model during the Arab spring a decade ago, Turkey is a different country under Mr. Erdogan, who has mobilized the more religious voters in the countryside.

A devout Muslim, Mr. Erdogan has become more nationalist and authoritarian, especially in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, when he purged and jailed many Turkish secularists, judges, journalists and military commanders.

He has broken definitively with Turkish secularism, symbolized by his recent decision to turn Hagia Sophia from a museum back into a mosque. He has pushed hard into the region with a neo-Ottoman ambition, downgrading older alliances to press Turkish interests.

#### Trump’s second term

**Drezner 22** Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel(5-21-22, “What would Trump’s second-term foreign policy look like?”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/04/21/what-would-trumps-second-term-foreign-policy-look-like/)HS

Here’s what I told the New Republic in full:

It took Trump almost all of his four years to figure out just how some of the levers of government worked. By the end, however, he had begun to realize the power of personnel moves and executive action, particularly in foreign policy. So if Trump wins in 2024, I would anticipate that he would pursue his foreign policy vision in an unconstrained manner. This would include U.S. withdrawals from NATO and security agreements with Japan and South Korea for starters. Withdrawal from the World Trade Organization would also happen. There would also be a wholesale purge of civil servants in national security bureaucracies — essentially what happened at the State Department under Pompeo, but on steroids. Trump’s political appointments — assuming GOP control of the Senate and continued GOP subservience to Trump — would make his subpar first-term appointees look like a team of George Kennans in contrast.

I am making a two-step argument: first, that as disorganized as Trump was during his first term, toward the end he was willing to fire those on his national security team who disagreed with him. Indeed, Trump’s lame duck period mostly consisted of him engaging in wholesale personnel transfers at the Pentagon in a last-ditch effort to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe the Middle East, and elsewhere before his term in office expired.

Trump might be an immature, impulsive leader with a short attention span, but even he can move down a learning curve. It’s safe to assume that he would only nominate individuals as pliant as Kash Patel or Ric Grenell in any second term.

Second, if Trump had more success in appointing only the most loyal toadies to his national security team in 2025, what would he want to do? Pretty much what I said in that paragraph.

It is not hard to find evidence for this claim from Trump’s own staffers and subordinates. In early 2019 Julian Barnes and Helene Cooper reported: “Senior administration officials told The New York Times that several times over the course of 2018, Mr. Trump privately said he wanted to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” They elaborated that “in the days around a tumultuous NATO summit meeting last summer … Mr. Trump told his top national security officials that he did not see the point of the military alliance, which he presented as a drain on the United States.”

In their book “I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final Year,” my Washington Post colleagues Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker wrote: “Trump had privately indicated that he would seek to withdraw from NATO and to blow up the U.S. alliance with South Korea, should he win reelection.” When his secretary of defense warned him not to do these things before the 2020 election, Trump responded, “Yeah, the second term. We’ll do it in the second term.”

And just last month, Trump’s former national security adviser John Bolton told The Post, “In a second Trump term, I think he may well have withdrawn from NATO. And I think [Russian President Vladimir] Putin was waiting for that.”

Little wonder that in his first joint address to Congress, President Biden said: “In my conversations with world leaders — and I’ve spoken to over 38, 40 of them now — I’ve made it known — I’ve made it known that America is back. And you know what they say? The comment that I hear most of all from them is they say, ‘We see America is back but for how long? But for how long?’ ”

### EXT Sustainability---Trump wins

#### Policy and midterms don’t matter---Trump is still crushing in the primary

**Easley 6-8** Senior editor at Morning Consult. Leads coverage of U.S. politics, geopolitics and foreign affairs. (Cameron Easley, 6-8-2022, "Despite Stumbles as Kingmaker, Trump Is Still Dominating the 2024 GOP Primary Field," Morning Consult, https://morningconsult.com/2022/06/08/trump-2024-gop-primary-field/)HS

Former President Donald Trump’s kingmaker status may be under scrutiny following a spate of recent losses by his endorsees in 2022 midterm election primaries, but a new Morning Consult/Politico survey suggests he remains firmly in control of the millions of Republican voters nationwide who would ultimately matter most come 2024.

Trump is outpacing the 2024 GOP primary field

In the June 4-5 survey, 53% of GOP voters said they would vote for Trump over at least a dozen other potential candidates if the 2024 Republican presidential primary were held today — down just 3 percentage points from his potential vote share in a survey conducted before 2022’s primary season heated up.

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis — who for the second year running defeated Trump in an unscientific straw poll of conservative activists at the Western Conservative Summit in Colorado over the weekend — saw his support tick up from 13% to 16%.

Once again, former Vice President Mike Pence finished third in the latest Morning Consult survey of the hypothetical primary field, seeing his support rise from 10% to 13%.

Nikki Haley, a former Trump administration official and South Carolina governor, was the top choice of 4% of respondents, followed by Sens. Ted Cruz (Texas) and Mitt Romney (Utah) at 3% each.

The remaining slate of potential candidates — which included Sens. Tom Cotton of Arkansas, Josh Hawley of Missouri, Tim Scott of South Carolina and Rick Scott of Florida and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo — all pulled in 1% or less.

Trump’s grip on the Republican Party

While political observers and operatives have taken a keen interest in the win-loss record of his endorsees in recent weeks, the latest survey is just another reminder of an uncomfortable truth facing the former president’s would-be challengers: It matters little that Trump has even a below-average endorsement victory rate as long as he remains the top 2024 choice for Republican primary voters around the country.

#### Trump is itching to get back in the cage with Biden

**Allen 6-5** senior national politics reporter for NBC News (Jonathan Allen, 6-5-2022, "Is Trump on the brink of another run for president?," NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-brink-rcna31774)HS

WASHINGTON — Former President Donald Trump is bored at Mar-a-Lago and anxious to get back in the political arena — as a candidate, not a kingmaker — according to his advisers, who are divided over whether he should launch a third bid for the presidency as early as this summer.

While many Trump confidants believe he should wait until after November's midterm elections — and caution that he has not yet made a final decision about running — some say he could move more quickly to harness supporters and deny fuel to the busload of GOP hopefuls in his rearview mirror.

"I’ve laid out my case on why I think he should do it," said longtime Trump adviser Jason Miller, who traveled with the former president to a rally in Wyoming over Memorial Day weekend. "I think that there being clarity about what his intentions are [is important] so he can start building that operation while it’s still fresh in people’s minds and they’re still active — a lot of that can be converted into 2024 action."

A second adviser, who believes Trump should pause until the more traditional post-midterm period, said the former president, famous for his lack of impulse control, is nonetheless likely to jump in "sooner rather than later."

Both said Trump has gathered a wide range of views.

One question is "whether he can sort of suppress his excitement about a 2024 rematch and not, say, go ahead and put that statement out … and waits for a big event, a big speech to do it," the second adviser said. "A betting person says he’s doing it, and he also wants to crowd out the rest of the field."

Two people in Trump's orbit told NBC News they had been asked informally to hold July 4 as a date for a possible announcement, but Miller — noting that Trump hasn't yet decided to run — said it is "not true" that the day has been reserved, even unofficially, for a launch.

Without specifically addressing the question of timing, Trump spokesman Taylor Budowich said in a text exchange with NBC News that he sees growing public appetite for a Trump comeback.

“America was strong, prosperous and greatly respected under President Trump, and that’s why he continues to have unprecedented strength through his endorsement record and the demand for his leadership has never been higher,” Budowich said.

Trump's decision, and its timing, promise to define the playing field for Republicans' efforts to oust President Joe Biden in 2024, and there is reason for him to feel greater urgency in recent weeks.

While he casts a longer shadow over his party than that of any former president in modern times, the footsteps of 2024 Republican hopefuls are growing louder. Several of them have visited early primary states, endorsed candidates in the midterms or delivered high-profile speeches designed to elevate their standing in the party.

That pack includes Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, former Vice President Mike Pence, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, and Sens. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., Josh Hawley, R-Mo., and Ted Cruz, R-Texas.

There is also an emerging dynamic in which his favorites in multi-candidate races often fail — win or lose — to finish with as much as one-third of the vote. Some Republican operatives see that as a sign that his influence on the GOP electorate has diminished, to say nothing of his standing with a broader public that voted him out of office less than two years ago.

Perhaps more important, Trump is frustrated by the ennui of engaging mostly through midterm endorsements for candidates he hardly knows, especially when — as has happened in several recent high-profile primaries — they lose.

But as much as Trump is tantalized by President Joe Biden's struggles in office — and his own impatience — there are plenty of reasons to hold off, Trump allies and Republican strategists say.

If Trump announces a bid, his campaign committee will be subject to hard-money fundraising limits and a technical ban on coordinating with his Save America PAC. He would also undoubtedly focus public attention away from Republicans running in midterm races, potentially hurting the party's candidates in swing districts and states. And he might inadvertently aid Biden by giving the president a contrast point.

"The clearest, cleanest path is to have a cage-match rematch," the second adviser said. "If you have that rematch too early, it could actually help Biden a little bit. ... Trump in modest doses has been good for Trump."

There is precedent for a once and possibly future president, and for the prospect of a Trump-Biden rematch. In 1892, former President Grover Cleveland defeated President Benjamin Harrison, who had unseated Cleveland in 1888.

That was one of six times in U.S. history that a candidate tried to unseat the incumbent president who beat him four years earlier, not counting the elections George Washington won before parties were organized. The first was in 1800, when Thomas Jefferson avenged his loss at the hands of President John Adams. The most recent: Dwight Eisenhower's consecutive wins over Democrat Adlai Stevenson II in 1952 and 1956.

In four of the six contests, the challenger won.

In recent months, Trump has teased audiences at his rallies by suggesting that he will, in fact, run in 2024.

"The truth is: I ran twice, I won twice and I did much better the second time," Trump said at a March rally in Georgia, repeating the lie that he was victorious in 2020. "And now we just may have to do it again."

For now, he is soliciting and receiving counsel, both on whether he should run and, if he does, when he should jump in.

"He always seeks advice from the unlikeliest of places and a very wide pool of voices," said Miller, who declined to go into the details of his own discussions with Trump on the matter. "I very much want him to run again in 2024."

#### Sleepy Joe’s submission to the RADICAL LEFT makes a Donald J Trump victory inevitable

**Thiessen 6-14** Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and the former chief speechwriter for President George W. Bush. (Marc Thiessen, 6-14-2022, "Opinion," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost .com/opinions/2022/06/14/it-almost-if-democrats-are-trying-ensure-trump-wins-2024/)HS

They chose Joe Biden as their nominee precisely because he presented himself as an inoffensive, genial moderate who was least likely to drive away swing voters wary of the Democrats’ leftward turn. But instead of governing as a centrist and uniter, as he promised, Biden has become captive to his party’s progressive wing. His leftward lurch is providing no safe harbor for voters who don’t like Trump but also don’t like the left’s agenda. It has also unleashed a series of catastrophes that has left him less popular around the 500-day mark of his presidency than any modern president before him.

Biden says today’s GOP “isn’t your grandfather’s Republican Party.” Well, this isn’t your grandfather’s Democratic Party, either. In just a few decades, we’ve gone from a Democratic president who promised that “the era of big government is over” to a Democratic president who tried to enact the highest sustained levels of federal spending since World War II while collecting more tax revenue as a share of the economy than at almost any point in the past century. That’s not what Americans voted for in 2020.

One of Biden’s first acts as president was to pass a $1.9 trillion social spending bill disguised as covid relief, which helped unleash the worst inflation in more than 40 years. Don’t take my word for it. Post contributing columnist Lawrence H. Summers, who served as director of the National Economic Council under President Barack Obama, warned in February 2021 that Biden’s plan would “set off inflationary pressures of a kind we have not seen in a generation.” And former Obama administration Treasury official Steven Rattner recently explained that Biden’s plan “overstimulated this economy” by “putting too much money in people’s pockets, which created a lot of this inflation.” Indeed, Rattner told MSNBC’s “Morning Joe,” things would have been even worse if Biden had succeeded in passing his Build Back Better social spending bill. “In an ironic way, you almost have to thank Joe Manchin for blocking that,” Rattner said of the Democratic senator of West Virginia, “because $6.5 trillion of spending in this economy would make these [inflation] numbers look small.”

That’s not all. Biden’s war on fossil fuels helped drive gas prices to record highs, while putting America at risk of widespread power outages because his radical green policies mean we might not have enough power to get through the summer heat wave. His radical immigration policies have helped unleash the worst border crisis in U.S. history. And the flood of illegal drugs surging across the southern border, together with Democratic soft-on-crime policies, helped fuel the worst crime wave in many cities since the 1990s. Never have Americans been confronted with so many failures of big government in so short a time.

Biden’s serial catastrophes are creating the perfect conditions for a Trump comeback. Democrats know it and are starting to panic. The New York Times reports that many party members now see Biden “as an anchor that should be cut loose in 2024.” Instead of blaming the disasters his left-wing policies unleashed, they blame his failure to pass even more “big-ticket legislation on signature Democratic issues” for his unpopularity — as if more spending leading to more inflation would have made him more popular.

Wrong. The problem is Biden’s failure to deliver on the central promise of his campaign, which was to restore normalcy, reach across the aisle, compromise and unite the country behind a moderate, bipartisan agenda. Americans voted for Biden expecting him to hew a centrist course, not to impose a radical progressive agenda on the nation. Unless Democrats are ready to change those policies and move to the center, getting rid of Biden won’t make a difference.

But Democrats seem unwilling to do that. Instead, they are focusing on the events of Jan. 6, 2021, in an effort to re-toxify Trump for the electorate. Never mind that the Senate already held bipartisan hearings and issued a bipartisan report on the events of that day, in addition to Trump’s impeachment hearings and trial. The Democrat-run committee, by holding its first prime-time hearing on the Capitol riot last week, sent the American people a clear signal: Democrats consider this the single most important issue facing the country — more important than inflation, record gas prices, the border catastrophe, the crime wave or the baby formula shortage. Americans can be forgiven for asking: Why are these people rehashing Jan. 6 when I have to choose between filling my gas tank and feeding my family?

The answer is: Because they want to remind voters how much they hate Trump. Sorry, but that won’t be enough when every visit to the gas station and grocery store reminds them why they dislike Biden. If Democrats change their candidate without changing their policies, then they are paving the way for the 45th president to become the 47th.

### EXT Sustainability-Trump Withdraws

#### The whole white house knew trump was gonna pull out

**Alfaro 22** (Mariana Alfaro, 3-4-2022, "Bolton says Trump might have pulled the U.S. out of NATO if he had been reelected," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/04/bolton-says-trump-might-have-pulled-us-out-nato-if-he-had-been-reelected/)HS

Former national security adviser John Bolton told The Washington Post Friday that he thinks former president Donald Trump would have pulled the United States out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had he been reelected in 2020.

Bolton, in an interview with Post opinions editor at large Michael Duffy, said the former president came close to pulling the United States out of NATO in 2018, a claim he originally made in a memoir published in 2020. In his book, Bolton wrote that he had to convince Trump not to quit NATO in the middle of a 2018 summit.

On Friday, Bolton, who served as a top Trump adviser from 2018 to 2019, offered more details on their conversations that day, saying he “had my heart in my throat at that NATO meeting.”

“I didn’t know what the president would do,” Bolton said. “He called me up to his seat seconds before he gave the speech. And I said, look, go right up to the line, but don’t go over it. I sat back down. I had no idea what he’d do.”

Bolton said he thought Trump would “put his foot over it, but at least he didn’t withdraw then.”

“In a second Trump term, I think he may well have withdrawn from NATO,” Bolton said. “And I think [Russian President Vladimir] Putin was waiting for that.”

White House press secretary Jen Psaki on Friday responded to Bolton’s comments, saying they highlighted “another reason the American people are grateful — the majority of the American people — that President Biden has not taken a page out of his predecessor’s playbook as it relates to global engagement and global leadership, because certainly we could be in a different place.”

“I mean, there’s no question that the strength and unity of NATO has been a powerful force in this moment,” Psaki added.

In a statement, Taylor Budowich, a spokesman for Trump, dismissed Bolton’s criticism and said the former adviser “is only happy when America is at war.”

“President Trump led America into one of the most peaceful times in U.S. history,” Budowich said. “John Bolton is just mad he was fired.”

Bolton’s remarks Friday offer new insights into Trump’s views on NATO. During his presidency, Trump frequently sought to undermine the alliance, accusing its members of being “delinquents” and repeatedly telling aides he wanted to leave it. According to the New York Times, Trump told his top national security officials that he did not understand why the military alliance existed, and often described it as a drain on the U.S.

Retired Marine Gen. John F. Kelly, one of Trump’s former chiefs of staff, has also been described as saying that “one of the most difficult tasks he faced with Trump was trying to stop him from pulling out of NATO.”

## Russia-China Alliance

### RCA Turn---1NC

#### NATO fails at deterrence but antagonizes Russia and China.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 19, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, 6-20-19, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323>, jy

NATO EXPANSION—TOWARD OR AGAINST RUSSIA?

Another constant feature of U.S. policy toward Russia has been the primacy of NATO as the cornerstone of the post–Cold War European security architecture, including its expansion to some of the former Soviet states. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO enlargement has been the principal instrument of U.S. security policy in Europe and Eurasia. It reflects a U.S. commitment to a whole, free, democratic, and peaceful Europe, as well as a view that the alliance should serve as the vehicle of the continent’s post–Cold War transformation. What went largely unnoticed were Moscow’s warnings beginning in 1994 that a “whole Europe” was not compatible with an expanding NATO, which would never be open to Russia.

Although NATO’s expansion has not necessarily been directed against Russia, it has negatively affected the Kremlin’s assessment of U.S. motivations and intentions and has been met with strong objections from Russians across the political spectrum. NATO enlargement also has shaped Russia’s perceptions of its own security requirements, which have had a profound impact on East-West relations. The issue is whether the U.S. transatlantic commitment necessitates the alliance’s continued eastward expansion and Open Door policy.31

The Clinton administration launched NATO expansion in 1997 when it led the alliance to offer memberships to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—a policy that the George W. Bush and Obama administrations subsequently embraced. In addition to extending a security umbrella to former Soviet bloc countries, NATO membership encouraged their domestic postcommunist transition to democracy. NATO was and remains an alliance based on shared democratic values. And since, as Clinton declared in his 1994 State of the Union address, “democracies do not attack each other,” the democratic transitions of new NATO members would strengthen European security. In this way, NATO also became an instrument of democracy promotion.32

Map

Description automatically generated

Russia has opposed NATO enlargement almost from the time it was raised as a possibility in the early 1990s.33 The Kremlin has maintained that NATO’s push to the east threatened Russian security and the alliance’s central role in Europe’s security architecture marginalized Russia as a nonmember. However, Russia’s objections proved insufficient to halt the alliance’s expansion; most officials and observers in the West treated such opinions as remnants of the old Soviet ideology that Russia would shed as it transitioned to a free market, liberal democracy. For those who did not believe that Russia would make this transition, NATO expansion made all the more sense as a hedge against Russia reemerging as a threat to Europe—a prospect that loomed ever larger as Russia recovered a good measure of its economic health, authoritarian-leaning domestic politics, and geopolitical ambitions.34 In 2007, Putin personally delivered an ominous warning to NATO not to expand further east, though most in the West regarded such rhetoric as an outdated blast from the Cold War era.35 Even though the alliance’s dual purpose—as a defense organization and instrument of democracy promotion—had emerged as a major irritant in the United States’ relations with Russia, Putin’s warning effectively was dismissed.36

In 2008, NATO promised membership to Ukraine and Georgia, crossing the red line that Putin had drawn around the territory of the former Soviet states.37 In the eyes of U.S. policymakers, NATO was in effect the only legitimate and viable security manager for Europe and Eurasia, and its expansion was the only sensible policy for the entire region.38 Putin’s response was the 2008 war with Georgia, which reaffirmed the red line around the former Soviet space, stopped NATO’s eastward expansion, and marked a major turning point in European security and in the relationship between NATO and Russia.39 In 2014, the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s undeclared war against Ukraine symbolized the end of the post–Cold War era and the reemergence of a new East-West divide in Europe.

Could this outcome have been avoided? NATO expansion undoubtedly benefited many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, providing a much-needed security framework for the region when it was left without one in the aftermath of the Cold War. It also played an important role in consolidating these former Soviet bloc countries’ transition from communism. But one size does not fit all. Political culture, history, geography, culture, and economic ties are crucially important in shaping individual countries’ trajectories. The ties between Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia—and Moscow’s strenuous objections to NATO membership for these former Soviet republics—mattered little to the George W. Bush administration or to the president, who reportedly lobbied for both countries to be admitted to NATO over many NATO allies’ major reservations.40

The promise of membership to Ukraine and Georgia—without a date or plan for their accession—was made as a compromise between Bush and many other NATO leaders, most notably German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who were opposed to the idea. The promise was vague and lacked concrete details. However, it was significant as a symbol of U.S. and NATO commitments to the policy of NATO’s eastward expansion regardless of any red lines drawn by Putin.

When Putin spoke about the breakup of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century, his message resonated with its intended domestic audience, reflecting widely held opinions among average Russians—a fact overlooked by Western policymakers.41 In retrospect, these warning signs were harbingers of future strife. But in the prevailing atmosphere of the West’s post–Cold War triumphalism, they were repeatedly dismissed as Russia’s atavistic attachment to an outdated, obsolete past rather than a vision of its future.42

With the 2008 promise of membership to Georgia and Ukraine, the United States led NATO across an invisible but distinct line. None of the other Soviet bloc countries that joined NATO after the Cold War had ties to Russia comparable to those of Ukraine and Georgia. The countries of Central Europe had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Poland reemerged as an independent state after World War I and had an adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union until it was crushed by Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler. The Baltic states had long been part of the Russian Empire, but they had closer ties to the German than to the Russian world. Following two decades of independence, they were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939, and they viewed Russia as an occupying power—a sentiment that survived Soviet occupation and propelled them to freedom in the late 1980s, helping to unravel the Soviet Union.

Ukraine and Georgia share a different history with Russia. Until 1991, Ukraine had been part of imperial and later Soviet Russia for more than three hundred years. It was the empire’s industrial heartland, home to its defense industry and breadbasket, and a bridge to the outside world. Georgia became a Russian protectorate in 1783 and part of the Russian Empire in 1801. Unlike the Baltic countries, both were integral parts of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and although both countries gave rise to powerful independence movements and played critical roles in the dissolution of the USSR, many of those ties survive to the present day, even after Russia went to war against both countries to keep them in its orbit.43

NATO’s 2008 pledge of eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine was a powerful restatement of its Open Door policy. For both countries—and perhaps for other Soviet states harboring similar hopes—it was taken as a Western promise to help them escape Russia’s orbit. But for Russia, it was seen as another perilous sign of NATO’s boundless ambitions, and it raised the prospect that it would lose control, or at least immediate influence, over two neighbors that it saw as critical to its security, well-being, and prestige as a major power.44 Given the alliance’s commitment to spreading democracy, Russia also perceived its neighbors’ intended accession as a threat to its domestic stability. Thus, the U.S. rejection of Russia’s geopolitical concerns as “atavistic” overlooked Russian sensitivities.45 Russia’s response to it was an outright repudiation of several key assumptions underpinning the original arguments for expansion—that Russia would gradually change its views, come to share the alliance’s founding values, and eventually accept NATO’s eastward push as it was intended by its proponents; in other words, Moscow would see expansion as a move toward Russia, rather than against it.

Russia’s opposition to NATO’s eastward push lived up to the expectations of those who argued for the expansion as a hedge against a resurgent, irredentist Russia. However, the architects of expansion had not thought through the consequences of that scenario. Having made the promise of membership to Georgia and Ukraine and encouraged their aspirations to join NATO, the alliance had not planned for and did not come to their defense when the two became victims of Russian aggression. The alliance had made a political but not legal commitment to their security. In effect, NATO chose to hide behind this narrow legalistic interpretation of its obligations to member states, rather than act upon the expansive political commitments that permeated the official declarations and speeches of its leaders.46

In choosing inaction, NATO reaffirmed what had long been obvious to many observers—that it was not committed to the two countries’ security. Russia’s wars against Georgia and Ukraine demonstrated the importance of interests as drivers of Russian, U.S., and NATO actions: Russia had more at stake in both Georgia and Ukraine than the United States and NATO and was prepared to go to war to protect those equities. The United States and its NATO allies did not see their stake in Ukraine and Georgia, or their commitment to shared values, as important enough to warrant war with Russia.

Moreover, in promising membership to Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO in the first place, the leaders of the alliance seemed to overlook the importance of geography. Even the most ardent advocates of NATO expansion recognize now that geographic proximity to Russia has been a powerful obstacle to realizing their aspirations of NATO membership and the alliance’s eastward push. Russia’s proximity to both countries has endowed it with a formidable military advantage, and the alliance would face a daunting challenge in overcoming that advantage if it chose to come to either country’s defense in a conflict with Russia. That challenge has been made abundantly clear by the ongoing discussion among defense experts about how the alliance would be able to defend the Baltic states in a hypothetical future conflict with Russia, given the latter’s overwhelming geographic advantages in such a conflict.47

Finally, the costs and benefits to the alliance of NATO enlargement, as well as the overall geopolitical context, have changed since the early 1990s in two fundamental ways. First, the promise of a Europe whole, free, and at peace with itself and its neighbors, which seemed within reach in the aftermath of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has been replaced with a new division in Europe between Russia and NATO. Several countries that belong to neither camp are now stuck in a geopolitical no man’s land, unwilling to return to Russia’s sphere of influence but unable to reach out to an alliance whose promises of protection are vague at best. Second, at the time of NATO’s first wave of enlargement in the 1990s, the prospect of a NATO-Russia military confrontation seemed to have been relegated to Europe’s past, and NATO was preparing to go “out of area.”48 Today, NATO officials and military planners are deeply preoccupied with augmenting capabilities to defend alliance territory against Russian aggression. As a consequence, the costs of opening NATO’s door to Europe’s east have risen dramatically with respect to new members and aspiring applicants. With the alliance focused on dealing with the new division of Europe and the adversarial relationship with Russia, the prospect of membership for Georgia and Ukraine has been pushed into a distant, indefinite future.

#### That causes Russia and China to create an Axis of Evil against the US.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 22, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; 3-23-22, “Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front,” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/23/russia-s-national-security-narrative-all-quiet-on-eastern-front-pub-87185>, jy

Putin’s war against Ukraine, preceded by his demands for the United States and its NATO allies to fundamentally alter post–Cold War European security arrangements, has dispelled all doubts—to the extent that any remained—about the primacy of Europe as the principal theater where Russia’s strategic interests reside, from where the principal threats to the country’s security emanate, and where the principal efforts to defend it from those threats are concentrated. As a critical strategic theater, Asia pales in comparison with Europe. The attack on Ukraine demonstrates the dominance of Europe and the unimportance of Asia—beyond China—in Russian strategic thinking.

Prior to the war in Ukraine, the view that Russian strategic thinking was myopic and misguided was widespread in the U.S. national security community. According to this view, the real threat to Russia in the medium and long term would emerge from China rather than the West. Sooner or later, the Russian strategic community would realize that. And the sooner it could be disabused of its mistaken approach to China, the better for the United States, whose interests would be best served by preventing Russia from becoming an ally and force multiplier of China. U.S. policy, therefore, should de-emphasize rivalry with Russia and instead seek to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. In other words, it was a policy prescription for a partnership with Russia on the basis of perceiving a shared threat from China.

That prescription is no longer viable. However, for many years before the invasion of Ukraine, Western analysts and policymakers ignored the basic fact that Russia’s partnership with China is not a short-term marriage of convenience but grounded in a set of coherent, complementary, and well-thought-out strategic rationales. This should have been obvious to anyone who followed the strategic discourse in Russia, read its national security documents, and sought to understand the basics of its domestic politics, national security decisionmaking, and economy.

One striking aspect of the Russian national security discourse largely overlooked by many in the U.S. strategic community is its all-consuming preoccupation with perceived threats from the West. Insecurity vis-à-vis the West has been the defining feature of official security documents since the 1990s, when the United States and Europe considered the Cold War to be over. In Russia, by contrast, the West’s security policy has always been viewed as a continuation in one form or another of its Cold War policies, initially as a “Cold War light” version, but increasingly as a manifestation of the West’s hostile intentions toward Russia.

Another striking aspect of Russian national security documents that has been overlooked is the absence in them of any references to China as a challenge, let alone a potential source of threats to Russia. As alarm about China and its growing ambitions on the world stage became louder in the United States, Russia’s national security documents avoided any mention of the country other than as a partner, and instead increasingly concentrated on the West as the principal source of threats. These documents, however, reflect the actual thinking of the country’s national security leadership and its strategic posture.

This paper first provides an overview of these documents, their evolution since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the strategic backdrop to that evolution. It then focuses on the treatment of China in these documents and explores the reasons why they have ignored the country as a threat or a challenge to Russian national security. Next, the paper explores the unofficial Russian debate about China, considers the practical manifestations in Russian defense policy of its Euro-centric preoccupation, and concludes with implications for the United States.

IT IS ABOUT EUROPE

The war in Ukraine is but the latest conflict in the long historic cycle of war and peace in the relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe. Virtually the entire history of Russia as a modern state is one of wars waged in the European theater—against Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prussia, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Austria, Germany, and so on.

The history of Russia’s relationship with Asia contains nothing similar. Compared to the major European wars, the conquest of Siberia was a series of skirmishes, few of which are recognized as milestones in Russian history. Two major military undertakings stand out—the lost Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 and the August 1945 campaign against Japan in Manchuria, which is extolled in Russian historiography as the final chapter of the Second World War. The latter lasted just a few weeks and is generally considered a footnote to the main war effort in the European theater, where the victory is celebrated on May 9 as the end of the Great Patriotic War.

Since the emergence of post-Soviet Russia in 1991, the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the insecurity of the country’s western flank has manifested itself on multiple occasions, and in defiance of indisputable trends in European security since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Russian leaders objected to NATO admitting new members from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Russia’s president at the time, Boris Yeltsin, accused U.S. president Bill Clinton of trying to split the continent again.1 Russia’s military threatened prospective members of the alliance with nuclear weapons, its foreign intelligence service warned about military retaliation in general, and its diplomats charged that the “NATO-centrism” and “NATO-mania” of U.S. policy “cannot suit Russia.”2 All of these accusations became the major, persistent theme in Russian policy toward Europe, culminating in the demands to fundamentally revise European security arrangements presented to the United States and NATO in December 2021 as the prelude to the war against Ukraine.3

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia’s objections to NATO’s eastward expansion made little sense to an outside observer as the country’s struggles and biggest challenges were domestic during that period—the bloody campaign to suppress the separatist guerilla movement in Chechnya, the instability in the wider North Caucasus region, the sputtering efforts to revive the economy, and the political chaos. The United States and its NATO allies had nothing to do with any of these, and they provided financial and technical assistance to the Russian government on a wide range of economic and societal reforms.

Moreover, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s breakup, the United States and its allies spent vast amounts of money on programs that were essential to Russian national security. They financed and in many other ways facilitated the removal to Russia and securing of the vast nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction scattered across several former Soviet republics. Although this Cooperative Threat Reduction program was one of the key U.S. national security priorities, its immediate beneficiary was Russia.4

As NATO’s eastward expansion got underway, the United States, eager to collect the post–Cold War “peace dividend,” drastically reduced its military presence in Europe.5 At the end of the Cold War, it had some 300,000 troops in the continent. By 1995, that number had decreased to just over 100,000, where it remained approximately for the next decade. By 2008, it dropped to about 65,000, where it has been ever since. By 2013—the last year before the annexation of Crimea by Russia—the United States had reduced the number of its tanks deployed in the European theater from 5,000 in 1989 to zero.6 Other NATO members had carried out equally drastic changes to reduce their defense spending and the size of their militaries.7

Thus, NATO’s expansion was accompanied by a process of its demilitarization. In speeches by its leaders and in official statements, the alliance embraced as its purpose securing “a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”8 That purpose at times seemed to overshadow its original mission of common defense, which was expected—or almost presumed—to become obsolete as common values would become the foundation of European security. In two strategic concepts—in 1999 and 2010—NATO also declared achieving “partnership” with Russia as a goal.9 In some documents it already referred to its relationship with Russia as a “partnership.”10

Senior U.S. officials in speeches and testimonies throughout the pivotal 1990s stated that expansion would not involve greater deployments of U.S. troops to the territories of new members but would instead result in an overall reduction of the U.S. military presence on the continent, which would be transformed into an “area where wars simply do not happen.”11 The alliance also pledged to Russia that it had

no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.12

And, given their small size and military capabilities, none of the new members could pose individually or collectively a meaningful threat to Russia.

In addition to its three pillars of propagation of shared democratic values, reduction of NATO’s military forces, and eastward expansion, the revamped European security architecture was buttressed by two key treaties intended to enhance the stability and security of all European nations. The first was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, which eliminated an entire class of weapons that Soviet leaders had found threatening to their heartland and destabilizing for international security.13 The other was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990, which imposed limits on and regulated military deployments by all its signatories.14 In addition, Vienna Document 99 provided for increased transparency of military activities to build mutual confidence and reduce the risk of inadvertent and accidental escalation.

In addition to these treaties and documents governing primarily European security matters, the United States and Russia signed several arms-control treaties that greatly reduced the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and means of their delivery in their arsenals. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and New START in 2010 were major contributions to both countries’ security.

When measured by such indicators as the presence of powerful hostile neighbors, the military footprint as well as the declarations and actions of its presumed principal adversary in the European theater, and the framework of legally binding treaties, Russia entered the twenty-first century with the security of its western flank assured as never before. That, however, was not enough for it.

IT IS OFFICIAL

These positive changes in European security were noted in a succession of Russian national security documents of the 1990s and the 2000s. However, these documents also expressed a clear unease about the eastward expansion of NATO. Beginning with the 1993 military doctrine, “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security” was noted as a “danger” that could become an actual threat in the event of “the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian Federation.”15 The expansion of NATO became a key theme in subsequent iterations of military doctrine and national security strategy, with growing apprehension that “military dangers to the Russian Federation [were] intensifying,” chief among them the “military infrastructure of NATO member countries” approaching Russia’s borders.16

The most notable official pronouncement in this regard was Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he issued a stern warning to the United States and its allies not to expand NATO further eastward.17 The Kremlin followed up on Putin’s warning by crushing the Georgian military in the brief 2008 war to make clear that it would not tolerate Tbilisi’s ambitions to join NATO.

The war was followed by the resumption of cooperative relations with the West.18 But the détente with the West during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency did not diminish Russian opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to its security interests.19

Russia’s balancing act between cooperation and competition with NATO ended following its 2014 annexation of Crimea and the start of its undeclared war in eastern Ukraine. NATO was officially and unequivocally declared the principal source of military danger to the country.20 Russia’s most recent National Security Strategy, published in July 2021, describes the United States and NATO as developing options for nuclear and conventional strikes against the country.21

The war against Ukraine, launched by the Kremlin in response to the West’s refusal to accept its demands to fundamentally revise the post–Cold War security arrangements, has put an end to the few remaining hopes of managing the tense relationship through such channels as the NATO–Russia Council, the Normandy Format to resolve the stalemate in eastern Ukraine, and the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue.22 The post–Cold War chapter in relations has ended with a major war between Russia and Ukraine backed by NATO in effect with all measures just short of direct participation by alliance troops. The ongoing conflict underscores the primacy of the European theater for Russia and the role of the United States and NATO as the pacing challenge for its defense and national security policy.

CHINA MISSING

By contrast, China is virtually absent from the Russian official statements, national security documents, and narratives spanning the three post–Cold War decades. The most recent National Security Strategy contains two references to the country: one in the context of “developing a relationship of all-encompassing partnership and strategic cooperation,” and the other in the context of deepening cooperation with it in the context of the BRICS (Brazil-India-China-South Africa) counterpart to the U.S.-led G7 group of advanced democracies.23 Earlier iterations similarly referred to China as a partner with whom Russia planned to sustain and expand cooperative relations.24

Partnership with China has been the counterweight to Russia’s increasingly adversarial relations with the United States and NATO. The two have progressed in synch over the course of Putin’s leadership, and the war against Ukraine is the most recent manifestation of this dynamic. Just before the war, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping jointly announced the “no limits” friendship and declared that there were “no ‘forbidden’ areas for cooperation” between their two countries. These statements confirmed that balancing against the West by aligning ever closer with China is at the heart of Russian policy.25

From Russia’s perspective, the partnership with China rests on solid reasoning. This includes political complementarity between two authoritarian governments and economic complementarity between China’s manufacturing sector and Russia’s resource wealth. For Russia’s ruling elite, the relationship is particularly important for two reasons. First, unlike the United States and the European Union, China does not seek to impose its values or demand domestic political changes that would loosen its hold on power in exchange for partnership. Beijing would also probably look unfavorably at attempts by Moscow to liberalize domestic politics. Second, Russia’s ruling elite derives significant material benefits from controlling the commanding heights of the economy. It has little incentive to change the resource sector’s dominant role in the economy, which benefits from trade with China.

Beyond these ideological, political, and economic factors, Russia has sound strategic reasons for pursuing and strengthening its partnership with China. Their priorities complement rather than contradict each other. Since Russia’s primary theater is Europe and China’s is the Asia-Pacific, their strategic interests overlap only in Central Asia, a region that is of secondary importance for both and where they can deconflict their interests as long as no strategic competitor like the United States is present.

Russia and China share a common adversary in the United States, which has global capabilities and presence that they see as challenging their interests in their critical theaters. Both consider U.S. defense programs, such as missile defenses deployed in Europe and the Asia-Pacific or to protect the homeland, as a threat to their security and an attempt by the United States to deny them the ability to deter and retaliate against it in the event of war. Russia and China also in effect function as a force multiplier for each other by tying up U.S. capabilities in their respective critical theaters and thus preventing it from focusing its efforts on one or the other.

AVOIDING A TWO-THEATER CONFRONTATION

For Russia, which during most of the Cold War faced a major confrontation in two strategic theaters—with the United States and NATO in Europe and with China in Asia—the repeat of that experience, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet economy and the breakup of the Soviet Union, is not an option. The Kremlin sees the West as by far the most serious threat, which must be prioritized while disagreements with China have to be managed and resolved through diplomacy.

A great deal has been written about the successful diplomatic maneuver that was the opening of U.S. relations with China during former president Richard Nixon’s administration. For the Soviet Union, already facing a hostile China in its Far East since the early 1960s as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, the prospect of an alignment between Washington and Beijing translated into a major military and economic burden. At the height of the Cold War, it had to maintain as many as fifty divisions facing China along a border of 4,200 kilometers.26 That was in addition to the sixty-five divisions in the western Soviet Union, twenty on its southern flank, and thirty in Eastern Europe.27 If the West’s victory in the Cold War is attributed to the inability of the Soviet economy to sustain the burden of competition with the United States and its allies, significant credit is owed to China as a force multiplier in that competition.

The imperative to avoid a two-theater confrontation with powerful adversaries is also a lesson of the Soviet experience during the Second World War. After the experience of tense relations in the 1930s, which culminated in a major battle in 1939 in Mongolia, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Japan in 1941.28 Combined with intelligence that Japan would not launch an attack against its Far East, this secured the Soviet Union’s strategic rear.29 No longer threatened with a two-front war in Europe and in Asia, Moscow was able to concentrate its effort on the war with Germany. This is a lesson well remembered in Russia today.30

The only major military campaign carried out by the Soviet army in the Pacific took place after the defeat of Germany. Launched against Japan in August 1945, when the outcome of the war in the Pacific was not in doubt, this lasted just a few weeks and was concluded in early September. Known as the Manchurian campaign, it resulted in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army.31

In Soviet and Russian military literature, which relies heavily on historical experience to inform future concepts of operations, the Manchurian campaign has long been held up as a successful example of rapid offensive operations designed to bring about a quick defeat of the enemy as early as in the initial phase of the war.32 In preparation for it, in early 1945, the Soviet High Command undertook major troop redeployments to the Far East from Europe, where the outcome of the war with Germany was already certain. In April 1945, the Soviet Union renounced its nonaggression treaty with Japan.33 It issued a declaration of war on August 8 and the following day launched its offensive—three days after the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The operation was concluded on September 2, when Japan surrendered. During the Cold War and the long period of tension with China, the Manchurian campaign was seen as the prototype for potential future operations against it.34

However, more recent Russian historiography reflects a different understanding of the Manchurian campaign. Instead of offering lessons for the conduct of hypothetical future operations against China, it is used to correct what Russia sees as the false historical narrative propagated in the West that the campaign was of marginal impact on the defeat of Japan in the Second World War. On the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the campaign in 2015, the dean of Russian military scientists, Army General Mahmut Gareev, who as a young officer fought in the Second World War and participated in the campaign, published an article challenging the proposition that the U.S. atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had played the decisive role in the defeat of Japan, arguing instead that the Manchurian campaign was of the “greatest military-political significance.”35 The campaign, he stated, had precipitated the capitulation of Japan.

Instead of the anti-China bias evident in Russian Cold War writings, more recent ones reflect a clear anti-Japan bias and emphasize the Japanese threat to the Soviet Union and China during the Second World War. Also on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Manchurian campaign, the official Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta charged that “Japanese aggression had for many years posed a serious threat to the vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples, [and] millions of Chinese were enslaved by treacherous occupiers.”36 Gareev wrote in his article that the defeat of the Japanese army in Manchuria “washed away the shame of [Russia’s] defeat” in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, which had weighed as “a heavy memory in the conscience of our country.”

The shift in Russian official historiography from the Cold War preoccupation with China to the post–Cold War focus on Japan is consistent with changes in security policy. Russia’s ever-closer partnership with China has relegated the prospect of a military confrontation between them to the margins, whereas the deteriorating relationship with the United States has elevated the perception of threat from its treaty ally Japan.

Japan is also the only country—other than Ukraine, after the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia—that maintains active territorial claims against Russia. The Russian military doctrine published in 2003 highlights the threat of maritime landing operations in the Far East.37 The potential culprit in such contingencies could only be Japan, possibly in coalition with the United States. The document also notes that inadequate transport links between central Russia and the Far East could have a “negative impact” on the course of military operations.38 The combination of Japanese territorial claims and inferior Russian capabilities in this theater could in the event of a conflict leave Russia with few alternatives to resorting to nuclear strikes against the invaders.

Japan hosts U.S. troops on its territory and participates in joint military activities with the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Although it has canceled two previously planned sites for the U.S. Aegis Ashore missile system, it has decided to procure two Aegis-equipped ships and thus to contribute to what Russian officials perceive as the U.S.-led effort to build global missile defenses, which they consider to be a threat to Russia.39 Russian analysts have also criticized Japan’s changes in its defense posture that entail, in their view, growing geographic ambitions, capabilities beyond self-defense, and participation in presumably U.S.-led coalition wars.40

Overall, however, the Far East and the Asia-Pacific do not hold a special place as an independent theater of operations in Russian official military thinking. Rather, its importance reflects threat perceptions driven by adversarial relations with the United States and its NATO allies centered on Europe and the imperative of avoiding a simultaneous confrontation in two far-flung theaters.

#### It’s impossible to defend against both. China’s the larger threat, but Russia will punish the US if the relationship doesn’t stabilize.

Hal Brands 22, Prof of Global Affairs at John Hopkins University, 1-18-2022, "The Overstretched Superpower," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-18/overstretched-superpower?check\_logged\_in=1&utm\_medium=promo\_email&utm\_source=lo\_flows&utm\_campaign=registered\_user\_welcome&utm\_term=email\_1&utm\_content=20220618, jy

ASIA FIRST

Biden’s initial theory of foreign policy was straightforward: don’t let smaller challenges distract from the big one. Of all the threats Washington faces, Biden’s interim national security strategy argued, China “is the only competitor” able to “mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.” That challenge has become greater as China has accelerated its efforts to overturn the balance of power in Asia. When Biden took office, U.S. military leaders publicly warned that Beijing could invade Taiwan by 2027. Biden was not naive enough to think that other problems would simply vanish. With trouble brewing on this central front, however, he did seek a measure of calm on others.

Biden avoided another doomed “reset” with Russia, but held an early summit with Putin in a bid to establish a “stable and predictable” relationship. He also sought to find a path back to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, thereby reducing the growing risk of confrontation in the Middle East. Finally, Biden ended the U.S. war in Afghanistan, a decision he justified by arguing that it was time to refocus attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific. Relations with U.S. allies followed the same pattern: the administration dropped U.S. opposition to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline linking Russia and western Europe, wagering that ending a contentious dispute with Germany would make it easier to win Berlin’s cooperation vis-à-vis Beijing.

Biden’s emerging defense strategy has a similar thrust. The Trump administration made a major shift in U.S. defense planning, arguing that the Pentagon must relentlessly prepare for a conflict against a great-power challenge—particularly from China—even though that meant accepting greater risk in other regions. Biden’s Pentagon likewise spent 2021 focusing on how to deter or defeat Chinese aggression, withdrawing scarce assets such as missile defense batteries from the Middle East, and making longer-term budgetary investments meant to “prioritize China and its military modernization as our pacing challenge.”

TROUBLE EVERYWHERE

Biden is undoubtedly right that the Chinese challenge overshadows all others, despite unresolved debates in Washington over exactly when that challenge will become most severe. His administration has made major moves in the Sino-American competition during its first year—expanding multilateral military planning and exercises in the western Pacific, focusing bodies such as NATO and the G-7 on Beijing’s belligerence, and launching the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom. Yet Biden hasn’t enjoyed anything resembling a respite on other fronts.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan precipitated the collapse of the government there, generating a near-term crisis that consumed Washington’s attention and leaving longer-term legacies—strategic and humanitarian—that are likely to do the same. Meanwhile, a brutal internal conflict in Ethiopia destabilized one of Africa’s most important countries. Most problematic of all, U.S. relations with Iran and Russia became worse, not better.

The United States is an overstretched hegemon, with a defense strategy out of balance with the foreign policy it supports.

Iran has taken a hard-line stance in negotiations on a revived nuclear deal while steadily decreasing the amount of time it would need to produce a potential weapon. Tehran’s proxies have also conducted periodic attacks against U.S. personnel and partners in the Middle East as part of an ongoing effort to force an American withdrawal from the region.

Putin, for his part, has authorized or at least permitted significant cyberattacks against critical infrastructure in the United States. He threatened war against Ukraine in the spring and has now mobilized forces for what U.S. officials fear could be a major invasion and prolonged occupation of that country. To preserve the peace, Moscow has demanded an acknowledged Russian sphere of influence and the rollback of NATO’s military presence in eastern Europe. What exactly Putin has in mind for Ukraine is uncertain, but “stable and predictable” is clearly not how he envisions his relationship with the United States.

These are ominous signs for 2022. The United States could find itself facing grave security crises in Europe and the Middle East in addition to persistent and elevated tensions in the Pacific. And these possibilities hint at a deeper problem in U.S. statecraft, one that has been accumulating for years: strategic overstretch.

MORE WITH LESS

Facing trouble on many fronts is business as usual for a global power. U.S. foreign policy—and the defense strategy that buttresses it—has long been designed with that problem in mind. After the Cold War, the United States adopted a “two major regional contingencies” approach to defense planning. In essence, it committed to maintaining a military large and capable enough to fight two serious wars in separate regions at roughly the same time. U.S. planners were under no illusion that Washington could fully indemnify itself against all the threats it faced if they happened to manifest simultaneously. Their aim was to limit the risk inherent in a global foreign policy by ensuring that an enemy in one theater could not wage a successful war of aggression while the Pentagon was busy with a crisis in another. Just as the United Kingdom, the superpower of its day, had a two-power naval standard in the nineteenth century, a unipolar United States had a two-war standard for a generation after 1991.

Over time, however, the two-war standard became impossible to sustain. The defense spending cuts associated with the Budget Control Act of 2011 (later compounded by the sequestration cuts of 2013) forced the Pentagon to adopt a somewhat stingier “one-plus” war standard aimed at defeating one capable aggressor and stalemating or “imposing unacceptable costs” on another. Meanwhile, the number of threats was increasing. During the post-Cold War era, the Pentagon worried mostly about potential conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. But the events of 2014 and 2015—the Islamic State’s rampage through Iraq and Syria, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and China’s drive for dominance in the South China Sea, along with ongoing operations in Afghanistan—showed that U.S. allies and interests were now imperiled in several regions at once.

Leaders in Moscow and Tehran see that the United States is stretched thin and eager to pay more attention to China.

Washington’s enemies were also growing more formidable. The two-war standard was primarily focused on rogue states with second-class militaries. Now, the United States had to contend with two near-peer competitors, China and Russia, that boasted world-class conventional capabilities alongside the advantages that would come from fighting on their own geopolitical doorsteps. By the end of Barack Obama’s presidency, it was an open question whether the United States could defeat China if Beijing assaulted Taiwan, or Russia if Moscow invaded the Baltic region. What was clear was that any such war would require the overwhelming majority of the Pentagon’s combat power, along with virtually all of its airlift and sealift capabilities.

This realization prompted a major change in U.S. defense planning. The Trump administration’s defense strategy declared that the two-war standard was history. The U.S. military would henceforth be sized and shaped to win one major war against a great-power competitor. The United States would still be capable of “deterring” aggression in other theaters, but, as a bipartisan commission that included several current Biden administration officials pointed out, how exactly the Pentagon would do so without the capability to defeat such aggression remained ambiguous.

Shifting to a one-war standard was a sensible way to motivate the lethargic Pentagon bureaucracy to find creative solutions to the urgent, daunting challenge of war with a near-peer rival. It involved a sober recognition that losing a great-power war could inflict a death blow on the U.S.-led international order. Yet the 2018 defense strategy was also an acknowledgment of overstretch: the United States could focus on its primary challenge only by reducing its ability to focus on others. This limitation is the root of the problem Biden has inherited, and it has some dangerous implications.

THE CREDIBILITY GAP

The most glaring danger, highlighted by the concurrent crises in eastern Europe and East Asia, is that the United States could have to fight wars against China and Russia simultaneously. This would indeed be a nightmare scenario for a one-war military. But it wouldn’t take a global security meltdown to reveal the problems caused by Washington’s predicament.

First, overstretch limits U.S. options in a crisis. Where the United States should draw the line against Russian aggression in eastern Europe, how hard it should push back against Tehran’s provocations in the Middle East, and whether it should use force to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state are matters that reasonable people can debate. But the fact that the United States increasingly has a China centric defense strategy has a constraining effect in other theaters. If a U.S. president knows that the Pentagon will need everything it has for an all-too-plausible war with China, he or she will be less inclined to use force against Iran or Russia, lest Washington be caught short if violence erupts in the Pacific.

This issue leads to a second problem: the loss of diplomatic influence in situations short of war. Since the Taiwan and Ukraine crises of early 2021, some observers have speculated that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are coordinating their coercion as a way of threatening Washington with a two-front war. The reality is that explicit coordination is hardly necessary to profit from U.S. overextension.

Historically, overstretched superpowers have eventually faced hard choices.

Leaders in Moscow and Tehran can see that the United States is stretched thin militarily and eager to pay more attention to China. This gives them an incentive to push Washington harder in hopes of achieving gains at the expense of a distracted superpower. As the Russia expert Michael Kofman has written, Putin’s strategy of using military coercion to revise the post-Cold War order in Europe is premised on his belief that the “greater threat from China” will eventually “force Washington to compromise and renegotiate.” The more intense its focus on China, the higher the price the United States may be willing to pay for restraint in other places.

The perils of overstretch, however, are not confined to secondary theaters. Weakness at the periphery can ultimately cause weakness at the center. A decade ago, the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq to economize in the Middle East and pivot toward the Pacific. Iraq’s subsequent collapse forced Washington to reengage there, fighting a multi-year conflict that devoured resources and attention.

Similarly, if the United States finds itself in a showdown with Iran or if Russia attempts to revise the status quo in eastern Europe, Washington may once again find itself pivoting away from the Pacific to reinforce under-resourced regions that still matter to U.S. security. America’s defense strategy is increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific, but its foreign policy remains stubbornly global. That’s a recipe for trouble all around.

TOUGH CHOICES

To be clear, military power is hardly the only thing that matters in global affairs. But it is a necessary component of an effective foreign policy, if only because force remains the ultimate arbiter of international disputes. Xi, Putin, and other U.S. adversaries are unlikely to be swayed by Biden’s “relentless diplomacy” unless they are also awed by the military power that backs it up.

Historically, overstretched superpowers have eventually faced hard choices about how to address mismatches between commitments and capabilities. When the United Kingdom found itself with more rivals than it could handle in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it began appeasing those that were less dangerous and proximate—including the United States—to concentrate on containing Germany. When the Korean War revealed that Washington’s containment policy outstripped its military resources, the United States was forced to undertake a significant defense buildup to close the gap.

The Biden administration may try to skirt this dilemma by managing tensions with Iran, Russia, and other challengers while encouraging allies in Europe and partners in the Middle East to take greater responsibility for their own defense. That’s an understandable instinct. In the near term, both the geopolitical costs of true retrenchment and the financial costs of rearmament may seem to exceed the difficulties of muddling along. Yet Biden’s first year has already shown that overstretch inflicts damage on the installment plan. Eventually, the world will punish a superpower that allows its strategic deficit to grow too big for too long.

#### Overstretch cedes competition with China, making hotspots escalate.

Nishtha Kaushiki 21, Assistant Prof of International Studies at the Central University of Punjab, 12-10-21, "China: A nemesis that NATO wouldn’t want," https://www.dailypioneer.com/2021/columnists/china--a-nemesis-that-nato-wouldn---t-want.html, jy

The mention of China as a potential challenger to NATO first emerged in one of its documents in 2019, and by 2020-21, it has become its "systemic rival". From a Euro-Atlantic perspective, Russia is a direct military threat that does not shy away from a head-on clash. Its primary focus is on its immediate strategic backyard- Eastern Europe and Central Asia. On the other hand, China has violent tendencies towards its neighbours and politically intimidates the countries of other regions by actively using its economic and political clout. Further, it has forged strategic partnerships with authoritarian countries, attempts to change the existing security architectures by challenging the freedom of navigation of commercial ships by buying or financing strategic assets worldwide. Thus, it has a global strategic agenda and is far more dangerous than Russia for the EU and NATO.

There has been an upward trend of trade between the EU and China. During the first nine months of 2020, the bilateral trade between the two was Euro 425.5 billion. Simultaneously, the EU-US trade saw a downward trend of -11.4 percent for imports and -10 percent for exports. With regard to the Chinese BRI, in 2018, China marked its strategic presence in North-Western Europe with the takeover of Zeebrugge terminal in Belgium and Greece's Piraeus seaport,followed by crucial infrastructural development projects in Spain, Italy and Greece. Germany's Duisburg inland port should not be missed either. The EU and NATO essentially see the 17+1 format as a leapfrog approach by Beijing that threatens the region's security.

In 2019, two significant developments took place. First, at the EU-China summit in April 2019, a few states opposed a standard EU stand against China, given its strategic influence. Second, Italy was the first G7 country to join the BRI. Thus, the cracks in the solidarity of the EU began to appear. In the investments sector, the regulatory preferences for the 5G rollout have been chiefly guided by the US. The EU security concerns have vetted the domestic legal guidelines of individual states, and hence, all efforts have been made to sideline Huawei, which is primarily seen as a "Trojan Horse". As China aims to become a world leader in Artificial Intelligence by 2030, the penetration of Huawei and other such critical technologies such as biotechnology and robotics, the propaganda warfare through disinformation campaigns challenges both Europe and the US. The additional challenge 'democratic backsliding' due to the Chinese influence over the fragile partners of the EU and the 'potential members' can also not be missed. In light of this, the 2021 summit communiqué acknowledged the evolving nature of warfare involving the malicious use of AI apart from simultaneous attacks with hypersonic missiles. The threat has thus become three-fold -- a fully modernised conventional attack with the potential of a supplemented nuclear attack apart from the emerging contours of hybrid warfare and the questions of the continuance of supply chains. In a nutshell, the Chinese policies of geostrategic and geo-economic penetration apart from its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy constitute the core of its "systemic challenge".

During the Cold War, it was asserted that the security of Western Europe depended upon the containment of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, with the 'unipolar moment' gradually coming to an end with the US overstretch with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the incorporation of Russia in the Atlantic partnership would probably have allowed NATO to geographically and politically cross the barriers of Eurasia. Consequently, today from "spoiler states", Russia and China have rapidly transformed themselves into "revisionist states", and the role of China is a much profound one. With Joint exercises of both the countries in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea and Beijing's recent outreach to Equatorial Guinea to establish its first permanent military mission in the Atlantic, the Euro Atlantic insecurities will increase all the more.

Had the Sino-Russo strategic convergences been nipped in the bud itself by strategic re-evaluation and the inclusion of Russia in NATO, the story of geopolitics perhaps could have been fundamentally different, both for the EU and as for South Asia. Acceptance of Russia as an "equal" would have probably done away with the heartburns that Moscow has right now. The inability to accept that hybrid warfare (4th and 5th generation) would necessitate politically expanding the horizons of deterrence against a new rising power (China) has done more harm than good to NATO. The visionary approach of including Russia in NATO was discouraged when Russia's request to join the organisation was turned down by the U.S. not once but thrice, leading to the creation of new political faultlines. It also led to strengthening the Sino-Russo alliance apart from leaving a geopolitical vacuum in which China and Russia could attempt to downplay the EU and NATO. Today, the takeover or annexation of the Crimea, the Ukrainian crisis, the refugee dispute between Poland and Belarus, and the inclusion of the EU countries in the BRI Corridor have become the larger geopolitical testers of a 'United' EU and NATO, apart from the US sphere of influence.

There is still a lack of political cohesion on the methodologies to tackle China in this direction. While the US and Britain have decided to boycott Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, the EU, on the other hand, has refrained from taking a collective stand on the issue. Given the increasingly intertwined stakes that the Union has with China, it is hesitant to take a joint stand fearing its retaliatory "economic coercion". France's position is contrary to the US, which is well grasped in the backdrop of the formation of the AUKUS and the severed deal between Canberra and Paris. Such emerging diverging approaches within the EU that China would possibly try to use in its favour to increase its strategic foothold, thereby weakening the Atlantic alliance.

Early this year, G7 partners announced the 'Build Back Better World Initiative' (B3W), followed by the 'Global Gateway' initiative that aims to mobilise Euro 300 billion between 2021 and 2027. As one can see, the developments are similar to the 'Greek-Turkish Aid Bill' — the US initial response to contain Communist expansion. However, in the contemporary scenario, additions such as hybrid warfare, hostile economic takeovers, and dual-use ports have ushered in new dimensions of geopolitics. A full-blown 'New Cold War' is in place.

China and Russia would probably seek to militarily distract the EU and the US with small but essential 'hotspots' such as Taiwan and Ukraine. The risks of escalation and misjudgement have increased the chances of open hostilities all the more, but, given the constraints of economic dependencies, especially the questions of the continuance of supply chain routes, one can be still doubtful of the NATO response. Nevertheless, territorial nibbling would also not be taken lightly by NATO. The vicious circle thus seems to continue with more of trade wars, sanctions, and hostile takeovers, thereby creating sharp polarisations throughout the globe and regional and other organisations such as the EU and NATO.

#### BUT, stabilization of relations solves a litany of existential threats.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 19, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, 6-20-19, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323>, jy

A military confrontation between the two countries could have profoundly destabilizing and even catastrophic effects on global order and security. In contrast, a more cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship could yield progress on threats to U.S. national security and prosperity—challenges that the United States cannot tackle effectively alone. Preventing further nuclear proliferation, including the complex problem of securing nuclear materials and other components of weapons of mass destruction, will require not only greater U.S.-Russia collaboration but also preserving at least some elements of the remaining arms control framework and inspection regimes. Efforts to combat transnational threats, from terrorist movements to criminal organizations and illicit trafficking, would also benefit from U.S.-Russian cooperation. Likewise, it will not be possible to resolve long-standing regional conflicts, for example on the Korean Peninsula and in Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, without U.S. and Russian cooperation and willingness to negotiate. Finally, the United States and Russia will need to find practical ways to avoid escalation of tensions in cyberspace and outer space, and restrain the growth of Chinese influence.

POST–COLD WAR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS—WHAT WENT WRONG?

U.S. policy toward Russia since the end of the Cold War is a story of different administrations pursuing essentially the same set of policies. Two aspects stand out as major irritants in the bilateral relationship: a refusal to accept Russia as it is, as evidenced by repeated initiatives to reform and remake its political system; and the extension of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture into the Eurasian space surrounding Russia. Both of these highly ambitious pursuits have been attempted repeatedly and unsuccessfully, yet both continue to be cornerstones of official U.S. policy toward Russia. In retrospect, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a less ambitious U.S. approach to dealing with Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union could have established a better basis for a less rocky U.S.-Russian relationship.

BOOM TO BUST

Addressing a joint session of Congress in January 1991, then president George H. W. Bush spoke about his desire “to continue to build a lasting basis” for cooperation with Russia.6 His wish, no doubt sincere, was expressed at a time of widely held hopes that the Cold War was ending and the two superpowers would put their differences aside and begin collaborating on the world’s many problems “for a more peaceful future for all mankind.”7

It was indeed a promising phase in relations between Washington and Moscow, full of significant accomplishments and optimism about the future. In a short period of time, the two Cold War adversaries negotiated a treaty to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (START II), signed a multilateral treaty on conventional forces in Europe, negotiated the terms for German reunification and a unified Germany’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and agreed on a charter for European security and stability after the Cold War. Moreover, their cooperation was not confined to Europe; they also jointly sponsored a major conference in Madrid on the Middle East and successfully dealt with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait. Most important, they entered into all of these endeavors with a new spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, a far cry from the threatening rhetoric and tensions that had been a hallmark of their relationship for more than a generation.

For the three decades that followed, the U.S.-Russian relationship went through a series of boom-bust cycles, reaching its nadir after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Through the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations, U.S. policy toward Russia followed a familiar pattern. First, a new presidential administration comes into the White House deeply dissatisfied with the state of the U.S.-Russia relationship. It commits to do better and launches a policy review that generates a new approach—a “reset”—toward Russia aimed at developing a partnership. The road toward partnership looks promising, but obstacles gradually begin to emerge and eventually escalate into a full-blown crisis. By the end of the administration’s time in office, the relationship is at the lowest point since the Cold War.

Thus, the spirit of partnership that marked the end of the Cold War did not last long. The elder Bush’s hope for a new relationship with Russia in a new world order ran into the harsh reality of the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union and the chaos that engulfed Russia less than a year after his speech. The Bush administration had little chance to prepare for such a dramatic turn of events and develop a policy commensurate with the magnitude of the change in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Consumed by domestic economic and political crises, Russia largely retreated from the world stage and for the most part was rendered largely incapable of acting as a partner to the United States as envisioned by Bush. Demoralized and embittered Russian elites soon constructed a narrative—greatly amplified by the Kremlin throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidency—that the United States had taken advantage of their country at a moment of weakness, which created a sense of victimhood and soured the overall atmosphere in U.S.-Russian relations.

The Clinton administration, frustrated with what it saw as its predecessor’s insufficiently robust engagement to support reforms in Russia, declared its intent in 1993 to build “the foundation for a new democratic partnership between the United States and Russia.”8 Speaking in Vancouver, Canada, in April 1993, at the first of his many summits with Russia’s then president Boris Yeltsin, Clinton promised:

Mr. President, our nation will not stand on the sidelines when it comes to democracy and Russia. We know where we stand. We are with Russian democracy, we are with Russian reforms, we are with Russian markets. We support freedom of conscience and speech and religion. We support respect for ethnic minorities. We actively support reform and reformers and you in Russia.9

Soon after these hopeful words were spoken, the relationship encountered its first bumps. In late September and early October 1993, tensions between the Russian executive and legislative branches came to a head in a bloody confrontation in Moscow, as the constitutional crisis between Yeltsin and his rebellious parliament led to violence in the streets. When the dust settled, Yeltsin had managed to push through a new constitution that consolidated executive power to such an extent that in effect it placed the presidency above all other branches of government. That same autumn, Russian officials expressed their strong opposition to NATO enlargement1, which was emerging as the principal pillar of U.S. policy in Europe.0

### RCA Link---2NC

#### NATO forces Russia’s hand to cementing the axis.

Bradley Devlin 22, MA Political Economy from UC Berkeley, 2-11-22, “Thank NATO For The New Russia-China Pact,” <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/thank-nato-for-the-new-russia-china-pact/>, jy

The new partnership between Russia and China is America's *chickens coming home to roost.*

Russia and China announced the formation of a “no-limits” partnership last week, the predictable consequence of America’s misguided policy towards post-Soviet Russia and ill-advised embrace of a rising China.

Putin and Xi publicized the agreement, spanning over 5,000 words in English, just before the two leaders were seen at the opening ceremonies of the Winter Olympics in Beijing, which is under diplomatic boycott by the U.S. and other Western nations over the CCP’s human-rights abuses. “Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation,” the signatory nations said in a joint statement.

In the new bilateral pact, the nations pledged mutual support on issues that are sure to enflame the U.S. and its allies. Russia proclaimed its support of the One-China principle—the idea that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China—and expressed opposition to Taiwanese independence. For its part, China joined Russia’s call to end NATO enlargement. The pair also reiterated their opposition to the trilateral “AUKUS” agreement, which would help provide the Australians with nuclear-powered submarines, and “the advancement of U.S. plans to develop global missile [defense] and deploy its elements in various regions of the world, combined with capacity building of high-precision non-nuclear weapons for disarming strikes and other strategic objectives.”

Further, China and Russia pledged to cooperate on the development of artificial intelligence, information security, and space technologies. The nations also unveiled an energy deal worth $117.5 billion that will bolster Russia’s gas exports to East Asia.

Evolving circumstances in Ukraine and the South China Sea provide the backdrop, and considerable incentive, for the new agreement between China and Russia. Russia has amassed over 100,000 troops on its border with Ukraine over the past few months. The Biden administration has responded by announcing the deployment of about 3,000 additional U.S. troops to Europe, keeping another 8,500 on standby. Aside from the AUKUS agreement, things have grown more complicated in the South China Sea due to an increased number of Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and rumors that Washington might shed its strategic ambiguity with respect to Taiwan. These developments are the latest in a long line of miscalculations by the U.S. foreign policy apparatus over 30 years.

In 1949, many core European countries were still recovering from the Second World War. The Soviet Union was, too, but its economy had recovered more rapidly than expected and it was developing and testing nuclear weapons. Thus, trans-Atlanticists saw a need for a defensive alliance to stave off whatever territorial ambitions the Soviet Union had in Western Europe. Et voilà, NATO was born. Originally, the alliance had 12 members. Only one, Norway, shared a border with Russia. The Soviets responded with the creation of their own alliance, the Warsaw Pact, in 1955. By then, NATO had already added Greece, Turkey, and West Germany.

Thirty-six years later, increased pressure from the West and contradictions within the Soviet system resulted in the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. The U.S. and its NATO allies outlasted the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. Just like that, NATO’s raison d’être disappeared. NATO was forced to reckon with the consequences of victory. More than four decades of bureaucratic entrenchment and military-industrial expansion made the thought of ending NATO unpopular—not to mention the fact that the United States, unquestionably the leader of the NATO alliance, saw the alliance as a means to cement its global hegemony.

So, instead of going out of business, NATO went out of area, wading into conflicts in the Middle East and micromanaging European instability. Since the fall of the USSR, NATO has pursued a dual track of diplomacy with Russia—simultaneously cooperating with Russia on its chosen campaigns to remain relevant and maintaining the Cold War frame that Russia is the main menace in Europe.

From 1994-1997, it appeared NATO and Russia were making real efforts to find areas of mutual cooperation. Russia entered into NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1994, and three years later, the two parties signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, stating “the reasons why NATO and Russia believe that it is in their shared interest to cooperate more broadly and intensively.”

In 1999, however, NATO returned to its old ways, accepting Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic as members of the alliance. The move angered the Russians, as NATO expansion was still a sore point for even post-Soviet Russia. The Russians had already felt betrayed by the fact that, in subsequent negotiations between the USSR and president George H.W. Bush’s administration, then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s alleged promise to the USSR that NATO would move “not one inch” eastward never reappeared. NATO’s expansion in 1999 confirmed Russia’s fears.

Nevertheless, NATO continued to court Russian cooperation. At the 2002 NATO Summit in Rome, the alliance and Russia signed another agreement to create the NATO-Russia Council, which produced results in issue areas such as counterterrorism.

Yet NATO continued to undercut its progress with Russia in other areas by its continued expansion. In 2004, NATO expanded for the fifth time, adding Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), two of which share a border with Russia. NATO then made Albania and Croatia members in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia as recently as 2020. “Not one inch” turned into nearly 1,000 miles pretty quickly.

Russia believes NATO expansion won’t end there. Given the precedent NATO has set, it’s hard to blame them. In fact, NATO and some of its key member states like the U.S. have openly expressed desires to keep expanding up to Russia’s western border. NATO has been courting Ukraine and Georgia, two vital nations in the Russian cultural imagination, since 1994.

While the U.S.-led NATO alliance was pursuing its muddled, incoherent approach to Russia, Russia and China started patching up the holes in their relationship left by the Sino-Soviet split. The two nations solved a decades-long border dispute, increased trade in vital industries like machine goods, textiles, energy, and other natural resources. The U.S. encouraged China’s rise to global prominence by, among other things, allowing it to enter the World Trade Organization. As one Joe Biden said in 2011, “a rising China is a positive, positive development, not only for China but for America and the world writ large.”

Which brings us to the present moment, in which the trans-Atlantic foreign policy elites, bolstered by their beneficiaries in the military-industrial complex, refuse to offer any prudent course-correction to prevent the formation of a full-fledged axis against the United States. This could end with America’s sons and daughters dying overseas to solve the problems they created. But it doesn’t have to.

#### NATO’s very functionality gives them shared ground.

Michael Cox 14, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, and Director of LSE IDEAS, 2014, “'Not just 'convenient': China and Russia's new strategic partnership in the age of geopolitics',” <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83632/1/Cox_Not%20just%20convenient.pdf>, jy

Hegemony and its discontents

"China opposes hegemonism and power politics in all their forms, does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion"

Xi Jinping at the 18th Party Congress. 2012.

The lessons drawn from the collapse of Soviet power thus provided, and still provides, China and Russia with a common point of historical reference. But it was the structure of the new international system that concerned them more. Both of course recognized that with the passing of the old order the world had changed for ever; and both would now have to sink or swim in a word dominated by the market. There could be no going back to the past. On the other hand, the world as seen from Beijing and Moscow was not one in which either could feel especially comfortable. For one thing, the established rules governing the world had all been written by the West. The metaphorical table around which the main players then sat was also made and designed in the West. And sitting at the top of the table of course was the established hegemon: United States.

To add material insult to injury, in this world the United States not only possessed a vast amount of power - soft and hard - but an extensive alliance system as well. Its very existence not only reminded China and Russia how few genuine friends they had themselves; it also contributed in significant ways to America's ability to place pressure on the two countries. The US may have proclaimed its innocence, insisting that the last thing it was thinking about when it enlarged NATO was to encircle Russia, or that when it tilted to Asia it was looking to contain China rather than engage it. However, that is not how things were viewed in either Moscow or Beijing. Indeed, for the Chinese the so-called 'tilt' (accompanied as it was by what they saw as a change in US military doctrine)29 was seen as a highly aggressive act; and the only legitimate response, it was felt, was to fight fire with fire which it did with an 'outpouring' of increased 'anti-American sentiment' in China itself followed up by what looked to many as a final abandonment in practice, if not in theory, of the tried and true Deng principle of keeping a low profile. To underscore the point, it also began to refer to the US less frequently as global partner - though such language did not disappear entirely from the Chinese foreign policy discourse31 - and more as a potential rival which would for ever seek to maintain its position of primacy in Asia through the manipulation of its still highly dependent allies. This in turn connects to a wider debate in which China and Russia have been engaged for some time about the structure of the world system after the Cold War; and one thing has emerged from these: neither feels that their interests, singly or collectively, are best protected in a system in which power is so heavily concentrated in the hands of a single 'hegemon', especially when that hegemon happens to be a liberal power like the United States of America. This not only flows from their very strongly held realist belief that hegemony by definition confers great status on the hegemon. The concentration of power in the hands of a single power they argue is also likely to encourage greater assertiveness. Clinton may have resisted the temptation for a while, though not entirely as the NATO-led bombing of Kosovo showed. But post 9/11 the situation changed dramatically, and buoyed up by a American public fearful of yet another attack, and taking full advantage of the freedom afforded it by the much debated unipolar 'moment', the US launched a war on terror with the ostensible goal of combatting global jihad (of which the Chinese and Russians approved) but with the unwritten purpose (to which they did not) of reasserting US power after what many on the republican political right saw as a post-Cold War decade of drift.34 The lesson drawn in China and Russia from all this were obvious: until and when the distribution of power in the international system had become more evenly distributed - in short had become 'multipolar' - then the world would not only remain a deeply disturbed place but one in which their voice would remain marginal at best, insignificant at worst. 35

#### Mutual containment causes a formal alliance.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, *International Politics*; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 1. The continuation of the Sino-Russian entente It is quite likely that, even seven or 10 years into the future, the forces that currently sustain the Moscow–Beijing axis will remain in place or could even intensify. Russia and China’s rivalry with the USA could grow more acute, while their illiberal autocracies would become even more entrenched. This will result in the continuation of the Sino-Russian entente, with ever tighter political, ideological, military and economic ties between Moscow and Beijing, and could even see the elevation of their ‘strategic partnership’ to the level of a full alliance based on a formal treaty.

#### Concessions would detract from their pursuit.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, *International Politics*; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 2. Russia-US rapprochement Even though Russian-American relations are presently at a very low point and unlikely to substantially recover any time soon, in the long term their normalization is not impossible. In fact, the USA will be under increasing structural pressure to make peace with Russia as China looms as by far the biggest threat to America’s positions in the international system. At some point, Washington might be forced to seek Moscow’s collaboration in managing the massive challenge from Beijing. Although Russia is unlikely to participate in any overt containment of China, it might, at least, agree to become a neutral player. However, Washington will have to make some significant concessions to Moscow, such as recognizing Russia’s special interests in Eastern Europe and lifting sanctions. The hypothetical normalization of US-Russia relations would likely have a dual effect on Russia’s policy toward China. First, Russia would relax its systemic balancing of the USA and thus have much less incentive to strategically collaborate with China, especially in the political-military domain. Second, if Russia feels secure on its western borders, it will have more freedom to play its own game in East Asia, rather than siding with Beijing, which would, to a degree, help balance China’s ambitions.

### Link---Status---2NC

#### Independently, status recognition can invoke an offensive reaction. Scaling it back solves.

Deborah Welch Larson 20, Prof of Political Science at UCLA, 7-13-2020, "Book Review Roundtable: Rising Titans, Falling Giants," https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-rising-titans-falling-giants/, jy

The question is whether this justification for the continued U.S. presence in Europe still stands, now that China is rising. Based on predation theory, Wohlforth deduces that the United States might want to bolster or strengthen Russia to obtain its help against China.

Taliaferro is more cautious about the benefits of predation, pointing out that Russia’s current interference in Ukraine and its disinformation campaign in Western democracies have their origins in bitter and long-standing resentments over how the Cold War ended. Taliaferro observes, “while relegation in 1990 succeeded in pushing the Soviet Union out of the great power ranks, it could never guarantee that post-Soviet Russia would remain ‘down’ indefinitely.” Refusing to accept the status claims of a declining power evokes strong emotions that can lead to an offensive reaction. Former great powers may, over time, recover some of their capabilities, and an aggrieved major power may be able to act as a spoiler, as Russia has done by interfering in Western elections and intervening in Syria.36

Treating the declining state with respect and offering it a chance to exercise leadership can go a long way toward diminishing the likelihood that it will adopt a policy of seeking revenge and increase the chances that it will cooperate with the rising state in preserving world order. Status incentives are also less costly — and less risky — than efforts to bolster the power of a declining state.

### RCA Internal---2NC

#### China and Russia will manage their differences because they’re both motivated in countering the U.S. BUT, if the American-Russian relationship stabilizes, collaboration would cease.

Yun Sun 22, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program at Stimson, former Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 3-4-2022, "China’s Strategic Assessment of Russia: More Complicated Than You Think," https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-russia-more-complicated-than-you-think/, jy

Brought Together by a Mutual Adversary

China and Russia are pushed together by two factors. The first is the shared threat the United States poses. The second is a leader-level nostalgia for the Sino-Soviet partnership. The most salient characteristic of the Sino-Russian alignment today is their shared threat perception of the United States. This does not mean that China and Russia would not have any relationship absent this shared perspective — they always have and always will. But it does mean that the shape and health of their relationship would be completely different if the shared threat perception of the United States was not present.

Prior to the 2014 crisis over Ukraine, China and Russia had a lukewarm relationship. However, the crisis created a watershed event that led Chinese government experts to designate 2014 as “a year of abnormal acceleration of Sino-Russia relations,” although, this acceleration needs to be qualified since China has not yet recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Still, around that time, China’s strategic anxiety over the U.S. strategy of “rebalancing to Asia” coincided with Russia’s fear over NATO’s potential expansion. As such, China made a determination that “China and Russia face the same international pressure from the U.S. bully on a wide range of issues from global governance to their neighborhood and to their domestic affairs.” For Beijing, China and Russia are both identified as revisionist powers in the international order (although the common title disguises critical distinctions of their desired goals). Furthermore, the United States constitutes the most important threat to both countries in their primary theaters — China in the West Pacific and Russia in Eastern Europe. Alignment and cooperation is thus sought, almost instinctively, to mitigate Chinese and Russian isolation by the West, to divide American attention and resources, and to complicate U.S. military planning in both theaters.

Such an alignment is significant for alleviating strategic pressure on China, at least psychologically. At a minimum, it provides a reassurance that China is not countering U.S. hegemony alone. As long as the United States pursues “dual containment” of both China and Russia, the alignment will have motivation and justification. Given the overarching theme in the Chinese national security strategy that defines the United States as China’s primary threat, any disagreements with Russia are seen as secondary and Russian diplomatic and military capabilities will be seen as a valuable asset.

Yet Russia’s fondness for strategic maneuver, such as the utilization of hybrid warfare, also constitutes a major risk for China. Four hundred years of Sino-Russian relations has taught the Chinese that during China’s conflicts with others, the Russian modus operandi is to maximize its own benefits in the name of mediation and assistance for China. For example, Russia carved out one million square kilometers of Chinese territory through its mediation of the Second Opium War. Therefore, the assessment by China’s Russia hands is that Moscow not only sees the “new Cold War” between Washington and Beijing as beneficial for Russia, but that Russia is also responsible for “exploiting and deepening the suspicion, hostility and fear” between Washington and Beijing through diplomatic maneuvers and manipulations. Yet, these experts also vigorously warn about Russian acts of “balancing and coalescing” with both America and China.

So long as the United States remains the biggest threat to China and Russia, the latter will manage their differences to serve the more important goal of countering U.S. pressure. However, while such alignment is strong in terms of words and postures, it is weak on actions. As attested by the joint statement by China and Russia during Putin’s most recent visit of Beijing, the two countries are adept at verbally expressing their shared positions and mutual support, but they are short on concrete policies to be adopted. For example, as China tries to gauge Russia’s substantive support in the South China Sea and on Taiwan, nothing but tepid statements have emerged, along with one joint military exercise in the South China Sea in 2016. While support in this limited domain does not do justice to China and Russia’s coordination on the global scale, the authenticity of the Sino-Russian friendship is tested by how Russia will act toward China’s most important security concerns, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Sino-Russian alignment is also vulnerable to shifts in the balance of relations between the United States, China, and Russia. This is the core weakness of a relationship driven by external factors, in the eyes of Chinese analysts. As put by Ji Zhiye, former president of CICIR, , the Sino-Russian relationship is “temporary, uncertain, vulnerable and could be severely weakened by even slight changes in the external factor (the U.S. policy toward both).” Improvement of relations with the United States, by either China or Russia, will undermine the confidence by the other party. Furthermore, overwhelming Russian dependence on China from sweeping Western sanctions will sow the seeds of Russian discontent against China and result in efforts to distance and counterbalance.

#### It’s not inevitable---BUT, rollback will only occur if they don’t have a shared interest of countering US influence.

Christian Shepherd 22, MA in Contemporary Chinese Studies at Tsinghua University, 3-21-22, “China and Russia’s military relationship likely to deepen with Ukraine war,” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/21/china-russia-military-arms-drones/>, jy

As a teenager in northwestern China during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, Yu Bin was drafted into the army, where for four years his training focused on how to repel a feared Russian invasion.

In 1969, the height of the Sino-Soviet split, skirmishes between the two nations over an islet in the Ussuri River threatened to escalate into a wider conflict as each side deployed troops and artillery to the border region.

If war had broken out, Yu, now a political scientist at Wittenberg University in Ohio, says he probably would have faced advanced Soviet battle tanks with little more than a machine gun.

His experience shows how far China-Russia military ties have come since that dispute. “If you talk about the military-to-military relationship, it’s not just about arms sales or joint exercises; it’s very comprehensive and gradually developed,” he said.

Regardless of whether China becomes directly involved in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the conflict is shaping up to be an important milestone in the two countries’ military partnership, much like the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Just as Western sanctions that year gave Russia’s military industrial complex new impetus to sell technology to the People’s Liberation Army, the Kremlin’s reliance on China after its Ukraine invasion could accelerate nascent joint technology development and operations.

After decades of China primarily buying arms from Russia, rapid advances in China’s military industry have balanced out the relationship, with some Chinese technologies beginning to surpass Russian counterparts, at a time of growing political alignment between the two nations.

The partnership stops short of a formal military alliance, which Chinese officials say is unnecessary for the two nuclear-armed states. Instead it allows each side to pick and choose when to join in the projection of power — most often in response to shared grievances against the United States — without forcing a stance on each other’s territorial disputes.

Nearly a month in, the war in Ukraine has tested the limits of Beijing’s support, as China ostensibly pursues a policy of neutrality even while refusing to criticize the Kremlin, blaming NATO for the crisis, and promoting Russian disinformation about U.S.-backed biological programs in Ukraine.

According to U.S. officials, Russia asked for Chinese military aid shortly after the invasion began. Moscow and Beijing both deny the reports.

Military analysts say China could aid Russia’s invasion substantially by providing basic supplies, ammunition, communications equipment and weaponry such as drones, but is unlikely to send anything beyond basic provisions or potentially some dual-use items such as trucks.

To do so would be a diplomatically perilous step for Beijing and risk abandoning an often tricky effort to minimize its involvement in a conflict that is increasingly targeting civilians. Advanced equipment would also be difficult to integrate into Russian forces quickly.

These constraints suggest that “supplies are mostly likely in the short term — if Beijing makes the strategic decision to move even closer to Moscow,” said M. Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Also a consideration is China’s relationship with Ukraine, supported in part by the latter’s willingness to provide critical military systems and its long-standing stance of noninterference. As Yu, of Wittenberg University, put it: “When two friends are fighting, are you going to give one of them a knife?”

But if precedent holds, the crisis may ultimately accelerate China-Russia military cooperation.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China continued to build ties with the Kremlin, using Russia’s isolation to break through lingering mistrust and fears of intellectual property theft that had held back sales of sensitive military technology.

Before 2012, when Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the China-Russia military-to-military relationship was in a lull, as bilateral arms sales declined because of Russian concerns that China could reverse-engineer its technologies as well as growing international competition from Chinese arms manufacturers.

But starting in 2013, Xi spearheaded a pivot to Russia, choosing it for his first overseas trip, and forged a close personal relationship with Putin. For the Chinese military, already unable to buy U.S. arms because of an embargo imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, sanctions imposed on the Russian arms industry over Crimea were a path to securing better deals.

“From that moment, we have seen sales of top-notch, first-rate and state-of-the-art Russian arms technology to China,” said Sarah Kirchberger, a scholar at Kiel University in Germany. “Previously, Russia was only willing to sell things that were older, at least one generation older, than what it would sell to other customers and what it would use itself.”

The shift was sealed with Chinese purchases of Su-35 fighter jets and the S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system. In recent years, the relationship has been furthered with joint naval drills in far-flung international waters and missile defense computer simulations that require a higher level of mutual trust and intelligence-sharing.

A number of joint development projects have also been disclosed, mostly by Russia, including for heavy-lift helicopters, an early-warning system for missile attacks, and nonnuclear submarines.

Little information is publicly available about these initiatives — and some may never materialize — but taken together, the projects suggest a shift from China being purely a customer to being a partner. “Submarine technology is something you do not share with others very easily,” Kirchberger said. “That would really indicate a whole new level of cooperation, if it is actually true.”

While the threat of sanctions may constrain China from providing overt military aid to Russia in Ukraine, an extended rupture with the West will encourage the Kremlin to deliver even more advanced systems and allow more technology transfers to China, according to Paul Schwartz, an analyst at CNA, a research organization in Arlington, Va.

“At the same time, China will conceivably become an important supplier to Russia of underlying military technologies and components as well as systems where China holds a lead — sometimes a substantial lead — over Russia,” Schwartz said, listing drones, shipbuilding and maritime radar systems as areas where advanced Chinese technology could interest Russia.

Space is another area where the two are working closely on technologies and systems with potential military applications, including the integration of the two country’s GPS equivalents: China’s Beidou network and Russia’s GLONASS.

Obstacles to a closer military relationship remain, however. Russia continues to worry about theft of its technology, international competition from Chinese arms manufacturers and even the possibility that a militarily strong China might not always treat Russia as an equal partner.

China may be hesitant to take advantage of the Ukraine war to expand military ties. While Chinese officials say normal trade with Russia will continue, Beijing has adopted a wait-and-see approach to the conflict, in part to minimize its exposure to sanctions and avoid unraveling already frayed relations with Western Europe and the United States.

But Xi’s long-term bet on Russia as a partner in challenging Western security blocs makes a rollback of military ties unlikely. In addition to arms trade and joint exercises, the two powers have increasingly coordinated opposition to security partnerships involving the United States and its allies.

China has lent support to Russian complaints about the expansion of NATO, while Russia has condemned initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and AUKUS, both of which Beijing blames for stoking tensions in the Pacific.

On Sunday, for example, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng told a forum in Beijing that the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy was provoking trouble and causing a formation of blocs in the region that “is as dangerous as the NATO strategy of eastward expansion in Europe.”

#### Everything else is overshadowed by the common enemy.

Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David O. Shullman 22, 6-22-22, “Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine,” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-and-bosom-friends-why-china-russia-ties-will-deepen-after-russias-war-ukraine>, jy

All Paths Lead to Partnership

It is plausible that the trajectory of the war in Ukraine will determine the course of the Russia-China relationship. Some analysts have argued, for example, that if Putin faces a clear defeat, Xi will look to distance himself from a weakened and discredited partner. This brief posits, however, that all roads lead to partnership. Except in the still unlikely case in which Russia uses chemical or nuclear weapons, China and Russia will deepen their ties irrespective of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, leaving the two more clearly aligned in an anti-Western partnership.

Regardless of how the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will indeed emerge as a weakened and more isolated country. This result will not, however, weaken its bonds with China. Russia’s new reality will make Moscow more dependent on China, and previous concerns about the growing asymmetry between the two countries—long touted as a constraint on future Russia-China relations—will be overshadowed by the Kremlin’s sense of threat from the West and internal challenges. For China and Xi, meanwhile, a weakened Russia would create some urgency for China to mitigate pressure imposed on Putin that could destabilize him internally. Chinese leaders judge that if Putin falls, the United States would be free to focus all its attention on countering China’s rise and undermining the CCP’s grip on power. Greater Western pressure could be even more difficult to manage if it occurs in tandem with the imperative to navigate relations with a post-Putin Russia that could adopt a less friendly approach to China and prompt newfound concerns about security along their shared 2,600-mile border. Moreover, Russia’s diminished strength could be useful in that it makes Moscow even more dependent on China and, therefore, a more loyal partner in Beijing’s fight against the United States.

Critically, it remains unclear just how weakened Russia will be. Yes, Putin made a mistake in Ukraine, but it is not a fatal one. Moscow will be economically weaker and increasingly isolated, but Russia will retain sufficient capacity and resolve to threaten U.S. and European interests. To illustrate, many of the military capabilities that the United States worries about most—Russia’s submarines, strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal, and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities—are untouched by the war in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia will retain the intent to challenge the West. If anything, the more devastating the defeat in Ukraine, the more dangerous Putin’s Russia may become. The Kremlin has unleashed a torrent of nationalist rhetoric inside Russia. Putin will have to find opportunities to satiate those sentiments and demonstrate that Russia is a power that should still be feared. For Xi, in other words, Russia, even in a weakened and isolated state after the war, will remain a nuclear superpower that distracts the United States from the Indo-Pacific.

#### Toss any cards before Ukraine. The relationship will survive because of shared interest.

Harry J. Kazianis 22, senior director at the Center for the National Interest, 3-14-22, “China and Russia forming a new axis to challenge the West,” <https://nypost.com/2022/03/14/china-and-russia-forming-a-new-axis-to-challenge-the-west/>, jy

For years, international-affairs watchers have scoffed at the idea that Beijing’s and Moscow’s interests would align so closely, or that they were scared enough of the United States and its allies, that they would become either formal or informal partners in crime.

Thanks to the war in Ukraine, that day has arrived, and we should be worried about what that means for the New World Order.

First, this won’t exactly be an alliance. It’s more like Moscow is set to become the biggest vassal state in modern history — the price Russian President Vladimir Putin will have to pay for his disastrous war in Ukraine.

Putin needs China’s cash, investments, military purchases, market for commodities and overall general support to survive in the months and years ahead.

Otherwise, with trillions of dollars of economic sanctions about to come down on Putin’s head, Russia as we know it today may simply cease to exist.

And, of course, China will be there — don’t listen to any vague statements that seem to suggest Beijing is balking — to provide whatever support Putin needs over the long term.

The Chinese Communist Party looks at its new partnership with Russia, which will surely be a level of support in the tens of billions of dollars per year — if not more — as the greatest geopolitical victory it has ever secured.

No matter what happens with the war in Ukraine, clearly, China will be the only victor.

For Beijing, the greatest threat to its regime, the idea that the US Navy and its allies could cut off China from natural resources coming from the Middle East in a war, has likely vanished.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will quickly move into Siberia and scoop up as much oil, natural gas and raw materials as he can get his hands on. China will no longer be dependent on the sea for survival — and that is huge.

Xi will also be able to transform China into a real military superpower, one that can compete and defeat the United States on the future battlefields of Asia. As no nation will likely buy Russian arms for years, Putin will drop any worries about selling such arms to Beijing. China could have access to Russia’s most powerful hypersonic technology, stealth submarine research, missile weaponry and much more.

And then there is the not-so-sexy but transformative stuff. China will surely want to get its hands on the millions of unused acres of land to farm and develop an alternative food source, again, so it will not have to depend on sources of food over sea routes the US Navy could block.

### RCA Internal---Structural Realism---2NC

#### Structural realism explains the alliance---the axis will not survive the costs outweigh the benefits, but it will if they do.

James MacHaffie 11, PhD in political science, specializing in relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2011, “The Potential for a China-Russia Military Alliance Explored,” <https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/tjir/v10i2/f_0024592_20089.pdf>, jy

Security Dilemma

The security dilemma is a paradox in international politics -- the more a state tries to increase its own security, it decreases security for other states.78 Within the security dilemma states have the fear of being exploited which 'most strongly drives the security dilemma'.79 Due to the anarchical (meaning no central authority) nature of the international system, states do not and cannot afford to trust each other. Thus, the security dilemma is difficult for states to avoid; as same states increase their security, other states will feel more insecure and increase their own security and the cycle repeats. States that wish to form an alliance face a security dilemma, which is best exemplified by the prisoner's dilemma game.80 Glenn Snyder has used N-person positive sum games, such as prisoner's dilemma, to determine alliance formation in the nineteenth century.81

The prisoner's dilemma is a positive sum game in which two prisoners are taken to separate interrogation rooms, wherein they are given different choices that offer both risk and reward. If one of the prisoners does not confess, he risks being 'sold out' by his ally in the other room. If he does confess, and the other prisoner does as well then he runs the risk of going to jail with his confession. However, if one of the prisoner's does confess and the other does not, then the confessed prisoner may be rewarded with a reduced sentence. If neither prisoner confesses however, then they both may be rewarded with freedom. However, neither prisoner knows what the other will do, thus the dilemma. It is much the same situation in alliance formation, for 'who aligns with whom results from a bargaining process that is theoretically indeterminate'.82

There are two parts to the security dilemma in alliance formation. The first part begins when states determine whether to join an alliance. In a multipolar system, states have a choice of alliances to join. The risks and rewards of joining or not 34 joining any given alliance can be illustrated in the prisoner's dilemma. The table below shows four alliances in Eurasia that a state in that region could potentially join, with some caveats; the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which is the collective security arm of the European Union (EU), is contingent on membership in the EU and requires its members to have certain standards with regard to democracy and human rights. Each alliance has a dominant state, a Great Power, and exists in regions that sometimes overlap with other alliances. Any other state that is a member of these alliances will have to bandwagon with the more dominant states.

Table 2. Alliance Choices for Eurasian States

Table

Description automatically generated

If a state joins the SCO then it gains the rewards from that alliance, but it also incurs the risks of being balanced by a counter-alliance from NATO or the ESDP. Likewise, the converse would be true if a state joined NATO or the ESDP. Determining whether to form or join an existing alliance structure involves a bargaining process akin to the prisoner's dilemma. A state has to weigh the costs and benefits of joining without knowing the outcome of other states' decisions to do the same. The risks of abandonment or entrapment are real, just as the rewards of protection.83

The second part of the alliance dilemma is after the alliance has formed, states must determine how firm they want their commitments to be.84 The risk entails possible further entrapment in alliance commitments, as well as potential abandonment by allies in a time of need. An example of abandonment in the CSTO was Russia's invasion of Georgia. Faced with the potential of being entrapped by further alliance commitments, the other states of the CSTO declined to endorse the Russian invasion. Thus, Russia felt the reverse effect of this action, abandonment by its allies.

The security dilemma can never truly be solved since both external contingencies and the reasons for the formation of alliances are dynamic, but alliance formations afford states the ability to mitigate some of the dangers of the dilemma, since there are payoffs for undertaking risks. Thus, when it comes to the SCO, each member state must ascertain whether the benefits of joining the alliance outweigh the costs.

The prisoners' dilemma is most commonly associated with the two-actor game laid out in Table 3. However, other strategies may be employed by states including: Chicken, Hero, Leader, Protector, Bully, and Big Bully.85 With uncertainty within the international system so prevalent, a state cannot be sure who to trust. Indeed, even reliable allies can restrain a state's actions, such as the case of Britain restraining the US in Indochina in 1954.86 Still, if it is deemed conducive to a state's interests to cooperate with another state in an alliance and the benefits of such an arrangement outweigh the costs, no doubt a state will take its chances and ally with that state.

Table 3. Two-Player Cooperative Game.

Table

Description automatically generated

In determining whether Russia and China will, or have, formulated an alliance, we can substitute 'Country A' with Russia and 'Country B' with China. The purpose of this game is not only to highlight the security dilemma states face, but also that at times and despite mistrust, states still need to rely on each other. Either state can restrain the other's actions with a C strategy with a double CC strategy being the most mutually beneficial for the players.88 A DD strategy (mutual defection) is one to be avoided by the state players, if they want to continue being allies, so presumably both states will strive for cooperation over competition.

Table 4. Choices for Russia and China in a Two-Player Cooperative Game

Table

Description automatically generated

The alliance will only be viable, if both states are content or have mutual cooperation or if either Russia or China gets its way and the other nation does not object. As long as there is appropriate burden sharing and generally reliable partners, there should 36 be some flexibility among the alliance partners. That is to say, that neither Russia nor China should get their way on every given issue the alliance may confront; compromise is the key, otherwise a state may defect.

The illustrative games shown here are primarily framed in two-person games, thus excluding the smaller Central Asian states. However, the motivations of the Central Asian states for joining or maintaining the SCO may be slightly different from the Great Powers, and will be discussed in detail in the next section. The predominance of power and influence remains with Russia and China, thus the two-person game is appropriate for understanding their interactions.

### RCA Internal---AT: Say No---2NC

#### The impact is about coordination, not an alliance---that’s possible and sparks war.

Kendall-Taylor 19, PhD in Political Science from Yale, Senior Fellow in and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security an Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. (Andrea, 03-21-2019, "An Emerging China-Russia Axis?: Implications for the United States in an Era of Strategic Competition", *CNAS*, https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/an-emerging-china-russia-axis-implications-for-the-united-states-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition)

4. Deepening relations between Russia and China will be among the most significant U.S. foreign policy challenges in the coming decade.

Russia and China are unlikely to forge a formal military alliance. But even short of such an alliance, their growing alignment and coordination will present a significant challenge for U.S. national security in the coming years. The Director of National Intelligence warned in his 2019 Annual Threat Assessment that strengthening ties between China and Russia will present a “wide variety of economic, political, counterintelligence, military, and diplomatic challenges to the United States and its allies.”5 If Russia-China relations continue to grow, it would harm U.S. interests by enhancing their mutual capabilities and stretching U.S. capabilities, complicating U.S. strategic planning by potentially dividing U.S. power, emboldening them to act knowing they will have each other’s support, enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the alternative they provide, and diluting U.S leverage over countries willing to play the United States off Russia and China.6 Russia and China are also poised to challenge U.S. interests through the complementarity of their actions.7 Russia and China take different approaches to pursuing their foreign policy objectives. Russian foreign policy is confrontational and brazen. So far, China has used a subtler and more risk-averse strategy, preferring stability that is conducive to building economic ties and influence. Although their tactics are different, they have the potential to converge in synergistic ways such that the combined effects on U.S. interests is greater than the sum of their individual efforts. This dynamic is most evident in Europe, but there is potential for greater synergies between Russia and China to create new challenges for the United States.

#### Coordination alone is strong enough to be a “game changer”.

Sakwa, 19 — Richard Sakwa a Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent, and an Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, and has written several, many books on this topic of Russia, Eurasia, and so forth. (5-8-2019; "Are the Days of U.S. Hegemony Finally Numbered?" *Truthdig*; https://www.truthdig.com/articles/are-the-days-of-u-s-hegemony-finally-numbered/)

The Russian-Chinese alignment is not an alliance, and it’s not a bloc, and it’s certainly not a military alliance, but the Russo-Chinese alignment is far deeper, far more extensive, and far more extensive than many Westerners have yet caught on. It’s an alignment in which Russia and China will not do each other any harm, they will support each other when it’s in their interests, and it’s a game changer. This is Kissinger in reverse. As you remember, in the early 1970s, Kissinger brilliantly managed to exploit the split between Moscow and Beijing to United States’ advantage. Today, the Beijing-Moscow alignment—not an axis, not an alliance—is far deeper. And when Trump came to power, he had, I think, a sensible idea, which was, I think, given to him by Kissinger to try to peel Russia away from this alignment with China, and to align Russia more closely with the United States. Of course, he was blocked in this because of Russiagate and various scandals, US domestic politics. And so, the exact opposite has happened, that this Belt and Road forum just recently demonstrated just how close Russia and China have become.

### RCA Internal---AT: Say No---China---2NC

#### China is motivating in changing the order. That drives them together.

Susan Thornton 22, Senior Fellow and Visiting Lecturer at the Yale School of Law, 4-13-22, “China’s Russia Dilemma,” <https://www.cfr.org/event/chinas-russia-dilemma>, jy

THORNTON: I’ll table a stab, sure. So I guess there are two issues here. One is the extent to which in the context of our current discussion today sort of the deterioration in U.S.-China relations facilitates the, you know, kind of driving together of China and Russia. And I tend to think that there is a causal relationship there. I don’t think Russia-China is a natural alliance. And although they have similar gripes, the biggest one is about their relations with the United States. So to the extent that they see in parallel relations with the United States deteriorating rapidly, it’s obviously going to give them more common cause than they would have otherwise had. But I have to say, Peter, that I think Chinese foreign policy has also been a huge underlying factor in the way things have deteriorated. And if you just look at sort of the way they have gone about—in my mind, it’s all about them deciding that China is now a big power, and it has been sort of disrespected, and we’re going to stand up for our interests now, and we’re going to push back on, you know, perceived slights, you know, around our periphery and around, you know, the international system. And, you know, the South China Sea I think is one of those stories, where, you know, the Chinese, being a rising major power that was going to basically instill fear in the neighbors. And in the context of its rapid military buildup, you can certainly understand how they would see that. And not taking a more kind of long-term and less aggressive approach to a lot of these maritime disputes which, frankly, are probably never going to be solved. And that used to be the Chinese approach. You know, put it on a shelf and find common ground. That was their big mantra for their foreign policy. And they somehow abandoned that. And there is a lot of discussion about why that is and what the causal factors are. But we don’t need to get into that today. But I do think that you need to look at that change in China’s approach to trace where we’ve come to. Now, that’s not to say that I think we should label China as an adversary. I mean, I authored this piece at the beginning of this kind of descent in relations saying China is not an enemy. But, you know, so I think there are factors in the U.S. that are making this worse than it needs to be. And but I think now, as Evan said earlier, the Chinese view almost every issue around the world through this prism of U.S. strategic competition, which they really see as U.S. strategic confrontation with China. And so that is going to color everything that we do going forward until there’s some prospect of an improvement in relations, which I unfortunately don’t see on the horizon. And the Ukraine situation is making it worse. So.

### RCA Internal---AT: Ukraine---2NC

#### Ukraine does not undermine their cooperation.

Paul Saunders 22, President of the Energy Innovation Reform Project and a Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Center for the National Interest, 2-3-2022, "Non-Aggressors With Benefits: Russia-China Alignment Won’t Be Game-Changed by Ukraine or Much Else," https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/non-aggressors-benefits-russia-china-alignment-wont-be-game-changed-ukraine-or-much-else, jy

Chinese Responses to Ukraine Crisis

Perhaps the most visible recent example of the two countries’ political cooperation is China’s defense of Russia’s demand for a halt to NATO expansion and more general reiteration of Russia’s key talking points on the matter. While Moscow’s veto in the United Nations Security Council would have been adequate to thwart any U.N. action over its implicit military threat to Ukraine, Beijing’s backing prevents unified U.N. condemnation and lends Russia a degree of legitimacy among governments outside America’s global alliance networks. Symbolically, for China’s President Xi Jinping the scheduled Feb. 4 meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, will be his first in-person summit with a fellow head of state in almost two years.

The geopolitical implications of the Ukraine crisis for Beijing have been a focus of intense speculation. Some observers suggest that Xi would back a Russian invasion but prefers that it occur after the Olympics. Others fear that China might exploit a military operation by the Kremlin to attack Taiwan simultaneously and present America with a “nightmare scenario” of war in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Yet others warn that, deliberately or not, Moscow and Beijing are jointly putting considerable pressure on NATO member Lithuania—the former through its troop deployments in neighboring Belarus, the latter with an import ban in retaliation for Lithuania’s agreement to host a Taiwan representative office (under that name rather than “Taipei,” Taiwan’s capital, which the United States and others have used to limit China’s ire).

There are also China watchers who see greater caution and attempts at a balancing act in Beijing’s approach to events surrounding Ukraine. They have pointed out, for example, that China does not recognize Crimea as Russian territory (as Moscow does not recognize some of China’s claims in the South China Sea) and that China has cultivated certain commercial interests in Ukraine, such as military technology, as well as agriculture and infrastructure for its Belt and Road Initiative, and hence would be unlikely to welcome war there.

More generally, China’s government has often assigned high priority to economic growth as a source of political legitimacy, so the possible disruptions for the global economy (and Chinese firms) that could result from a Russian invasion of Ukraine—especially sanctions affecting Russia’s banking sector or an energy market shock—may seem unattractive for China’s leaders as they manage their economy’s pandemic recovery. Earlier this year, a Chinese Communist Party official wrote that maintaining economic stability was “crucial” in advance of a forthcoming Party congress, at which observers expect Xi to pursue a third term as president.

Allied or Not, and What to Do About It

These discussions fit into longer-term American debates surrounding Russia’s relationship with China. Though few U.S. observers would call Moscow’s current ties to Beijing an alliance, some analysts argue that a “three-decade-old nightmare” has become reality as “Beijing and Moscow have ganged up on America.” Others see the relationship as geopolitically convenient for Russia’s and China’s leaders but lacking the depth necessary for a durable state-to-state alliance.

These differing viewpoints, in turn, have policy implications and thus have prompted policy debates. Prior to Moscow’s ongoing implicit military threat to Ukraine, some suggested that Washington should try to “lure” Russia away from China. Skeptics argued that this approach “won’t work.”

Chinese and Russian officials, meanwhile, each have an interest in playing up their relationship as they simultaneously manage difficulties with Washington. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described a December videoconference between Putin and Xi as “a discussion between allies.” After the call, however, Putin’s foreign policy advisor Yuri Ushakov reported that Xi had acknowledged that the two nations are not allies, yet added that the Chinese leader claimed “their effectiveness even exceeds this level.”

History Matters

It is essential to remember that Russia’s post-1991 relationship with China emerged from the troubled Soviet-Chinese relationship, which the two countries had incentive to change for strategic reasons. The undeclared 1969 Sino-Soviet war demonstrated to both sides the possible consequences of enduring tensions along their 2,600-mile border. Soon thereafter, former President Richard Nixon’s 1972 opening to China showed how Moscow’s and Beijing’s rivals could exploit those tensions to the detriment of either or both parties.

After the Soviet collapse, the two sides gradually signed a series of agreements, which helped further establish the foundation for today’s Russia-China relationship. Two border deals—the 1997 agreement limiting troops on the Russian-Chinese border and the 2008 treaty finalizing Russian-Chinese border demarcation—did not resolve Russian-Chinese differences or eliminate mutual suspicions. What they did, however, was to establish a minimum threshold of mutual trust. A 2001 Russian-Chinese friendship and cooperation treaty (renewed in 2021) included one of the earliest formal acknowledgements that leaders in Moscow and Beijing shared concerns over American conduct (alluding to the 1999 U.S./NATO war against Serbia) as well as a commitment to consult “if a threat of aggression arises.”

Managing Competition Without Watching Your Back

This stance matters because presidents Putin and Xi have expansive global ambitions that neither can fulfill if each must constantly watch for a knife in his back. From this perspective, the Russia-China relationship is perhaps best understood as a non-aggression pact that has enabled deepening economic, political and security cooperation. With their backs covered, Moscow can face to the west and Beijing can face to the east. That doesn’t rule out disagreements to Russia’s north (the Arctic) or south (Central Asia), where some Russian officials worry about China’s growing presence. It does, however, establish a framework in which the two governments can approach their bilateral competition—something the United States currently lacks in its relations with either Russia or China.

Most important, the shared desire to avoid a military confrontation has established a floor beneath which Russia-China relations will not deteriorate absent a radically different strategic environment. In this sense, those who insist that America cannot “split” Russia from China are correct that Washington is highly unlikely to succeed in persuading Moscow to take any steps that would threaten the foundation of its relationship with Beijing. Still, sophisticated U.S. policy could create an environment in which Russia’s and China’s leaders do not reflexively align with one another and against the United States on most issues.

Costs and Benefits of Cooperation

The ceiling for the Russia-China relationship is in theory unlimited but in practice depends on the costs and benefits to each specific form of cooperation that the two governments might undertake. Those who say that Russia and China will not form an alliance are probably right because an alliance—as traditionally understood—would require a mutual defense commitment, something with potentially high costs for Moscow and Beijing since it could conceivably draw either into the other’s war with the United States and its allies. Indeed, if one defines allies as nations willing to endure significant costs for one another, neither Russia nor China has any such partners; they have clients whom they can aid or not as it suits them. For Moscow or Beijing, the marginal benefits offered by a bilateral alliance would be little beyond those of a non-aggression arrangement, since each country has (and would probably be prepared to use) nuclear weapons to address military threats beyond those its conventional military forces could handle.

Nevertheless, that Russia and China do not have, and are unlikely to create, a full-scale alliance does not constrain their military and security cooperation, much less any other cooperation they might otherwise wish to pursue. The existing Russia-China relationship already allows for consultation and coordination on security affairs, economic matters and other policy issues. This poses sufficient dangers to the United States that the absence of a Russian-Chinese mutual defense agreement is largely irrelevant. After all, Russian and Chinese forces would be unlikely to fight together too much even if both countries were simultaneously at war with America. The principal theaters for these two hypothetical wars would be thousands of miles apart.

Perhaps most dangerous is Russia’s sharing of military technology with Beijing, though China’s technical capacity is expanding rapidly across multiple areas. Russia’s weapons sales to China have also been a longstanding concern for America. While the volume of these arms deals peaked in 2005—and was at just one-fifth of that level in 2020—Russian firms have supplied China with modern systems (such as Su-35S interceptors and S-400 air defense systems). Earlier, Russia reportedly provided engines for China’s J-20 stealth fighter.

Rubles and Yuan

Finally, the economic relationship between Russia and China is still deepening and this can help protect Russia from some of the consequences of Western sanctions, including diminished trade with the United States and many of its allies. China’s share of Russia’s oil and gas exports in 2020 were 31% and 5%, respectively. Russia’s goods exports to China, by one measure, more than tripled from $16 billion in 2009 to $58 billion in 2019—about four times more than goods exports to the U.S. for the same year. As a result, unilateral U.S. trade sanctions have limited impact on Russia outside technology restrictions such as those related to defense, dual-use and energy technologies, which can be more significant. (Russia’s trade with the European Union is considerably larger than its commerce with America or China, especially when energy exports are factored in, and Europe’s largest economies are quite unlikely to sever or even dramatically reduce their trade relationships with Russia.)

Rules of the Game

Security, economic and political collaboration between Russia and China does not rest on an authoritarian alignment—though shared defense of their governing systems contributes to it—or on a formal alliance. Instead, its foundation is the mutual recognition that enduring Russia-China tensions would considerably undermine each government’s efforts to secure the global role it seeks. It is likewise notable that their relationship has expanded beyond that in parallel with each government’s growing frustration at attaining its aims through cooperation with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. This is not to say that all Moscow’s and Beijing’s goals have been entirely reasonable, or that every effort at cooperation has been sincere. Rather, it is to note that from Russia’s and China’s perspective, Washington and its allies are obstructing rather than facilitating what leaders in each country have seen as a legitimate desire for greater influence, including a voice in defining the rules of the game. Thus, China’s rhetorical support for Moscow’s efforts to force a role for itself in European security is both helpful to Russia and self-serving. Even so, it seems unlikely that Beijing will do too much more.

#### Ukraine is neg. China views it as a mirror and more reason to compete with the U.S.

Reid Standish 22, RFE/RL correspondent, former editor at Foreign Policy magazine, 5-11-2022, "China Takes Aim At NATO," https://www.rferl.org/a/china-nato-ukraine-war/31845030.html, jy

China increasingly sees the war in Ukraine -- and the roles of the United States and its NATO allies in backing Kyiv against Moscow -- as a reflection of future tensions to come between the military bloc and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific.

Ever since Russian tanks first crossed into Ukraine on February 24, Beijing has walked an awkward line between not giving outright support to Moscow's invasion while accusing the United States and other NATO countries of provoking the war by allowing the security alliance to expand eastward despite protests from the Kremlin.

Now, as the war continues to grind on with the Russian military suffering major setbacks on the battlefield, China has ramped up its rhetoric to warn about NATO and the United States' footprint in Asia.

"NATO, a military organization in the North Atlantic, has in recent years come to the Asia-Pacific region to throw its weight around and stir up conflicts," Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, said in late April. "NATO has messed up Europe. Is it now trying to mess up the Asia-Pacific and even the world?"

Wang's comments were in response to earlier remarks from U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, who called for boosting NATO in the wake of the Ukraine war and warned China that it should "play by the rules."

The added focus on NATO from Beijing comes as both China and the United States see Russia's invasion as a foil for future tensions between the two countries in Asia. NATO said last year that it intended to focus more on China and Beijing is expected to play a large role in the bloc's strategy moving forward.

Likewise, Washington is increasingly convinced that the conflict provides it with an unexpected advantage in the long term, with Bloomberg reporting on May 10 that U.S. officials believe that bolstered European defense spending and a weakened Russia could allow it to accelerate a security shift toward China.

Those aims are part of the shared distrust toward NATO and the United States that has led Beijing and Moscow to become closer in recent years and why many analysts believe that China has not abandoned Russia throughout its brutal war in Ukraine.

Similarly, experts and Western officials warn that Beijing is closely watching the response to Russia's invasion and drawing potential lessons for any tensions over Taiwan, which China claims as its territory and has threatened to invade if Taipei refuses to submit to its control.

"If China joins the West in condemning Russia, it will be much applauded in Washington and most European capitals. But it will lose Russia's partnership," Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, a retired officer of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), wrote in The Economist on May 9. "And it is only a matter of time before America takes on China again. The Biden administration's policy towards my country is 'extreme competition' that stops just short of war."

Ukraine War As a 'Mirror'

The parallels drawn between U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific and NATO's expansion in Europe are not new, with both China and Russia underlining this point in the 5,000-word joint statement they released in February when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin declared a "no-limits" partnership.

The document voiced their opposition to the "further enlargement of NATO" and pledged to "remain highly vigilant about the negative impact of the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy."

Despite Chinese protests, experts point out there are key differences between NATO's role and U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, which also includes a wider range of economic and political policies beyond the bloc and the United States dealing with its long Pacific Ocean border.

Still, the Ukraine war is set to affect the region, with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Yucheng saying in March that the crisis could be used as a "mirror" to view the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region.

For the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, the move toward Asia is seen as critical and long overdue.

Washington has increasingly warned about China abusing its military and economic clout in the region, pointing to the country's moves to exert greater control over Hong Kong, expand its military presence in the South China Sea, and crack down on human rights in Xinjiang Province, which has seen more than 1 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities interned in camps.

But while both U.S. and Chinese officials see parallels between the Ukraine war and rising tensions in Asia, they are each drawing different lessons.

U.S. officials continue to view increased defense spending in Europe, as well as both Finland and Sweden on an immediate path toward NATO membership, as positive security developments that could allow the United States to follow through on its long-delayed "pivot to Asia." That policy was first outlined by U.S. President Barack Obama and the move is seen as necessary as U.S. policy circles increasingly view China, not Russia, as the country's main military adversary.

Chinese officials and experts, however, are reaching different conclusions from the reflections they see in Ukraine.

Beijing -- and Xi in particular -- has long supported "strategic autonomy," a concept pushed by French President Emmanuel Macron that calls for Europe to play a more independent role in its defense that relies less on the United States.

In a May 10 call with Macron, Xi pushed the French president and other European leaders to take security "into their own hands," echoing earlier comments from a May 9 call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

While the long-term implications of the Ukraine war are still uncertain, as is the future of European "strategic autonomy," Beijing increasingly seems to believe that it could further delay the U.S. strategic pivot to China and lead to a lasting division among European and NATO allies.

"Joe Biden had hoped to put Russia policy on a 'stable and predictable' footing in order to focus on America's Indo-Pacific strategy. The war in Ukraine undoubtedly will distract America's attention and [siphon] away resources," wrote Zhou, the retired PLA officer. "The question is...how long Mr. Biden will allow Ukraine to remain a distraction."

### RCA Impact---2NC

#### Kaushiki says trade wars: they escalate.

Gordan Chang 19, J.D. Cornell and author, 7-11-19, “When ‘Trade Wars’ End Badly,” <https://www.hoover.org/research/when-trade-wars-end-badly>, jy

Second, escalating trade friction is convincing the business community that disagreements will continue for a long time. As Joseph Foudy of New York University Stern Business School told CNN, it is not the additional tariffs that are motivating companies to exit China. “It’s the uncertainty that drives you to look abroad because you can’t put a price on that,” he said.

Despite what Chinese officials call “decoupling,” there will still be a high volume of trade between the two countries. Many, therefore, think economic ties will continue to stabilize relations. Trade and investment have often been called the “ballast” of Sino-U.S. ties.

Perhaps they will no longer be. “Does trade increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict?” Samuel Huntington, the great Harvard political scientist, asked in his landmark work, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. “The assumption that it reduces the probability of war between nations is, at a minimum, not proven, and much evidence exists to the contrary.”

As many have now pointed out, high levels of trade in the first years of the last century did not prevent the First World War. As Huntington, building on the work of others, pointed out, what is important is expectation. “Economic interdependence fosters peace,” he wrote, “only ‘when states expect that high trade levels will continue into the foreseeable future.’” If, however, trade partners “do not expect high levels of interdependence to continue, war is likely to result.”

Of course, war does not inevitably result when countries believe they will delink their economies. Yet the threshold for the use of force will drop when Americans believe China poses an existential threat.

Beijing, unfortunately, continually provides evidence that it is America’s enemy. In April of last year, for instance, the Chinese military, from its base in Djibouti, lasered a C-130 Hercules cargo plane, causing eye injuries to two military pilots. American planes are continually lasered in the East China Sea by Chinese forces. Furthermore, last year sonic waves caused brain injuries to American diplomats at the Guangzhou consulate. Because the Communist Party runs a surveillance state, Chinese officials either were the perpetrators of this crime or complicit in it. Soon, Americans will ask why they should trade with a state that uses the proceeds of commerce to harm their service personnel and diplomats. Beijing is leaving its most important trading partner no choice.

So what will be the result of the U.S.-China trade war? Commerce and investment between the U.S. and China will decline, friction between the two countries will soar, and people will reread The Clash of Civilizations.

#### Russia-China coordination triggers global war.

Kendall-Taylor & Shullman 19, \*PhD in Political Science from Yale, Senior Fellow in and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security an Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. \*\*PhD, Senior Adviser at the International Republican Institute and an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. (Andrea, David, 5/14/19, "A Russian-Chinese Partnership Is a Threat to U.S. Interests", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-14/russian-chinese-partnership-threat-us-interests)

While Washington takes a wait-and-see approach, Moscow and Beijing could be coordinating to significantly thwart U.S. interests over the next 15 to 25 years. The two powers may never forge a formal military alliance, but they could still work together in ways that cause major headaches for the United States. Imagine, for example, that Russia and China coordinate the timing of hostile actions on their peripheries. If China made aggressive moves in support of its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea at the same time that Russia made further incursions into Ukraine, U.S. forces would struggle to respond effectively to either gambit.

Nonmilitary collaboration between Russia and China could weaken the United States and even threaten its way of life. Both countries are likely to use their cyber and disinformation capabilities to, as the director of national intelligence put it in January, “steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.” China currently does not exhibit Russia’s zeal for using such measures, particularly against the United States; but if U.S.-Chinese relations darken, Beijing could plausibly take a page from Russia’s playbook and mount coordinated, deniable cyberattacks or interference campaigns against the United States.

China and Russia behave very differently in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, but the combined effect of their actions is often greater than the sum of its parts. In Europe, for example, China has amassed economic influence through growing trade relationships and Belt and Road-related infrastructure investments not contingent on standards for democratic governance and human rights, particularly in eastern Europe, Greece, and Italy. This engagement will ultimately translate into political leverage, as it already has in many countries in Asia. Russia, for its part, appears intent on pursuing hybrid tactics that disrupt democratic processes. On their own, each of these activities is already worrisome for the United States and Europe. But a scenario in which each country’s actions amplify the other’s is not hard to imagine. China, for example, could eventually use its growing ownership of European ports and rail lines to slow a NATO response to Russian aggression. Likewise, Beijing could use the economic leverage it has accrued to quietly dissuade an already reluctant NATO member state such as Hungary or Turkey from responding to Russia’s hybrid tactics, which could ultimately serve to discredit NATO’s commitment to collective defense.

#### Overstretch leads to spiral that escalate, opening the possibilities of war.

Korolev & Portyakov 18, \*Alexander Korolev, Lecturer in politics and international relations in the School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, at University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. \*\*Vladimir Portyakov, Professor and Deputy Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Affairs, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia. (11-29-2018, "Reluctant allies: system-unit dynamics and China-Russia relations", *International Relations*, Volume 33, Issue: 1, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0047117818812561)

One way to do so is to compare today’s international material power structure to that of the Cold War – when the pressure for the two major superpowers to balance was high and when two competing blocks effectively contained each other. While such comparison is unavoidably a gross simplification, it provides a first-cut picture of the power dynamics within the international system. The changes of GNP and military expenditures reveal that the current power structure is nearing that of the Cold War and is therefore conducive to the formation of a China–Russia alliance. In 1991, the total GNP of the United States was almost 16 times that of China and 12 times that of Russia (US$6.164 trillion vs US$405.714 billion and US$517.953 billion, respectively). By 2015, China’s GNP had 60% of that of the United States (US$11.226 trillion versus US$18.121 trillion). Meanwhile, Russia has shown an 11-fold increase in GNP from a meager US$196 billion in 1999 (the post-Soviet low) to US$2.13 trillion in 2013, which is one-seventh of the GNP of the United States.50 Even given the devaluation of the Russian ruble in 2014 and, as a result, the shrinkage of the nominal dollar value of Russia’s GNP in 2015 by almost 40%, combining China’s and Russia’s GNPs would create a pole that, as a percentage of US GNP, is close to the Soviet Union’s Cold War peak of 1975 when the Soviet GNP reached 58% of the United States total.51 At the same time, the United States has been cutting its military spending substantially over the last several years: in 2011, 2012, and 2013, it cut military spending to US$711.3 billion, US$684.8 billion, and US$640.2 billion, respectively; the figure further dropped to US$596 billion in 2015.52 China now has the world’s second largest military budget of US$188.6 billion, followed by Russia with its US$88 billion.53 The purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted estimates of China’s military budget reached US$314 billion in 2014, which, if combined with Russia’s military power, also reaches the level of the Cold War’s USSR-versus-US proportions.54 With all the caveats, these figures show that the United States still overpowers a China-Russia hypothetical alliance by considerable margins; however, the power threshold it generates has become less insurmountable, opening structural opportunities for China and Russia to successfully balance the United States.

However, changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) and military expenditures are only part of the story of the increasing systemic pressure. The second part has to do with the actual behavior of great powers and the nature of their interactions. The international system’s acquisition of a structure that makes systemic balancing more feasible emboldens potential challengers and reduces the possibilities for the major great powers to remain unaffected by each other’s behavior. Feeling more confident about their capabilities, the challenger states adopt more assertive foreign policies in various regions that provoke a degenerative spiral of reactions involving the hegemon and further precipitate the increased systemic pressure. This process manifests itself in the emergence, proliferation, and intensification of what Buzan and Wæver termed geopolitically charged regional security complexes (RSC)55 – highly contentious, great-powers-dominated regional settings in which ‘the members are so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any one member, and significant security-related developments inside any member, have a major impact on others’.56

### RCA Impact---Turns Case---2NC

#### Makes NATO dysfunctional.

Rainer Meyer zum Felde 22, Senior Fellow the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University, ret. Brig. Gen., 6-16-22, “What a Military Alliance Between Russia and China Would Mean for NATO,” <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3_13>, jy

2.2 Implications and Consequences of a “Model B” Alliance—Dangerous and Not Unlikely

Even the most limited case of a “Model A” type cooperation, and certainly the moderate “Model B” version of a Russian-Chinese de facto military alliance would have far-reaching consequences for Europe’s security. Conversely, “Model C” seems as yet unlikely (though not entirely impossible). Therefore, this analysis focuses on Model B as a worst-case scenario that cannot be ruled out nor deemed highly unlikely, and discusses its possible consequences for Europe’s security. Model B supposes an opportunistic rather than a strategic alliance between Russia and China. This means a de-facto military alliance where both Russia and China are united in their geopolitical intent to change the international rules-based order according to their interests; jointly undermine the unity and resolve within Western institutions and US-led alliances; and follow a “division of labor” principle, taking separate approaches in their respective regions without strictly coordinating their plans and activities. The framework of such a non-formalized, purpose-driven de facto alliance would not be based on a coordinated geostrategic approach and would not be underpinned by integrated operational planning, and would therefore also not include pre-planned mutual support in case of a conflict with military land, air or naval forces. However, even such a moderate kind of de facto military alliance between Russia and China would have far-reaching negative consequences for NATO in Europe, both at the geopolitical and strategic-operational level, and could become a nightmare scenario for Europe’s security. What could this look like, and how can it be prevented from happening?

2.3 A “Nightmare Scenario” Based on “Model B”: War Between China and the USA in the Indo-Pacific Creates an Opportunity for Russia to Achieve Revisionist Aims in Europe

In this scenario, an opportunistic, audacious Russian leader uses the opportunity of an escalating major confrontation between China and the USA in the Indo-Pacific region to simultaneously test NATO in Europe with the aim of achieving as many of his revisionist territorial and geopolitical goals as possible. Such an opportunistic large-scale attack against NATO in Europe, conducted by Russia while the USA is fully engaged in a major war with China in the Indo-Pacific, becomes more likely the more some particular prerequisites would occur. The following list contains such elements that could change the risk calculus in Moscow.

Russian willingness to accept the risk of launching a large, military campaign of high intensity with regular forces (i.e. a regional war) in Europe would rise,

(a)

if the USA got engaged in a major conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific region and both sides escalated the conflict to high intensity military campaigns rather than keeping their power struggle limited to political, diplomatic, economic or other non-military instruments;

(b)

if in such a conflict with China, the USA were forced to commit all available air, land, maritime and other forces and capabilities to this theater of war in order to gain the upper hand;

(c)

if the USA’s focus on major military confrontation with China created significant gaps in NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in Europe and the Europeans were unwilling or unable to fill those gapsFootnote3;

(d)

and if Germany, as the key NATO ally in Europe’s center, or a group of allies around Germany, could be discouraged by hybrid activities or nuclear coercion from fulfilling their NATO commitments in peacetime, during the transition from peacetime to crisis and conflict, or during the course of war. This would be the case, e.g., if the political and military decision-making process were delayed, the transfer of authority regarding in-place formations was not timely transferred, reinforcements were not rapidly deployed, or if Germany did not fully play its critical role in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) rear area of operations.

Russia’s leadership would be even more encouraged to take risks if they could plausibly rely on the following assumptions regarding their ally China:

(a)

Firstly, as a result of China’s military buildup in terms of quantity and quality, especially in the maritime, air, space, cyber and also nuclear dimensions over recent years, China would be capable and willing to engage the US in a full-blown war, and China would no longer be forced to avoid confrontation due to military weakness. As of this writing, there is no reason any more for China to fear rapid defeat right from the outset of hostilities, while unlike in the past, US military planners now need to take significant US losses into account.Footnote4

(b)

Secondly, a military conflict between the US and China would be large-scale and long-lasting, so that in the USA, not much attention, political energy, military forces and capabilities would be left for a crisis provoked by Russia in other regions of secondary priority, e.g. in Europe’s Baltic Sea region. It would be helpful for Russia if China’s assertiveness created the perception in the USA that a military confrontation is unavoidable sooner or later. This would imply that the USA would re-allocate the bulk of its air and naval forces as well as its force-multiplying enablers to the Indo-Pacific region and also make these services their budgetary priority at the expense of the US army. For deterrence and defense in Europe, this would mean that in the land domain only, a minimum of reinforcements could be expected, and that the key prerequisite for any success on the ground—a favorable air situation—would have to be achieved by European air forces.Footnote5 As of late 2021, none of the European nations had any comparable capacity nor the plans or budgets to compensate for such a strategic re-allocation of US forces and capabilities.

(c)

Thirdly, Russia would have a free hand and perhaps could count on Chinese support with covert or open hybrid activities against all critical elements of NATO’s and the EU’s posture.

(d)

Fourthly, with regard to China, no precautionary measures would be needed in the Far East (Siberia, Arctic) to protect Russia’s territorial integrity and strategic interests from China.

Needless to say, the Russian calculus would be most encouraged to take on high risks:

(a)

if China contributed pro-actively with substantial forces and capabilities (including disruptive technologies and future force multiplying enablers) to coordinated conventional military operations beyond covert hybrid support. This could be done at Europe’s southern flank with a “second front,” e.g. through a deployment of Chinese naval forces and land-based missile systems for additional A2/AD bubbles for sea denial in the Mediterranean and along Europe’s sea lines of communication to its partners in the Indo-Pacific;

(b)

if China closely cooperated with Russia vis-à-vis Europe in coercive nuclear messaging and in their strategic missile activities (and vice versa Russia with China in the Indo-Pacific theater).Footnote6

These points are important for answering the question of what Europeans can and should do to prevent their nightmare scenario from becoming reality. Point by point, they indicate exactly what European NATO nations can and in their own best interest must do to discourage or deny every single prerequisite. Overall, they must strive to prevent any constellation in which these prerequisites all apply together.

### RCA Impact---Authoritarian Tech---2NC

#### The Axis cements authoritarian tech use.

Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania 19, 10-29-19, Bendett, Analyst with the CNA Adversary Analysis Group; Kania, Adjunct Fellow with the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program, "A new Sino-Russian high-tech partnership," https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership, jy

Sino-Russian relations have been adapting to an era of great-power rivalry. This complex relationship, categorised as a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era’, has continued to evolve as global strategic competition has intensified.1 China and Russia have not only expanded military cooperation but are also undertaking more extensive technological cooperation, including in fifth-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology and the digital economy.

When Russia and China commemorated the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in October 2019,2 the celebrations highlighted the history of this ‘friendship’ and a positive agenda for contemporary partnership that is pursuing bilateral security, ‘the spirit of innovation’, and ‘cooperation in all areas’.3

Such partnerships show that Beijing and Moscow recognise the potential synergies of joining forces in the development of these dual-use technologies, which possess clear military and commercial significance. This distinct deepening of China–Russia technological collaborations is also a response to increased pressures imposed by the US. Over the past couple of years, US policy has sought to limit Chinese and Russian engagements with the global technological ecosystem, including through sanctions and export controls. Under these geopolitical circumstances, the determination of Chinese and Russian leaders to develop indigenous replacements for foreign, particularly American technologies, from chips to operating systems, has provided further motivation for cooperation.

These advances in authoritarian innovation should provoke concerns for democracies for reasons of security, human rights, and overall competitiveness. Notably, the Chinese and Russian governments are also cooperating on techniques for improved censorship and surveillance and increasingly coordinating on approaches to governance that justify and promote their preferred approach of cyber sovereignty and internet management, to other countries and through international standards and other institutions. Today’s trends in technological collaboration and competition also possess strategic and ideological implications for great-power rivalry.

#### Worse than extinction.

Di Minardi 20, MA Political Science at Boston College, 10-15-20,   
“The grim fate that could be ‘worse than extinction’,” https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence

What would totalitarian governments of the past have looked like if they were never defeated? The Nazis operated with 20th Century technology and it still took a world war to stop them. How much more powerful – and permanent – could the Nazis have been if they had beat the US to the atomic bomb? Controlling the most advanced technology of the time could have solidified Nazi power and changed the course of history.

When we think of existential risks, events like nuclear war or asteroid impacts often come to mind. Yet there’s one future threat that is less well known – and while it doesn’t involve the extinction of our species, it could be just as bad.

It’s called the “world in chains” scenario, where, like the preceding thought experiment, a global totalitarian government uses a novel technology to lock a majority of the world into perpetual suffering. If it sounds grim, you’d be right. But is it likely? Researchers and philosophers are beginning to ponder how it might come about – and, more importantly, what we can do to avoid it.

Existential risks (x-risks) are disastrous because they lock humanity into a single fate, like the permanent collapse of civilisation or the extinction of our species. These catastrophes can have natural causes, like an asteroid impact or a supervolcano, or be human-made from sources like nuclear war or climate change. Allowing one to happen would be “an abject end to the human story" and would let down the hundreds of generations that came before us, says Haydn Belfield, academic project manager at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge.

Toby Ord, a senior research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at Oxford University, believes that the odds of an existential catastrophe happening this century from natural causes are less than one in 2,000, because humans have survived for 2,000 centuries without one. However, when he adds the probability of human-made disasters, Ord believes the chances increase to a startling one in six. He refers to this century as “the precipice” because the risk of losing our future has never been so high.

Researchers at the Center on Long-Term Risk, a non-profit research institute in London, have expanded upon x-risks with the even-more-chilling prospect of suffering risks. These “s-risks” are defined as “suffering on an astronomical scale, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far.” In these scenarios, life continues for billions of people, but the quality is so low and the outlook so bleak that dying out would be preferable. In short: a future with negative value is worse than one with no value at all.

This is where the “world in chains” scenario comes in. If a malevolent group or government suddenly gained world-dominating power through technology, and there was nothing to stand in its way, it could lead to an extended period of abject suffering and subjugation. A 2017 report on existential risks from the Global Priorities Project, in conjunction with FHI and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, warned that “a long future under a particularly brutal global totalitarian state could arguably be worse than complete extinction”.

Singleton hypothesis

Though global totalitarianism is still a niche topic of study, researchers in the field of existential risk are increasingly turning their attention to its most likely cause: artificial intelligence.

In his “singleton hypothesis”, Nick Bostrom, director at Oxford’s FHI, has explained how a global government could form with AI or other powerful technologies – and why it might be impossible to overthrow. He writes that a world with “a single decision-making agency at the highest level” could occur if that agency “obtains a decisive lead through a technological breakthrough in artificial intelligence or molecular nanotechnology”. Once in charge, it would control advances in technology that prevent internal challenges, like surveillance or autonomous weapons, and, with this monopoly, remain perpetually stable.

If the singleton is totalitarian, life would be bleak. Even in the countries with the strictest regimes, news leaks in and out from other countries and people can escape. A global totalitarian rule would eliminate even these small seeds of hope. To be worse than extinction, “that would mean we feel absolutely no freedom, no privacy, no hope of escaping, no agency to control our lives at all", says Tucker Davey, a writer at the Future of Life Institute in Massachusetts, which focuses on existential risk research.

“In totalitarian regimes of the past, [there was] so much paranoia and psychological suffering because you just have no idea if you're going to get killed for saying the wrong thing,” he continues. “And now imagine that there's not even a question, every single thing you say is being reported and being analysed.”

“We may not yet have the technologies to do this,” Ord said in a recent interview, “but it looks like the kinds of technologies we’re developing make that easier and easier. And it seems plausible that this may become possible at some time in the next 100 years.”

AI and authoritarianism

Though life under a global totalitarian government is still an unlikely and far-future scenario, AI is already enabling authoritarianism in some countries and strengthening infrastructure that could be seized by an opportunistic despot in others.

“We've seen sort of a reckoning with the shift from very utopian visions of what technology might bring to much more sobering realities that are, in some respects, already quite dystopian,” says Elsa Kania, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, a bipartisan non-profit that develops national security and defence policies.

In the past, surveillance required hundreds of thousands of people – one in every 100 citizens in East Germany was an informant – but now it can be done by technology. In the United States, the National Security Agency (NSA) collected hundreds of millions of American call and text records before they stopped domestic surveillance in 2019, and there are an estimated four to six million CCTV cameras across the United Kingdom. Eighteen of the 20 most surveilled cities in the world are in China, but London is the third. The difference between them lies less in the tech that the countries employ and more in how they use it.

What if the definition of what is illegal in the US and the UK expanded to include criticising the government or practising certain religions? The infrastructure is already in place to enforce it, and AI – which the NSA has already begun experimenting with – would enable agencies to search through our data faster than ever before.

In addition to enhancing surveillance, AI also underpins the growth of online misinformation, which is another tool of the authoritarian. AI-powered deep fakes, which can spread fabricated political messages, and algorithmic micro-targeting on social media are making propaganda more persuasive. This undermines our epistemic security – the ability to determine what is true and act on it – that democracies depend on.

“Over the last few years, we've seen the rise of filter bubbles and people getting shunted by various algorithms into believing various conspiracy theories, or even if they’re not conspiracy theories, into believing only parts of the truth,” says Belfield. “You can imagine things getting much worse, especially with deep fakes and things like that, until it's increasingly harder for us to, as a society, decide these are the facts of the matter, this is what we have to do about it, and then take collective action.”

### RCA Impact---Asia---2NC

#### The RCA weakens the Asian Quad.

Monika Chansoria 22, Senior Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Associate Director of Studies at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 5-9-2022, "Challenge of the China-Russia Axis in the Post-Ukraine World Order," https://japan-forward.com/challenge-of-the-china-russia-axis-in-the-post-ukraine-world-order/, jy

Great Power Pressures

2022 and beyond is likely to see the traditional engine of political instability and conflict return in full force worldwide. No region, alliance, or grouping, shall remain immune from the Great Power Bloc politics and ensuing pressures.

This time, perhaps it shall be the China-Russia axis that shall challenge the democratic, pluralist order led by the West along with key partnerships in Asia, and nations that orient or align themselves with it. Democracies will severely be put to test.

The Test for India

The above quandary, most visible in the case of India’s position on Russia, was highlighted a few weeks back when former Japanese PM Yoshihide Suga signaled understanding of New Delhi’s position. As per Suga, it would be in Japan’s national interest, given that “India’s current relationship with China is tense. From that standpoint, Russia is an extremely important country for India… Considering the cold, harsh reality of international politics, it is crucial to keep India in the Quad…”

Tokyo and Delhi, apart from being two major Asian democracies, also happen to be the linchpins of the Quad in Asia. Moreover, Japan and India have “…placed emphasis to work in tandem towards a stable world, based on a rules-based order that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations…”

During the latest meeting between the prime ministers of Japan and India in March 2022, the need for “seeking peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law without resorting to threat or use of force or any attempt to unilaterally change status quo” was unequivocally emphasized.

The Russia – China Paradigm

Apparently, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have spelled out the common position of China and Russia on how they view democracy, development, international security and order. While hosting Putin for the February 2022 summit meeting, Xi simultaneously sent a tacit message to Japan when he hosted Putin at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing. The venue’s criticality lay in its name – referring to what Japan calls the Senkaku Gunto (Islands).

Assessing the Taiwan Threat: What if China Strikes the Senkakus First?

Relations between China and Japan have increasingly been strained over the very bitterly contested territorial and sovereignty row involving these uninhabited islands.

Xi noted the world entering a new phase of fluidity and transformation. And he expressed readiness to work with Putin to fully leverage the political advantage of their ties and chart the course for China-Russia relations under the new historical circumstances.

Russia, on the other hand, described China as its most important strategic partner and said that the China-Russia relationship symbolizes 21st century international relations.

Implications for the Free World

While Beijing and Moscow announce firm support for each other in “defending their core interests, strengthening political and strategic trust… and… in upholding sovereignty…” it ends up creating a strategic binary for the world.

More importantly, the China-Russia axis will complicate multilateral initiatives for many democratic nations as the former provide further impetus to regional groupings led by them, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.

China, in all likelihood, shall be more perceptively proactive than simply sitting on the fence here. Beijing appears set to take charge in being the bigger player in this supposed new alliance with Moscow that is presenting itself in Eurasia and expanding eastwards.

The emergence of China in the post-Ukraine conflict world will be a seismic shift that every major democratic player, globally and regionally, shall be challenged with for strategic and realist reasons.

#### Prevents Sino-Indian border skirmishes---deterrence is key.

Sim Tack and Detresfa\_ 22, Tack, co-founder and military analyst at Force Analysis; Detresfa\_, open-source and image intelligence analyst and contributor; 5-23-22, “China-India Border Crisis Has Quietly Resulted In Victory For Beijing,” <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/china-india-border-crisis-has-quietly-resulted-in-victory-for-beijing>, jy

Choosing a path of stability and de-escalation has also allowed India to nurture close relationships with strategic partners in the developed world to help balance against or contain Chinese power on a global level. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known commonly as “the Quad,” that brings India together with the United States, Australia, and Japan (as well as possibly South Korea and Vietnam’s role as part of the so-called “Quad Plus”) is one of the main ways in which India tries to build such a diplomatic alliance. Coordinating with countries that all share concerns over Chinese power projection may allow India to be part of a higher-level strategic effort to counterbalance against China. Still, that doesn’t mean these burgeoning alliances will directly impact the situation in Akai Chin.

The most critical manner in which China has in fact managed to establish its undisputed control over the Aksai Chin region is evidenced by the evolution of China’s frontline positions. While initially composed of small outposts and then joined by temporary tent camps during the 2020 face-off, these positions have now evolved into permanent bases with cold weather shelters.

At the Depsang Plains for example, at the northern end of the disputed Aksai Chin region, China used to maintain an observational presence. Today, this area boasts a large military position composed of infantry shelters and ammunition storage facilities, as well as tanks and artillery systems. The Chinese presence at the Depsang Plains evolved from a limited mission to a permanent deployment of a large combat-capable force that would present serious challenges for India to dislodge from its positions.

At Galwan Valley and Hot Springs, Chinese troops were in fact forced to withdraw following skirmishes with Indian troops and ensuing negotiations in 2020. Even at these locations of the so-called “mutual withdrawals” just a single kilometer removed from their initial positions, Chinese forces have established large permanent bases supported by solar panels to provide them with energy and modern roads to resupply them.

China does maintain some rather rudimentary temporary positions in the Spanggur Lake area (just south of Pangong Lake), but even these positions are directly supported by permanent military positions that China developed at Pangong Lake and the even larger military support positions deeper into China at Rutog.

China’s ability to claim undisputed control over Aksai Chin is not based solely on its ability to establish permanent military positions on the border of the disputed territory. Perhaps even more important is the vast network of large logistical nodes and support bases that China established within the disputed region, and the tremendous effort it has gone through to connect these and its frontline positions by building new roads. Where China in the past maintained a logistics network that could support the presence of several hundred Chinese troops on the frontlines of its territorial claims in Aksai Chin, this upgraded infrastructure and support network now allows it to reinforce many thousands of troops simultaneously.

This effort may seem easier than it really is, but in order to effectively connect all these positions and support bases to China’s existing military lines of communication, it has had to effectively tame the geography of Aksai Chin.

This means, for example, taming the riverbed in the many valleys between mountain ranges, to guarantee year-round mobility even when the rivers are in spate. By constructing this brand new road network, interspaced with large arterial support bases behind the frontline, China effectively turned what used to be a long five-hour journey into just a one or two-hour trip.

China has also not limited its logistical expansion into Aksai Chin to ground transport and has expanded its logistics into the third dimension by constructing a number of large heliports inside and nearby Aksai Chin. Prior to the 2020 crisis, small Chinese observation posts would sometimes have a small helipad nearby, but the new disposition includes the permanent deployment of entire helicopter squadrons at key logistical nodes to facilitate the rapid movement of troops or supplies when needed. The redevelopment and expansion of airpower on China’s western border is not only limited to Aksai Chin, the pattern has been observed across the Tibetan Plateau indicative of a larger vertical lift network that is rapidly taking shape. You can read all about this reality and our analysis of it in past features linked here and here.

The expansion of China’s forward deployments and logistical support even expands beyond the Aksai Chin region itself. Since the beginning of the 2020 crisis, China has erected veritable military cities from the empty desert. These immense bases directly support China’s ability to maintain troop presence within Aksai Chin, and offer it the ability to rapidly surge its military presence in the area during future crises.

At Pangong Lake, for example, new roads – and a bridge across the lake just outside of India’s territorial claim – reach all the way around the lake to the town of Rutog where large military facilities now dominate the landscape.

These facilities provide for a permanent deployment of Chinese forces, as well as frequent rotations of training exercises that allow Chinese military units to even better prepare for potential conflict in this region and especially at extreme altitudes that are a staple of it. The same is true for other regions, where in the North, the logistical connections draw all the way to China’s Hotan Air Base, and in the south, Chinese forward positions at Demchok are supported by connections to military facilities in Gar County and the Ngari Gunsa air bases.

Vikram J. Singh, Senior Advisor for Asia at the US Institute For Peace, says enhancing India’s situational awareness and deterrent posture will be critical to maintaining stability.

“In Aksai Chin, China has largely replicated its success of gaining de facto control of disputed territory in the waters of the South China Sea,” Singh says. “Getting the best intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities possible and investing in its military to deter further Chinese provocations is vital.”

“Beijing’s success with coercion and militarisation of disputed territory below the threshold of conflict can easily lead to miscalculation about what will provoke a forceful response from a neighbor and risk escalation.”

As India turns to self-reliance, Singh says, it should leverage its "willing partners, the United States, as well as Europe and Israel, can provide technology India needs right now to stay on top of the challenge from China and contribute to self-sufficiency.”

The intensity of China’s military buildup in and around Aksai Chin, which has continued effortlessly after the limited withdrawals in 2020, effectively puts it in a position where its ability to project military power into the disputed region is relatively uncontestable. Negotiations have not led to any breakthroughs for India to improve its position or access within the disputed territory.

In essence, time has been on China’s side and India now faces a (quite literal) uphill battle to restore even a semblance of control over its territorial claims in this area while it simultaneously faces similar challenges at other locations of its shared border farther East.

#### Clashes escalate to nuclear use. Ukraine makes it likelier.

James Rupert 22, senior writer and editor at the U.S. Institute of Peace, former Alicia Patterson Fellow and Michigan Journalism Fellow, 5-19-2022, "Our Next ‘Unthinkable’ Crisis: Nuclear War in Asia?" https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/our-next-unthinkable-crisis-nuclear-war-asia, jy

Rising Risks for Nuclear Conflict

The British Empire’s withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947 left unresolved issues of statehood and borders — and the Himalayan frontiers of China, India and Pakistan have since formed a persistent, unhealed wound. The three nations have clashed in dozens of confrontations, from full-scale, conventional wars to Himalayan border skirmishes and armed standoffs, terrorist attacks or air strikes. India-Pakistan conflicts have escalated since Pakistani terrorists attacked Mumbai in 2008, killing or injuring hundreds of Indians. The India-China border conflict has flared since 2020, including its worst violence in 45 years.

The risks of sudden violence in the region were dramatized in March when India’s military accidentally launched an unarmed, supersonic missile 75 miles into Pakistan. Luckily, the missile’s crash killed no one, and it came in a moment of relative calm in the two countries’ volatile relations. Less noticed outside the region is China’s and India’s continued buildup of military infrastructure and capabilities along their disputed border, including a recent shift of Indian troops to to that zone.

While the rivalries, periodic clashes and armed capacity of the three nations have sharpened over 15 years, policies to protect strategic stability “didn’t really move along with the changes,” said Vikram Singh, an Asia security policy specialist at USIP. Fundamentally, “there is an absolute lack of strategic engagement among the three powers about how they would manage escalation,” and rising uncertainty about “how crises might spiral,” he said. “I think what we’ve seen in Russia and Ukraine gives us reason to think hard about the unthinkable.” Singh spoke at USIP alongside others among 19 Asia and nuclear security specialists who conducted the study, published this week. The report analyzes recent years’ evolution of the conflicts and offers recommendations for U.S. policymakers.

“We see an evolution, both in terms of the capabilities” of the rival states, notably “more and different types of weapons of technology,” and perhaps more importantly, in deteriorating relationships, “particularly between India and China, and India and Pakistan,” said Daniel Markey, a scholar and policy practitioner on South Asia and USIP advisor. These evolutions lead “to possibilities for even the potential of nuclear use in the region that are very worrisome,” he said.

Analysts from the USIP-convened Senior Study Group on Strategic Stability in Southern Asia discussed specific evolutions that are increasing the risks. One is that China is significantly expanding its nuclear arsenal, which is expected to reach “up to 700 deployed warheads within the next five years,” said Lynn Rusten, who leads efforts to reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons at the nonpartisan Nuclear Threat Initiative. Another problem is that the return to power of Afghanistan’s Taliban creates new space for violent extremist groups bent on attacking India through Pakistan. Such attacks have been a frequent trigger for India-Pakistan military clashes.

Southern Asia has gradually become a theater of rival alliances — between the United States and India on one hand and China and Pakistan on the other, a polarization that has been accelerated by the global strategic rivalry between China and the United States, noted Yun Sun, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at the Stimson Center. While both countries have sought to calm previous eruptions of violent conflict between India and Pakistan, the increasingly pronounced alignments of the United States and China now will make it more difficult for them to play a mediating role in future crises, Sun and other analysts said.

The ‘Ukraine Effect’

The study group expressed concern that China, India and Pakistan all underestimate the risks that a next flareup in any of their conflicts could escalate out of control, whether by miscalculation or accident, Singh said. “Across all three there is a level of comfort … that this isn’t going to be a major problem,” he said. Sun and Andrew Scobell, a specialist on Chinese foreign relations at USIP, echoed the concern, and Scobell said Beijing could deepen that false sense of comfort if the Ukraine war avoids a nuclear escalation following public alarm about that risk.

While some commentators have suggested that Russia’s setbacks in the Ukraine war will largely indicate caution to China over any military effort to seize control over Taiwan, study group members said it remains unclear what lessons China will absorb about the various conflicts along its periphery. “I’d be wary of thinking that they’re drawing the lessons … we hope they’re drawing,” said Scobell. “The Chinese conclusion is likely that they [Russia] didn’t prepare properly, and we’re going to prepare properly” for any strike on Taiwan, he said.

In southern Asia, the Ukraine conflict is likely to disadvantage India by weakening Russia as a reliable supplier of the vast majority of Indian weapons — from tanks to missiles to submarines, Singh and Sun said. Singh asked whether such a tilting of the military balance might help prompt Beijing to consider pushing “a little harder” in the countries’ border dispute — and what the response of an uncertain India might be.

### RCA Impact---Asia---Extra---2NC

#### Prevents Chinese excursion in the SCS, ECS, Indian Ocean, and Himalayas.

Zaheena Rasheed 20, senior producer covering the Asia Pacific, 11-25-2020, "What is the Quad and can it counter China’s rise?," https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/25/what-is-the-quad-can-us-india-japan-and-australia-deter-china, jy

Rules-based order

Under President Xi Jinping, China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, Beijing has become more nationalistic and assertive. It has cracked down on pro-democracy protesters in semi-autonomous Hong Kong, interned more than one million Muslims in the far western region of Xinjiang and stepped up threats of military force to seize the self-ruled island of Taiwan.

It is also rapidly modernising its defence forces and increasing its military presence in the disputed waters of the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

This April, with the world distracted by the coronavirus pandemic, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat close to the Paracel islands in the South China Sea. Later, a standoff between a Malaysian oil exploration vessel and a Chinese survey vessel, off Malaysia’s Borneo, prompted the US and Australia to deploy warships to the area.

The Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan all lay claim to parts of the energy-rich waters, but Beijing, which claims almost the entire area under its decades-old “nine-dash line”, has been extending its reach by building military bases on reefs and rocky outcrops.

A United Nations tribunal ruled in 2016 that China’s “historical rights” had no basis in the law.

On China’s Himalayan frontier with India, long-simmering tensions boiled over in June, with troops from both sides fighting each other with clubs and stones in the Galwan Valley. The clashes left 20 Indian soldiers dead and was the first fatal confrontation between the two sides since 1975.

Friction also increased in the East China Sea, where China has a territorial dispute with Japan, with the US accusing Beijing in July of “unprecedented” military incursions into the disputed waters.

“The Quad comes about as an effort to try to deter China’s ability to challenge and disrupt the rules-based order and the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region,” said Lemahieu. “It’s a signalling on the part of these four democracies that they are and they would get even more serious about acting as a military and strategic counterweight to China, if Beijing were to continue to challenge [the status quo], not just in the South China Sea but also in the Indian Ocean.”

What also worries the four countries, Lemahieu said, is China’s willingness to exploit “economic interdependencies to try to level informal sanctions” to punish countries that oppose it.

For instance, this year, Beijing slapped trade sanctions on Australia, after Canberra backed an inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus. It suspended some beef imports on a technicality and effectively blocked barley imports by imposing huge tariffs on the Australian grain. Australian traders are now expecting more sanctions on exports of Australian wine, timber and even lobsters.

#### US-Russia will check China’s expansion in Asia.

Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi 21, Green, senior adviser and Kissinger Chair at the Center for CSIS, prior, served as the senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair and director of Asian studies at Georgetown University, Obama special assistant for national security affairs, assistant professor of School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University; Szechenyi, senior fellow with the Japan Chair and deputy director for Asia at CSIS, MA in international economics and Japan Studies; 4-6-21, “The Return of the Quad: Will Russia and China Form Their Own Bloc?” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/return-quad-will-russia-and-china-form-their-own-bloc>, jy

Moscow, however, is also motivated by practical considerations. As a Pacific power, it is concerned about the U.S. military buildup in the region. The United States’ sale of more than 100 fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters to Japan last summer prompted Russia to strengthen its air defense grouping in the Far Eastern islands, deploying S-400s and S-300V4s in addition to short-range anti-aircraft missile systems and extending Russia’s power projection capabilities. Reports that the Biden administration could seek to deploy ground-based intermediate range missiles in Japan were met a stern warning from Minister Lavrov that Russia would “retaliate.” Moscow views the U.S.-led Quad security arrangement the way it sees NATO—as an instrument of American hegemony veiled as multilateralism.

But Moscow’s response may also be a by-product of U.S. inattention to Russia as an equal global partner as Washington concentrates its geostrategic focus on the Indo-Pacific and describes Russia as “also a threat, but in decline.” This message is further reinforced in the Biden administration’s interim U.S. National Security Strategy, which emphasizes China almost to the exclusion of Russia. As the United States and its allies increase their military posture in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s defense cooperation with Beijing will grow because China, more so than any other Asian power, enhances Russia’s standing globally, and in the Indo-Pacific region to a lesser extent. Moscow will subordinate its relations with other regional powers, such as India and Vietnam, to its strategic partnership with Beijing. Russia’s goal will not be to engage the United States directly or contribute direct military support to China, but rather to extend the geographical scope of contestation in order to dilute U.S. power in the region and demonstrate its own value to China as a strategic partner.

What can be done to avoid this strategic conundrum?

Though the Russian and Chinese economies are highly compatible—China requires energy, food and diverse shipping routes for its exports, which Russia provides in the form of oil, liquified natural gas, wheat, and the Arctic-based Northern Sea Route—their economic disparities are great, and their economic relations are negotiated on China’s terms, not Russia’s. Russian arms sales to China have increased, but China’s indigenous military technological capabilities are catching up to and in some areas, such as artificial intelligence, shipbuilding, and stealth aircraft, surpassing Russia’s. This carries security as well as business implications, since Russia will likely sell fewer weapons to China. Perhaps more worrisome to Russia is its long, sparsely populated border with China, which for Moscow remains a natural security concern.

Russia is fully aware of this asymmetry but can do little to counterbalance it other than to seek engagement with other Pacific powers such as India, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to enhance its own standing in the region and preserve room for maneuver. However, Moscow finds itself in a catch-22: the closer it positions itself with China, the further it will alienate itself from its historic relationship with Delhi in particular, as well as with Tokyo. This dilemma was a point of interest in recent Track 2 dialogues held by CSIS and a Russian and Japanese partner organization, but participants sensed little movement on Moscow’s end to resolve it. Further second track work between the United States, Russia, and India focused on ways of preserving regional optionality may be warranted.

Despite great tensions in their bilateral relationship, the United States and Russia could identify some narrow areas of compatible long-term visions for the Indo-Pacific region. Both aim to establish a multipolar regional order in which China is a driver of positive sum economic growth but not a regional hegemon. With troubling signs that China’s ultimate goal is unipolarity, Moscow may seek strategic rebalancing while continuing to view the Quad skeptically. Russia and China have no military obligations to each other, but a crisis in the region would put pressure on Russia to align with China rhetorically, thereby reducing the political space for Moscow to counterbalance its relations with other states. Preservation of Russia’s economic and security relationship with India may offer opportunity in an effort to avoid expediting Moscow’s military alignment with Beijing, which remains in the interest of the United States.

### RCA Impact---Blackmail---2NC

#### The RCA breaks MAD with nuclear coercion. Extinction.

Fatma Khaled 22, Staff Reporter, 6-18-22, “Ex-Generals See Nuclear Blackmail 'Trinity' in Russia, China, North Korea,” <https://www.newsweek.com/ex-generals-see-nuclear-blackmail-trinity-russia-china-north-korea-1717147>, jy

Former U.S. generals said Saturday that they see a nuclear blackmail "trinity" in Russia, China, and North Korea, adding that the United States must now "seriously" consider how it would counter one.

"The most significant of all the problem sets may be the emergence of a new norm in nuclear doctrine—blackmail. That approach is in stark contrast to the notion of Mutually Assured Destruction, where major powers—United States, the USSR, and China—viewed atomic attack as truly a last resort," retired Air Force Major General Howard Thompson and former Lieutenant General Dan Leaf wrote in a report published by Real Clear Defense.

The report by the former generals comes in the wake of China and Russia vetoing sanctions against North Korea last month for the first time since October 2006, according to CNN, despite a series of North Korean ballistic missile tests that were launched during the first half of this year.

"This first-ever rejection of sanctions marks the emergence of an unholy trinity implicitly willing to hold the world order at risk by threatening, and perhaps executing, limited nuclear attack," the former generals said.

This was not the case in October 2006 when the United Nations Security Council, including China and Russia, were fast in condemning and passing sanctions against North Korea after the country launched its first nuclear test, according to the report. The two countries haven't blocked any of the nine previous sanction votes that were passed since that year.

"The vetoes today are dangerous. Those members today have taken a stance that not only undermines the Security Council's previous action to which they have committed but also undermines our collective security," U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield said in a statement last month that was made on behalf of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.

Some experts previously said that North Korea's fast-paced missile launches earlier this year were meant to pressure the Biden administration to reconsider U.S. sanctions against the country.

In their report, Howard and Leaf referenced a Financial Times article that was published in April with national security analyst at Harvard University, Graham Allison, that pointed out that there is "every reason to believe" that Russian President Vladimir Putin would choose to "escalate the level of destruction" instead of accepting a loss in Ukraine, if he had to pick between the two.

"Putin first explicitly raised the nuclear option to deter outside intervention, and since has hinted of the use of tactical nuclear weapons to force capitulation or punish intervention from or expansion of the NATO alliance," the former generals said in their report.

Meanwhile, Howard and Leaf didn't rule out the possibility of China using a nuclear option as Beijing's tension with Taiwan continues. The Chinese government repeatedly pointed out that it's not hesitant to use military force to reclaim the independent island.

"Xi has left no doubt about his willingness to resort to a military option to reclaim Taiwan, and it would be naïve to expect the Chinese to refrain from nuclear coercion in such circumstances. With Russian backing for a move against Taiwan or aggression in the volatile South China Sea, the potential for nuclear coercion is exceedingly high," they explained.

### RCA Impact---Cyber---2NC

#### Split national interests drive the RCA to escalate cyberattacks. Deterrence is key.

Fabio Rugge 18, Prof Emirtus of Political Science at the University of Pavia, Grand Officer of the Order of Merit of Italy, “Confronting an ‘Axis of Cyber?’” 2018, <https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/cyber_def_web2.pdf>, jy

Volatile Security

Security "in and around" cyberspace will likely remain volatile for the years to come, given the conflicting strategic national interests and the diverging cultural and ideological approaches at play. The confrontation between the West on the one hand, and Russia, North Korea, China and Iran on the other, will most likely impact international stability in profound ways. It will most likely trigger sharp escalations of hostilities in the conventional domain, the adoption of international counter-measures in response to cyber campaigns26, and the application of conflicting operational standards concerning the Internet development. Technological developments in the fields of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things, robotics and quantum computing (to name just a few) will most likely consolidate the current trends, and the international community will drift — as explained in detail by Professor Umberto Gori in his chapter of this Report — towards a Balance of Power that is much more difficult to assess and to maintain 27.

In this scenario of ambiguity and uncertainty, every state is actively engaged in attaining "cyber superiority", defined as the "degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary"28. Cyber superiority is key in enhancing situational awareness and attribution, allowing countries under attack to impose swift, costly and transparent consequences in response to malicious behaviour29. Cyber superiority is also vital in mapping the the-atre of future conflicts, in anticipating the adversary's vulnerabilities and in contesting its courses of action, and in establishing the deterrence posture - which is particularly complex to establish in cyberspace, as actionable attribution, and therefore retaliation, are troublesome30. If the new US (and, hopefully, Western) posture will succeed in enhancing predictability in cyberspace, the international community might then be facilitated in agreeing on constraining rules of behaviour, and in enhancing international cooperation against non-state malicious actors.

The problem with these developments is that the national legitimate quests for cyber superiority translate, at the international level, in a massive security paradox ("my security is your insecurity") that undermines trust within the international community and threatens international stability. In fact, one of the main features of cyberspace is the fact that offensive and defensive capabilities develop "hand in hand": it is impossible to ensure the appropriate defence of national ICT networks without knowing how an attack is executed and without developing a certain degree of cyber superiority. Moreover, cyber incidents typically do not allow time to react, and therefore mapping the battlefield before full-scale hostilities erupt is an operational imperative. This implies conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations against the networks of potential enemies - operations that, in turn, may easily be perceived as military in character. Signaling about offensive capabilities, also, serves also the purpose of deterring potential enemies by clarifying the readiness to respond "in kind" to an attack31. How else to read, for instance, the malwares that have been found in critical infrastructures around the world, other than weapons designed and planted to indicate readiness to strike in case of full-scale hostilities? Finally, cyber weapons are inherently secret, as they rely on ICT vulnerabilities (zero-days) to be effective; as such, visibility on each other cyber arsenals is virtually impossible, an armament control regime is unsustainable, and the security paradox becomes more relevant everyday.

### RCA Impact---Dollar---2NC

#### The RCA unravels the Dollar.

Zongyang Zoe Liu and Mihaela Papa 22, Liu, Fellow for International Political Economy at the Council on Foreign Relations; Papa, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Sustainable Development and Global Governance at Tufts, 3-7-22, “The Anti-Dollar Axis,” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-03-07/anti-dollar-axis>, jy

A GROWING COALITION

Russia’s unilateral initiatives to escape the hold of the dollar may be defensive in nature, but it has also worked with other countries to chip away at the dollar’s dominance. These coalitions present a long-term threat to the dollar’s preeminent role in international commerce and, consequently, a challenge to U.S. global leadership. The shared desire to reduce dependence on the dollar has strengthened the relationship between Russia and China. Bilateral currency swaps between the two central banks helped Russia bypass U.S. sanctions in 2014 and facilitate bilateral trade and investment. In 2016, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev called for harmonizing the two countries’ national payment systems and discussed the prospect of launching a new Russia-China cross-border payment system for direct settlements in yuan and rubles. In 2018, Putin stated that Russia and China “confirmed their interest in using national currencies more actively in reciprocal payments.”

In 2019, China upgraded its ties with Russia to a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era,” the highest level of China’s bilateral relations. Thereafter, Russia’s central bank invested $44 billion in yuan, increasing its share in Russia’s foreign exchange reserves from five to 15 percent in early 2019. Russia’s yuan holdings are about ten times the global average and account for nearly a quarter of global yuan reserves. In 2019, China and Russia signed a treaty that increases the use of their respective national currencies in cross-border trade to 50 percent. In 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov urged China to work with Russia to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar and Western payment systems. The Russian government allowed Russia’s sovereign wealth fund to invest in yuan reserves and Chinese state bonds. Chinese policymakers hope that partnership with Russia will help broaden a yuan-based financial infrastructure, including a Chinese rival to SWIFT and a rival bank card payment system, thereby boosting the yuan’s status as a reserve currency and bolstering China’s financial autonomy.

Putin seeks to expand such alternative financial infrastructure through Russia’s dealings with other countries. In 2019, Iran and Russia connected their financial messaging systems, thereby bypassing SWIFT by allowing banks in both countries to send cross-border transaction messages. Russia and Turkey have discussed using the ruble and the Turkish lira in cross-border trade. Russia introduced its version of SWIFT to banks in the Eurasian Economic Union (a partnership of five post-Soviet states) and expressed interest in expanding it to countries in the Arab world and Europe. Russia has tried to muster further support for de-dollarization in multilateral forums such as the BRICS grouping, which consists of Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. BRICS’ New Development Bank has raised funds in local currencies as part of its goal to “break away from the tyranny of hard currencies.” In 2020, SCO members underscored the importance of using national currencies in trade among one another and discussed the establishment of a development bank and development fund. Russia and China can use these forums to create a broad de-dollarization coalition with the promise of greater financial autonomy for all and reduced dependence on the dollar.

#### Kills the global economy.

Michael Pettis 22, Senior Fellow for Carnegie China, professor of finance at Peking University’s School of Management, specializing in Chinese financial markets, 4-12-22, “Changing the Top Global Currency Means Changing the Patterns of Global Trade,” <https://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/86878>, jy

HOW WOULD THE WORLD AND GLOBAL TRADE BE AFFECTED BY AN ABANDONMENT OF THE DOLLAR?

If the United States—and presumably the other Anglophone economies—were to take steps that eliminated the role of their domestic financial markets as the net absorbers of foreign savings, by definition they would also no longer run current account and trade deficits. But because these countries account for 70–75 percent of the world’s current account deficits (with the developing world accounting for most of the rest), this would also mean that, unless some other large economy proves willing to convert its surpluses into massive deficits, the world would have to reduce its collective trade surpluses by 70–75 percent.

To understand the implications, let’s assume a country that runs persistent trade surpluses is forced to adapt to a world of much lower trade deficits, and hence of much lower trade surpluses. As I have explained elsewhere (here, here, and here, for example), in countries that run persistent surpluses, domestic savings must exceed domestic investment. Domestic savings are high, in turn, mainly because ordinary households, who consume most of their income, receive a very low share of the GDP they produce—compared to shares of businesses, the government, and the very rich.

Countries that run persistent surpluses, in other words, do so because deficiencies in domestic demand caused by distortions in the distribution of income make them incapable of absorbing all they produce domestically. To put it in another way, these distortions force up their savings rates above their investment rates. This means that, if an external event were to force a sharp contraction in a country’s trade and current account surpluses, there are broadly speaking five ways (or some combination thereof) by which its economy could adjust to bring savings and investment back in line.

* A surge in unemployment: Such a country’s savings would decline if a collapse in its exports caused manufacturing unemployment to surge. Unemployed workers, of course, have negative savings.
* A boost in consumer lending to spur domestic demand: The country’s savings would decline if the central bank, in response to a collapse in exports, quickly forced banks to increase consumer lending dramatically so as to replace foreign demand with domestic demand. Even if it were possible to do this efficiently, rising household debt would eventually be unsustainable.
* A jump in government deficit spending to spur demand: Savings would decline if the country’s government, in response to a collapse in exports, quickly expanded the fiscal deficit so as to replace foreign demand with domestic demand. Even if it were possible to do this efficiently, rising fiscal deficits would eventually be unsustainable.
* Income redistribution: The country’s savings would decline if the government were able to engineer a substantial redistribution of income to ordinary households. This would be sustainable and by far the best long-term outcome for both the country and the world, but any substantial redistribution of income would be a slow and difficult process, and it would almost certainly be politically disruptive, as is clearly the case, for example, in China.
* A surge of investment: The country’s government could engineer a massive increase in investment. The private sector is unlikely to respond to a collapse in exports by increasing investment, and indeed private firms would probably reduce investment, so the increase in government investment would have to be enough to absorb both the contraction in the trade surplus and any reduction in business investment. This is what China did, for example, in 2009–2010.

There are only a limited number of ways in which a country that runs persistent surpluses can adjust to a global contraction in aggregate trade deficits, all of which are very difficult. This just reinforces how it is the willingness and ability of the United States to run large, persistent deficits that underpins the role of the dollar as the world’s dominant currency, and how it is these deficits that most benefit, directly or indirectly, the countries that claim to be most eager to dethrone the U.S. dollar. These are also the countries—especially China—who claim to be most keen to have their currencies replace the U.S. dollar even as their domestic economic policies make this impossible.

Slow growth causes **great power war**.

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Slowing growth makes it harder for leaders to keep the public happy. Economic underperformance weakens the country against its rivals. Fearing upheaval, leaders crack down on dissent. They maneuver desperately to keep geopolitical enemies at bay. Expansion seems like a solution—a way of grabbing economic resources and markets, making nationalism a crutch for a wounded regime, and beating back foreign threats.

Many countries have followed this path. When the United States’ long post-Civil War economic surge ended, Washington violently suppressed strikes and unrest at home, built a powerful blue-water Navy, and engaged in a fit of belligerence and imperial expansion during the 1890s. After a fast-rising imperial Russia fell into a deep slump at the turn of the 20th century, the tsarist government cracked down hard while also enlarging its military, seeking colonial gains in East Asia and sending around 170,000 soldiers to occupy Manchuria. These moves backfired spectacularly: They antagonized Japan, which beat Russia in the first great-power war of the 20th century.

A century later, Russia became aggressive under similar circumstances. Facing a severe, post-2008 economic slowdown, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded two neighboring countries, sought to create a new Eurasian economic bloc, staked Moscow’s claim to a resource-rich Arctic, and steered Russia deeper into dictatorship. Even democratic France engaged in anxious aggrandizement after the end of its postwar economic expansion in the 1970s. It tried to rebuild its old sphere of influence in Africa, deploying 14,000 troops to its former colonies and undertaking a dozen military interventions over the next two decades.

All of these cases were complicated, yet the pattern is clear. If a rapid rise gives countries the means to act boldly, the fear of decline serves up a powerful motive for rasher, more urgent expansion. The same thing often happens when fast-rising powers cause their own containment by a hostile coalition. In fact, some of history’s most gruesome wars have come when revisionist powers concluded their path to glory was about to be blocked.

America **lashes out**. Cross out defense that doesn’t assume **polarization**.

Matthew Baum 19, Marvin Kalb Professor of Global Communications at Harvard University, and Philip Potter, Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, April 2019, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy in the Age of Social Media,” *The Journal of Politics*, 82(2), <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/702233>, Stras

An erosion of the public’s capacity to impose democratic constraint has a similar impact on the audience cost arguments and, more broadly, on our understandings of democratic credibility and conflict reciprocation. International relations scholars generally agree that leaders usually feel some pressure to actually carry out the threats and promises that they make in the international system. This might be because they care about their reputation with other leaders, but the usual argument is that democracies are more likely than autocracies to follow through on threats because they have domestic audiences who will hold them to account if they fail to do so (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001). Polarization undermines that linkage, thereby potentially undermining the democratic advantage in foreign crisis negotiations and, ultimately, making war more likely. The tribal element of polarized politics means that followers are unlikely to hold their leader to account. Opposition, in turn, is unlikely to give the president any credit regardless of the policy. Thus, while traditional versions of audience cost theory assumed that in democracies domestic audiences would judge a vacillating leader harshly, such accountability is less likely to emerge in a polarized environment.3 In this respect, polarization thus causes democratic leaders to more closely resemble their autocratic counterparts.

As we have noted, even in the information environment that preceded cable, satellite, and the Internet, the public had a low baseline of attentiveness. But voters were able to use heuristics to help them determine both when to engage with foreign policy issues and what to think about them when they did (Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991). This was accomplished primarily through reliance on partisan elites (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990). However, opposition and disaffected copartisans have no meaningful access to the public in a polarized and fragmented media ecosystem. Elite whistle-blowing will only inhibit leaders when there is a credible threat that the public will hear the whistle being blown, but the audience cost mechanism relies on precisely this hand-tying process. If it breaks down there is no reason for democratically elected leaders to fear punishment for backing down on their threats and commitments and therefore no boost to their credibility when they make commitments.

The polarized and fragmental information environment also has corrosive effects on the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon, at least with regard to how it has been widely understood to date. Since approval rallies for presidents following uses of force abroad were traditionally located primarily among opposition partisans, partisan tribalism seems likely to result in smaller and less frequent rallies. For instance, when President Obama drew a “red line” with Syria over President Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, he faced widespread criticism from Republicans in Congress and low marks from the public over his handling of the crisis. At the same time, public support for intervening in Syria remained low, arguably complicating Obama’s efforts to credibly communicate America’s resolve to Assad.

That said, while we may observe smaller and less frequent spikes in presidential approval ratings as a consequence of heightened polarization, a different sort of rally effect may become more common. That is, the intensity of support for and opposition to the president might spike among his supporters or opponents in the immediate aftermath of a crisis event. A case in point is President Trump’s recent sounding of the alarm over a Central American migrant caravan during the run-up to the 2018 midterm election. Notwithstanding the assertions of many pundits, there is little evidence that President Trump succeeded in increasing overall support for Republicans by characterizing the migrant caravan as an invasion. Trump first tweeted about the caravan on October 18, 2018. According to data on fivethirtyeight.com, Democrats led Republicans by 8.4 percentage points in the generic ballot during October 1–18. The Democratic lead from October 19 through election day was 8.3 points, or basically unchanged. Indeed, one postelection analysis (Winston Group 2018) concluded that late-deciding voters broke toward the Democrats by 12 points and cited the emphasis on the migrant caravan, which crowded out good news on the economy, as a key causal factor. However, among Republicans, concern over illegal immigration measurably increased with Trump’s caravan-related tweets. It is entirely possible, albeit uncertain, that Republican turnout in some states consequently rose, thereby improving the performance of Republican candidates in close elections, such as the Senate race in Florida and the gubernatorial race in Georgia. Since Democrats were already at historic levels of intensity leading up to the election, such a spike could have produced a net benefit for Republican candidates. The implication is that prior concerns about “diversionary” conflict were overblown because the types of conflicts that a leader might initiate for such a purpose were precisely those most likely to collapse the elasticity of reality (making the risk greater than the potential reward). However, in a highly polarized environment where the electoral battle is more about mobilizing supporters than convincing the undecided there may be much more incentive for leaders to engage in this potentially destructive behavior.

Causes leadership turnover.

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Abstract

We argue that the growth rate, but not the level of aggregate income, affects the support for extreme political parties. In our model, extreme parties offer short-run benefits to part of the population at the expense of a minority. Growth effects on the support for such parties arise when uncertainty exists over whether the same subset of individuals will receive the same benefits in the future. More people are willing to take political risks if economic growth is slow. Based on a panel of 16 European countries, our empirical analysis shows that slower growth rates are associated with a significant increase in right-wing extremism. We find no significant effect of economic growth on the support for extreme left-wing parties.

1 Introduction

Distributional consequences are associated with political extremism, both in the short run and in the long run. Extreme political parties often propose to redistribute resources away from specific subgroups of society, such as the rich, ethnic minorities, or citizens living in specific regions. This paper analyzes the impact of economic growth on the support for extreme political parties in western democracies. We argue that the growth rate, but not the level of aggregate income, affects the support for extremism.

In the first part of our paper, we discuss three alternative explanations for why an increase in the economic growth rate reduces the support for extreme political parties. Two well-known explanations are related to retrospective voting and behavioral effects, the latter meaning that voters may react more strongly to changes in than to levels of economic well-being. The third, novel explanation is that parties with extreme political platforms are perceived to create considerable uncertainty about the future distribution of income.

We develop a simple game-theoretic model that analyzes that uncertainty effect. In our model, extreme political parties offer short-run gains from redistribution to a group of individuals. However, the same individuals also face long-run losses owing to the higher income risk that is associated with an extreme regime.1 The model permits a comparative static analysis with respect to several key variables of interest. The growth rate is associated with larger future income risk. Such risk reduces the number of voters favoring extreme parties. The level of aggregate income has no effect on the support for extremism. Income inequality raises support for redistribution and affects the impact that a change in the growth rate has on the support for extremism.

An important feature of our model is that the effect of economic growth on the support for extremism depends on uncertainty of future income redistribution. If redistributive policies are perceived as predictable—in the sense that the same group will have income taken away from it in the future—then the political support for an extremist party is unaffected by growth.

In the empirical part of our paper, we estimate the relationship between economic growth and the support for extreme political parties using a panel dataset comprising 16 European countries. Our dependent variable is a survey-based measure, compiled by Euro-barometer, of respondents' support for extreme right-wing parties and extreme left-wing parties. We use that data, which spans more than three decades and contains entries on a semi-annual frequency, to estimate the effects of economic growth on the support for extremism. Our empirical analysis shows a significant negative effect of real per capita GDP growth on the support for extreme right-wing parties: controlling for country and time fixed effects, a one percentage point decline in real per capita GDP growth increases the vote share of extreme right-wing parties by up to one percentage point. We document that the negative effect of economic growth on the support for right-wing extremism is robust across estimation techniques and model specifications. We do not find a systematic effect of growth on the support for left-wing extremism.

A possible explanation for the differential effects between left-wing and right-wing extremism that relates closely to our theoretical model is that right-wing extremism might be associated with more uncertainty over what groups will be subject to income expropriation in the future. Left-wing extremism is associated with income redistribution, but little uncertainty exists over its target. Communist doctrine (see, for example, the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels 1848), envisions a classless society; i.e., a society wherein incomes are distributed equally. Over the past century, extreme left-wing parties have followed closely that doctrine by proposing to redistribute incomes from rich to poor; as opposition parties they have voted against laissez faire policies and, when in power, they have implemented programs that reduced the wealth and income prospects of the rich (see, e.g., Brown 2010).

Right-wing extremism, in contrast to left-wing extremism, does not advocate a classless society. Instead, it often is associated with discrimination against specific groups of society for racial, religios, political or other reasons.2 An extreme case of a murderous and discriminatory regime was the German fascist rule during the first half of the 20th century. One can see it as a direct consequence of the Nazi party's "Fuhrerprinzip"—"the principle of unconditional authority of the leader" (Bernholz 2017, p.9)—which created considerable uncertainty over who might be stigmatized, imprisoned or killed in the future.3 Indeed, from the Nazi period we know that various groups were stigmatized for different reasons4 and that stigmatization also was particularly erratic.5,6

The empirical analysis of our paper is related to Stevenson (2001), who examines the determinants of aggregate policy preferences in a panel of 14 European countries. One of Stevenson's main findings is that declines in economic growth cause policy preferences to shift to the right, while increases in economic growth cause policy preferences to shift to the left.7 Our paper differs from Stevenson in at least three important aspects. First, in contrast to Stevenson, we show that our empirical results are robust to controlling for country fixed effects, meaning that our results also hold at the within-country level, and not just in cross-section. Relatedly, Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) showed that the cross-country relation between income and democracy turns insignificant when country fixed effects are entered into the econometric model. Second, we provide evidence that our empirical findings reflect a causal effect of economic growth on political extremism. We show that our main findings are robust to estimating dynamic models that enable to test for Granger causality; and we also show that the main findings hold with an instrumental variables approach. Third, we distinguish in our empirical analysis between extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing parties. That distinction matters: a robust negative effect of economic growth is found on the support for extreme right-wing parties, whereas no systematic effect exists for the support of extreme left-wing parties. Our finding of a significant negative effect of economic growth on the support for right-wing extremism is in line with the finding of Bromhead et al. (2012), who show that the vote share of right-wing extremists during the Great Depression was significantly larger in those countries that experienced a more severe economic crisis. Using subnational data for 218 European regions during 1990-2016, Rao et al. (2018) find a significant negative effect of regional output on the vote share of extreme right-wing parties, but no signicant effect on extreme left-wing parties.

#### Causes nuclear war.

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Is the likelihood that a democracy will take military action against other countries largely influenced by which party controls the presidency? Many believe so (Palmer, London, and Regan 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009; Clare 2010). In modern American politics, one party is consistently identified as more hawkish than the other. Surveys have revealed that Republican voters consistently prefer more aggressive policies (Eundak 2006; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Gries 2014). Moreover, many believe that Al Gore, had he been elected, would not have invaded Iraq like President George W. Bush did (Jervis 2003; Lieberfeld 2005), and that the foreign policies of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump would be similarly opposed (Paletta 2016).

Nevertheless, it is very difficult to determine whether the party in control of the presidency really has an important impact on foreign policy due to the selection of parties into particular domestic and international contexts. Put simply, which party controls the presidency is not random. For example, the victory of George W. Bush in 2004 can be attributed to a number of domestic and international factors at the time, including the American public's heightened concerns over national security following September 11. Similarly, Barack Obama's success in 2008 was influenced by problems at home and a decrease in public willingness to engage in military adventurism. Therefore, an observational analysis would likely be biased by such selection processes. Thus, even if countries behave differently when certain parties control the presidency, it would be very difficult to know if that difference is explained by the parties or by the environments into which the parties are selected.

In principle, we could overcome this problem by running an experiment in which we randomly assigned countries to be ruled by leaders from different parties. Such an ideal research design would avoid the confounding problem, making it possible to test whether countries tend to be more or less aggressive when certain parties control the presidency. Experiments are unmatched in their ability to identify causal effects, so this type of study could greatly improve our understanding of how electing candidates from different parties influences foreign policy.

We approximate this ideal experiment by using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Specifically, we look at close presidential elections where a candidate from one party barely defeated a candidate from a different party. Such a design works if it is close to random which party won in these cases, a premise which is plausible given the inherent randomness in large national elections. Thus, we use close elections to get data that are similar to what would result from a real experiment. Such natural experimental designs are extremely rare in the study of war and thus warrant attention in the exceptional instances when they do occur.

We run two main analyses. First, we look at whether countries tend to be more (or less) aggressive when presidential candidates from right-wing parties barely defeat candidates from left-wing parties. This quasi-experimental comparison involves a small sample size (n = 29), but we still find noteworthy evidence that electing right-wing candidates increases the likelihood that countries will initiate high-level military disputes against other states. Second, to increase our statistical power, we examine cases where candidates from incumbent parties barely won or barely lost to candidates from challenger parties (n = 36). Specifically, we test whether countries experienced a larger change in their propensity to engage in military disputes when the candidate from the challenger party barely won. Thus, our key outcome of interest here is how much countries deviated from their prior levels of dispute involvement. We find statistically significant evidence that electing candidates from challenger parties causes countries to experience a larger change in their propensity to engage in military conflict with other states.

Upon further examination of the data, we find that the results from our second test are largely explained by a tendency for candidates from challenger parties to initiate military disputes in their first year in office. Thus, these findings support the theory that major leadership transitions tend to increase the chances of state aggression, either because new leaders lack the experience to manage international crises effectively or because they need to prove their resolve by acting tough.

This article makes several important contributions to the study of international relations. First, there is a long-standing debate in political science over whether leaders have an important independent impact on interstate conflict or whether their influence is largely constrained by strategic realities (Byman and Pollack 2001; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003; Jones and Olken 2009; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Saunders 2011; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015; Croco 2015). This study provides quasi-experimental evidence that leaders do have a meaningful impact on foreign policy. Second, the results presented here suggest that domestic political ideology can spill over into the international realm. One of the main explanations for the democratic peace is that democracies act in accordance with their domestic norms when it comes to foreign policy (Morgan and Campbell 1991). The findings presented here support that hypothesis by showing that left-wing leaders do tend to behave more dovishly in international affairs. Third, these results suggest that we should be alert to the potential for interstate conflict when right-wing leaders are in office, as well as after elections where party control of the presidency changes hands.

This study is also notable because it is one of the first in the international relations literature to use a preanalysis plan. Prior to looking at any of the results, we pre-registered the main tests that we planned to conduct in this article. Our motivation here was to tie our hands, so that there could be no question of sifting through the data to find the statistical tests that produced the most interesting or significant results. The temptation for scholars to run many tests and then report the ones that are most "interesting" can lead to misleading findings. This danger has attracted a great deal of attention across scientific fields over the last decade, and it is seen by many as a major problem for quantitative research (Nosek et al. 2015). The purpose of preanalysis plans is to help ensure that research remains credible.

The article proceeds as follows. We first discuss the theoretical bases for the claim that party control of the presidency influences conflict decisions and review the existing empirical work on this subject. We then outline the research design in more detail. Next, we conduct design checks to verify that the research design is appropriate. We then present the results for party ideology. After that, we test whether party turnover leads to changes in the likelihood of state aggression. We then discuss the findings and conclude.

Leaders, Parties, and International Conflict

In recent years, much debate has arisen over whether leaders influence the chances of interstate conflict, and if so, how. A major question in this research program is whether leaders from certain parties are more likely to behave aggressively in foreign affairs or whether the ideology of the leader is largely unrelated to state behavior.

The theory that party control of the presidency influences the chances of interstate conflict can be derived from three premises. The first is that conservatives and liberals hold different views about the legitimacy or efficacy of military force. This assumption is backed by cross-national survey data showing that liberals tend to be more concerned with fairness, duties of care, and preventing harm, while conservatives tend to favor the preservation of social orders, the purity of sanctified objects, and loyalty to in-groups (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Boer and Fischer 2013). Several studies have also found that these differences in moral foundations influence foreign policy attitudes (Schwartz 1992; Kertzer et al. 2014; Kertzer and Rathbun 2015). In particular, liberals are more "prosocial" and seek compromise internationally, in contrast to conservatives, who are more "proself” and therefore bargain more aggressively (Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010).

The second assumption is that general differences in party attitudes appear at the elite level. There are two ways that these differences could affect the behavior of political elites. First, the political leaders could sincerely hold beliefs and preferences similar to those of their constituents, leading them to have different foreign policy strategies and goals. Alternatively, the leaders could have different beliefs and attitudes than their constituents, but nonetheless recognize that they must carry out their supporters' agenda if they hope to stay in office.

Although it is difficult to know the extent to which leaders true foreign policy preferences reflect those of their constituents, several observational studies show that changes in a leader's base correlate with changes in their approach to international affairs. First, Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll (2015) find that changes in the supporting coalitions of leaders predict foreign policy change, measured by the policy positions taken by nations in the United Nations General Assembly. Rathbun (2004) and Haas (2005) come to a similar conclusion looking at support for peace-enforcement missions, and Solingen (2009) finds that economic interests and the ideologies of partisan coalitions influence nuclear weapons policy. Therefore, even when a leader has different foreign policy beliefs and goals than the rest of the party, there may still be pressure to toe the party line.

The third assumption is that leaders from different parties can act on their divergent preferences. This means that international and domestic constraints on leaders cannot be so powerful that they largely limit leaders to a single course of action. For example, some realists argue that there is little room for leaders to have an independent impact on foreign policy because they all need to defend and advance the national interest (Mearsheimer 2001; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003). Regarding domestic constraints, Trager and Vavreck (2011) find that right-wing and left-wing leaders can have incentives to hide their "types." Liberal leaders may be forced to adopt more hawkish foreign policies because they fear that their moderation will sometimes be interpreted as weakness (Schultz 2005), whereas conservative leaders may have incentives to adopt more moderate policies because the public would likely judge them unduly aggressive if they acted hawkishly. Thus, leader preferences and political incentives could actually push in opposite directions.

Several previous studies have examined whether right-wing leaders tend to behave more aggressively in foreign policy than left-wing leaders. Using logistic regression on panel data covering eighteen parliamentary democracies from 1949 to 1992, Palmer, London and Regan (2004) find that right-wing governments are more likely to be involved in military disputes, while left-wing governments are more likely to see the disputes in which they are involved in escalate. Their explanation is that right-wing parties favor using force more often, so their leaders will engage in military conflict more often. However, when left-wing leaders engage in conflict, they will need to emerge victorious to justify their involvement, so they will be more likely to bargain tough and escalate if necessary. These researchers find that a shift from left to right government increases the chances of dispute initiation by about 50 percent and that left-wing governments are about twice as likely to escalate conditional on being in a dispute. Second, Arena and Palmer (2009) apply a probit model to panel data covering twenty stable democracies from 1960 to 1996 and find that right-wing governments are more likely to initiate disputes. Their theory is based on the finding that right-wing leaders are less likely to be removed from office for using force unwisely than left-wing leaders. This makes right-wing leaders more likely to start international conflicts in the hopes of increasing their domestic support. Third, Clare (2010) applies logistic regression to twenty parliamentary democracies from 1950 to 1998 and finds that parliamentary democracies are about twice as likely to initiate disputes when they are controlled by right-wing parties.

The central limitation of these studies is that their conclusions rest on the results of regression analysis on cross-national panel data. Such an approach is not guaranteed to eliminate bias from omitted variables. In fact, the results from this type of analysis can be badly biased, even when researchers control for a wide range of important covariates (Clarke 2005). In some cases, controlling for potential con-founders can even amplify bias (Pearl 2013). Thus, the results from these past studies should be interpreted as a tentative first cut at answering this question rather than the final word on the subject.

The design-based approach that we employ in this article gets around the omitted variable bias problem because the as-if random assignment of leaders to office should create balance across observable and unobservable pretreatment characteristics. In many other scientific fields, the results of conventional observational analyses have been overturned by design-based studies. For example, the validity of hormone replacement therapy and a variety of theories in development economics, psychology, and elsewhere have been overturned when experimental and quasi-experimental approaches were brought to bear (Women's Health Initiative 2002; Freedman 2009; Dunning 2012). Therefore, the tests that we present in this article provide an important step forward in our understanding of the empirical relationship between party control of the presidency and interstate conflict.

Before moving on to our research design, though, we should first lay out the hypotheses that we want to test. As we detail in our preanalysis plan, we started this project with the belief that leaders do matter and that electing leaders from different parties does affect the likelihood of state aggression. Given this prior, we formulated two main hypotheses. The first is the party ideology hypothesis, which predicts that electing leaders from right-wing parties will increase the likelihood of state aggression. The second hypothesis is highly general and speaks directly to the question of whether leaders matter in international relations. It posits that electing a leader from the incumbent party will lead to less change in international dispute behavior than electing a leader from a challenger party. We refer to this as the incumbent/challenger hypothesis.

Party Ideology Hypothesis: Electing presidential candidates from right-wing parties will make countries more aggressive than electing candidates from left-wing parties.

Incumbent/Challenger Hypothesis: Electing candidates from challenger parties will lead to a greater change in state aggression than electing candidates from incumbent parties (the absolute difference in aggression between presidential terms will be greater when there is party turnover).

One issue that is related to the incumbent/challenger hypothesis is that new leaders may be particularly likely to act aggressively early in their terms. There are several reasons why this might be the case. First, new leaders may lack the experience to manage international crises effectively, making it more likely that disagreements with other states will turn into military conflicts (Potter 2007). Second, new leaders may be more likely to want to show the international community that they are willing to use force abroad, which could strengthen their bargaining leverage in future international negotiations (Wolford 2007; Dafoe 2012). Third, new leaders may want to send a signal to their domestic audiences that they are tough when it comes to foreign affairs, which could increase their popularity at home. This idea that leaders are more likely to get involved in military disputes when they first arrive in office has received support from cross-national logistic regression analysis on panel data (Gelpi and Grieco 2001) and a mixed-methods analysis that looks at American presidents (Potter 2007).

While most of the existing theory and research on leadership transitions has focused on cases where new leaders come to office, a similar logic might be applied to party control of the presidency, particularly when it comes to the reputational mechanisms. New leaders who are from the same party as the old one should be able to associate themselves with the previous leader's reputation, giving them less of a need to signal their resolve. On the other hand, when leaders from challenger parties come to power, there should be less certainty that the new leader will have an approach to foreign policy that is similar to the old one's. In short, when party control of the presidency changes hands, it marks a more significant leadership transition (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura 2016). Thus, even if parties tend to behave pretty similarly across ideologies, we might still find that leaders from challenger parties might be much more aggressive early in their tenures.

Challenger Aggression Hypothesis: Electing candidates from challenger parties will lead to an increase in state aggression when the new leader takes office.

We did not preregister the challenger aggression hypothesis prior to looking at the results, but this was the only hypothesis we tested outside of those we preregis-tered. Thus, the findings do not reflect data mining. Nevertheless, some readers may wish to interpret the test of this particular hypothesis as exploratory.

Research Design

There are several different design-based approaches that could be used to investigate how leaders affect state behavior. One would be to look at all cases of leadership turnover and compare how countries behaved before and after the leadership change. This research design rests on the idea that countries are comparable before and after leadership transitions. This assumption may be plausible in some cases, but in others, it is clearly invalid. For example, the periods before and after normal electoral leader transitions are usually not comparable. Many countries elect the leader and members of the legislature at the same time, making it difficult to determine the effect of leadership change by itself. Similarly, looking at cases when leaders were forcibly removed from office also has its limitations, since leaders are usually removed at times of extreme political tension. Likewise, leadership changes that are caused by assassinations are not likely to provide valid comparisons. The new leader will probably have to deal with a more complicated political situation in the aftermath of the assassination, making the beginning of their term much different from the end of the previous leader's term.

Another potentially promising approach would be to focus on changes in leadership that resulted from the natural deaths of leaders. The timing of natural leader deaths should be fairly unrelated to the domestic and international environments. Moreover, the legislature will typically not change following the natural death of a leader, making it much easier to isolate the independent effect of leaders on foreign policy. However, the natural death approach is not well-suited for this particular study. The reason is that the new leader almost always comes from the same party as the old leader. Thus, this exogenous change in leadership does not provide much leverage in determining how party control of the presidency affects interstate conflict. This research design could be useful in looking at other types of variation in leaders, such as age, military experience, and occupational background. However, it is not a promising design for this study.

The approach that we take instead is to use an RD design. RD involves comparing units that barely surpassed and barely fell short of an important cut point that influenced treatment assignment. For example, if there was a test where everyone who scored a fifty or higher got a scholarship, researchers could assess the effects of getting the scholarship by comparing the students who scored fifty and fifty-one to the students who scored forty-eight and forty-nine. So long as there is no sorting at the cut point, as could happen if the graders had opportunity and motive to nudge some test takers above the cut point, it should be close to random which of these students won the scholarship, since they were all on the verge of getting it (Lee 2008).

Close elections provide an excellent opportunity to use RD analysis. Given the inherent randomness in the electoral process, whether candidates barely win or barely lose in close elections is plausibly as-if random (Eggers et al. 2015).1 Political scientists have used RD to study questions like how winning an election influences a party's likelihood of winning the next election (Lee 2008) and how winning an election affects a candidate's wealth later in life (Eggers and Hainmueller 2009). Scholars have also used RD to test how economic and political outcomes differ when Republican candidates for mayor barely defeat or barely lose to Democratic candidates (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008; Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Beland 2015; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016).

In this article, we look at close presidential elections. To our knowledge, this study is the first to apply RD specifically to presidential elections. For our analysis, we followed the procedures that were outlined in our preanalysis plan (which is available at the end of the Online Appendix). We will briefly summarize these procedures in the remainder of this section.

Our Statistical Approach

There are two general ways to analyze an RD. The first, known as the continuity approach, involves plotting two smoothing functions on either side of the cut point and estimating the difference at the cut point (Voeten 2014). This method should be used when the score, or "forcing variable," is continuous. The second method is the local-randomization approach, appropriate when the forcing variable is discrete (Lee and Card 2008; Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik 2015; Bertoli 2017). It involves drawing a window around the cut point and treating the units within that window like they were in a randomized experiment.

Since the forcing variable in this study is vote share in a presidential election, which is essentially continuous, we would normally use the continuity approach. However, we discovered in our preanalysis plan that the continuity approach had a type 1 error rate (false-positive rate) of 12 percent for this study, which we believe is due to our small sample size. Since the type 1 error rate should be 5 percent by design, we chose not to use this method, since it was overly likely to give us significant results. Instead, we used the local-randomization approach, which we found had a type 1 error rate of about 4 percent.

Defining Close Elections

We considered elections to be close if the top two candidates were within 2 percent of the cut point (48 percent to 52 percent range). Data on close races were available in the data set constructed by Bertoli, Dafoe, and Trager (2018). This data set includes every democratic election between 1815 and 2010, where democracies are defined as countries with Polity IV Institutionalized Democracy scores above five. The data set provides information on the top two candidates including their names, parties, and vote shares in the election. If there were more than two candidates running in an election, we focused only on the votes for the top two candidates, rescaling their vote shares accordingly. In cases where there were runoffs, we used their vote shares from the runoff rather than the initial election. We also excluded close elections in nondemocracies because we were concerned about fraud in these cases. Given the possibility of fraud, we did not feel confident in assuming that the outcomes of these elections were as-if random.

One complication that arose is that the United States elects presidents through the electoral college. This system makes it possible for candidates to lose the popular vote but still win the election if they defeat their rival in the electoral college. To deal with this issue, we counted the electoral college vote rather than the popular vote when looking at the United States. This decision is consistent with other similar studies (Bertoli, Dafoe, and Trager 2018). For every other country, we used the popular vote.

Measuring Party Ideology

To identify parties as left or right-wing, we evaluated the parties against each other according to their positions at the time of the election on social questions associated with liberalism and conservatism. Parties were judged further to the right when they expressed support for "traditional values," national, religious, racial, or ethnic in-groups, or the benefits of authority and traditional sources of authority such as a monarchy. Parties were judged further to the left when they expressed inclusive sentiments, a duty of care for vulnerable groups, and support for democratic principles. Secondarily, we evaluated parties as left or right on economic policy preferences. Advocacy for wealthier interests placed a candidate further to the right, and advocacy for the less well-off is associated with the left. These two social and economic dimensions are highly correlated, with the principal exceptions coming from communist and postcommunist countries. In these cases, the primary social dimension determined the left-right coding. When parties could not be easily classified as left or right according to these metrics, we excluded the election from the ideology test.

Main Analyses

We looked at two different types of close elections. The first were close elections between right-wing and left-wing parties, where it was essentially random whether the presidency was controlled by a leader with a right-wing or left-wing ideology. In total, we have twenty-nine close elections between right-wing and left-wing parties. The second set of close elections that we analyzed was narrow races between an incumbent and challenger party. In these cases, it was as-if random whether the country experienced party continuity or change in the executive branch. We have thirty-six of these close elections in our data set. For this group of cases, we were particularly interested in testing whether a change in party control of the presidency increased the likelihood of a change in state aggression.

Although our sample sizes are not large, the power tests that we ran at the beginning of this project indicated that we had a good chance of picking up a medium-sized or large effect. For the test of left- versus right-wing parties, we determined we would correctly detect (at a = .05) a medium-sized effect (0.5 standard deviation [SD]) 30 percent of the time, a large effect (0.8 SD) 54 percent of the time, and a very large effect (1.2 SD) 82 percent of the time. In the incumbency power analysis, we found that we would detect a medium-sized effect 55 percent of the time, a large effect 93 percent of the time, and a very large effect over 99 percent of the time. Also, if the effects were small or nonexistent, the power tests indicated that we would be able to establish confidence intervals that were precise enough to rule out very large (+1.2 SD) positive and negative effects.2

Moreover, although the results turn out to be significant at conventional levels, we encourage readers to avoid interpreting p values as either significant (p < .05) or not while reading this article and to bear the bias-variance trade-off in research design in mind. Almost all quantitative research in international relations lacks any claim to strong causal identification, being based on observational data and linear adjustment of largely ad hoc covariate sets. By contrast, the design presented here has a strong claim to causal identification and unbiasedness, providing a crucial complement to the vast majority of the literature which does not. Thus, since p values provide a continuous measure of how inconsistent the evidence is with the null hypothesis, a higher p value in an unbiased design may actually reflect more evidence against the null than a lower p value in a biased one. Small p values (e.g., p < .2), even if not significant at conventional standards, also provide important evidence in these contexts.

In addition to our two main tests, we examined whether candidates from challenger parties are more likely to initiate military disputes at the beginning of their terms than candidates from incumbent parties, which would be consistent with the theory that major leadership transitions make state aggression more likely. Our motivation for running this test came from reading Wolford (2007), Dafoe (2012), and Wu and Wolford (2016). These articles advance a compelling theory and intriguing empirical evidence that new leaders have reputational incentives to act tough when they first come to office. We find strong evidence consistent with this hypothesis.

Outcomes

We measured aggression using the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) that a country initiates. These disputes are cases where countries explicitly threatened, displayed, or used force against other states (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). Specifically, we look at the number of these disputes that a state initiated starting from when the leader took office and ending at the date that the winner of the next election was scheduled to start. In cases where leaders were replaced part of the way through their term, we used the day that they left office instead. Since the length of time that candidates held office varied, we divided the total number of disputes by the duration of the time period. Thus, the unit of measurement is military disputes initiated per year in office.

We use slightly different versions of the outcome variables for our different tests. For the ideology test, we use military disputes initiated per year, as described in the previous paragraph. For the main incumbency test, we use the absolute change in military disputes initiated per year from the previous term. We use this variable because we are interested in evaluating whether there was a larger absolute change in military aggression when the challenger party barely won. Thus, the measure is:

Absolute change in military aggression =|MIDs/year during winner's term

—MIDs/year during previous term|

In other words, we are testing whether challenger parties gaining control of the presidency makes countries with high levels of prior aggression more likely to experience a decrease in dispute initiation and countries with low levels of prior aggression more likely to experience an increase in dispute initiation. We conduct a one-sided test for this analysis, since we expect that the absolute change will be larger for countries where the challenger party barely wins. Lastly, for the exploratory test about whether challenger candidates tend to be more aggressive when they first take office, we look at the number of disputes that each country initiated in the first year of the new presidential term.

Across these tests, our main outcomes are (1) military disputes initiated and (2) high-level military disputes initiated. High-level disputes are cases where countries used force against other states or entered into international wars.3 Following the preanalysis plan, we examine high-level disputes, which constitute actual uses of force, separately because the factors that drive posturing may be different from those that drive actual violence. As secondary outcomes, we look at (3) all disputes that countries engaged in and (4) all high-level disputes that countries engaged in. These cases include disputes that countries did not start but participated in nonetheless.

Estimation

We employ two estimation strategies. Our primary statistical analysis involves t tests. This is a simple approach, recommended for its parsimony and robustness, which is appropriate given the assumption that close elections were as-if random (Dunning 2012). As a secondary test, we plot the outcome as a function of the electoral result and estimate how the expected value of the outcome changes at the cut point using local linear regression, as is often done for RD designs. An advantage with using this approach is that it makes it possible to visualize how outcomes change at the cut point.

Design Checks

Our research design rests on one main assumption, necessary for internally valid estimates: the outcomes of the close elections considered in this study are as-if random. For example, the design would be invalid if any candidates could precisely manipulate their vote shares around the cut point, such as by counting the votes and adding just enough to win. This assumption should be valid for democracies provided that elections are fair (Eggers et al. 2015).

A second "representativeness" assumption facilitates generalizing from our results, and this is that the democracy years experiencing close elections are not dissimilar to democracy years in which elections are not close. If this assumption is reasonable, then we can generalize from our results to all democracy years. However, if the countries that had close elections are not representative of other democracies, then the causal estimates that we find may not reflect broader patterns in international relations.

We can test the as-if randomness assumption in two ways. First, we can check that the samples are balanced on important pretreatment characteristics. Figure 1 plots the balance using two-sided t tests. The graph on the left shows that countries where right-wing parties barely won were very similar to countries where left-wing parties barely won, and the graph on the right shows that countries where incumbent parties barely won were similar to countries where challenger parties barely won. In Figure 1, we look at twenty-four covariates, and not a single one is significantly imbalanced. Thus, the data are consistent with the assumption that who won these close elections was as-if random.

[Figure One Omitted]

[Figure Two Omitted]

Second, we can test whether there is balance in the number of cases on either side of the cut point. Figure 2 shows how close right-wing and incumbent parties were to winning the presidency. For the twenty-nine close elections between right-wing and left-wing parties, there were sixteen cases where the right-wing party won and thirteen cases where the left-wing party won (p = .71). Similarly, for the thirty-six close elections between incumbent and challenger parties, there were seventeen cases where the incumbent party won and nineteen cases where the challenger party won (p = .87). Thus, there is no evidence of sorting in either sample.

[Figure Three Omitted]

We can also evaluate the external validity assumption by comparing the two samples to the broader population of all democracies since 1815. Figure 3 uses box-plots to compare our samples to the broader population with respect to covariates related to military power. The comparisons show that our samples are very similar to the broader population of democracies from 1815 to 2010. Thus, at least with respect to these covariates, there is little reason to believe that either of our samples consist of an idiosyncratic group of countries that would behave differently than most other democracies. Rather, the representativeness of our samples indicates that our results should be indicative of broader trends in international relations.

In sum, the outcomes of the close elections appear to be random, and the countries where the close elections happened are fairly representative of all other democracies. Therefore, the design appears to have worked very well. In the next two sections, we will look at how electing presidential candidates from different parties affects state aggression using this new empirical approach.

Results for Party Ideology

Our results indicate that right-wing parties tend to be more aggressive than left-wing parties. Table 1 shows the aggression levels of the countries that had close elections between right-wing and left-wing candidates. On average, the countries where right-wing parties barely won started .06 more disputes per year than countries where left-wing parties barely won. Similarly, they engaged in .10 more high-level disputes per year than countries where left-wing parties barely won. Given that the average duration of a presidential term for these countries is 4 years and 169 days, this adds up to .32 more disputes initiated and .43 more high-level disputes initiated over an average presidential term.

Figure 4 plots the estimates for the two main outcome variables along with the two other indicators of aggression. The confidence intervals are based on two-tailed t tests. They suggest that electing right-wing parties does increase state aggression, particularly when it comes to high-level disputes. Of course, all of these confidence intervals cover zero, so we cannot rule out zero effect with 95 percent confidence based on this analysis alone. The estimate most different from zero is of high-level disputes initiated (p = .25). For disputes initiated, the results appear to be more consistent with no effect (p = .64), as do the results for the supplemental tests of all disputes and all high-level disputes.

[Table One Omitted]

[Figure Four Omitted]

However, if we look at the specific disputes in more detail, the evidence that electing right-wing leaders increases state aggression grows stronger. While all the high-level disputes that the right-wing leaders engaged in involved unequivocal uses of force, the only high-level dispute that any of the left-wing leaders initiated is questionable and should probably be excluded. This dispute was between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1995, and it did not involve any military action by either country. Costa Rican police crossed the Nicaraguan border in pursuit of suspects and were arrested. Two days later, the Costa Rican police force retaliated by arresting two Nicaraguan police officers who had crossed the border "to get a drink of water." The two sides made a prisoner swap on the following day. If this case is dropped, then electing right-wing parties appears to lead countries to initiate . 12 more high-level disputes per year (p = .162).4

Moreover, the only reason that these results are not significant is because the United States (2001) is an outlier, which inflates the standard errors. We can address this issue by modifying the outcome to a simple indicator variable for whether countries initiated any high-level disputes (no = 0, yes = 1), which makes our test insensitive to outliers. The estimates then suggest that electing right-wing parties increases the chances that countries will initiate high-level military disputes by 25 percent (p = .041). Therefore, even though the initial tests were not statistically significant, they become more conclusive after we address some minor issues with the data.

Given the number of democracies in the world today, there may be enough close elections to get much more precise estimates a decade or two from now or maybe even after the next expansion of the MID data set. This design is definitely worth returning to in the near future. However, for the present, we will turn to a second test in the next section on more data that yields increased statistical power. This test provides further evidence that which party controls the presidency does affect the likelihood of state aggression.

Results for Incumbent versus Challenger Parties

The second test that we run compares cases where challenger parties barely defeated incumbent parties to cases where they barely lost to incumbent parties. In these cases, it was as-if random whether the incumbent or challenger party won. Thus, we can test how much military aggression changes when the party that controls the executive branch changes. The outcomes that we use for this test are the absolute changes in the military indicators between the term when the incumbent or challenger party barely won and the previous term. For this analysis, we use one-sided tests that assume that there will tend to be a larger change in military aggression when the challenger party barely wins.

Table 2 shows the absolute change in aggression levels for the countries that had close elections between candidates from incumbent and challenger parties. When the candidates from challenger parties barely won, the absolute change in disputes initiated per year was .031 greater than when candidates from incumbent parties barely won (p = .30; 26 percent increase from baseline). For high-level disputes, the difference is even more notable. The absolute change in high-level disputes initiated per year was .074 greater than when candidates from incumbent parties barely won (p = .046, 133 percent increase from baseline). The average length of the presidential terms for these data was 4.42 years, so this adds up to a difference of .33 high-level disputes initiated per presidential term. Figure 5 plots the confidence intervals for the aggression indicators.

This estimated effect is substantively large relative to other determinants of conflict that international relations scholars have analyzed. For example, past studies have found that revolutions increase the likelihood that countries will initiate military disputes by about 74 percent (Colgan 2010), arms transfers by about 60 percent (Krause 2004), and neutrality pacts with potential conflict joiners by about 57 percent (Leeds 2003). The effect of challenger parties winning appears to be in the ballpark of these estimates, although it is hard to nail down this effect very precisely because of the relatively small sample size.

Figure 6 illustrates the effect for high-level disputes across a greater range of margins of victory. As countries move from incumbent party victories (the points on the left) to challenger party victories (the points on the right), there is a large shift in the absolute change in high-level disputes initiated. Countries where the challenger party barely won experienced a much larger change than countries where the incumbent party barely won. Although this method of estimating the treatment effect was not the primary method that we discussed in our preanalysis plan, the results for this approach are fairly conclusive.

It undermines **multilateralism**. **Extinction**.

Rachel Ansley 17, editorial assistant at the Atlantic Council, citing Werner Hoyer, president of the European Investment Bank, 4-24-2017, "Making the Case for Multilateralism," Atlantic Council, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/making-the-case-for-multilateralism

While the surge of populism throughout Europe—in response to terrorism and economic stagnation—means that “renationalization is visible,” particularly in France during an election year, Hoyer insisted that when “the cooperative approach and the multilateral approach is being put into question in an irresponsible way… it is important to explain again the values of international cooperation.” In France, Emmanuel Macron of the En Marche! movement and Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front party won the first and second spots, respectively, in the first round of the presidential elections on April 23. They will face each other in a runoff election on May 7. Le Pen has called for a French departure from the European Union (EU), and stricter border controls. Her calls for harsh security measures intensified after a policeman was shot dead in Paris on April 20, an attack claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In contrast, Macron is an outspoken advocate of the EU, and the benefits of international cooperation. With each new administration and change of government in Europe, “we have a certain temptation to cut the branch on which we are sitting,” Hoyer said, referring to multilateralism. However, “we live in a global system,” said Robert Zoellick, former president of the World Bank and a member of the Atlantic Council’s International Advisory Board, adding, “no matter how powerful a country you are, it helps to have friends, too.” Hoyer and Zoellick spoke at an event, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Global Business and Economics program as part of its EuroGrowth Initiative, to discuss the role multilateral institutions can play in promoting international prosperity and security. Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, moderated the discussion. In his introductory remarks, Kempe described the myriad challenges facing the international community—the increasing threat of terror attacks, the rise of populism, economic stagnation, and potentially protectionist trade policies. “All of this demands collaborative, rapid, and global responses,” said Kempe. “That’s where multilateral institutions come in.” Hoyer described how the EIB was founded as an institution to serve all members of the European Union, but also aid development projects around the world. At the EIB, he said, “we believe in multilateralism and cooperating structures because the European Union’s success is built on that.” Kempe said: “multilateralism is the gears, the workings, the ending of so much of what goes on in the world.” However, he said, “while arguably more important than ever, it’s purpose is called into question.” In the midst of discussion surrounding the French elections, labelled by Le Pen as a “referendum on globalization,” and the questions raised by US President Donald Trump regarding the value of international cooperation, the future of multilateral institutions is at a crossroads, according to Kempe. “I think it’s fine for people to debate that,” said Zoellick. However, using the rhetoric of Trump as an example, Zoellick said that he “starts from a very mistaken perspective that it’s a zero-sum game; that if you’re serving the international system, you’re not serving the United States.” Trump has criticized international institutions such as NATO and the EU, as well as multilateral trade deals, questioning the value-added benefits for the United States, and “pitting nationalism against internationalism,” Zoellick said. “The danger here is that it’s a totally mistaken economic line,” he said, warning that “it’ll lead to mistaken approaches because you are trying to solve the wrong problem.” “It also means you’re missing the next-tier issues,” Zoellick added, referring to China as an emerging player on the world stage. “There’s opportunities for China to gain, but if we’re trying to block our markets, that won’t happen,” he said, insisting that both the United States and Europe must focus on cooperative, rather than mutually destructive, approaches to the global system. “The tricky thing with international agreements is that you are easily accused of selling your national sovereignty,” said Hoyer. He insisted that leaders must find a way to convince their people that nations are stronger in groups of countries that have organized their sovereignties together. “By simply walking away from a group of cooperating people, you don’t get stronger, you get more lonely,” he said. “We face monumental challenges, and only together can we surmount them,” Hoyer earlier wrote in a blog post for the New Atlanticist. “Though there’s no denying that currently Europe has many problems, it is still collectively convinced of the need to reach out beyond its borders to other continents, to other peoples.” Hoyer expressed the hope that US President Donald Trump’s visit to Europe will be “an opportunity for our political leaders to be convincing enough about the benefits of multilateralism.” Trump will be in Brussels for the NATO Summit on May 25. Zoellick described the benefits of international institutions, particularly financial institutions such as the World Bank, and the value-added services they can provide in an integrated global system. He said that the World Bank, of which he is a former president, serves as a nucleus of information for global development projects, can leverage funds to have a demonstrable impact on such projects, and can use capital in an innovative fashion. “People tend to think about [multilateralism] in the way that people thought about development institutions when they were founded,” Zoellick said, adding “we’re so far beyond that.” Working through multilateral institutions, “you also shape ideas,” with the aim of creating new dynamics that go beyond the institutions, he said. According to Zoellick, the key to appreciating multilateral institutions is “trying to understand that these banks and institutions can play a policy and catalytic role, rather than just a funding role.” He pointed to the challenges of climate change and cyber security as areas where the EIB and World Bank can play a significant role in mitigating global threats. “This is where the international system has to continue to evolve; we’re not done with these issues,” he said.

### RCA Impact---EMPs---2NC

#### China and Russia will develop EMPs AND use them.

David T. Pyne 21, former U.S. Army combat arms and H.Q. staff officer with an M.A. in National Security Studies from Georgetown, serves as Deputy Director of National Operations for the EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security, 10-1-21,“Russia and China are Already Winning the Nuclear Arms Race,” <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-and-china-are-already-winning-nuclear-arms-race-194527>, jy

U.S. leaders have been seemingly unconcerned about the increasingly bellicose and militarily superior “New Axis” powers aligning against it since the end of the Cold War. This alliance by America’s two most powerful adversaries is not a recent development. The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2001. Russian president Vladimir Putin has since described it as “a reborn Second Warsaw Pact.” Russia and China now lead a military alliance that includes over 68 percent of the landmass of Eurasia, nearly 42 percent of the world’s population, nearly 30 percent of the world’s GDP, and approximately 75 percent of the world’s operational nuclear weapons, with over two-thirds of them deployed by Russia.

Russia developed super-electromagnetic pulse weapons more than two decades ago. These nuclear weapons are designed to greatly enhance their EMP effects. It subsequently shared this deadly technology with its Chinese and North Korean allies. More recently, Russia, China, and North Korea have been assessed as likely having the capability to use EMP and cyberwarfare attacks to shut down America’s electrical power grid and other critical infrastructure, including the internet, financial systems, transportation systems, food, and water distribution systems, communications systems and emergency services in a matter of minutes. Such attacks could possibly disable the Global Positioning System and military early-warning satellites, blinding Americans to subsequent attacks against the United States and its allies. U.S. military leaders have even expressed concern that our nuclear command, control, and communications system might be vulnerable to cyberattack. Such an attack could disrupt the president’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike. Also, it could prevent America’s conventional military forces from being able to communicate with their commanders or coordinate their attacks, making them much easier to defeat. The United States has yet to develop any super-EMP weapons to help deter any such attack.

President Joe Biden was elected, in part, on a platform of protecting the environment from global climate change. However, few people realize that a super-EMP or cyberattack on the U.S. homeland would likely be far more catastrophic for American citizens and the environment. Such an attack could cause all ninety-four nuclear reactors in the United States to meltdown, spreading radioactive contamination and fallout to nearby cities. If such an attack were to occur, then U.S. leaders might not be certain which country attacked us or who to retaliate against. In 2008, the Congressional EMP Commission estimated that such a cataclysmic attack on a national scale could cause up to 90 percent of Americans to die within twelve months due to starvation, disease, and societal breakdown. A comprehensive cyberattack on the U.S. homeland could also kill tens of millions of Americans. Given their destructive potential, U.S. national security professionals should seriously consider reclassifying cyber and EMP weapons as weapons of mass destruction. Despite these warnings, U.S. leaders have done little to protect the American people from EMP and cyberattacks. They have also failed to deploy a national missile defense system to protect against nuclear missile attacks. In the event of a catastrophic Sino-Russian attack against the U.S. homeland, there is a good chance that even America’s allies would decline to come to its defense for fear of sharing its fate.

How did America’s leaders allow the country to become so vulnerable? U.S. leaders began a policy of nuclear disarmament at a pace far exceeding Russia’s following the end of the Cold War, naively believing the existential threat had passed. This exposed the United States to unnecessary and increasingly intolerable risks. By 2016, the U.S. nuclear arsenal had been reduced from 30,000 nuclear weapons to only 1,750 operational warheads. Many of these weapons are deployed on aging delivery systems of increasingly questionable reliability. Today, only 720 of America’s warheads are ready to launch at any given time, of which 50 percent would likely survive a full-scale nuclear first strike. The reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile is also a major concern. Successive administrations have failed to ensure it will function as designed in the event of a crisis.

In August, Koffler wrote in an op-ed for The Hill that,

Moscow is prepared to fight a nuclear war over its perceived sphere of influence, on which Russia has relied for centuries as its strategic security perimeter... The Kremlin envisions fighting a limited nuclear war with Washington, over contested areas such as Ukraine and Crimea, the latter of which Russia illegally annexed in 2014... Moscow also has conducted mock nuclear attacks on the U.S. homeland. The Russians regularly practice nuclear launches in simulation exercises, with Putin “pressing the button.” ... There is no question that Russia is preparing for a nuclear conflict with the United States and NATO. The only question is whether this conflict can be deterred or fought.

Meanwhile, U.S. satellite imagery has revealed that China is in the process of rapidly expanding its strategic nuclear arsenal by up to 4,000 warheads--a number of nuclear warheads up to twenty times greater than recent U.S. Department of Defense estimates of the size of their entire nuclear arsenal. Peter Huessy recently noted in an op-ed published by the National Interest that “U.S. satellites have discovered some 350-400 new Chinese missile silos, each laid out in a grid pattern some three kilometers apart. These new intercontinental ballistic-missile ‘launchers’ are designed to hold the DF-41 missile.”

“The DF-41 is a ten-warhead missile,” Huessy explained. “Added up, the Chinese potential sprint to nuclear superiority may indeed be materializing, a possible four-thousand warhead build that would be 266 percent of the total deployed warheads currently in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. More worrisome, China’s future nuclear force could be 400 percent of today’s U.S. alert nuclear forces. ... Alongside China, America’s two nuclear-armed enemies would have combined strategic nuclear warheads some 600 percent greater than the United States. If compared by the number of nuclear weapons that are on alert on a day-to-day basis, the imbalance reaches on the order of 1,000 percent.”

Huessy estimates that Russia and China could field a combined force of 9,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads within the next few years, 7,200 of which will be on alert and ready to fire at any given time. Based on the time it took the United States to build its own missile silos during the Cold War, China could complete the construction of its four hundred DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos in as little as two years. However, given the rapid pace of their construction, it’s possible they could finish them even sooner. Last month, Adm. Charles Richard, that commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said that America was “witnessing a strategic breakout by China.” “The explosive growth in their nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I described as breathtaking. ... Frankly, that word ‘breathtaking’ may not be enough,” he said. Richard characterized China as a “peer” nuclear competitor and noted that we now face two nuclear “peer” competitors, Russia and China, compared to one during the Cold War. Air Force Gen. John Hyten, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed Richard’s assessment.

“It is going to take us 10 to 15 years to modernize 400 silos that already exist,” Hyten said. “And China is basically building almost that many overnight. So the speed of difference in that threat is what really concerns me most. ... Why are they building that enormous, enormous nuclear capability faster than anybody in the world? ... It’s the almost unprecedented nuclear modernization. ... They could put, you know, ten reentry vehicles on every one of those ICBMs if they wanted to; There’s nothing to limit that ability.”

Despite the increasing Sino-Russian nuclear superiority, the U.S. government currently has no plans to increase the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, let alone restore “rough nuclear parity” with Russia and China along with our ability to credibly deter a nuclear/cyber/EMP attack on the U.S. homeland. As a result of the growing disparity between Sino-Russian unconventional warfare capabilities and those of the United States, the chances of an unconventional nuclear/EMP/cyberattack on the U.S. homeland have, arguably, never been greater.

The result of nuclear superiority could be calamitous. John Mearsheimer writes in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics:

In the unlikely event that one state gained nuclear superiority over all of its rivals, it would be so powerful that it would be the only great power in the system. The balance of conventional forces would be largely irrelevant if a nuclear hegemon were to emerge.

The combined nuclear arsenal of Russia and China is already estimated to constitute nearly twice as many deployed strategic nuclear warheads as the United States. If the Sino-Russian alliance achieved anywhere near the 600 percent greater level that Huessy predicted, then the two countries would be the only remaining nuclear hegemons. The relative size of America’s conventional military would make no difference to deterring their aggression. America’s leaders must act quickly to prevent this from happening.

#### Extinction.

James Woolsey 13, former director of the CIA, 2013, “The Ultimate Cyberthreat: Nuclear EMP Attack,” https://www.proquest.com/docview/1373225743?parentSessionId=ZhfbIoq18MT2TeBsQfi4p8X1sA0dRRkM88vjeQNzbm4%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=14667, jy <3 Eshan, edited language in [brackets]

I am going to talk about a dimension of the cyber threat that is not usually considered a cyber threat in Western doctrine, but is in the playbooks for an Information Warfare Operation of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. These potential adversaries in their military doctrines include as a dimension of cyber warfare a wide spectrum of operations beyond computer viruses, including sabotage and kinetic attacks, up to and including nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.

It is vitally important that we understand that a nuclear EMP attack is part of cyber and information warfare operations as conceived by our potential adversaries. Our cyber doctrine must be designed to deter and defeat the cyber doctrines of our potential adversaries by anticipating how they plan to attack us--but our doctrine currently does not.

Our cyber and information warfare doctrines are dangerously [unaware] ~~blind~~ to the likelihood that a potential adversary making an all-out information warfare campaign designed to [debilitate] ~~cripple~~ U.S. critical infrastructures would include an EMP attack.

The assessment that nuclear EMP attack is included in the cyber and information warfare doctrine of potential adversaries, and the effects of an EMP attack described here, are based on the work of the Congressional EMP Commission that analyzed this threat for nearly a decade (2001-2008). The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and several other major U.S. Government studies independently arrived at similar conclusions, and represent collectively a scientific and strategic consensus that nuclear EMP attack upon the United States is an existential threat.

What is EMP? A nuclear weapon detonated at high-altitude, above 30 kilometers, will generate an electromagnetic pulse that can be likened to a super-energetic radio wave, more powerful than lightning, that can destroy and disrupt electronics across a broad geographic area, from the line of sight from the high-altitude detonation to the horizon.

For example, a nuclear weapon detonated at an altitude of 30 kilometers would project an EMP field with a radius on the ground of about 600 kilometers, that could cover all the New England States, New York and Pennsylvania, damaging electronics across this entire region, including electronics on aircraft flying across the region at the time of the EMP attack. The EMP attack would blackout at least the regional electric grid, and probably the entire Eastern Grid that generates 70 percent of U.S. electricity, for a protracted period of weeks, months, possibly years. The blackout and EMP damage beyond the electric grid in other systems would collapse all the other critical infrastructures--communications, transportation, banking and finance, food and water--that sustain modern civilization and the lives of millions.

Such an EMP attack, a nuclear detonation over the U.S. East Coast at an altitude of 30 kilometers, could be achieved by lofting the warhead with a meteorological balloon.

A more ambitious EMP attack could use -a freighter to launch a medium-range missile from the Gulf of Mexico, to detonate a nuclear warhead over the geographic center of the United States at an altitude of 400 kilometers. The EMP field would extend to a radius of 2,200 kilometers on the ground, covering all of the contiguous 48 United States, causing a nationwide blackout and collapse of the critical infrastructures everywhere. All of this would result from the high- altitude detonation of a single nuclear warhead.

The Congressional EMP Commission warned that Iran appears to have practiced exactly this scenario. Iran has demonstrated the capability to launch a ballistic missile from a vessel at sea. Iran has also several times practiced and demonstrated the capability to detonate a warhead on its medium-range Shahab III ballistic missile at the high-altitudes necessary for an EMP attack on the entire United States. The Shahab III is a mobile missile, a characteristic that makes it more suitable for launching from the hold of a freighter. Launching an EMP attack from a ship off the U.S. coast could enable the aggressor to remain anonymous and unidentified, and so escape U.S. retaliation.

The Congressional EMP Commission warned that Iran in military doctrinal writings explicitly describes making a nuclear EMP attack to eliminate the United States as an actor on the world stage as part of an Information Warfare Operation. For example, various Iranian doctrinal writings on information and cyber warfare make the following assertions:

\* "Nuclear weapons...can be used to determine the outcome of a war...without inflicting serious human damage [by neutralizing] strategic and information networks."

\* "Terrorist information warfare [includes]...using the technology of directed energy weapons (DEW) or electromagnetic pulse (EMP)."

\* "...today when you disable a country's military high command through disruption of communications you will, in effect, disrupt all the affairs of that country....If the world's industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years."

China's premier military textbook on information warfare, written by China's foremost expert on cyber and information warfare doctrine, makes unmistakably clear that China's version of an allout Information Warfare Operation includes both computer viruses and nuclear EMP attack. According to People's Liberation Army textbook World War, the Third World War--Total Information Warfare, written by Shen Weiguang, "Therefore, China should focus on measures to counter computer viruses, nuclear electromagnetic pulse...and quickly achieve breakthroughs in those technologies...":

With their massive destructiveness, long-range nuclear weapons have combined with highly sophisticated information technology and information warfare under nuclear deterrence....Information war and traditional war have one thing in common, namely that the country which possesses the critical weapons such as atomic bombs will have "first strike" and "second strike retaliation" capabilities ....As soon as its computer networks come under attack and are destroyed, the country will slip into a state of [unawareness] paralysis and the lives of its people will ground to a halt. Therefore, China should focus on measures to counter computer viruses, nuclear electromagnetic pulse...and quickly achieve breakthroughs in those technologies in order to equip China without delay with equivalent deterrence that will enable it to stand up to the military powers in the information age and neutralize and check the deterrence of Western powers, including the United States. North Korea appears to be attempting to implement the information warfare doctrine described above by developing a long range missile capable of making a catastrophic nuclear EMP attack on the United States. In December 2012, North Korea demonstrated the capability to launch a satellite on a polar orbit circling the Earth at an altitude of 500 kilometers. An altitude of 500 kilometers would be ideal for making an EMP attack that places the field over the entire contiguous 48 United States, using an inaccurate satellite warhead for delivery, likely to miss its horizontal aimpoint over the geographic center of the U.S. by tens of kilometers. North Korea's satellite did not pass over the United States--but a slight adjustment in its trajectory would have flown it over or near the U.S. bull's eye for a high-altitude EMP burst.

### RCA Impact---EMPs---Extra---2NC

#### Russia-China Axis causes an EMP World War.

Vincent Pry 17, Executive Director of Task Force on National and Homeland Security, Director of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, “Nuclear EMP Attack Scenarios and Combined-Arms Cyber Warfare,” 2017, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1097009.pdf>, jy

A final worst-case scenario would be coordinated EMP attacks by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to advance their common global strategic and ideological interests by what would amount to an EMP World War. Is a nuclear world war implausible? Russia apparently does not think so, according to international and Russian press in October 2016:

"Russia is holding a massive evacuation drill for more than 40 million people to prepare for nuclear war. More than 200,000 emergency services personnel and soldiers will use 50,000pieces of equipment during the massive civil defense 101 exercise.

What are the common strategic and ideological interests of a New Axis comprising Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran?

Strategically, these states are all dissatisfied with the established world order dominated by the United States and its allies. Like Germany before World Wars I and II, they perceive themselves as threatened, victim nations, hemmed in territorially and economically by an international system built by rival powers. Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran would all like to overthrow the existing world order and replace it with a new world order—dominated by themselves.

All also see "the world's only superpower" that is the United States as the greatest threat to their existence. No matter how benign the U.S. really is, they do not, perhaps cannot, see anything but that the U.S. is a great potential threat. The New Axis are what might be called "national security states" or "militant dictatorships" because they are obsessed with survival and dominance to the point of sacrificing prosperity. Co-existence might be a temporary necessity. But real security is achieved by dominance, by the annihilation of rivals, a view like that in organized crime. An unsurprising parallel, as these are criminal states.

Ideologically, contrary to common Western assumptions, these "outsider" states do not perceive the United States and the West as necessary to their prosperity, but as impediments actively hostile to their existence. Totalitarian and authoritarian societies see politics and economics, power and wealth, as a zero-sum game. Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran do not blame themselves for their economic and political problems—they blame the U.S. and the West.

Moreover, they fear the free political, economic, and cultural systems represented by the United States and the West, so alien and diametrically opposed to their own totalitarian and authoritarian systems. Like ancient militarist Sparta, in its war with democratic Athens, that made common cause against Athens with all other city states run by tyrants, the elites of Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are united by their fear and hatred of freedom.

Evidence is substantial that Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are tacit allies. Russia and China conduct military exercises together, support each other at the UN, and typically have a united front on most international issues. China's new and growing military power is largely built on Russian technology. Russia and China have both helped North Korea and Iran's nuclear and missile programs, and often protect them from sanctions at the UN.

Is it a coincidence that all four of these powers are now embarked on major acts of aggression in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East that challenge international law and the existing world order—simultaneously?

An EMP World War might unfold by sequencing the already described theater EMP scenarios as follows:

• Iran Strikes Israel comes first, while Russia, China, and North Korea wait for U.S. forces to concentrate in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. military is now so diminished by cuts in budget, material, and manpower that it can no longer fight more than one big theater war. After perhaps a week, when U.S. forces and crucial C3I assets are committed and en route to the Middle East, simultaneously or in rapid succession:

• North Korea Strikes South Korea and Japan

• China Strikes Taiwan

• Russia Strikes European NATO

Finally, if necessary:

• North Korea Strikes the United States

• Russia Strikes the United States

This sequencing of EMP attacks would maximally exploit the U.S. "hollow" military. Where the U.S. is no longer able to support major military operations in more than one theater, the proposed plan would confront the U.S. nearly simultaneously with an EMP World War in four theaters—in five theaters if the U.S. itself is attacked.

EMP is essentially an anti-technology weapon—and perhaps the perfect "silver bullet" to defeat and humble the high-tech military of the United States that is the basis for its claim to be "the world's only superpower."

### RCA Impact---Hypersonics---2NC

#### Russia-China collaboration triggers hypersonic development.

Kendall-Taylor & Edmonds 20, \*Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program, \*\*Adjunct Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program. (Andrea and Jeffrey, 8-31-2020, "Addressing Deepening Russia-China Relations", *CNAS*, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/addressing-deepening-russia-china-relations)

Accelerated defense innovation

Russia and China have complementary operational needs and work together to develop new military capabilities. Both likely view collaboration on a number of fronts—including space, missile defense, various missile technologies, unmanned systems, and training data for artificial intelligence—as opportunities to fill mutual capability gaps and accelerate development of innovative technologies. Although less likely, Russia and China could look to cooperate in more sensitive domains such as theater hypersonic weapons, submarine technology, and space-based and undersea sensor technology.3 Both countries also look to one another to help mitigate the effects of U.S. sanctions and restrictions on technology exports. The overall risk is that Russia and China together will jointly innovate faster than the United States can alone, eroding the U.S. technological edge and straining already stretched defense budgets.

**Goes nuclear.**

Klare 19, PhD, Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. (Michael T., June 2019, "An ‘Arms Race in Speed’: Hypersonic Weapons and the Changing Calculus of Battle", *Arms Control Association*, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/features/arms-race-speed-hypersonic-weapons-changing-calculus-battle)

Escalation Risks and ‘Entanglement’ Many weapons can be employed for offensive and **defensive purposes**, but **hypersonic** weapon**s**, especially those designed for use in a regional context, are primarily intended to be used **offensively**, to destroy high-value enemy assets, including **command-and-control facilities**. This raises two major concerns: the risk of **rapid escalation** from a **minor** crisis to a **full-blown war** and the unintended escalation from **conventional** to **nuclear warfare.** That hypersonic weapons are being designed for offensive use at an early stage in a conflict has been evident in U.S. strategic policy from the beginning. Claiming that a major adversary might try to hide or move critical assets at the outbreak of a crisis to protect them from U.S. air and missile strikes, the Pentagon hoped the prompt global-strike program would enable U.S. forces to attack those targets with minimal warning. As this program got under way, hypersonic weapons became the technology of choice for its implementation. “Systems that operate at hypersonic speeds … offer the potential for military operations from longer ranges with shorter response times and enhanced effectiveness compared to current military systems,” states the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Such munitions, it adds, “could provide significant payoff for future U.S. offensive strike operations, particularly as adversaries’ capabilities advance.”12 Most of the hypersonic weapons being developed by the U.S. military, including the Air Force cruise missile and the Navy’s sea-launched system, are intended for strikes against key enemy assets at an early stage of conflict, when speed confers a significant advantage. Certain Russian weapons, such as the Kinzhal, also seem intended for this purpose. Some analysts fear that the mere possession of such weapons might induce leaders to escalate a military clash at the very outbreak of a crisis—believing their early use will confer a significant advantage in any major engagement that follows—while **reducing the chances** of keeping the fighting **limited**. It is easy to imagine, for example, how a **clash** between U.S. and **Chinese naval vessels** in the **South China Sea**, accompanied by signs of an air and naval mobilization on either or both sides, might prompt one combatant to launch a **barrage of hypersonic weapons** at all those ships and planes and their command-and-control systems, hoping to prevent their use in any full-scale encounter. This might make sense from a military perspective, but would undoubtedly prompt a fierce counterreaction from the injured side and restrict efforts to halt the fighting at a lower level of violence. The introduction of hypersonic weapons also raises concerns over the escalation from conventional to nuclear warfare. The United States has focused primarily on the development of hypersonic weapons carrying conventional warheads, but there is no fundamental reason why they could not be nuclear armed. Indeed, Russia’s Avangard missile is intended to deliver a nuclear warhead, and it is assumed that China’s DF-ZF is also designed with this in mind. This leads to what is called “**warhead ambiguity**”: the risk that a **defending nation**, aware of an enemy’s **hypersonic launch** and having **no time** to assess the warhead type, will **assume the worst** and **launch** its own **nuclear weapons**.13 Concern over this risk has led the U.S. Congress to bar funding for the development of ICBM-launched hypersonic glide vehicles, thereby helping to propel the Pentagon’s shift away from such systems and toward the development of medium-range weapons more suitable for use in a regional context. Nevertheless, warhead ambiguity will remain a feature of any future landscape involving the deployment of multiple hypersonic weapons, as a defender will never be certain that an enemy’s assault is entirely non-nuclear. With as little as **five minutes** to **assess an attack**—the time it would take a hypersonic glide vehicle to traverse **2,000** **miles**—a defender would be understandably **hard pressed** to avoid **worst-case assumptions.** Equally worrisome is the danger of “target ambiguity”: the possibility that a hypersonic attack, even if conducted with missiles known to be armed only with conventional warheads, would endanger the early-warning and command-and-control systems a defender uses for its nuclear and conventional forces, leading it to fear the onset of a nuclear attack. This is especially dangerous in light of what James Acton, a security analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, calls the “**entanglement**” problem. Although almost everything involving nuclear decision-making is secret, the **nuclear** and **conventional command-and-control systems** of the major powers are **widely assumed** to be **interconnected**, or **entangled**, making it difficult to **clearly distinguish** **one** from **another**. Therefore, **any** attack on command-and-control facilities at the onset of crisis, **however intended**, could be interpreted by the defender as a prelude to a **nuclear** rather than a conventional **attack** and prompt the defender to **launch** its own **nuclear weapons** before they are destroyed by an anticipated barrage of enemy bombs and missiles.14 All this points to yet another concern related to the impact of emerging technologies on the future battlefield: the risk that nuclear-armed nations, fearing scenarios of just this sort, will entrust more and more of their critical decision-making to machines, fearing that humans will not be able to make reasoned judgments under such enormous time pressures. With hypersonic weapons in the arsenals of the major powers, military leaders may conclude that sophisticated artificial intelligence (**AI**) **systems** should be empowered to determine the **nature of future missile attacks** and select the **appropriate response**. This is a temptation that can only increase as hypersonic weapons are themselves equipped with AI systems, a capability being developed at Sandia National Laboratories, enabling them to select and navigate to an array of potential targets.15 This convergence of advanced technologies is one of the greatest concerns of analysts who fear the loss of human control over the pace of combat. Paul Scharre, a program director at the Center for a New American Security, has warned of a “**flash war**” erupting when machines **misinterpret** radar signals and initiate catastrophic, possibly **nuclear responses**. “Competitive pressures in fast-paced environments threaten to push humans further and further out of the loop,” he wrote. “With this arms race in speed come grave risks,” including “a **war** that **spirals out of control** in mere **seconds**.”16

### RCA Impact---Russia---2NC

#### The alliance, not internal Russian psychology, drives revisionism.

Hiroyuki Akita 22, 5-11-22, “Russia's potential subordination to China poses threat,” <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Russia-s-potential-subordination-to-China-poses-threat>, jy

The power balance between the two is already far from equal. Russia's gross domestic product is just one-tenth of China's. Russia sends about 15% of its exports to China, while relying on its neighbor for around 23% of its imports, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, an American research group.

Even closer ties between Beijing and Moscow could be a bigger concern for the rest of the world than even the "axis of evil," a term used by former U.S. President George W. Bush in reference to North Korea, Iran and Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. That is because Russia has a large number of nuclear missiles and a hefty capacity for cyberattacks.

In addition, Moscow's diplomatic influence cannot be taken lightly. When the United Nations General Assembly voted in April on whether Russia should be suspended from the U.N. Human Rights Council, 93 countries voted in favor and 82 abstained or voted against.

If Russia becomes subordinate to China, its pride as a big power will be wounded and it could start to suffer a sense of inferiority, said a European government official long involved in policy toward Moscow. It could deepen Russia's feeling of paranoia toward the Western bloc, making it more belligerent and unpredictable, the official said.

Russian subordination to Beijing would also bring major changes to the rivalry between the U.S. and China. With the eastern part of Eurasia under its influence, China would quickly extend its sphere of interest over Central Asia and Afghanistan.

British political geographer Halford Mackinder called Central Asia and Afghanistan "the Heartland" about a century ago, forecasting that a country controlling the area would dominate the whole of Eurasia and the world.

Britain and Russia vied for control over the region in the 19th and early 20th centuries. When it comes to the current Sino-U.S. competition for global hegemony, Russia's subservience would help China bolster its position.

The security of Asia would be greatly affected as well. For example, China would likely call for more cooperation from Russia over the questions of the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan.

The Putin administration has so far tried to maintain a neutral stance on the Senkaku and Taiwan issues, according to an expert on Russian diplomacy. That is because Russia wants to avoid confrontation with Washington or Tokyo over Chinese disputes.

But there is no guarantee that Russia would remain neutral if it becomes more subordinate to China. Although direct Russian military involvement in disputes involving the Senkakus and the Taiwan Strait is unlikely, the nation could indirectly disturb Japanese and U.S. operations in favor of China.

"We have to be more alert about Russian moves [than before] in case of an emergency in Asia," said a Japanese government official in charge of security.

With regard to how Russia is managed, the Putin administration is making the country more like a giant version of North Korea -- with both nations relying on nuclear weapons for their security. Putin has been consolidating his personal power, though not to the same extent as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Putin's Russia repeatedly threatens the use of nuclear weapons because it is no match for the U.S. in terms of conventional arms. As is the case for North Korea, Russia is likely to reinforce this tendency.

All this does not mean that Western countries should soften their stance on Russia's continuing invasion of Ukraine. In the short term, the invasion should be forced to end in failure by maximizing sanctions on Russia.

To prevent Moscow from becoming subordinate to China, however, nations should leave room for rebuilding relations with a post-Putin Russia. They should maintain connections with Russian politicians who remain aloof from Putin, while boosting efforts to provide the Russian public with accurate news and information.

Putin should be brought to bay. But, at the same time, it is imperative to avoid permanently darkening the geopolitical map.

### RCA Impact---Space Weapons---2NC

#### The alliance commits Space Pearl Harbor.

Patrick Knox 21, Snr. Reporter focusing on World News, 12-23-2021, "Putin reveals chilling China pact to create space weapons of the future," https://www.the-sun.com/news/4328484/putin-alliance-china-space-weapons-plunge-west-dark-ages/, jy

VLADIMIR Putin has revealed a new alliance with China to create space weapons that could unleash havoc in the West if its satellites were targeted.

Speaking at his annual news conference, the Russian strongman leader said the partnership was “strategic” amid growing tensions with NATO.

As previously revealed by Sun Online, Russian and Chinese space weapons could send the West into the Dark Ages should it destroy satellites.

It is feared an orbital onslaught could shut down hospitals, crash the economy, knock out communications, and cause mass blackouts.

At his press conference today, Putin said: "We cooperate with China in the security area.

"China’s armed forces are equipped with the most advanced weapons systems to a large extent.

“We are even developing certain high-tech types of weapons. We are working in space, aircraft areas.”

The revelation of the alliance between Russia and China comes amid deepening concerns that Putin is plotting an invasion of his neighbour Ukraine in 2022 with more than 175,000 Russian troops said to have been detected on the border.

But despite the massive build-up of forces, Putin insisted he did not want a war with Ukraine.

He said: “We have clearly and precisely let them know that any further NATO expansion eastward is unacceptable.”

Last week, Moscow submitted draft security documents demanding that NATO deny membership to Ukraine and other former Soviet countries and roll back the alliance's military deployments in Central and Eastern Europe.

Putin said: “Is it us who are putting missiles near the US borders? No, it's the US who came to our home with their missiles.

“They are already on the threshold of our home. Is it some excessive demand not to place any offensive systems near our home?

“What would the Americans think if we decided to come to the border between Canada and the United States, or Mexico, and simply deploy our own missiles over there.”

Isabel Sawkins, a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society specialising in Russia, told The Sun Online that Russia and China joining forces could "potentially could be catastrophic" for Western powers.

She said: "Bringing China into the conversation is a deadly addition for the West.

"This would mean America's standing in the world will be absolutely shot to pieces.

"If you have Russia and China working together the US is going to go into absolute panic.”

"Because China is on its way up in the world. It's not only a massive economy - they have so much power.

"You would have China working with Russia and them both having this anxiety over the West - and that brings them together. That's a really terrifying prospect."

Meanwhile experts told The Sun Online warned Chinese and Russian space weapons could plunge the West into the Dark Ages.

Power supplies, hospitals, businesses and transport networks could be disrupted as satellites are lost leaving those under attack both literally and figuratively in the dark.

British military chiefs have previously warned there could be an attack from space within the next two years - something which has also been dubbed a potential "Pearl Harbor in space" for the US.

Allen Antrobus, a military space expert at Airbus Defence and Space in Stevenage, Herts, told The Sun Online he "absolutely" believed there was an increased threat of an attack in space.

His warnings echo those of other experts who fear that Britain is at risk of "an economic blackout of frightening proportions".

Space industry body UKspace admitted firms have very little ability to defend key data and infrastructure should the West come under attack from space.

#### Most likely scenario for extinction.

Lee Billings 15, editor of Scientific American, author and journalist, 8-10-2015, "War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever," https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/, jy, edited language in [brackets]

The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name.

The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could ~~cripple~~ [destroy] the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth.

The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations.

Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both “developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict,” such as those that might erupt over China’s military activities in the South China Sea or Russia’s in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007.

There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers.

In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least $5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July at the United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo, likely leading to years of further debate within the UN’s General Assembly.

“The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space,” says Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. “But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if attacked.”

Offensive space weapons tested

The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested “space mines,” self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administration’s multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit.

Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted. According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites were—particularly the ones in “geosynchronous” orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth, both superpowers backed down. “Neither one of us signed a treaty about this,” Krepon says. “We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too.”

Today, the situation is much more complicated. Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk, in part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rules—and they don’t have to, because the rules remain as yet unwritten.

Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space at very high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation uses such a “kinetic” method to destroy an adversary’s satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris, potentially cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby.

In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was generated at a much lower altitude.

More recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional tests of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of last year. Chinese officials insist the tests’ only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific experimentation. But one test in May 2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe haven of strategic geosynchronous satellites.

That was a wake-up call, says Brian Weeden, a security analyst and former Air Force officer who studied and helped publicize the Chinese test. “The U.S. came to grips decades ago with the fact that its lower orbit satellites could easily be shot down,” Weeden says. “Going nearly to geosynchronous made people realize that, holy cow, somebody might actually try to go after the stuff we have up there.”

It was no coincidence that shortly after the May 2013 test, the US declassified details of its secret Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), a planned set of four satellites capable of monitoring the Earth’s high orbits and even rendezvousing with other satellites to inspect them up-close. The first two GSSAP spacecraft launched into orbit in July 2014.

“This used to be a black program—something that didn’t even officially exist,” Weeden says. “It was declassified to basically send a message saying, ‘Hey, if you’re doing something funky in and around the geosynchronous belt, we’re going to see.’” An interloper into geosynchronous orbit need not be an explosives-tipped missile to be a security risk—even sidling up to an adversary’s strategic satellites is considered a threat. Which is one reason that potential U.S. adversaries might be alarmed by the rendezvous capabilities of GSSAP and of the U.S. Air Force’s highly maneuverable X-37B robotic space planes.

Russia is also developing its own ability to approach, inspect and potentially sabotage or destroy satellites in orbit. Over the past two years, it has included three mysterious payloads in otherwise routine commercial satellite launches, with the latest occurring in March of this year. Radar observations by the U.S. Air Force and by amateur hobbyists revealed that after each commercial satellite was deployed, an additional small object flew far away from the jettisoned rocket booster, only to later turn around and fly back. The objects, dubbed Kosmos-2491, -2499 and -2504, might just be part of an innocuous program developing techniques to service and refuel old satellites, Weeden says, though they could also be meant for more sinister intentions.

Treaties offer little assurance

Chinese officials maintain that their military activities in space are simply peaceful science experiments, while Russian officials have stayed mostly mum. Both nations could be seen as simply responding to what they see as the U.S.’s clandestine development of potential space weapons. Indeed, the U.S.’s ballistic missile defense systems, its X-37B space planes and even its GSSAP spacecraft, though all ostensibly devoted to maintaining peace, could be easily repurposed into weapons of space war. For years Russia and China have pushed for the ratification of a legally binding United Nations treaty banning space weapons—a treaty that U.S. officials and outside experts have repeatedly rejected as a disingenuous nonstarter.

“The draft treaty from Russia and China seeks to ban the very things that they are so actively pursuing,” Krepon says. “It serves their interests perfectly. They want freedom of action, and they’re covering that with this proposal to ban space weapons.” Even if the treaty was being offered in good faith, Krepon says, “it would be dead on arrival” in Congress and would stand no chance of being ratified. After all, the U.S. wants freedom of action in space, too, and in space no other country has more capability—and thus more to lose.

According to Rose, there are three key problems with the treaty. “One, it’s not effectively verifiable, which the Russians and Chinese admit,” he says. “You can’t detect cheating. Two, it is totally silent on the issue of terrestrial anti-satellite weapons, like the ones that China tested in 2007 and again in July 2014. And third, it does not define what a weapon in outer space is.”

As an alternative, the U.S. supports a European-led initiative to establish “norms” for proper behavior through the creation of a voluntary International Code of Conduct for Outer Space. This would be a first step, to be followed by a binding agreement. A draft of the code—which Russia and China prevented from being adopted in last month’s UN discussions—calls for more transparency and “confidence-building” between spacefaring nations as a way of promoting the “peaceful exploration and use of outer space.” This, it is hoped, can prevent the generation of more debris and the further development of space weapons. However, like the Russian-Chinese treaty, the code does not exactly define what constitutes a “space weapon.”

That haziness poses problems for senior defense officials such as General John Hyten, the head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. “Is our space-based surveillance system that looks out at the heavens and tracks everything in geosynchronous a weapons system?” he asks. “I think everybody in the world would look at that and say no. But it’s maneuverable, it’s going 17,000 miles per hour, and it has a sensor on board. It’s not a weapon, okay? But would [a treaty’s] language ban our ability to do space-based surveillance? I would hope not!”

Is war in space inevitable?

Meanwhile, shifts in U.S. policy are giving China and Russia more reasons for further suspicion. Congress has been pressing the U.S. national security community to turn its attentions to the role of offensive rather than defensive capabilities, even dictating that most of the fiscal year 2015 funding for the Pentagon’s Space Security and Defense Program go toward “development of offensive space control and active defense strategies and capabilities.”

“Offensive space control” is a clear reference to weapons. “Active defense” is much more nebulous, and refers to undefined offensive countermeasures that could be taken against an attacker, further widening the routes by which space might soon become weaponized. If an imminent threat is perceived, a satellite or its operators might preemptively attack via dazzling lasers, jamming microwaves, kinetic bombardment or any other number of possible methods.

“I hope to never fight a war in space,” Hyten says. “It’s bad for the world. Kinetic [anti-satellite weaponry] is horrible for the world,” because of the existential risks debris poses for all satellites. “But if war does extend into space,” he says, “we have to have offensive and defensive capabilities to respond with, and Congress has asked us to explore what those capabilities would be. And to me, the one limiting factor is no debris. Whatever you do, don’t create debris.”

Technology to jam transmissions, for example, appears to underpin the Air Force’s Counter Communications System, the U.S.’s sole acknowledged offensive capability against satellites in space. “It's basically a big antenna on a trailer, and how it actually works, what it actually does, nobody knows,” Weeden says, noting that, like most space security work, the details of the system are top secret. “All we basically know is that they could use it to somehow jam or maybe even spoof or hack into an adversary’s satellites.”

For Krepon, the debate over the definitions of space weapons and the saber-rattling between Russia, China and the U.S. is unhelpfully eclipsing the more pressing issue of debris. “Everyone is talking about purposeful, man-made objects dedicated to warfighting in space, and it’s like we are back in the Cold War,” Krepon says. “Meanwhile, there are about 20,000 weapons already up there in the form of debris. They’re not purposeful—they’re unguided. They’re not seeking out enemy satellites. They’re just whizzing around, doing what they do.”

The space environment, he says, must be protected as a global commons, similar to the Earth’s oceans and atmosphere. Space junk is very easy to make and very hard to clean up, so international efforts should focus on preventing its creation. Beyond the threat of deliberate destruction, the risk of accidental collisions and debris strikes will continue to grow as more nations launch and operate more satellites without rigorous international accountability and oversight. And as the chance of accidents increases, so too does the possibility of their being misinterpreted as deliberate, hostile actions in the high-tension cloak-and-dagger military struggle in space.

“We are in the process of messing up space, and most people don’t realize it because we can’t see it the way we can see fish kills, algal blooms, or acid rain,” he says. “To avoid trashing Earth orbit, we need a sense of urgency that currently no one has. Maybe we’ll get it when we can’t get our satellite television and our telecommunications, our global weather reports and hurricane predictions. Maybe when we get knocked back to the 1950s, we’ll get it. But by then it will be too late.”

### RCA Impact---Venuzuela---2NC

#### Sino-Russian coordination triggers intervention in Venezuela.

Kendall-Taylor & Edmonds 20, \*Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program, \*\*Adjunct Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program. (Andrea and Jeffrey, 8-31-2020, "Addressing Deepening Russia-China Relations", *CNAS*, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/addressing-deepening-russia-china-relations)

Coordinated actions

The most stressing scenario for U.S. defense planners is a two-theater scenario in which one power acts opportunistically to achieve a military objective while the United States is engaged in conflict with the other. But there are several more likely scenarios in which the United States may have to confront a China-Russia united front, or at least their tacit coordination, in key regions such as the Indo-Pacific (including North Korea) and the Middle East. In some cases, Russia and China may combine their capabilities to challenge U.S. foreign policy. In Venezuela, for example, Russia has provided arms transfers on credit, which gave Venezuela updated armored and air capabilities. Meanwhile, China transferred some arms and provided surveillance technology and capital investment to keep the regime of Nicolás Maduro in power. Looking forward, it is not out of the question that the two partners could conduct a limited joint intervention in a third country.

#### Extinction.

Szénási 19, Endre Szénási (Say-now-shay), MS, Security and Defense Policy Expert. (2-27-2019, “The Possibilities of an External Military Intervention in Venezuela”, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331385440_The_Possibilities_of_an_External_Military_Intervention_in_Venezuela>) \*typo corrected---brackets

The great power struggle for Venezuelan oil and gas, spheres of interest The arguments concerning the miserable state of the Venezuelan people serve “public consumption”, because the Venezuelan crisis stems from great power struggle, that is not aimed to enhance the welfare of the Venezuelan people, but, above all, to retain/gain control over the fate of the world's largest (!), known, traditional oil reserves. The Venezuelan leadership officially denies the mere existence of a humanitarian crisis.9 This is supported by evidence from recent reports of US journalists, when they reported on a private store chain and state-subsidized (humanitarian) stores.10 11 Venezuela is ahead of Saudi Arabia since 2010 in terms of the quantity of oil reserves. 12 The Venezuelan oil reserves amounted to 297 billion barrels, while the Saudi oil reserves in 2009 were around 267 billion barrels, according to data provided by OPEC.13 With this, Venezuela has gained global leadership. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the extraction of Venezuelan ultra-heavy oil requires more sophisticated and expensive technology than the Saudi light-oil. In addition, Venezuela's natural gas reserves are significant: in 2010, it had the world's 8th largest conventional natural gas reserves. 14 95% of Venezuela's exports are made up of hydrocarbons.15 Considering that the easy to extract (technically simple and inexpensive to extract), traditional oil and gas reserves are being systematically exhausted globally, there is bright future for the Venezuelan and other ultra-heavy oil. It coincides with the development of the utilisation of other, harder and more expensive to extract resources in the future, such as shale-gas, shale-oil, ultra-deep sea oil, oil sand etc. Venezuela benefited from US private companies in terms of oil extraction technologies and required investments in the 1980s and 1990s. The “deadly crime” against the large, privately owned American oil companies was made by presidents Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, by ousting the US and supporting Russian and Chinese investments. Russia and China have invested increasingly in the Venezuelan oil industry, providing the necessary know-how and the technological background. Reliable, official data on this cooperation is hardly available. According to a Caracas analysis firm, at the end of 2015, Russian-Venezuelan oil production was 209 000 barrels/day, while Chinese-Venezuelan production reached 171 000 barrels/day. With this, Russia has overtaken China in the fields of the Venezuelan oil investments and extraction indicators.16 Igor Sechin, Rosneft ’s CEO, had promised to invest $17.6 billion in Venezuela’s oil fields by 2019. Sechin’s promise carried authority: A former deputy prime minister, he has been a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin for over 20 years, and until recently was described as Russia’s second most powerful person.”17 As we have already seen in the motto, some of the Russian oil-producing private companies have already left Venezuela, while Rosneft, a Russian state-owned company, has remained and takes development very seriously. This leads to many conclusions. Private oil extraction companies that had left Venezuela, considered the future of extraction to be risky, since Venezuela could be returned to the US sphere of interest if Maduro is overthrown. Russian companies would be expelled from Venezuelan oil production as it happened to the US during the presidency of Chavez. Private companies involved in oil extraction are afraid of the loss of their capital, and their willingness to take risks is, is of course, much smaller than that of the Russian state-owned oil-giant, Rosneft. The fact that they do not know the plans of the Russian state for Venezuela also contributes to the withdrawal of private companies. It goes without saying that Sechin, known as Putin's loyal ally, knows much more about the plans of the Russian state. There must be Russian plans going beyond oil production, since the Russian state has already invested tens of billions of US dollars in Venezuelan oil extraction, knowing exactly that they and the Chinese have penetrated an American sphere of interest. The latter is inevitably a serious risk factor for Russia and China. The Russian and Chinese share of Venezuelan oil production is somewhat constrained by the 40% maximum available share of ownership18 (see Annex 1). The restriction of the foreign ownership of oil extraction has different advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that the Venezuelan state remains the majority owner and thus the Venezuelan state itself can make strategic decisions in terms of oil production. Allowing the Venezuelan state to do so is also a matter of national sovereignty and national security. At the same time, it may be a disadvantage that the Venezuelan state does not master the technologies required for ultra-heavy oil extraction, as Russian or Chinese companies do, which could lead to disruptions in Venezuelan state-owned oil extraction. “Between 2012 and 2015, Russia sold arms worth $ 3.2 billion to Venezuela, which made Venezuela the world's third largest Russian weapon purchaser.” 19 With this, Venezuela de facto left the US sphere of interest and joined that of Russia and China. There is a great power struggle in Venezuela to keep or gain control over significant fossil-originated resources, depending on whether we consider Russian, Chinese, or US perspectives. It goes far beyond the aspirations and possibilities of the Venezuelan people, political elite, government, and parliament. While in the case of Ukraine and Georgia, the US-led West entered Russia's sphere of interest, in case of Venezuela, Russia and China penetrated the US sphere of interest. Since the trio of great powers in these games have systematically hindered each other's aspirations in each of the three target countries (US support for the Ukrainian coup to overthrow president Janukovich, Russian military intervention in Ukraine and Georgia, the dismantling of RussianUkrainian and Russian-Georgian economic relations, US economic sanctions against Venezuela and companies wishing to trade with the country, the (British) denial to give back the Venezuelan state-owned gold reserves, Venezuelan coup attempts with active US and Western support, etc.) have caused a variety of social shocks in all three target countries, not least resulting in the deterioration of living standards and living conditions. Burning the US humanitarian aid convoy on 23 February 2019 On 22 February 2019, Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced that the US humanitarian aid shipment scheduled for 23 February, delivered through Colombia to Venezuela, would be a provocation.20: „Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said a U.S. humanitarian aid convoy for Venezuela could provoke clashes and create a pretext for removing President Nicolas Maduro, a staunch Russian ally, by force”, that was labelled by the US as “propaganda”.21 The position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was, of course, agreed with the Venezuelan government. President Maduro refused the American humanitarian aid, claiming that it was a means of consciously organized political hysteria, provocation, disinformation about conditions in Venezuela, and it was a tool to overthrow him. „Maduro has accused Washington of orchestrating a coup d’état in order to install a puppet regime in Venezuela.”22 The Venezuelan and Russian forecasts were “well-proven”: masked “activists” (thugs) set US humanitarian aid convoy on fire when the trucks were on a bridge connecting Colombia with Venezuela, prior to reaching Venezuelan territory. The chain of accusations continued. US Secretary of State Pompeo made president Maduro responsible for the incident claiming that Maduro's men were responsible for setting the aid convoy on fire. According to Pompeo, the incident demonstrated the cruelty and illegality of the Venezuelan system. “We denounce Maduro’s refusal to let humanitarian assistance reach Venezuela. What kind of a sick tyrant stops food from getting to hungry people? The images of burning trucks filled with aid are sickening” – claimed Pompeo.23 Following the incident, self-proclaimed “interim president” Guaido and the president of Colombia held a press conference in which they condemned Maduro because of the incident. Venezuela rejected the charges and made Guaido's men responsible for what happened. The US-Colombian and Venezuelan opposition positions describing the incident are likely to be based on predetermined lies. The shipment of USAID was escorted by the people of Guaido, and was set on fired on the bridge before the shipment arrived to Venezuelan territory. It was totally unrealistic, unlikely that Maduro's activists could have invisibly “replaced” Guaido’s activists, who ignited the convoy. It is also unrealistic and unlikely, that Maduro’s men infiltrated Guaido’s supporters, being able to ignite the entire convoy without being beaten by activists supporting Guaido. It is obvious, that the incident is perfectly suitable to put the blame on Maduro, who “refuses and burns humanitarian aid”, and not the US and Guaido “who supply humanitarian aid to Venezuelan people in need”. It is noteworthy that the provocation was well anticipated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that officially predicted it. It is obvious, that if Maduro plans a provocation, he would not inform adversaries in advance. It is thought-provoking that if a state (in our case: Venezuela) does not ask for assistance from another state, furthermore: refuses it, then why it should be forced upon that state. According to the official explanation from Washington is dead simple: that the interests of the Venezuelan people were kept in mind. For those, who believe in this, I would advise considering the faith of the 14 million people in Yemen, who are literally starving to death, lacking clean water, medical attention etc. Guaido’s lie concerning the possible amount of people in need in Venezuela, that is claimed to be around 300 000, is – even if it is true – pale in comparison to what is going on in Yemen. The bottom line is, that there is hysteria in Washington due to conditions in Venezuela, and there is deafening silence concerning enormous suffering in Yemen.24 At the same time, it would be naïve to believe that if the Venezuelan government refuses help officially, the Americans would still believe that the shipment could be delivered to the Venezuelan people. At the same time, the need for conscious provocations and hysteria against Maduro for the justification of a military attack on Venezuela gives an in-depth explanation of why Washington forced (!) “humanitarian assistance”. In a new round of US aid accusations, Carlos Rafael Faria Tortosa, Venezuela’s ambassador in Moscow (!) accused the US of delivering spoiled food and expired medicines, and the shipment was not examined by any international organization.25 The last charge is likely to be verifiable and true, the first two will be difficult to prove once the shipment burned down. We might recall that Kiev has criticised Moscow several times for deliveries of humanitarian aid to Donetsk and Lugansk. Kiev claimed that the Russians did not really want to help, but to smuggle soldiers, weapons and ammunition under the disguise of aid deliveries. “Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko described the entry of the trucks without Kiev’s permission as a “flagrant violation of international law”… Repeating earlier suspicions by Kiev that the aid cargo could be somehow used to support the separatists, the foreign ministry said: «Neither the Ukrainian side nor the International Committee of the Red Cross knows the content of the trucks. This arouses special concern.» The fact that Russian vehicles had crossed into Ukraine without permission “testifies to the deliberate and aggressive character of actions by the Russian side”, the ministry said … “We consider this a direct invasion by Russia of Ukraine,” Ukrainian state security chief Valentyn Nalivaychenko said…”26 Interestingly, the Russian reactions concerning the Ukrainian statements are quite similar to that of the US referring to the Venezuela humanitarian aid incident: “We warn against any attempts to disrupt this purely humanitarian mission,” the Russian foreign ministry said. “Responsibility for any possible consequences of provocations … will lie, completely and entirely, with those who are prepared to further sacrifice human lives for the sake of their ambitions and geo-political ploys.”27 Generally speaking, if a relief shipment comes from a hostile country, it would be treated with mistrust and suspicion. If it can be done, the host power would take action. However, our story in Venezuela is entirely different. The possibilities of military interventions US and/or Russian military interventions in Venezuelan are fundamentally determined by two things: (a) whether rival big powers can achieve their goals without a military intervention, and (b) how much Venezuelan oil, gas reserves and the weapon market is worth for rival great powers. There is no clear answer to the question (a) yet. For the time being, attempts to overthrow president Maduro's power seems to be unsuccessful, although this political game is far from being over. We cannot be take seriously the promise of self-proclaimed president Guaido that he will not touch the energy contracts that have already been concluded, if he comes to power. Some analysts say that time is working against president Maduro, while others say that the coup attempt of US backed Guaido has failed and Maduro is still more popular than Guaido. If the Gray Zone Project's US journalist Ben Norton's data on the popularity of president Maduro are true, 86% of Venezuelans oppose military intervention and 81% oppose economic sanctions against Venezuela “to overthrow Maduro's system” (see Annex 4). This explains many things. For example, it becomes clear why Guaido's coup attempt to oust Maduro failed in a short time. It can be seen, why the Venezuelan Armed Forces could have been a solid support for former, then president Chavez and the system of president Maduro today. Obviously, the latter question is not only dependent on which side the Venezuelan people are on, but also on the fact that these two Venezuelan presidents and their Russian and Chinese supporters have been very consciously struggling over the years to recruit and maintain soldiers in the Venezuelan Armed Forces, who are firm supporters of the power represented by the Chavez and Maduro. It is no coincidence that US President Trump threatened Venezuelan Armed Forces, that the continuation of their loyalty to Maduro “threatens their future and life” (!).28 This is a classic and rough form of open US intervention in Venezuelan internal affairs. The answer to the question (b) is clear: Venezuelan oil and gas reserves, the arms market and, in general, the country's belonging to US or Russian/Chinese sphere of interest are worthy of a large-scale external military intervention. For such a military intervention, rival great powers can always find detailed political reasons to convince public opinion around the world. Russia has the possibility of a legal armed intervention in Venezuela according to international law, as the Venezuelan government may, if necessary, formally request it. The same is true of a possible Chinese military intervention, although this seems unlikely in the light of current Chinese foreign policies. In the case of the US, a possible Venezuelan military intervention lacks international legal conditions, as the UN Security Council (UNSC) would not approve it as a result of the Russian and Chinese vetoes (as a minimum), and there is neither a case of US self-defence, nor a formal invitation by the Venezuelan government. Guaido’s formal invitation for a US military intervention cannot be legitimized in terms of international law because of his “dubious” legal status, since Guaido is a self-proclaimed “interim president”, officially recognized by the US and pro-US followers (that currently includes 24 EU member states). Guaido asked the US to examine “all options on the table”. This term, on the one hand, matches the American political dictionary used by Washington's leading politicians on a regular basis and, on the other hand, literally means that the US must seriously consider overthrowing president Maduro with military force. Although formally Guaido did not ask the US to perform an open military intervention, he indicated that he would support such an option if the appropriate decision is made. Otherwise, he would have said that the US would look at all options “other than military intervention”. It would be an interesting, food-for-thought experiment if a US Senator would ask Russia and/or China to seriously consider “all options on the table” to overthrow the US president in power and his social system. The Russians and the Chinese would obviously refuse this, emphatically and categorically, as a very serious and open political provocation, also an entirely unreasonable request. In America, a widely publicised political scandal would force to resign the US Senator calling for such interventions. Perhaps this is all ridiculous and not lifelike, but it is noteworthy that the US has not rejected the initiative of Guaido, to consider “all options on the table”, but did this exactly. The US secretary of state, Pompeo (the minister of foreign affairs) repeated the term of “interim president” Gauido, that “all options on the table” are considered. Pompeo threatened Maduro, that “his days are numbered”, announcing the installation of new US sanctions and other, necessary steps.29 The classic antic Roman saying can be illustrated: “whatever Jupiter is free to do, is not allowed for the ox.”30 It would be more fortunate if the strong states would respect the sovereignty of all other states, and all the states would treat each other as equal, regardless of which state is stronger or weaker. The capabilities of the Venezuelan Armed Forces cannot be measured against the great powers that compete for the country. In a narrow military sense, the Venezuelan Armed Forces, which are firmly supporting president Maduro, can be overcome by the US, just like the defeat of president Saddam's Iraqi forces. At the same time, it is highly questionable whether political and economic “stabilization” following a possible US military victory would be “successful”, keeping in mind Iraq or Afghanistan etc. Although Russian president Putin warned the US not to intervene with military force in Venezuela, political willingness to intervene by the Russian military is at least as questionable as by the US, under the authority of president Trump. Whichever of the competing great powers might intervene militarily first in Venezuela, has a great chance of victory in a short term, in a narrowly military sense. This happened in Syria, when the West, wishing to openly overthrow president Assad, was mostly pleased with the material and armed support of the opposition. Russia militarily intervened quickly and openly in support of Syrian president Assad. With this, the West was largely displaced from Syria. It seems a logical step for Russia to plan to establish a military base in Venezuela. At the same time, with the appearance of Russian TU-160 strategic bombers, it is not difficult to notice that Russia is sending a message to the US, in fact provoking Washington. Russia “reminded” the US, that “penetrating and overtaking the “wrong” sphere of interest” could cause “a legitimate outrage”. The emergence of Russian strategic bombers in Venezuela shows that Russian leadership is well aware of where Venezuela belongs to, in terms of spheres of interest. To be specific, Venezuela currently de facto belongs to Russian/Chinese sphere of interest, despite being in the US sphere of interest geographically and traditionally. Although the current Venezuelan laws prohibit the establishment of foreign military bases in the country, it would be naïve to believe that this law cannot be amended.31 A plan of a possible establishment of a Russian air and naval bases in Venezuela would clearly show that Russia wants to maintain Venezuela in her sphere of interest (together with China) in a long-run. Russia can later strengthen it with military guarantees. However, Russia (and China) cannot provide direct military guarantees for Venezuela against the US, as a possible and highly unlikely, direct Russian-US (Chinese-US) military conflict would most likely lead to the extinction of humanity, when including the possibility of massive use of nuclear weapons. If the Venezuelan demonstrations deteriorate to a civil war, its military “solution” in the classic sense is very risky, if it includes firing at protesters. At the same time, it is much more likely that, if a civil war starts, the US would attack the targets of the Venezuelan Armed Forces supporting president Maduro, claiming, that the US “wants to prevent the Venezuelan Armed Forces from being deployed against the Venezuelan people”. In the event of a possible civil war, Russia would be in a militarily sensitive position because (a) if the protesters are shot by Russian soldiers, it would have a huge global political price, (b) if Russia would openly support the Venezuelan Armed Forces being heavily engaged in a civil war on the side of president Maduro, that could also have serious global political consequences. According to the official Russian position, the US is preparing a military invasion of Venezuela in order to remove Maduro from power. “Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev said that the United States show “sarcasm and arrogance towards the Venezuelan people” while it imposes humanitarian aid that will be rejected. Nikolai Patrushev stressed that the United States, deploying military forces to Puerto Rico and Colombia, is preparing an invasion of Venezuela to remove legally elected incumbent President Maduro from power.”32 The current extent of the US military build-up in the vicinity of Venezuela is unclear. It is highly likely, that the current amount of US troops around Venezuela is insufficient for a full-scale invasion. However, if tensions escalate and a civil war breaks out, the US troop levels could be elevated rapidly. US bombardment of Venezuelan troops loyal to president Maduro might not even require a military build-up in the vicinity of the country, since the targets are within reach for the US anyway. False flag operations by the US and the US-backed opposition are likely to increase tensions to create a pretext for the removal of president Maduro from power in Venezuela.33 If there is “enough” violence on the streets in form of a civil war, and the removal of president Maduro is still not in sight, US bombardment of Venezuelan troops loyal to Maduro [will be] become likely.

### Relations Impact---Arms Control---2NC

#### Arms control is existential BUT will fail if relations are sour.

William Caplan 18, program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS, 1-13-18 through carbon dating the web, “Nuclear Stability in a Post-Arms Control World,” <https://www.csis.org/npfp/nuclear-stability-post-arms-control-world>, jy

Strategy for a Post-Reduction World

Prospects for the Future

There appears to be little appetite for any diplomatic engagement with Russia, even outside of arms control. The United States and Russia have deep-seated structural and ideological disagreements over Syria and eastern Ukraine, as well as over the role and appropriate reach of NATO, which are compounded by Russia’s interference in the U.S. election. These issues play into a broader anti-Russia narrative that bleeds into arms control. The attempted “reset” with Russia at the beginning of the Obama administration that precipitated the negotiation of New START is largely viewed as a failure. New START specifically was seen by arms control skeptics as a measure to lull the United States into a false sense of security as Russia pressed ahead with its own nuclear modernization, including the new INF Treaty-violating SSC-8 missile.15 In addition, Russia had not made the same pace of disarmament for meeting the deadlines put in place by New START for force levels until recently, which made some pessimistic that Russia will follow through on its commitments to this treaty as well.16 Thus, there is a strong possibility that the Russians are noncompliant with the INF Treaty and that one or both sides will withdraw from the arrangement, while New START is not extended. The United States needs to prepare for this possibility and begin putting in the military and diplomatic footwork necessary to maintain nuclear stability with Russia, in terms of keeping mutual vulnerability and deterrence between the two nations, and avoid an arms race reminiscent of the Cold War. To determine the United States’ strategy for the post-reduction world, the points of mutual agreement must be salvaged from each treaty and wrapped into a new arrangement between the United States and Russia.

Ultimately, there is not much cause for optimism for salvaging much of the INF Treaty. Because the treaty completely bans two systems with similar capabilities, if one side demonstrates a willingness to violate it, there is not much left to salvage. In particular, both sides’ interest in developing GLCMs would almost certainly prevent any sort of treaty that would ban that category of weapon for the time being. The range limit on ballistic missile systems could be reinstated, though the cruise missile threat is the real challenge at this juncture given Russia’s focus on the development of this technology for its warfighting purposes in Europe given U.S. vulnerabilities.17 On-site inspections for the treaty expired in 2001 and would not likely be favored by the Russians, as they would demonstrate that the Russians were in noncompliance.18 Even if inspections were somehow agreed to by the Russians, the Russian narrative that U.S. missile defense installations violate the treaty would likely lead to Russians pushing for on-site inspections to be broadened to U.S. missile defense sites in Europe and the United States, something that would likely be strongly opposed by U.S. policymakers given the systems’ sensitivity.

New START provides the basis for aspects to be salvaged from previous arms control treaties. While the reduction aspect may be challenged, by both the Trump administration and potentially the Russians, the data exchanges and on-site inspections may be continued for the sake of nuclear stability. Given national security professionals’ insistence that the United States retains a ‘boots on the ground’ presence in Russia to keep an eye on their nuclear capabilities, there is a strong chance that this could be sold as a mutually beneficial transparency measure as opposed to an arms control ‘gift’ to the Russians, which is how New START has been framed by many of its detractors.19

Making the Strategy

The United States needs a strategy that confronts the threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal, upholds strategic stability, and keeps open the possibility of future negotiations on arms control treaties. Accordingly, the United States should undertake the following measures to build a workable strategy for a post-arms reduction world:

Immediately begin negotiations on a strategic nuclear transparency treaty with Russia. The United States and Russia could negotiate an agreement that would allow both sides to keep an eye on the other’s strategic nuclear forces via arsenal declarations and associated inspections to verify declarations. Even if the arms control caps are not followed by either side, knowing what the other side has (outside of relying on one’s own national technical means of verification) with inspection procedures to back up the declarations would play a part in avoiding miscalculations that may be present in a world without New START. These transparency measures would likely not include systems previously banned under the INF Treaty at the onset due to the fact that it would likely still be a hot button issue, but eventually transparency could be broadened once the inspections regime is perceived as legitimate.

Continue with current nuclear modernization plans. The current U.S. nuclear modernization plan will recapitalize every aspect of the United States’ nuclear arsenal and provide a twenty-first-century deterrent equipped to respond to a wide range of threats.20 The plan will replace aging systems in just enough time to prevent any loss of capabilities, though the time lines will be cutting it incredibly close. The United States must stick to this plan in order to keep deterrence intact and avoid any sort of strategic mismatch between the United States and Russia.

Consider the deployment of additional air- or water-breathing systems. Violations of the INF Treaty by Russia introduces another capability that puts U.S. and allied forces at risk throughout Europe without a clear counter. Deployment of additional conventional capabilities, such as the Joint Air-to- Surface Standard Missile (JASSM-ER) air-launched cruise missile, to allied countries would provide weapons with similar ranges to Russian systems that threaten them and hedge against any reassurance challenges that the United States may face. In addition, the development of a follow on to the TLAM-N nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missile would give the United States an INF Treaty-compliant nuclear capability that would further expand its range of potential responses to new Russian nuclear capabilities.21

In addition to these positive actions, the United States must also do its part to avoid any overtures that could be read as antithetical to nuclear stability. Accordingly, the United States should avoid the following:

Break out of New START limits. Russian budget cuts mean that they will likely not be able to grow their nuclear forces in the short term, removing the need for the United States to attempt to gain the upper hand by growing its own arsenal.22 If the United States breaks out of limits first, however, it would eviscerate U.S. moral authority and potentially negotiating power in future negotiations by being painted as the instigator in the situation and make it hard to pick up where both sides left off in terms of reductions. This could potentially be exploited by Russia to build an anti-U.S. coalition on nuclear issues and beyond.23

Building and attempting to deploy a new GLCM. While this would be a tit-for-tat response to Russian INF Treaty violations, it would not be a helpful decision for nuclear stability for similar reasons to breaking out of New START limits. First, it would demonstrate that United States is unwilling to cling to INF Treaty limitations and thus weaken the U.S. stance on the issue if a follow-on treaty were attempted at some point in the future. Second, the same capabilities could be procured in a way that is compliant with the INF Treaty, such as through air- and water-breathing cruise missiles. Third, U.S. allies do not want to base U.S. GLCMs, aggravating rather than solving assurance problems.24

Unilaterally downsize. While it is not the time for growth in the U.S. arsenal, it is also not the time to reduce nuclear forces in this scenario. Downsizing while outside of the treaty would put a cap on U.S. leverage in future negotiations, as the United States would have fewer forces to negotiate away. In addition, it would send a weak signal that might be read by allies and the Russians alike that we are willing to accede to Russian nuclear dominance.

Conclusion

The combination of staying the course on modernization, not inciting an arms race, and pushing for increased transparency measures between the United States and Russia would go a long way toward maintaining nuclear stability between the two countries and keeping the future open to the possibility of additional negotiations on arms control. The existential threat posed to the entire world from nuclear escalation means that the United States compartmentalize nuclear stability away from other issues plaguing the U.S.-Russia relationship. If the United States is able to do so, it could lead by example and encourage similar behavior on the Russia side that could lead to substantive agreement on further diplomatic efforts. During the Cold War both sides were able to bracket off nuclear issues as a unique area of potential cooperation. Cooler heads should similarly prevail in this instance, to prevent an arms race reminiscent of the most dangerous time in the history of the world.

### AT: Assurances---2NC

#### Ukraine shoots non-prolif.

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel 22, O'Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution; Riedel, senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project; 3-29-2022, "The Russia-Ukraine war may be bad news for nuclear nonproliferation," https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/03/29/the-russia-ukraine-war-may-be-bad-news-for-nuclear-nonproliferation/, jy

Alas, though some arms control advocates would like to argue that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack on one’s territory, recent world events confirm that nuclear weapons can have another plausible purpose for some countries. For smaller or weaker states, owning nuclear weapons helps ensure that a large country will not be able to attack them and overthrow their government. Or, at least, the converse is true — NOT having nukes clearly leaves one vulnerable.

Just ask Saddam Hussein, who did not have nuclear weapons, about the 2003 Iraq war. Or Moammar Gadhafi, who also did not have nuclear weapons, about the 2011 NATO air campaign launched against Libya after he threatened to exterminate domestic opponents. Of course, we cannot really ask them — because not only are their regimes gone, they are dead, as a direct consequence of wars that they could not deter with conventional arms alone.

Watching all this, Kim Jong Un had already made the calculation, long before the Ukraine war, that he would cherish the North Korean nuclear weapons that his grandfather and father had bequeathed him. Our efforts to persuade him to denuclearize have failed under U.S. President Joe Biden’s four immediate predecessors, and the Biden team itself appears to be putting little effort into the quest itself, perhaps out of recognition that the task is just too hard if attempted in absolutist terms.

North Korea is not alone. Twenty four years ago we tried to persuade Pakistan not to test nuclear weapons after India had done so. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott led a team to Islamabad to make the case. Then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reluctantly said he had no choice, and, buoyed by Saudi money and his Chinese ally, Pakistan tested.

Now we watch a Ukrainian regime vilified as “Nazi” in nature by Russian propaganda fighting for its territory, as well as its existence as a country — and indeed the personal survival of its leadership. Can there be any doubt that Putin would prefer the dismemberment and annexation of Ukraine — Putin has repeatedly called into doubt the very concept of Ukraine as a sovereign state — and the capture or killing of its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, given the way Putin has demonized him? When aggressors have extremist, existential goals like these, nuclear theorists rightly argue that nuclear weapons alas CAN be relevant, for threatening unacceptable retaliation to any such attack and thereby deterring it.

At the end of the Cold War, Ukraine had the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. The fact that, in 1994, Ukraine returned to Russia almost 2,000 nuclear weapons that it had inherited from the breakup of the Soviet Union — receiving in reply a guarantee, in the form of the Budapest Memorandum (also signed by the U.K. and U.S.) that Ukraine would not be attacked — adds insult to the injury. Presumably Kyiv would like to take that decision back, given Russia’s subsequent behavior.

Some countries will draw two lessons, neither in the interest of the United States, from this history. If you have nuclear weapons, keep them. If you don’t have them yet, get them, especially if you lack a strong defender like the United States as your ally, and if you have beef with a big country that could plausibly lead to war.

Thinking through similar hypothetical scenarios 60 years ago, President John F. Kennedy predicted that there would be at least 25 nuclear weapons powers in the course of the 20th century. Luckily, he was wrong, and today we still have only nine. But the reasons for Kennedy’s fears persist; in fact, recent events have exacerbated and magnified them.

There is no simple solution to this problem, and we certainly do not propose that the United States enter the Ukraine war and fight a nuclear superpower today to reduce the risks of nuclear nonproliferation tomorrow. That would be oxymoronic in the extreme.

However, there are other more practical implications of this analysis. One is clearly that the Biden team and U.S. government, more broadly, should be working as hard as possible, not only to help Ukraine defend itself, but to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict that preserves intact most or all of Ukraine’s territory as well as its government. Otherwise, beyond the further damage done to Ukraine and its people, the resulting precedent will be terrible for the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. Second, we need to be more careful about promising alliance expansion when we don’t really mean it. NATO proposed, back in 2008, that Ukraine would someday be invited to join the alliance — but with no timetable and no interim security guarantee. That had the net effect of painting a bullseye on Kyiv’s back that Russia has now targeted. Third, where we do have allies and alliances, we need to be resolute and consistent in conveying our seriousness about defending them. Biden is doing this latter job well, but his predecessor did not.

If we fail in these efforts, Kennedy’s prediction about the spread of nuclear weapons may wind up just being premature, not wrong. That would be a very dangerous and regrettable outcome for the future of international security.

#### No prolif spread nor escalation.

Mueller 17 – John Mueller, Political Science Professor at Ohio State University. [Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism, CATO Handbook for Policymakers, 8th Edition, <https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-handbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-76_0.pdf>]

However, nuclear proliferation is unlikely to accelerate or prove to be a major danger. Terrorists are likely to continue to find that obtaining and using nuclear weapons is exceedingly difficult. And aggressive counterproliferation policies can generate costs far higher than those likely to be inflicted by the proliferation problem they seek to address. Those policies need careful reconsideration.

Nuclear Proliferation

Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, nuclear powers have found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. If the recent efforts to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been successful, those efforts have done Iran a favor.

There has never been a militarily compelling reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because it has not been possible to identify suitable targets—or targets that couldn’t be attacked as effectively by conventional munitions. Conceivably, conditions exist under which nuclear weapons could serve a deterrent function, but there is little reason to suspect that they have been necessary to deter war thus far, even during the Cold War. The main Cold War contestants have never believed that a repetition of World War II, whether embellished by nuclear weapons or not, is remotely in their interests.

Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be crucial status symbols. How much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or much less if they had none? Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth or its Olympics?

Those considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear proliferation. Most famously, in the 1960s, President John Kennedy anticipated that in another decade “fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.” Yet, of the dozens of technologically capable countries that have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, very few have done so. Insofar as most leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons, they have come to appreciate several drawbacks of doing so: nuclear weapons are dangerous, costly, and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as the University of Southern California’s Jacques Hymans has demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult for administratively dysfunctional countries to obtain—it took decades for North Korea and Pakistan to do so. In consequence, alarmist predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points of no return have proved faulty.

Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not because the only countries to get nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries that acquired the bomb were run at the time by unchallenged—perhaps certifiably deranged—monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who, in 1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong, who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished.

Some also fear that a country might use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” its area. That argument was used with dramatic urgency before 2003 when Saddam Hussein supposedly posed great danger, and it has been frequently applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination is to be carried out is never made clear. The notion, apparently, is this: should an atomic rogue state rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would bow to its demands. Far more likely, threatened states would make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries (including nuclear ones) against the threatening neighbor. That is how countries coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s region-threatening invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Yet another concern has been that the weapons will go off, by accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process: the weapons exist in the thousands, sooner or later one or more of them will inevitably go off. But those prognostications have now failed to deliver for 70 years. That time period suggests something more than luck is operating. Moreover, the notion that if one nuclear weapon goes off in one place, the world will necessarily be plunged into thermonuclear cataclysm should remain in the domain of Hollywood scriptwriters.

### AT: Assurances---Spicy---2NC

#### The non-prolif regime is unsustainable---BUT, reigning it back solves nuclear escalation.

Stephen M. Walt 21, 3-23-21, "It’s Time to Fold America’s Nuclear Umbrella," https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/23/its-time-to-fold-americas-nuclear-umbrella/, jy

“Europe needs to build up the nuclear dimension of its defense efforts, including by retaining and modernizing capabilities for existing NATO nuclear missions and by France and Britain working together to extend their nuclear deterrents to their European allies.”

Why is this statement so intriguing? Because it shows the authors of this report recognize that Europe as a whole might be more secure if it could rely on a locally based deterrent instead of continuing to shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And if that is true for the nations of Europe, then it might well be true for others. Although the report’s authors are opposed to new states joining the nuclear club (Britain and France are already members), their statement clearly implies that deterrence would be strengthened if states facing serious external threats had a nuclear guarantee that didn’t depend on Uncle Sam.

This is hardly a new issue. Since fairly early in the nuclear age, the United States has used nuclear weapons to “extend deterrence” and shield some of its allies. It sought to convince potential adversaries that the United States might use its formidable nuclear arsenal if these allies were attacked, even if the United States was not. Of course, there was always some chance that a war involving one of the United States’ allies might escalate to the nuclear level, either by accident, through inadvertence, or via deliberate decision, no matter what U.S. leaders said in advance. Even so, Washington went to considerable lengths to make its nuclear umbrella credible, partly to discourage enemies from attacking but also to convince its allies not to get nuclear weapons themselves.

Accordingly, U.S. leaders made lots of public statements linking the U.S. arsenal to its core alliance commitments, and NATO drew up various plans and doctrinal pronouncements designed to reinforce perceptions of a reliable U.S. guarantee. The United States also deployed thousands of warheads on some of its allies’ territory, along with dual-key arrangements that gave those allies some say in how, when, or if these fearsome weapons got used. Lastly, and very importantly, the United States kept trying to achieve a meaningful degree of nuclear superiority to make a possible first use of nuclear weapons to defend allies more credible. Instead of acquiring a “minimum deterrent” (i.e., retaliatory forces that could survive any possible attack and then inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor), U.S. war plans and weapons decisions always focused on trying to come out on top in the awful event of an actual nuclear war.

Why did the United States do this? In good part because convincing people you might use nuclear weapons to defend an ally isn’t easy. One might imagine a U.S. president using nuclear weapons to retaliate against a direct attack on U.S. territory or to deter the extremely unlikely prospect of a conventional invasion that threatened U.S. independence. This is the one thing nuclear weapons are good for: deterring existential threats to their possessors’ independence or autonomy. This form of deterrence (sometimes termed “basic” or “Type I”) works because the deterring side will almost certainly care more about preserving its own independence than a potential attacker is likely to care about trying to take it away. Because the balance of resolve favors the defender, even much weaker nuclear powers can deter enemies from attacking them directly. If you don’t find this argument persuasive, remember the U.S. attacked non-nuclear Iraq in 2003 and non-nuclear Libya in 2011, but it leaves nuclear-armed North Korea alone.

By contrast, deterring a conventional or a nuclear attack on an ally by threatening to go nuclear—and convincing your allies that you really mean it—is more challenging. It is one thing to threaten to use nuclear weapons to keep one’s own country from being subjugated but quite another to do so to save an ally from defeat or domination. Or, as people used to wonder back in the Cold War, would a U.S. president really risk Washington or Chicago to save Paris or Berlin? Long after they had left office, a few former U.S. officials suggested the answer was almost certainly “no.” Extended deterrence could still work because potential attackers can’t be sure about any of this, but it still isn’t as credible as deterring attacks on one’s own territory.

The solution to this conundrum—if one can call it that—is to achieve overwhelming “nuclear superiority.” If you could wipe out an adversary’s entire nuclear force in a first strike, you wouldn’t have to fear its retaliation, and using nuclear weapons to defend an ally would be much more credible. Even if a splendid first strike were not possible, perhaps you could convince a potential attacker that it will end up even worse off than you are at the end of a nuclear war to convince it not to put so much as a toe on the first rung of the escalation ladder.

Thus, the perceived need to extend deterrence is one of the reasons why the United States has long sought nuclear superiority. It’s not the only reason: A genuine first strike capability could limit damage in the event of an actual war. A few commentators have also tried to argue—not very convincingly—that superiority would enable the stronger side to coerce weaker states in crises. Chasing the holy grail of a first-strike advantage was also popular with defense contractors and parts of the armed services because it requires spending billions of dollars annually on more and more accurate weapons, more efficient and destructive warheads, improved surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and lots of other shiny objects.

Interestingly, a number of sophisticated scholars have recently claimed that technological advances have put the United States on the brink of a true first-strike capability. Perhaps in theory, but certainly not as a usable option. To see why, ask yourself what you would do if you were president and facing a serious crisis with a nuclear-armed adversary. You’ve put the armed services on alert, and there is some danger that force might be used and fighting could escalate. Suppose your military advisors and intelligence experts tell you if you order a first strike now, you can almost certainly destroy the enemy’s entire nuclear arsenal, leaving the United States unscathed and in an ideal position to resolve the dispute on favorable terms.

Being a sensible person, you’d undoubtedly ask them: “Can you guarantee that? Are you absolutely, 100 percent sure the enemy will have zero usable weapons left, and therefore, we won’t even get our hair mussed?”

“We are highly confident of success,” you are told. “But there is a slim chance that a few enemy weapons would survive and reach U.S. soil. No more than one to three.”

Even if you weren’t troubled by the moral issues involved in ordering an attack that would kill untold numbers of people (and you ought to be), would you do it? Of course you wouldn’t, because you wouldn’t want to risk losing New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, or any other major U.S. city, which is what might happen if that first strike you authorized turned out to be just a tiny bit less effective than your advisors predicted. To issue a launch order, you’d have to believe the proposed attack would work perfectly the very first time it was executed (simulations and exercises aren’t the same), almost all of the missiles and bombs that have been sitting in silos or storage facilities for years would work as designed, and the other side wouldn’t have dispersed its own forces or hidden some extra weapons in places you had failed to detect. Based on everything the United States’ knows about complex military operations and the limits of intelligence, you’d be a fool to roll the dice in this way.

One more thing: As first-strike capabilities improve, adversaries may respond by keeping forces on higher alert or adopting “launch-on-warning” procedures that increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent war. No matter what U.S. forces are capable of in theory, in short, it’s hard to see how any president would be willing to use nukes first even if the probability of “success” was extremely high. This reality casts further doubt on the whole idea of extended deterrence, insofar as it is based on the threat to deliberately escalate to the nuclear level if a key ally is in danger of being conquered.

Extending a protective umbrella over allies in Europe and Asia may have made good sense during the Cold War, both to protect them and to discourage proliferation. But the nuclear weapons environment has changed: The number of nuclear-armed states has crept upward, and several countries (India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom) are increasing the size of their own arsenals (though they remain far lower than U.S. or Russian levels). Moreover, the United States is not as tightly coupled to some of its traditional allies as it was during the Cold War, and serious rifts may continue to grow despite the Biden administration’s efforts to restore alliance solidarity and reassert U.S. leadership.

Which raises the obvious question: Does it still make sense to shield allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Using the threat of nuclear use to protect other countries is not cost- or risk-free, and it may even be more dangerous than letting some other states acquire arsenals of their own and encouraging them to rely on “Type I” deterrence provided by their own national capabilities.

This view has been advanced before—most notably by Kenneth Waltz in a controversial Adelphi Paper 40 years ago. Waltz was not advocating giving other states the bomb or arguing that the rapid spread of nuclear weapons would be desirable; his central point was that trying to prevent the slow spread of these weapons was not without costs of its own and that in some cases, as he put it, “more may be better.” The question is: Is that becoming the case today?

To be sure, folding the nuclear umbrella might well have some negative effects. It might make states long accustomed to U.S. protection question its commitment (though there’s no logical reason for them to do so if it is still in the United States’ interest to aid their defense in other ways). It could also reduce U.S. influence or leverage if certain allies were no longer as dependent on U.S. protection, though folding the umbrella would not eliminate their reliance on other elements of U.S. power. Removing the U.S. nuclear guarantee might encourage a few states to pursue nuclear arms of their own, but it is not obvious that acquisition by Japan or Germany would be a terrible outcome from a purely U.S. perspective.

Moreover, even the possibility that these states might take over responsibility for deterring attacks on their own territory could have a sobering effect on a rising China and a recalcitrant Russia. In particular, it would remind Beijing and Moscow that their own behavior will affect the strategic calculations that their neighbors make in the near future, including decisions about nuclear arms. If China doesn’t want to face more nuclear weapons states in its immediate region, for instance, then its leaders should start asking themselves what they can do to make those neighbors feel less need for additional protection. The obvious answer: Stop harassing them in various ways, drop the sharp-elbowed approach to diplomacy, stick to agreements previously reached, and do more to resolve existing disputes on a fair-minded basis.

Whatever Washington ultimately chooses to do with its nuclear umbrella, the more important task is to move beyond the tendency to see nuclear weapons as potent signs of status, indispensable tools of statecraft, or powerful sources of leverage. Nuclear weapons are extremely useful for deterring direct and all-out attacks on one’s own homeland but not much else. For that purpose, a great power doesn’t need an enormous arsenal or some hypothetical capability to “fight and win” a nuclear exchange. All it needs is a stockpile that can survive an enemy attack and be able to respond in kind. Properly concealed or protected, they don’t need to be poised and ready to strike at a moment’s notice. Fetishizing the bomb and using it to try to protect others isn’t just expensive; it may also be dangerous.

### AT: Deterrence---2NC

#### Ukraine thumps.

Hal Brands 22, 4-5-2022, "Putin’s Ukraine Invasion Showed Biden’s Failure at Deterrence," https://www.aei.org/op-eds/putins-ukraine-invasion-showed-bidens-failure-at-deterrence/, jy

The Putin Paradox

When it became clear, in late 2021, that Putin was mobilizing for a potential invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration faced a dilemma. America has a compelling interest in preventing revisionist powers from destabilizing the global system through large-scale aggression — and in preventing Russia from overrunning Ukraine and threatening NATO’s entire eastern periphery.

Yet Ukraine is not a U.S. treaty ally. It is located on the wrong side of the world for a superpower hoping to focus on China. It was being threatened by a dictator with a penchant for risk-taking and thousands of nuclear weapons. And America’s military posture in Europe was so minimal that the Pentagon might have anticipated great difficulty defending Ukraine even had Biden wanted to. The result was a deep, and obvious, ambivalence in U.S. policy.

U.S. officials repeatedly stated that they sought to deter Putin from invading. Yet Biden simultaneously took the use of force off the table early in the crisis. This left the administration relying on a form of deterrence that was very creative but not very integrated.

The administration began with “deterrence by disclosure” — the release of detailed intelligence to reveal Putin’s plans, frustrate his deceptions and rally an international coalition. This enabled Washington and its allies to threaten Russia with sharp, multilateral economic sanctions.

The administration also promised that Moscow would suffer adverse strategic consequences, such as additional U.S. and NATO force deployments in Eastern Europe. Finally, the West rapidly bolstered Ukrainian military capabilities, raising the price Russia would pay if Putin pounced.

This was classic deterrence by punishment. The U.S. was not threatening to prevent Russia from conquering Ukraine — the military element of integrated deterrence was absent. Biden was threatening Putin with a bundle of penalties that would leave Russia weaker even if it accomplished its military objectives.

When Putin attacked, in late February, the democratic world showed, as one U.S. official put it, that the U.S. and its allies could indeed use their economic power to “absolutely pummel aggressors.” Official and private-sector sanctions are causing shortages of basic goods and a degree of financial and technological isolation Moscow clearly did not expect. The U.S. has pursued a “new kind of economic statecraft with the power to inflict damage that rivals military might,” Biden has said. Meanwhile, Ukrainian resistance, bolstered by Western weapons, has put Moscow in a military vise.

Yet it is hard to take seriously the Pentagon’s boast that “integrated deterrence comes out smelling pretty good,” because Putin — in invading Ukraine — did exactly what America tried to prevent him from doing. And had Putin been less greedy, ordered only a limited operation in Donbas or elsewhere, he might have succeeded in grabbing Ukrainian territory without suffering global blowback. So why did integrated deterrence fail?

Biden Said Too Much

One answer involves an inherent problem with deterrence-by-punishment — it can be hard to signal, before an act of aggression, how bad the eventual punishment will be. Had the West credibly and explicitly threatened to do what it actually did — killing the Nord Stream II pipeline, sanctioning Russia’s central bank, booting Russian financial institutions from the SWIFT global payments system, and so on — perhaps Putin might have reconsidered. As Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov admitted, “No one” in Moscow anticipated “what sanctions the West might apply.”

The problem, though, was that not even Western officials knew how far they would go until Putin tried to erase Ukraine from the map. By the time that reaction came, deterrence had already failed.

A second answer is that Washington botched the application of deterrent threats. To be clear, Biden mostly deserves high marks in managing this crisis. The administration is waging an extremely successful proxy war against Russian forces. But Biden’s declaratory policy — the effort to shape Putin’s incentives through precisely worded statements — has been a disaster.

While it is undoubtedly important to avoid a great-power military showdown over Ukraine, removing any threat of American intervention simply ensured that Putin didn’t have to worry about matters getting out of hand. Similarly, Biden’s offhand remark that the allies would simply bicker among themselves in the event of a “limited incursion” was probably accurate — and it probably gave Putin hope that he could split the opposing coalition.

The third answer is the most sobering. Perhaps Putin simply valued the subordination of Ukraine, and the restoration of a Russian empire, so highly that anything short of the threat of a major war with the West would have failed to move him. If so, then the one thing that might have deterred Putin was the one thing that U.S. and Western officials were unwilling — whether wisely or unwisely — to contemplate.

Calculated Risks

That’s a problem, because Ukraine isn’t the last great-power military crisis the U.S. will face. The threat of economic and financial sanctions alone probably won’t prevent Xi Jinping from attacking Taiwan, in part because it would be far harder for the democratic world to do to China — with its larger, more globally integrated economy — what it has done to Russia. Even if Putin doesn’t attack a NATO country, he or a successor could provoke another showdown in Eastern Europe involving Finland, Sweden or Belarus.

Moreover, deterrence doesn’t stop when the war begins, and America still faces hard questions about how to deter Russia in Ukraine. As Moscow struggles to achieve its objectives, it could take several actions — employing chemical weapons, striking neighboring states that support Ukraine, or further escalating its brutal siege tactics — that would dramatically increase the damage or even lead to a wider war.

So far, however, Biden has been wobbly in applying the calculated risk-taking that deterrence requires.

When Putin first raised the alert status of his nuclear forces, Biden canceled a scheduled U.S. missile test — a demonstration of responsibility, but also of a proclivity for restraint when confronted with even the vaguest risk of escalation. Then, on March 11, Biden promised to defend “every inch of NATO,” while also pledging to stay out of Ukraine at all costs, given that intervention would cause “World War III.”

Of course, saying that virtually nothing could prompt direct U.S. intervention in Ukraine may make Putin feel that he has license to escalate. And if any war with Russia would indeed be “World War III,” then would Washington really defend even its NATO allies in a crisis?

Biden has subsequently tried to clean up some of these statements, and his administration may be signaling privately that there are forms of escalation it will not tolerate. Yet when it comes to a problem we haven’t faced in decades — deterring major aggression by a nuclear-armed adversary — America is still shaking off the rust.

#### The sole question for this debate is where to spend finite resources. Russia is defensive and limited in power, whereas China is seeking international power. An axis is the worst scenario.

Brahma Chellaney 22, prof of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research New Delhi, 2-14-22, “America Is Focusing on the Wrong Enemy,” <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-threat-to-us-global-leadership-is-china-not-russia-by-brahma-chellaney-2022-02>?, jy

This may explain why US President Joe Biden is treating a “rogue” Russia as a peer competitor, when he should be focused on the challenge from America’s actual peer, China. In comparison to Russia, China’s population is about ten times bigger, its economy is almost ten times larger, and its military expenditure is around four times greater. Not only is China more powerful; it genuinely seeks to supplant the US as the preeminent global power. By contrast, with its military buildup on Ukraine’s borders, Russia is seeking to mitigate a perceived security threat in its neighborhood.

Hastening the decline of US global leadership is hardly the preserve of Democrats. A bipartisan parade of US leaders has failed to recognize that the post-Cold War unipolar world order, characterized by unchallenged US economic and military predominance, is long gone. The US squandered its “unipolar moment,” especially by waging an expensive and amorphous “Global War on Terrorism,” including several military interventions, and through its treatment of Russia.

After its Cold War victory, the US essentially took an extended victory lap, pursuing strategic maneuvers that flaunted its dominance. Notably, it sought to expand NATO to Russia’s backyard, but made little effort to bring Russia into the Western fold, as it had done with Germany and Japan after World War II. The souring of relations with the Kremlin contributed to Russia’s eventual remilitarization.

So, while the US remains the world’s foremost military power, it has been stretched thin by the decisions and commitments it has made, in Europe and elsewhere, since 1991. This goes a long way toward explaining why the US has ruled out deploying its own troops to defend Ukraine today. What the US is offering Ukraine – weapons and ammunition – cannot protect the country from Russia, which has an overwhelming military advantage.

But US leaders made another fatal mistake since the Cold War: by aiding China’s rise, they helped to create the greatest rival their country has ever faced. Unfortunately, they have yet to learn from this. Instead, the US continues to dedicate insufficient attention and resources to an excessively wide array of global issues, from Russian revanchism and Chinese aggression to lesser threats in the Middle East and Africa and on the Korean Peninsula. And it continues inadvertently to bolster China’s global influence, not least through its overuse of sanctions.

For example, by barring friends and allies from importing Iranian oil, two successive US administrations enabled China not only to secure oil at a hefty discount, but also to become a top investor in – and security partner of – the Islamic Republic. US sanctions have similarly pushed resource-rich Myanmar into China’s arms. As Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, whose country has faced a US arms embargo over its ties to China, asked last year, “If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on?”

Russia has been asking itself the same question. Though Russia and China kept each other at arm’s length for decades, US-led sanctions introduced after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea drove President Vladimir Putin to pursue a closer strategic partnership with China. The bilateral relationship is likely to deepen, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. But the raft of harsh new sanctions the US has promised to implement in the event of a Russian invasion will accelerate this shift significantly, with China as the big winner.

The heavy financial penalties the US has planned – including the “nuclear option” of disconnecting Russian banks from the international SWIFT payments system – would turn China into Russia’s banker, enabling it to reap vast profits and expand the international use of its currency, the renminbi. If Biden fulfilled his pledge to block the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is set to deliver Russian supplies directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, China would gain greater access to Russian energy.

In fact, by securing a commitment from Putin this month to a nearly tenfold increase in Russian natural gas exports, China is building a safety net that could – in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan – withstand Western energy sanctions and even a blockade. China could also benefit militarily by demanding greater access to Russian military technology in exchange for its support.

For the US, a strengthened Russia-China axis is the worst possible outcome of the Ukraine crisis. The best outcome would be a compromise with Russia to ensure that it does not invade and possibly annex Ukraine. By enabling the US to avoid further entanglement in Europe, this would permit a more realistic balancing of key objectives – especially checking Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific – with available resources and capabilities.

The future of the US-led international order will be decided in Asia, and China is currently doing everything in its power to ensure that order’s demise. Already, China is powerful enough that it can host the Winter Olympics even as it carries out a genocide against Muslims in the Xinjiang region, with limited pushback. If the Biden administration does not recognize the true scale of the threat China poses, and adopt an appropriately targeted strategy soon, whatever window of opportunity for preserving US preeminence remains may well close.

#### Defensive realism explains Russian behavior. They’re realist and status seeking. Failure to reciprocate causes nuclear war.

Roger Boyd 22, PhD, Fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, 3-16-2022, "A realist take on the Ukraine war," https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/a-realist-take-on-the-ukraine-war, jy

No conflict “just happens,” it is an historical process and therefore we must look at that process. I propose that we start with the collapse of the Soviet Union; a time when the “peace dividend” was widely proclaimed. It has now been comprehensively documented that a number of US state officials made explicit promises that with the unification of Germany the Western NATO alliance would not move any further east. Instead, a neutral Eastern Europe was envisaged, especially by the Russians, as a way of ensuring an enduring peace. With the collapse of Russia into a depression worse than that suffered by the US in the 1930s, and the weakness of the Russian leadership of Boris Yelstin, such considerations were thrown aside.

In 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the ranks of NATO members. In 2004, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were added; with Latvia and Estonia sharing borders with the main part of Russia—the latter not far away from the major Russian city of St. Petersburg. Several years later, at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated his discomfort and alarm at the eastward march of NATO. His concerns were rejected out of hand by the West. Then came the 2008 war with Georgia, which was partly triggered by tensions arising from Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili seeking NATO membership. At this time, Belarus was ruled by Alexander Lukashenko, a dictator who attempted to balance between East and West, while Ukraine was governed by the Western-leaning Viktor Yushchenko (after the 2004 Orange Revolution that led to the overturning of the election of the Russian-leaning Viktor Yanukovych) who stated a desire to join the EU and NATO. Russia’s concerns about having a large Western-aligned state only 500 kilometres from Moscow were partly assuaged with the election of Yanukovych in 2010.

Then came the fateful events of 2014, as Yanukovych struggled to balance between the EU and Russia, leading to his rejection of an EU association agreement that would have significantly damaged trade relations with Russia and aligned Ukrainian foreign policy more with that of the West. At this time, a compromise agreement between the EU and Russia would have maintained the balance in Ukraine and helped allay Russia’s security concerns, but that was not forthcoming.

At this point we should stop and think about what the response of the US would have been to, for example, a Cold War alliance between Canada and the Soviet Union. Indeed, any reasonable person would assume either a US-inspired coup or an outright invasion. Belarus and Ukraine are to Russia what Canada and Mexico are to the US. Instead of a compromise agreement, the elected president of Ukraine was deposed in a coup—openly supported by Western politicians and diplomats who spent significant time in Maidan Square egging the protesters on—that installed an extremely anti-Russian administration. Imagine Russian politicians and diplomats publicly endorsing protestors against the current Canadian government who amassed outside parliament last month. Of course, the US would be extremely concerned, just as Russia was in 2014.

In response to the Maidan coup, Russia acted to maintain its national interests, including its massive naval base in Crimea. The debate over whether this was a breakaway region freely voting to join Russia or an annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia is an endless one, but it is pointless from a realist point of view. Russia secured its security by maintaining its naval base in the Black Sea and making sure that such a base did not fall into the hands of the West. Russia also supplied arms and support to the two breakaway republics in the southwestern Donbas region, full of Russian speaking Ukrainians who did not wish to be ruled by a Ukrainian nationalist government.

Since 2014 Ukraine has become increasingly aligned with the West, signing the EU association agreement and accepting extensive military training, coordination and munitions from Western nations, including Canada. Its leaders have increasingly called for membership of both the EU and NATO, with those calls escalating recently with little pushback from the West. Last year, Putin stated Russia’s security redlines, which included a Ukraine in NATO but again these were treated with disdain. Even his promises of a “military-technical” response by Russia were not heeded, and the Ukrainian president’s calls for Ukraine to become a nuclear power were not rejected by Western leaders.

Ultimately, Russia acted out of its rational self-interest after all of its calls for a non-military resolution to its legitimate, and actually existential, security concerns had been rejected. Russia invaded Ukraine and will turn it into a Russia-aligned nation, securing its own security; any commentators who think that Russia is not militarily capable of doing such a thing are ignorant of the basic facts on the ground and the Russian military.

All war is of course a horrible thing, as is the ongoing genocidal war in Yemen by a Saudi Arabia that Canada arms, as was the illegal war of aggression against Iraq by our ally the US, and as was the destruction of the state of Libya by NATO. Those who cry out against the civilian deaths in Ukraine must take time to consider why those other deaths aren’t as important, just as with the over 13,000 civilian deaths in the Donbas in the last eight years caused chiefly by Ukrainian government forces and pro-Kyiv militias. The answer is of course that they are not different, just some of the killing is done by those our state considers to be allies and some by those it considers to be enemies.

A realist analysis puts such considerations to one side and allows us to rationally assess what actions are appropriate; just as cooler heads prevailed during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and saved the world from nuclear annihilation. To get lost in our own propaganda is incredibly dangerous when our opponent is a nuclear power capable of ending human civilization.

This should be a time for reflection on the Western policy establishment’s responsibility for creating an existential threat to Russia that should have been expected to lead to a major response. The sanctions currently being leveled against the Russian economy are unlikely to dissuade Putin, and Russia has extensively prepared for them; it is a massive exporter of raw materials that the world cannot do without, and the ‘international community’ outside the West has refused to sanction Russia.

The extensive damage to Western economies, especially Europe, through the range of sanctions enacted, are currently being exacerbated through the theft of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves. The West benefits hugely from the current global financial system based upon the US dollar, but it has now been displayed that the West thinks nothing of outright theft and financial warfare. The previous cases of Iran, Venezuela, and Afghanistan were relatively small. The case of Russia is large enough to catch other nation’s attention and lead them to create a parallel financial system.

What’s more, Western statements of support, no matter how fulsome, come to nothing when a real war starts with a country that possesses a highly competent military and nuclear weapons. Ukraine in reality is on its own against Russia, no matter how many Western sanctions are implemented or how much material is provided. Other nations will take note of this.

Reflection does not seem to be in order though, as the US has threatened nations who have refused to sanction Russia. The most profound outcome of such threats may be a reconciliation of India with China, and a closer relationship between India and its erstwhile ally Russia. This is not 1995, and the West can no longer push nations such as India around without significant blowback.

After the Cuban missile crisis, the US leadership realized that it must treat the Soviet Union with some respect if nuclear war was to be averted. The West must now learn to respect other nation’s security needs if it wants to avoid becoming increasingly separated from the rest of the world. As the philosopher Mike Tyson put it so well, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.” The Russian invasion is the West’s punch in the mouth, and it desperately needs a new plan.

### AT: Deterrence---Extra---2NC

#### Fear the Chinese dragon over the Russian bear.

Sakshi Tiwari 22, MA Defence and National Security, 5-4-22, With ‘Resources, Capability & Intent’, China Remains The Biggest, Long-Time Threat To US Than Russia — USAF, <https://eurasiantimes.com/china-remains-the-biggest-long-time-threat-to-us-than-russia/>, jy

China’s Quest For ‘Worldwide Influence’

One reason why China could be seen as a bigger challenger than Russia is because of its GDP. Nitin J Ticku, a defense expert and managing editor of the EurAsian Times says — forget Russia, even the USSR was never as rich as China is today. Chinese military spending is roughly four times that of Russia and could bypass the overall American economy in a decade. These are ominous signs for the US.

The major difference between the two US adversaries is — Russia is interested in territorial gains that would allow it to secure its frontiers from an expansionist NATO and, China, on the other hand, seeks to dominate the international landscape and wrest the hegemony that has been held by the US since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

China has been marching towards regions that have traditionally been the American sphere of influence and threatening the status quo, which is often seen as a threat to the security of the regional US allies.

Closer home, China has territorial disputes with several South-East Asian countries in the South China Sea. Beijing claims practically the entire region and has used intimidation as a tactic to corner the smaller states (aligned with the US) that it has disputes with — including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. It has built artificial islands to further secure its ownership and militarized them, against warnings.

A controversy had erupted when a US admiral revealed in March that China had fully militarized three islands in the region with anti-ship and anti-missile systems – understood as an attempt to bolster its A2/AD capability.

In its neighborhood, China remains marred in a border conflict with the strategic partner of the United States and the cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific policy, India.

Both nations fought a brief but bitter war in 1962 and recently were involved in a bloody confrontation along the disputed Himalayan border.

Besides, China is also arming India’s bitter enemy, Pakistan with cutting-edge equipment to challenge India’s influence in the region, cultivating Islamabad’s Navy to function as a PLA proxy until Beijing can exponentially enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).

China has also constructed a military base in Africa on Djibouti Island and is expanding far and wide into the African continent through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Africa has traditionally been in the British, French, and American spheres of influence.

Though Indo-Pacific rivals led by the US have come up with a counter-initiative called the Blue Dot Network, they are still years away from reaching the scale of investment and trade that Beijing currently enjoys. Its (Chinese) massive capital and military power have been instrumental in its quest to Africa.

However, the most significant flashpoint between the US and China goes through the Taiwan Strait. China has vowed to reunite Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, with force if necessary.

Despite accepting the One-China policy, the US has extended military support to Taipei and remains the biggest obstacle for China to gobble Taiwan.

Another major stakeholder in the Taiwan issue is a staunch US ally, Japan. By its location close to Taiwan, any aggression against the island state is expected to draw Japan into the conflict which could risk a direct military confrontation between China and the US.

According to Pacific Commander in the US Air Force, Kenneth Wilsbach, China has very sophisticated Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities along its coast to repel any possible attack on itself. If an armed confrontation was to take place between the US and China, the latter would have a homeland advantage against the US.

Another region where China’s growing influence is threatening the US and its ally, Australia, is the Pacific region. China recently concluded a security pact with the Solomon Islands which has raised concerns about a potential military base just about 2,000 kilometers from Australia.

China’s growing influence among the Pacific Island Countries (PIC) also threatens the existing regional order where Canberra is the first responder.

Further, China has also stationed missiles like the DF-26 that threaten American assets as far as Guam, which hosts a critical American military base in the region.

The heat has been felt by Australia which is now in the process of developing its nuke submarine equipped with nuclear propulsion technology sourced from the US and the UK under the AUKUS agreement. The three partners will also cooperate on the development of hypersonic missiles as was announced recently.

China has also made inroads into the Latin American region, riding on the plank of the Belt and Road Initiative. The region is the United States’ backyard where it has historically exerted influence and on several occasions, even by suppressing popular movements.

Chinese investment and its growing influence in the Caribbean region is a clear red line given that Venezuela and Cuba already favor Russia.

In a surprising turn of events, China has also now reached as far as Siberia in Europe. In a semi-secret mission that took place earlier, Chinese transport aircraft YJ-20 delivered surface to air missile system to Siberia passing through Turkish and the airspace of other European nations.

A common pattern among all these regions is the Chinese ambition of dismantling the existing world order to slowly make space for itself next to the US and then gradually assuming the role of a global hegemon – a reputation that has so far only been enjoyed by the United States.

On top of that, the fact that China is a close ally of Russia is also detrimental to the interests of the US. It has issued several warnings to China against supplementing Russia or helping it circumvent global sanctions but doubts persist.

China has not only refused to condemn Russia for the invasion of Ukraine but also reinforced its relationship with Moscow.

China’s Robust Military Advancement

China’s stupendous military rise has unsettled the United States whose military prowess is being constantly challenged by the People’s Liberation Army.

A US Congressional report had earlier mentioned that the Chinese Navy has the largest naval fleet by size. China, according to US Navy Chief Admiral Michael Gilday, is a formidable military enemy that is constantly developing and achieving its goals years ahead of schedule, putting pressure on the US Navy.

The US Air Force has also accepted China’s air prowess. US Air Force Chief Charles Brown had earlier said that China would be able to surpass the US Air dominance by 2035. He had said that the PLA had “the largest aviation forces in the Pacific” and had created them “underneath our nose”.

A domain where the US trails behind not just China but also Russia is the hypersonic weapons program. Both China and Russia have operational hypersonic missiles, with Russia even using its missile in the Ukrainian invasion.

However, the US is still some time away from fielding a weapon. However, efforts are on to achieve that objective in full earnest and the HAWC test conducted by the US secretly in the recent past was hailed as a success.

The US faces a serious challenge from China, even in space. After the International Space Station retires sometime around 2030, China could be the only country to operate a space station, that too single-handedly.

So while the US is having to dole out significant resources for Ukraine, it recognizes the threat from Russia will not last forever and that the Chinese dragon is only going to get bigger and bigger.

### AT: Deterrence---Mearsheimer---2NC

#### Mearsheimer is a contradictory joker. Walt is the savior of realism.

Peter Henne 22, Associate Prof of Political Science at the U of Vermont, 3-3-2022, "A tale of two realisms," https://www.duckofminerva.com/2022/03/a-tale-of-two-realisms.html, jy

It’s been a rough week for John Mearsheimer. He has come under a barrage of criticism for his claim that Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine is the West’s fault. His theoretical tradition, realism, has also come under fire, for producing not only (arguably) bad policy takes but policy takes that don’t seem to flow from the theory itself. Does this mean that all of realism is flawed? I would argue no, by pointing to another target of such claims, Stephen Walt. This says something about how to make/keep realism relevant.

THE TROUBLE WITH REALISM?

Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Mearsheimer’s statements on US-Russian tensions circulated widely on Twitter; he argued that the post-Cold War expansion of NATO threatened Russia, leading to Putin’s aggressive moves. After Russia’s invasion, as the world pulled together in opposition to Russia’s actions, he became the target of widespread criticism for his views, as encapsulated by this New Yorker interview.

Most are critiquing his policy prescriptions, but some are taking aim at his academic work. What does it say about offensive realism, which Mearsheimer championed, if it produces policy takes such as this? What does it say about realism in general? The issue isn’t just that many of us disagree with his policy views, it’s that they don’t seem to connect at all with his theory. Mearsheimer argued that states will inevitably seek to expand their power, as this is the only way they can be assured of their security. This expansion will continue until they are balanced by a countervailing force or come up against geographic boundaries. The idea that Russia’s security could be assured with promises from America, thus undermining Russia’s aggressive tendencies, seems like something Mearsheimer should argue against.

This has drawn in another famous realist, Stephen Walt. Several critiques of Mearsheimer list Walt alongside him (just search the two names together on Twitter). Like Mearsheimer, Walt has become a public intellectual and at times has advanced policy views that do not seem to fit with his academic work, in his case defensive realism. Defensive realism accepts that states can achieve security, with international tensions emerging from misperceptions or systemic destabilizing factors.

MEARSHEIMER’S POLICY TAKES ARE A BLATANT CONTRADICTION OF HIS ACADEMIC WORK. WALT’S THEREOTICAL ELABORATIONS ON REALISM, HOWEVER, ALLOW FOR A RICHER POLICY ANALYSIS.

A few of his policy works seem to contradict this. There is the famous (infamous) “Mearsheimer and Walt” book, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. Beyond being controversial for its depiction of a unified “Israel lobby,” many pointed to the irony of two structural realists claiming domestic politics drives US foreign policy. In Walt’s Taming American Power (a book I find excellent, and which I assign in my Intro to IR classes) he discusses the importance of things like the United Nations and normative legitimacy. And in his periodic columns on foreign policy he has argued realism can explain issues it has ignored, like public health.

So here we have two academic realists who seem to depart from their scholarly theories when they are incapable of explaining current events. They do so, it seems, by adding ad hoc extensions to their theory or abandoning its core foundations altogether. This is the sort of Lakatosian regressive research program Andrew Bennett warned us about in our PhD seminars at Georgetown.

But I’m not sure this is fair to Walt.

IN DEFENSE OF STEPHEN WALT

I have been critical of Walt, such as when he claimed realism can explain Covid-19. And I’ve been critical of the paradigms in general, as I think they don’t reflect current trends in the study of international relations. But I think it’s unfair to lump Walt in with Mearsheimer.

Let’s compare their heresies. Mearsheimer went from arguing that states will constantly seek power to arguing states will only be aggressive if others make them feel insecure. That is a blatant contradiction, and we should call it out as such. Walt, however, has argued that revolutions and the intentions of a state can influence how threatening it appears. More generally, this encompasses domestic factors–instability and foreign policy orientation independent of structural position–and ideas such as revolutionary ideologies and the aforementioned foreign policy orientation.

LET’S ALL CRITICIZE MEARSHEIMER. BUT LEAVE REALISM OUT OF IT.

Some have criticized Walt over these elaborations on realism, arguing it weakens the theory and demonstrates its unsuitability. But I would argue it strengthens it, by expanding on the things that matter in international relations (which is actually more in line with structural realism’s classical realist roots). And it creates a theoretical foundation for a richer foreign policy analysis. If domestic instability or preferences can matter in international relations, why not domestic lobbying groups? If ideological orientations can influence how threatening a state is, then why can’t shared international beliefs do the same? Admittedly, it’s harder to reconcile his recognition of the UN’s importance (although if someone has an example where he theorized this, let me know). He’s even admitted he was wrong on things like culture.

This matters for assessing the usefulness of academic realism in both policy and academic debates. Realists argue that states are self-interested and insecure, giving rise to a tense and uncertain international system. Walt’s work demonstrates the variety of forms this tension can take, and the possibility of reducing (but never eliminating) it. This allows for a rich policy analysis. Mearsheimer rejects anything beyond the pursuit of material power, which gives him little with which to analyze international relations.

On the academic side, there’s nowhere really to go with offensive realism. You just find cases of states balancing based on power. As more and more studies show, however, that isn’t really the norm. Defensive realism provides more options, while Walt’s policy work provides suggestions for how to incorporate normative concerns and international organizations into the study of power politics. Instead of rejecting realism, we should deepen these theoretical connections. One good approach (although one of the authors may recoil at me comparing his work to Walt’s) is Goddard and Nexon’s work on power politics.

Either way, let’s all criticize Mearsheimer. But leave realism out of it.

### AT: Deterrence---Russia Nukes---2NC

#### China will outpace the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Michael Martina 21, China-Russian relations correspondent for Reuters, 8-27-2021, "China will soon surpass Russia as a nuclear threat –senior U.S. military official," https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-will-soon-surpass-russia-nuclear-threat-senior-us-military-official-2021-08-27/, jy

WASHINGTON, Aug 27 (Reuters) - China, in the midst of a rapid nuclear weapons buildup, will soon surpass Russia as the United States' top nuclear threat, a senior U.S. military official said on Friday, warning that the two countries have no mechanisms to avert miscommunication.

U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas Bussiere, the deputy commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees the country's nuclear arsenal, said China's development of nuclear capabilities "can no longer be aligned" with its public claim that it wants to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent.

"There's going to be a point, a crossover point, where the number of threats presented by China will exceed the number of threats that currently Russia presents," Bussiere told an online forum.

He said the determination would not be based solely on the number of Beijing's stockpiled nuclear warheads, but also on how they are "operationally fielded."

"There will be a crossover point, we believe, in the next few years," Bussiere said.

Unlike with Russia, the United States did not have any treaties or dialogue mechanism with China on the issue to "alleviate any misperceptions or confusion," he added.

Bussiere's comments come as the United States is attempting to realign its foreign policy to put greater emphasis in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China's growing economic and military might.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed deep concern about China's growing nuclear arsenal during a meeting with foreign ministers of Asian countries and partner nations in early August. read more

Think-tank reports based on satellite imagery say China appears to be constructing hundreds of new silos for nuclear missiles, and Washington has accused Beijing of resisting nuclear arms talks.

### AT: Deterrence---Ukraine---2NC

#### Ukraine’s a unique country in the Russian strategic calculus that makes them afraid of NATO expansion. Aff evidence misunderstands history.

Alexander Thalis 18, MA International Relations, 5-3-18, “Threat or Threatened? Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of NATO Expansion,” <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/threat-or-threatened-russian-foreign-policy-in-the-era-of-nato-expansion/>, jy

The Arrival of Putin: Conciliation Fails Amid NATO Provocations

When Vladimir Putin came to power in January 2000, relations between Russia and NATO were at a very low ebb. Yet far from exhibiting any anti-Western tendencies, Putin initially attempted to facilitate rapprochement between Russia and the West. Putin characterised NATO as a minimal threat to Russia’s security, and even went as far as to suggest that Russia may still consider joining the alliance in the right circumstances.[26] NATO responded with a conciliatory gesture of its own, establishing the NATO-Russia Council in November 2001.[27] However, Putin’s overtures failed to dampen the alliance’s expansionist zeal.

From 2003 to 2005 the West extended its influence further into Eastern Europe by aiding revolutions against pro-Russian regimes in Georgia and the Ukraine. Between 1993 and 2003, $700 million in US aid and $420 million European Union (EU) aid was directed into Georgia.[28] Most of this money was channeled through Western NGOs and was used toward electoral and judicial reform and citizen mobilisation.

Vote rigging by Georgia’s pro-Russian government in 2003 sparked widespread protests against the incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze. Western NGOs played a key role in financing opposition parties and organising demonstrations.[29] When popular pressure forced Shevardnadze to resign, he was succeeded by the pro-NATO Mikhail Saakashvili. Voter fraud orchestrated by the Ukraine’s pro-Russian President, Victor Yanukovich, in 2004 sparked similar protests in the Ukraine. Again, state-funded Western NGOs played a central role in mobilising anti-government demonstrators. Protestors were entertained with rock music, provided with free food and tent accommodation and even paid small amounts of money for attending rallies.[30] When popular pressure prompted Ukraine’s Supreme Court to annul the election result and order a revote, the Western-backed Victor Yushchenko was elected President.

In March 2004 NATO accepted seven new member states including the three Baltic states. For the first time, NATO was right on Russia’s border. [31] Twelve hundred miles had separated Saint Petersburg from NATO during the Cold War, but that distance had been reduced to less than one hundred miles. Later that year Georgia and the Ukraine signed Individual Partnership Action Plans, and joint NATO-Ukraine military exercises in Crimea soon followed.[32]

Whilst Putin downplayed the importance of these events, others in his administration expressed much alarm. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned “we cannot, of course, watch impartially the military structure of the alliance moving ever closer to our borders.”[33] It was quite reasonable for the Kremlin to view NATO’s incorporation of the Baltic States as an outright threat. Unlike the existing NATO members and former Warsaw Pact states, the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was designed to prevent any country from amassing the weaponry required to launch an offensive war, didn’t bind the Baltic nations.[34] NATO now held the legal right to deploy an unlimited quantity of troops and military hardware in the Baltic.[35] Plans were made for the Baltic states to accede to an adapted CFE treaty, but a series of diplomatic stalemates resulted in the US and its NATO allies refusing to ratify the new agreement.[36]

In 2007, the Bush Administration announced plans to construct a missile defence shield in Eastern Europe.[37] The pretext for this decision was that it was necessary to protect Europe from an Iranian nuclear attack. However, Moscow quickly realised that the shield would have the potential to undermine and perhaps even neutralise Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Putin suggested an alternative, namely the construction of a joint Russia-US radar warning system in Azerbaijan, but the US rejected this proposal.[38] At this point, Putin was forced to abandon his conciliatory approach. In his 2007 State of the Nation Address, the Russian President characterised NATO as, “a real threat”.[39] Russia formally suspended its observance of its CFE treaty obligations a month later.

At a summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO released a statement affirming that Georgia and the Ukraine would be offered membership.[40] US pressure was the chief driver of this decision, as several Western European alliance members expressed opposition to the plan.[41]

This was NATO’s most threatening and provocative move towards Russia yet. Ukraine, as the biggest country is Europe, constitutes an important strategic buffer between Russia and NATO. Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany all invaded Russia through southeastern Europe and consequently, the Kremlin is extremely reticent to allow the armies of those countries to once again be stationed there. Georgia borders Russia’s volatile Caucasus region, already rife with minority nationalism and secessionist sentiment. Furthermore, both Georgia and the Ukraine are proximate to Russia’s Volga region, its agricultural heartland and its access point for Caspian Sea oil. The Kremlin cannot and will not risk its control over these assets being compromised.

The Fight over Georgia and the Ukraine: Russia’s Militarist Turn

It was only a matter of time before tension between Russia and NATO over the status of Georgia and the Ukraine spilled over into conflict. After winning wars of secession against Georgia in the early 1990s, the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had enjoyed de facto independence from Tbilisi.[42] Both had been reliant on Russia for strategic and financial support, though Russia still formally recognised them as part of Georgia. In May of 2008, when Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili requested that Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia be withdrawn and replaced by either EU or NATO forces, Russia responded by increasing the size of its force.[43] In June, Georgia detained Russian peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia. Then on August 7 Georgia launched an attack on South Ossetia, killing numerous civilians and 12 Russian soldiers.[44] A day later, Russia sent ground troops into the secessionist territories and began bombing Georgian military and industrial targets. After five days of fighting, Moscow forced Tbilisi to agree to a ceasefire on Russian terms. Russia formally recognised the two breakaway polities as sovereign nations and announced that a force of 7,600 would remain in the territories indefinitely for their “protection”.[45]

Russia’s strong-arming of Georgia was the Kremlin’s way of signaling to NATO that it would not tolerate any further expansion of the alliance. Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev evoked a siege mentality, stating that “we do not have any illusion of partnership [with NATO]… Naturally we are not happy with being surrounded by military bases.”[46]

Russia’s war succeeded, as NATO’s plans to extend membership to Georgia were put on an indefinite hold. The alliance could hardly incorporate Georgia when Tbilisi had no sovereignty over 20 percent of its territory. Nonetheless, the West continued to put geostrategic pressure on Russia. NATO suspended the Russia-NATO Council, established a permanent military presence in the Baltic and, in December 2009, refused a Russian proposal to replace the CFE treaty.[47] In 2010 the US relocated a Patriot missile battery from Germany to Poland and, in 2012, opened phase one of its European Missile Defence Shield.[48]

With tensions high and the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership still unresolved, another conflict always seemed likely. Ukrainian society is deeply divided between pro-Russian and pro-Western segments, and voting in the country tends to follow this division.[49] The Westernisation of Ukraine had been stalled by the election of the pro-Russian Victor Yanukovich in 2010. On 25 November 2013, Yanukovich delayed his decision to sign an Association Agreement with the EU which would have forced the Ukraine to sever all economic ties with Russia. Instead, Yanukovich signed a deal with Russia whereby the Kremlin would buy $15 billion of Ukrainian bonds and cut its gas prices to the country by one third.[50] This decision angered pro-Western Ukrainians, who took to the streets in protest.

As civil unrest grew, police began to crack down violently on demonstrators.[51] On the 21 February 2014, after three months of protests, Yanukovich fled to Russia and, in what can only be described as a coup, a new pro-Western government took power in Kiev.[52] The full extent of US involvement in the coup is at this stage unknown, but a leaked conversation between US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to the Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt suggests it could have been substantial. During the conversation, Nuland expressed her support for regime change in Ukraine and her desire to see Arseniy Yatsenyuk become the country’s new Prime Minister – which he did.[53]

Russian troops moved into the Crimean Peninsular on 22 February. Putin chose to take Crimea primarily because it contains the strategically important Black Sea port of Sevastopol, which Russia had been leasing from the Ukraine since the end of the Cold War.[54] The annexation of Crimea was a warning that Moscow would not tolerate the Ukraine slipping out of its orbit. On the day of the Crimean annexation, Putin warned NATO not to “make itself at home in our backyard or in our historical territory.”[55] Russia then orchestrated a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, arming pro-Russian rebels and probably also deploying several hundred Special Forces soldiers in Eastern Ukraine to aid them.[56] In May, Ukraine elected a pro-Western government that renounced the country’s non-aligned status and signaled its desire to join NATO.[57]

Russia’s militarist tactics were once again successful in stalling NATO’s advance. In March 2016, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker affirmed that the Ukraine would not gain NATO membership within the next two decades.[58] However, since 2014, NATO and the Ukraine have conducted numerous joint military exercises and NATO has committed $5.4 million to assist with the modernisation of Ukraine’s army.[59] The alliance has also increased its troop presence in the Baltic and conducted a military parade in Estonia less than a kilometer from Russian territory.[60] In 2016, the US completed phase two of its missile defence shield, opening a weapons system in Romania and announcing that a similar system will be opened in Poland in 2018.[61] Russia, meanwhile, has ensured that Eastern Ukraine remains in a state of frozen conflict and has effectively consolidated its control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[62]

Russia and NATO: Where to Next?

Winston Churchill once famously remarked that Russia is, “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”[63] However, since the end of the Cold War at least, the Russian mindset has been remarkably easy to understand.

Russia regards NATO, the world’s most powerful military alliance, as a dire threat the [to] its security. Russia’s goal of trying to halt NATO’s eastward march is rooted in a defensive realist view of international politics. The Kremlin is attempting to safeguard its security; it is not looking to reclaim lost status or recapture an empire. Analysts such as Derk Eppink have contended that, “Putin’s mind-set is largely rooted in the 19th century. Politics [for him] is about power.”[64] Those who dismiss this worldview as outdated would do well to remember that Russia was almost destroyed twice in twentieth century by invasions through Eastern Europe. At least twenty-seven million Russians were killed during WWII, roughly one third of the war’s overall death toll.[65] It should hardly be surprising that a sense of vulnerability still pervades Russian strategic thinking today.

It is also worth noting that the US’ worldview is not significantly different to that of Russia. The US has pursued the Monroe Doctrine for almost two centuries, often employing violence and subverting democracy to prevent foreign powers from establishing a presence in the Americas.[66] As John Mearsheimer explains, “this is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory… Imagine the American outrage if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico.”[67]

As the Ukraine continues to suffer through a protracted civil war, what can be done to ameliorate the tension between Russia and NATO and restore stability in Eastern Europe? Stephen Walt proposes that NATO should strike a deal with Ukraine and Russia that enshrines the status of the Ukraine as a non-aligned buffer state.[68] Striking a similar deal regarding Georgia would also be prudent. Furthermore, NATO should support the incumbent government in Ukraine, whilst at the same time discouraging it from adopting a provocative stance towards Russia.

Crimea will never be returned to the Ukraine, but NATO may be able to help the Ukraine regain sovereignty over its war torn eastern provinces by encouraging Kiev to cooperate with Moscow. Additionally, the US should discontinue its plans to expand its missile defence shield in Europe. This is a misguided policy that incentivises Russia to increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and risks sparking another nuclear arms race. Paradoxically, Europe is safer without the shield.

Finally, NATO should propose a replacement to the CFE treaty and guarantee that its nuclear arsenal will move no closer to Russia’s borders. In return for these assurances, Russia may be willing to downsize its nuclear armoury in Kaliningrad or even make concessions on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

With neither side having shown much interest in diplomacy so far, it is hard to know how much can be achieved through negotiation. But the dangers entailed by the current standoff are alarming. Russia and NATO control the overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear weapons and whilst the likelihood of an all out war is low, this risk cannot be ignored. Russia and NATO are never going to see eye to eye on some issues, but tensions cannot be allowed to escalate any further. Western leaders are loathed to make any concessions to Russia, but peace can only be re-established in Eastern Europe through compromise.

# AFF Answers---AT: NATO Bad

## AT Russia War Turn

### NATO Key---2AC/1AR

#### Nato is key to deterring Putin--- collapse causes global insecurity.

Ilya Timtchenko 03-21-2022 [Ilya Timtchenko is studying public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and is chair of the Ukraine Caucus, a student organization at the Harvard Kennedy School. He was previously an editor at the Kyiv Post, Atlantic Council, “Fear of provoking Putin is leading the Western world toward disaster,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fear-of-provoking-putin-is-leading-the-western-world-toward-disaster///ZW]

The conventional wisdom in Washington is that NATO should refrain from enforcing a No-Fly Zone over Ukraine due to the risk of an all-out NATO-Russia war. This view reflects a decades-long misunderstanding of both Russia and Ukraine, and is mired in appeasement thinking. While the window to impose a No-Fly Zone has likely closed, there are still alternatives that could work. The West should implement them without delay. After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the US hastily abandoned the post-Soviet world and moved on to other international challenges. Ironically, this disinvestment meant that it stopped maintaining and developing the very expertise that had allowed America to triumph over the USSR in the first place. Over the intervening three decades, appeasement has replaced expertise. Whether it was Russia’s brutal wars in Chechnya, the 2008 war with Georgia, or the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the West’s approach has frequently been shaped by fear of provoking an already aggrieved Russia. This has led the West to misread Putin’s Russia again and again. It also caused Western leaders to misinterpret developments in Ukraine. We overestimate Putin and underestimate Ukraine due to limited understanding of the fast-changing dynamics in the post-Soviet region. The West’s dangerous disregard for the threat posed by a revanchist Kremlin explains why the democratic world did not maintain its advantage over Russia when the latter was most vulnerable. The fall of the Soviet Union provided a golden opportunity for rapid NATO expansion, including into Ukraine. While it is fashionable to claim NATO enlargement went too far, in the current circumstances it makes far more sense to argue that it did not go far enough. Thankfully, it is not too late for the West to learn from its mistakes. While Russia has significantly greater military power today than in the 1990s, it is still no match for NATO, and Putin will not fight if challenged by the collective might of the West. NATO could coordinate with non-NATO nations to protect Ukraine’s skies, especially as the Biden Administration has demonstrated its ability in recent weeks to unify the world against Russia. America could theoretically mobilize a broad coalition to protect Ukraine. In the current extreme circumstances, there is no reason why the global community cannot adopt a creative approach to save a country that has been blatantly attacked by a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has stunned the world with its heroism. Retired four-star General in the United States Air Force Phil Breedlove has stated that a No-Fly Zone must be on the table. He also suggested an alternative: a humanitarian No-Fly Zone. This is a potentially attractive idea that could serve as a compromise between advocates of a cautious policy towards the Kremlin and those who believe Russia will not ultimately escalate into open war with NATO. While Western leaders have so far been unambiguous in ruling out direct intervention, they are also providing Ukraine with enhanced anti-aircraft capabilities. Such measures need to be significantly speeded up and bolstered by the parallel provision of fighter jets and anti-missile defense systems. In less than four weeks of war, Russia has fired more than a thousand missiles at Ukraine and reduced entire Ukrainian cities to rubble. While the civilian death toll remains unconfirmed, many thousands are already feared dead. Despite the obvious urgency of the situation, the West is still acting in half-measures and contemplating if arming Ukraine could be interpreted as provocative by Putin. If Western leaders maintain their current cautious approach towards Russian aggression, the watching world will witness an unfolding genocide of the Ukrainian people. This will be joined by a rapidly escalating global food crisis. Russian tanks will not stop at Ukraine’s western borders. On the contrary, Putin will be emboldened to expand his wars of imperial aggression and will inevitably turn his attention to Moldova and the Baltic States while also seeking to destabilize Central Europe and the Balkans. Meanwhile, China and other authoritarian powers will take note of Putin’s success and act accordingly. They will forge closer ties with a resurgent Russia and will seek to expand their own spheres of influence in a similar manner. The entire world will enter into a new era of global insecurity that will reverse much of the progress made since World War II. Rather than remaining reactive and paying an even greater price in the near future, NATO should act decisively now and dramatically increase its support for Ukraine. To do otherwise is not only immoral; it is against the core strategic interests of the entire Western world.

#### Aff is key to deterring Russia.

Bruce Ackerman 05-17-22 [Sterling professor of law and political science at Yale University, Politico, “How to Reinvigorate NATO and Deter Putin’s Aggression,” https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/05/17/new-nato-21st-century-revitalize-putin-00032744//ZW]

As Vladimir Putin made clear in his recent Victory Day speech, the war in Ukraine will grind on for years. Even if Russia ultimately retreats, this won’t lead to a lasting peace. During the Cold War, Western Europe could confidently rely on American military power to deter Soviet aggression. This is no longer true. And Putin and his successors will continue to exploit this fact — unless and until NATO decisively reorganizes itself. The United States and Europe are understandably wary of engaging in direct conflict with Russia, but they can still do more than provide short-term assistance to Ukraine. Now is the time to start taking steps to establish NATO as a credible force for the defense of Western democracy in the 21st century. Bold measures are required, including dramatically revising the NATO treaty, raising an army in Europe and even expelling countries who have betrayed their democratic commitments. But it’s the best way to deter the Kremlin and ultimately avoid more brutal wars in the future. European democracies have resisted this path in the past, but the only realistic response to the attack on Ukraine is to construct their own powerful army as part of a reorganized NATO. The Ukraine tragedy has generated dramatic increases in European defense budgets, but this is only the first step toward building a large and permanent fighting force that could take the field against future Russian invasions of NATO members in the Baltic — or Finland or Sweden once they join the alliance. While the Europeans can continue to rely on American air and naval power, they themselves must be prepared to take the leading role in their own defense on the ground. This won’t happen unless Europeans rapidly commit themselves to a concrete action plan that requires each NATO member to fulfill strong and specific military obligations on an annual basis. No less important, governments must place their troops under the control of a unified command structure. If each country sends its fighters into the field under its own national commander, their separate forces would be overwhelmed by coordinated Russian assaults, especially in an era of lightning-fast weapons. This raises a very real institution-building challenge for the continent’s political leaders. Only the European Union is in a realistic position to organize a broad-based military effort. Its parliament is directly elected by the citizens of all the states in the Union. After each election, the majority of delegates choose an executive commission — currently led by Ursula von der Leyen — to make key policy decisions. This body has the precious democratic legitimacy required to embark on such an unprecedented military initiative. At present, however, the treaties defining the powers of the EU don’t grant the Union any war-making authority whatsoever. Before the commission can step into the breach, another key institution — the Council of Ministers — must propose revisions that empower the commission to move forward with its rigorous demands upon the member states. The council consists of the chief executives of each country. But fortunately, its current leader is Emmanuel Macron — who staked his presidential campaign against Marine Le Pen on an emphatically continental vision of France’s future. Many commentators have downplayed Macron’s achievement by emphasizing Le Pen’s success in generating popular support for her hard-right nationalist program. Yet the fact remains that Macron is the first French president who has won a second term in office in the last 20 years — and he did so by a decisive 59-41 margin. The French president is the continental leader with the strongest democratic mandate to expand the EU treaties to authorize collaboration with NATO to confront the Russian military threat. Indeed, Macron has already stated that “[i]n the coming weeks, we need to bring to being a European proposal to forge a new security and stability order. We need to build it between Europeans, then share it with our allies in the NATO framework.” Here is where Joe Biden can play a crucial role. He should not only publicly encourage Macron and von der Leyen to begin the hard bargaining required to enact the dramatic revisions to EU law required before a European army can become a reality. Since the reorganization of NATO also requires America’s consent to treaty revisions, Biden should immediately announce his strong support for the necessary changes. Normally, of course, it is virtually impossible to win the two-thirds Senate majority needed for treaty revisions. The Ukraine bloodbath, however, has dramatically transformed the political situation. With Macron and von der Leyen embarking on their own intensive efforts to reconstruct NATO, Biden will be in a strong position to gain the bipartisan support of a supermajority — especially since the Europeans are now prepared, at long last, to pay their fair share of the overall defense effort. It will take a lot of hard work to develop a concrete action program for the new continental army and assure its effective implementation in each of the states of the European Union. If serious efforts to lay the legal foundations don’t start immediately, Europe won’t have a realistic chance of putting a fighting force on the ground by 2030. Even if Democrats lose control of the Senate in 2022, this will be one of the rare issues where Capitol Hill will likely stand behind the president. In the meantime, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his team can offer concrete help to Macron and von der Leyen in their ambitious campaign to gain broad-based political support for the reconstruction of NATO on their side of the Atlantic. Even with America’s help, their success is by no means assured. At best, it will take a year or two of wheeling-and-dealing before EU leaders can gain the legal authority to develop a concrete action program and assure its effective enforcement in each of the states of the European Union. Nevertheless, there will never be a better time to make this effort — and if it succeeds, Putin and his successors will confront a decisive deterrent. In giving their strong support to the European effort, however, Biden and the Senate should also insist that the new NATO remain faithful to its founding principles. In particular, when the treaty was first signed in 1949, NATO members attached a fundamental condition to their pledge of mutual military assistance. They made it clear that they would come to a country’s defense only if its government was making a good-faith effort to “strengthen their free institutions.” Otherwise, it could not rely on its NATO allies to come to its defense against attack. Seventy-five years later, it is painfully apparent that some NATO countries are working to destroy freedom rather than strengthen it. Turkey is the most obvious example. Over the past decade, it has been transformed into an authoritarian state by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Worse yet, Erdoğan sent his army to help Syria’s despotic regime fight NATO’s troops — battling against the very alliance he and his predecessors had pledged to support. Since Turkey is neither a reliable ally nor a defender of “free institutions,” Biden and the Senate should refuse to sign a treaty that continues to recognize it as a NATO member. Hungary is a tougher case. Like Erdoğan, Viktor Orbán has used his time in office to create an “illiberal democracy,” which decisively undermines NATO’s founding commitment to freedom. Moreover, when he was running for reelection during the early days of the Ukraine war, he condemned Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “as an enemy of the Hungarian nation” and campaigned on a platform that opposed any EU sanctions against Russia for its invasion. He then used his control of the mass media to deny his opponents a fair opportunity to challenge his celebration of Putin’s aggression. As a consequence, Orbán’s “landslide” victory at the polls only dramatizes his success in entrenching his illiberal principles into the nation’s constitution. At the very least, Biden should insist that Hungary be suspended from NATO until it can credibly reestablish that it has dramatically changed course and is on the way to rebuilding its “free institutions.” There is every reason to believe that the leadership in Brussels and Paris would respond to this American initiative with enthusiasm. Indeed, von der Leyen is already leading the commission down a rarely invoked path that would strip Hungary of the billion-dollar EU subsidies its government receives — which Orbán now uses as a slush fund to sustain his dictatorial ambitions. The commission is also seriously considering similar steps against Poland in response to its continuing defiance of decisions by the European Court of Justice, which has declared that the current government is violating fundamental principles of constitutional democracy to which the European Union is committed. If von der Leyen gains the necessary support to suspend Poland’s voting privileges in parliament until it complies with the court’s demands, Biden should support its suspension from the Alliance as well. The challenges ahead are extraordinary. But the reconstruction of NATO not only represents the West’s best chance to prevent future Russian aggression. It also offers an opportunity for the United States and Europe to revitalize the great Enlightenment tradition of liberal democracy against the nationalist demagogues seeking to destroy it on both sides of the Atlantic.

#### NATO strong now.

Giulia Carbonaro [US News Reporter, Newsweek, “NATO to Massively Expand Army in Bid to Deter Further Putin Aggression,” https://www.newsweek.com/nato-massively-expand-army-bid-deter-further-putin-aggression-ukraine-defense-1718435//ZW]

NATO is preparing to expand its army in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, according to Sky News Security and Defence Editor Deborah Haynes. The military alliance has been forced to rethink the way it can deter the aggressive ambitions of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Europe, she reported. Moscow's assault on Ukraine, which isn't a NATO member, has added urgency to the organization's long-standing but stalled defense plans. "Overnight the mentality changed," an unnamed NATO officer told Haynes. "NATO now feels like it is electrified. You can feel the energy surging through the system." Separately, a diplomat told the Sky News editor that "a radical change in posture" is expected to emerge from the NATO summit in Spain between June 28 and 30. Officials at the gathering will discuss how NATO's 40,000-strong Response Force (NRF) will be rebranded and made up to six times larger, according to Haynes. The overhaul, the biggest in NATO since the Cold War, would rename the NRF the Allied Reaction Force (AFR), according to the Sky News editor. Her source at NATO said the final increase in numbers will probably be lower than that. New Package for Ukraine Another possible change to be implemented will be an increase in the size of the NATO mission in the alliance's eastern and southeastern flank, with thousands more troops expected to be based in their home nations and only being deployed if needed. NATO could also decide to designate Russia as the "most significant and direct threat" to security, wrote Haynes, and to approve a new "comprehensive assistance package" for Ukraine. In a statement delivered on April 6 ahead of the meeting of NATO's ministers of foreign affairs, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg talked of the war in Ukraine as having "long term implications" for NATO security, "because we have seen the brutality," he said. "We have seen the willingness by President Putin to use military force to reach his objectives. And that has changed the security reality in Europe for many, many years. So therefore, we have started the process in NATO, we have tasked our military commanders to provide options for the political leaders to take decisions on how to reset our deterrence and defence for the long term. This will of course, build on what we have already done," Stoltenberg said then. NATO has already reinforced its collective defense in response to Russia's aggressive campaigns against its neighbor, when it tripled the size of the NRF in 2014 following Putin's annexation of Crimea. "So we, NATO, [were] actually quite well prepared when Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time, and on the day of the invasion, we activated our defence plans, deployed 1000s of additional troops in the eastern part of the Alliance. Now there are 40,000 troops on the NATO command in the eastern part of the Alliance. And there are more U.S. troops in Europe, 100,000 in total, and other Allies have also increased their presence," Stoltenberg said. "We were well prepared when they invaded Ukraine. But now we need to take a new step, for a more long term strengthening of our deterrence and defence," the secretary general said in April, adding that "decisions for the longer term will be made at the summit in Madrid in June when the heads of state and government meet." The meeting in Madrid next week will also be marked by disappointment surrounding the obstacles now faced by Sweden and Finland in their bid to join NATO. Both the alliance and the two Nordic countries expected the membership process to be swift and smooth, but were caught by surprise by Turkey's strong opposition to their candidacy —especially Sweden's. Ankara has accused Stockholm of sheltering terrorists from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

#### NATO deters Russia.

Daniel Kochis et al. 03-14-22 [Daniel Kochis is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Thomas W. Spoehr is Director of the Center for National Defense, of the Davis Institute. Luke Coffey is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, of the Davis Institute. Patty-Jane Geller is Policy Analyst for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense in the Center for National Defense, The Heritage Foundation, “The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time,” https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-russian-threat-bolstering-nato-deterrence-critical-time//ZW]

The security and prosperity of the transatlantic community, including the United States, rests on the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s ongoing war of naked aggression against Ukraine, a NATO non-member state, should put to rest any lingering questions about the modern utility of the Alliance and about which threat should be the focus of NATO’s upcoming strategic concept. The answer is clear: The U.S. must lead the Alliance to a wholesale refocusing on the organization’s raison d’être of collective defense. While the Alliance faces challenges emanating from an unstable Mediterranean basin and terrorism originating from the Middle East, the fact remains that Russia continues to be the only existential threat to member states. NATO must send a strong signal that it is strengthening deterrence measures explicitly in response to the increased threat from Russia. Deterrence measures should include an Alliance-wide recommitment to defense spending; a persistent and continuing U.S. presence in Eastern European member states; updated Alliance operational planning in light of Russia’s position in Belarus and Ukraine; and an increase in U.S. air, ground, and naval forces in the European theater as a sign of continued commitment to the NATO treaty’s Article 5. These deterrence measures must be carried out with the recognition that, from a long-term perspective, China is the largest peer challenger from whom the U.S. must expect hostile action. Any improvements to the U.S. force posture must not be to the detriment of the nation’s ability to counter China. The Importance of NATO Deterrence Has Only Increased From the Arctic to the Levant, Russia remains an aggressive and capable threat to NATO and the interests of its members. For member states in Eastern Europe, Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat. Russia’s entrenched position in Belarus, along with its ongoing actions to cleave Ukraine, a nation that borders four NATO members, in two, scramble the geostrategic map of Europe and necessitate changes to NATO operational planning, exemplifying the need for the Alliance to take swift and resolute steps to bolster deterrence measures along its eastern flank. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine will hopefully be the push that some allies need to finally live up to their commitments to the NATO defense spending benchmark. As an intergovernmental security alliance, NATO is only as strong as its member states. Weak defense spending on the continent has led to a significant loss of capabilities and embarrassing gaps in readiness for NATO allies. As a result, American Presidents of both political parties have long called for increases in defense spending by NATO allies. Although most are familiar with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—an attack on one is an attack on all—Article 3 is the most important when it comes to the overall health of the Alliance. Article 3 states that member states, at a minimum, will “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Only a handful of NATO members can legitimately say that they are living up to their Article 3 commitment. In 2006, in an effort to encourage defense investment, NATO set a target for its 30 member states to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. At the 2014 Wales Summit, member states recommitted to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense and committed to spending 20 percent of their defense budgets on “major equipment” purchases by 2024. NATO allies have made real and sustained increases in defense spending in recent years, but it is far from enough. In 2021, 10 members of the Alliance spent 2 percent of GDP on defense, and 24 members met the 20 percent benchmark.**1** Procuring capabilities does not happen overnight, and allies in NATO must commit today to investing the necessary political and economic capital to fulfill their Article 3 treaty commitments. **U.S. Deployments in Europe Can Magnify NATO Deterrence** U.S. basing structures in Europe harken back to a time when Denmark, West Germany, and Greece represented the front lines of freedom. The security situation in Europe has changed, not least of which due to Russia’s force posture in Belarus and occupied portions of Ukraine. The U.S. must account for this shift by establishing a persistent and continuing military presence in allied nations further east. A robust presence displays the long-term U.S. resolve to live up to its NATO treaty commitments. The U.S. should lead by example, while also encouraging other NATO allies to base forces in Eastern European member states. Over the course of the past few weeks, the U.S. has deployed additional rotational forces in Europe. On Thursday, 7,000 troops from the Army’s First Brigade, Third Infantry Division, deployed to bases in Germany.**2**In total, the U.S. has deployed an additional 14,000 troops to Europe in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The U.S. has also redeployed aircraft further east on a temporary basis, including 20 Apache helicopters (AH-64s) based in Germany deploying to Baltic allies, 12 AH-64s based in Greece deploying to Poland,**3** and six F-35 fighter jets from Utah deploying temporarily to bases in Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania.**4** Furthermore, two B-52s from the 5th Bomb Wing deployed on a “long-planned Bomber Task Force Europe mission over the Arctic and Baltic Sea regions.”**5** Earlier in February, the U.S. deployed 3,000 forces to Poland and Romania to bolster deterrence and aid in preparations for refugees crossing the border from Ukraine. The U.S. Department of Defense noted that “[t]hese moves are temporary in nature, and are part of the more than 90,000 U.S. troops already in Europe on rotational and permanent orders.” Some NATO allies have also increased their presence further east. Germany, which serves as the framework nation in Lithuania for NATO’s enhanced forward presence battalion stationed there, added 350 troops.**6** NATO allies have battlegroups stationed in Estonia (U.K.-led), Latvia (Canadian-led), and Poland (U.S.-led); France has offered to lead a similar battalion in Romania, and stated that it is “accelerating” the deployment of forces to the nation.**7** On Friday, NATO activated its Very High Readiness Joint Taskforce (VJTF), with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stating: “We are now deploying the NATO response force for the first time in the context of collective defense.”**8** NATO will partially deploy a portion of the VJTF to Eastern Europe; the deployment will include air, land, and naval assets.**9** **No Time to Lose** Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine highlights the stark reality that the threat from Russia to NATO is real and enduring. The U.S. and its allies must take immediate steps to bolster collective defense and deter Vladimir Putin from aggression against a NATO member state. In light of the emerging new security reality on the continent, the U.S. should: **Reaffirm the importance of Article 3.** Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the most important when it comes to the overall health of the Alliance. Article 3 states that member states, at a minimum, will “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Only a handful of NATO members can say that they are living up to their Article 3 commitment. This is a case where “naming and shaming” should play a role. The U.S. should focus on those nations that do not have a plan to increase defense spending. **Encourage NATO members to make increased defense spending the law of the land.** Some allies have passed legislation requiring that a certain amount of GDP be spent on international aid, while failing to do the same for defense spending. The U.S. should encourage NATO members to enshrine defense spending commitments and timelines in legislation. This would help to increase transparency and political accountability. **Call a special meeting to renew focus on defense spending.** NATO should call a special session to discuss the need for immediate commitment of allies to meeting NATO defense spending benchmarks. This session should include as many finance ministers as possible. In many parliamentary democracies, it is the finance minister who controls public spending. Educating the finance ministers on the importance of military investment might help to secure more defense spending over the long term. Germany’s recent announcement that it would finally work to meet its 2 percent spending commitment shows that the time is ripe for such a push. **Encourage allies to make a public case for defense spending.** An average of 71 percent of the publics across NATO believes that their country should defend another NATO ally if attacked. To honor this commitment, however, a nation must have the appropriate capabilities and manpower. Leaders in Canada and Europe should not take public support for NATO membership for granted. Instead, the strategic review should encourage governments to strongly and consistently make the case for NATO, and for the importance of robust defense spending, to their publics. **Establish a persistent and continuing presence in Eastern European member states.** Persistent and continuing deployments could include a U.S. Army heavy division in Poland (not just the headquarters, but a division with three full brigade combat teams) with supporting air defense and long-range fires or stationing a U.S. Air Force Wing in Europe. It is important to note that while new rotational forces in Europe certainly improve deterrence, they are an unequal substitute for permanently stationed forces. Living, operating, and training where the fighting will occur is an advantage that both U.S. allies and adversaries enjoy. Permanently stationed forces have better person-to-person contacts with allies, as well as improved doctrinal, technical, and cultural interoperability. **Increase the U.S. Naval presence near Russia.** U.S. military planners should not underestimate the importance of a robust naval component for deterrence. The U.S. should ensure a continued robust Naval presence in key regions, such as the North Atlantic, the eastern Mediterranean, and the northern Pacific, as a means of additional deterrence against Russia. Given Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, near-term consideration should be given for increased naval presence in the Baltic Sea to signal commitment to Baltic State NATO members, as well as to allies Finland and Sweden, who have come under renewed threat from Russia regarding potential future accession to NATO. **Develop the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to bolster U.S. non-strategic nuclear capabilities.** Russia deploys thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe meant for use on the battlefield; meanwhile, U.S. nuclear forces in this category are very limited. Fielding the SLCM-N, as proposed by the Trump Administration in 2018, would help to fill this gap in U.S. nuclear deterrence should conventional conflict in Europe escalate. Conversely, canceling the SLCM-N after the program has already been initiated would only signal further weakness to Russia and NATO at a time when nuclear threats are growing.**10** **Encourage allies to increase their presence in Eastern Europe.** For NATO allies in Eastern Europe, the threat from Russia is existential and looming, the U.S. should encourage all allies of the Alliance**11** to contribute forces to Eastern European theaters in a show of unity against Russian aggression. **A Critical Time for Deterrence** Russia’s ongoing violation of the sovereignty of Ukraine highlights the importance of NATO and its Article 5 guarantee, as well as the need for a united and robust Alliance posture in Eastern Europe. Both are necessary for sending a clear message to Russia to deter Putin from violating the sovereignty of a NATO member.

### AT: NATO Root Cause

#### Putin doesn’t care about NATO--- he’s just hates democracy.

David Tafuri 02-10-2022 [Opinion contributor to The Hill, The Hill, “Putin doesn’t fear NATO or Ukraine – he fears democracy,” https://thehill.com/opinion/international/593627-putin-doesnt-fear-nato-or-ukraine-he-fears-democracy///ZW]

As the world waits to learn if Putin will order a full-scale military offensive in Ukraine, Washington seems to be stumbling over a simple question: How much does Russian aggression in Europe matter to U.S. interests? One view is that Ukraine’s status is more important to Russia than to us, especially because Ukraine is not a part of NATO. Others go further, questioning whether even NATO members, guaranteed protection by Article 5, are worth defending. Media have noted Tucker Carlson’s growing influence in Republican circles on this question. Two years ago, he previewed his stance when I debated him on his show. He argued that NATO members Estonia and Latvia, are, like Ukraine, not worth defending if invaded by Russia. I countered, as I explain in more detail here, that it’s in America’s vital interest to support these sovereign nations — precisely because Putin is targeting them for their decision to turn away from the governance model on offer from Russia. To understand why Putin’s threat to invade Ukraine — or any other independent state in Europe — matters, consider why he might do it. Putin wants you to believe it’s because NATO expansion to Ukraine threatens the Russian people and Russia’s security. He doesn’t genuinely believe this. It’s propaganda. NATO is a defensive alliance. No member of NATO, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, has conveyed a credible threat to peoples or places inside Russia’s current borders. In fact, NATO sought a constructive relationship with Russia after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., until Putin steered the country onto its present course. Putin is a careful study and knows that NATO isn’t interested in gobbling up Russian territory or subjugating Russian people. Similarly, a sovereign and independent Ukraine presents no actual threat to Russian lands. Putin fears an independent Ukraine with strong ties to the West for the same reason he sent troops to Kazakhstan last month to put down peaceful protests, poisoned and imprisoned Alexei Navalny, his political opponent in Russia, and directed Russian spy services to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. There’s one common thread running through each of these endeavors — and nearly every other foreign policy initiative now championed by Putin: He wants to undermine democracy, wherever it is, or can take root, especially in countries on Russia’s border that he’s worried he can’t control. Why does he fear democracy so much? Sure, Putin is a Cold War enthusiast, but his main priority is not to restore the eminence of old U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe. It’s to boost his own prospect for self-preservation. To Putin, this means consolidating all political powers in Russia inside his office and carefully guarding against the appeal of democratic challengers to his “forever presidency.” Last year, Putin amended the Russian constitution so he can remain President until at least 2036. This will make him Kremlin’s longest serving leader since Peter the Great, even longer than Stalin. NATO has never posed a real threat to Putin’s supremacy inside Russia. But a well-functioning democracy on Russia’s border, which could inspire new democratic movements within Russia, would. And this threat could be especially dangerous for Putin if it re-focused Russians inward, at their own lamentable economy, instead of on Putin’s outward bluster that NATO is the greatest threat to their well-being. Because the true source of Putin’s ire is the adoption of more democratic institutions by sovereign states in Russia’s neighborhood, Putin is actually challenging not a particular nation or alliance, but the spread of democracy and rule of law. When the sovereignty of nations striving for more stable democracies is threatened, U.S. commitment to democracy in general is at stake. The U.S. cheered Ukraine during three defining events in its democracy: first, when it held a referendum in 1991 and 90 percent of its population voted in favor of independence; second, during the “Orange Revolution” in the winter of 2004, when people took to the streets of Kyiv to protest an election clearly rigged to benefit the Kremlin-backed candidate (the pro-Western candidate survived an attempted assassination by poison), and third, when a groundswell of democratic protests in 2013 forced former President Viktor Yanukovych from power after his decision to back out of a popular trade agreement with the EU in fealty to Moscow. All three were clear rejections of Russia, in favor of democracy. What Russia is posing to do now, after 30 years of Ukrainian independence, is a clear violation of international law. The lack of a response could usher the collapse of a rules-based order which the U.S. has nurtured since the end of WWII. The U.N. is already absent on the issue of Ukraine’s sovereignty because of Russia’s veto. In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait without any legal basis for doing so, the U.S. organized a coalition and mobilized in Kuwait’s defense, with U.N. authorization. This sent a message to aggressors around the world that if they invade their neighbors, they could be destroyed. If Putin successfully invades Ukraine without serious consequences, it would send the opposite message — and might lead Putin to believe he can do it again, including to one of those NATO democracies in Eastern Europe that Tucker Carlson believes aren’t worth defending. It would also signal to other nationalist regimes with extraterritorial aspirations — including China, Iran, and Turkey — that they too could orchestrate cross-border offensives to stamp out democratic tendencies in their region without repercussion.

### AT: Entrapment

#### No NATO entrapment.

Lanoszka 17 -- Alexander Lanoszka, International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo. [Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Contemporary Security Policy, 39(2), December 2017, Taylor & Francis]

Critics charge that NATO has been reckless in its outreach to countries like Georgia and Ukraine. In so doing, it has encouraged those countries to behave more aggressive towards Russia, risking war in such a way that implicates NATO members against their own interests. The dangers of entrapment abound.

This article analyzes the different causal pathways and variables that scholars have invoked to describe how entrapment risks arise. According to the international relations literature, four broad sources of risk exist. The strength of the commitment given to the ally—actual or potential—is an institutional source. The greater the commitment, the more perverse incentives it creates for the ally to behave recklessly. System polarity and the offense-defense balance are systemic factors insofar as no one country can manipulate them. Multipolarity raises the value of allies for maintaining the balance of power, whereas the offense-defense balance affects how a defender might manage its ties with its ally. Reputational sources of risk arise when an ally exploits the defender’s interest to defend its commitments for intrinsic reasons. Finally, entrapment risks can have ideological sources: An ally strategically appeals to the ideological prejudices of its defender, thereby reshaping the defender’s own sense of strategic interests on favorable terms. Some of these arguments regarding how entrapment unfolds have already been subject to criticism on empirical and logical grounds. Besides organizing these arguments typologically, I demonstrate how uncovering clear evidence of entrapment is a difficult enterprise, even when the theories themselves seem straightforward.

The main problem concerns counterfactuals. The factors that allegedly generate entrapment risks can be so wide-ranging that imagining a world in which they operate differently would require changing other variables, which in turn can make war more or less likely. Alternatively, they might not exclude other factors that could lead to the same violent outcome. After all, conflict drives both alliance formation and the likelihood of war. States join alliances because they assess that the possibility of war is non-trivial. Similarly, a defender might be receptive to the overtures of an ally precisely because it has a pre-existing desire to see conflict with the adversary of that ally. In social scientific parlance, endogeneity problems are pervasive when trying to understand whether entrapment has occurred or is at risk of occurring. The case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War is instructive by revealing these ambiguities. Many NATO members—especially those in Western Europe—were lukewarm towards Georgia’s bid to become a treaty ally, arguably because they recognized that Georgia posed certain entrapment risks. The United States was the most supportive of Georgia, but it might have overstated its support to Georgia in order to gain a bargaining chip with Russia. It might have even done so because Western European countries were so hesitant, thereby ignoring Saakashvili’s non-democratic tendencies. But by this very token, the United States limited its response to the outbreak of hostilities between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. The Georgian case suggests that states do not forge alliances mindlessly nor do they follow their allies off the cliff thoughtlessly. One cannot by definition want to be entrapped.

The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 illustrates the need to disentangle the factors that push states to fight wars and to seek alliances while carefully investigating the mechanisms through which alliances fuel wars. As noted, some baseline probability of war had already existed between the two former Soviet republics when Saakashvili became President. Their conflict centered on an unresolved dispute regarding the political status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Neither could commit to a durable settlement. Moreover, territorial concessions and submission to salami tactics could have signaled Georgian weakness, thereby encouraging new or more assertive territorial demands. Georgian leaders might have also faced domestic incentives to stand firm towards Russia—incentives that would have existed independent of NATO. To the extent that alliance politics mattered from Georgia’s perspective, Saakashvili might have cherry-picked information that confirmed his beliefs regarding Western support. Nevertheless, these factors are idiosyncratic because they stem directly from his personality. In a counterfactual world where NATO was not a factor, he could have had these and other cognitive biases that would have elevated the likelihood of war.

By undertaking this sort of counterfactual analysis, scholars thus must take care to isolate the effect of an alliance commitment—to the degree that it exists—from the underlying propensity of war. Georgia bears a methodological and analytical lesson for thinking about entrapment: Just because NATO was an issue for Georgian security in 2008 does not mean the alliance was causally responsible for the war. Future research on alliances and war must not only identify correlations between alliances and conflict, but also sort out various causal mechanisms that connect different causal factors with war.

Carefully disentangling the factors that could lead to entrapment matters not only for theory and methodology but also for policy. If entrapment concerns are real, then defense planners must have a clear idea as to where they come from. Some entrapment risks can be attenuated with active policy measures. Conditioning a political or military commitment when dealing with a risk-acceptant ally is one example. But doing so might not matter if we have reason to think that systemic forces make that ally more aggressive. Strong commitments could even make seemingly jumpy allies more secure. And so, armed with a better understanding of what drives entrapment risks, defense planners would be more confident in modulating political and military commitments appropriately. As such, critics of NATO expansion and American foreign policy may be overstating their case. NATO might bear some indirect responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War, but its culpability lessens when we consider the other factors that increased the likelihood of war: misperceptions, overconfidence, and the commitment problems underlying the territorial disputes themselves. If anything, the key policy challenge is for NATO to determine whether prospective partners like Saakashvili have psychological traits or cognitive biases that would make them unjustifiably optimistic about the level of support that they would receive.

### AT: Commitment Trap

#### The alliance solves by moderating both parties.

Fang et al. 14 -- Songying Fang, Political Science Professor at Rice University, PhD at the University of Rochester. Brett Ashley Leeds, Political Science Professor and Department Chair at Rice University. Jesse C. Johnson, Director of Peace Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Kentucky, Political Science PhD from Rice University. [To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances, International Organization, 68(4), JSTOR]

Interstate wars cost more than thirty million lives during the twentieth century, and nine new interstate wars have begun since the end of the Cold War.1 Finding ways to avoid interstate disputes and to manage those that arise short of war, therefore, is a major priority for policy-makers and for scholars of international relations. It is well recognized that military alliances play a role in conflict prevention by deterring attacks on their members, but less attention has been paid to the role of allies in conflict management. We argue that allies, as coercive actors with a stake in the dispute, are sometimes especially well positioned to help resolve disputes short of war.

We examine the influence of allies to a target state on crisis bargaining. Not only do allies have an interest in the outcome of crisis bargaining but they also may have the ability to make credible threats to both the challenger and the target that influence the bargaining stances of both disputants. A target's ally can make it clear to the challenger that if the challenger demands too much, the ally will intervene in the war on behalf of the target. But a target's ally may also be able to make a credible threat to the target - that if the target refuses to concede to a demand that the ally finds reason- able, the ally will not intervene in the war on the target's behalf. The ally may therefore have a moderating effect not only on the challenger's demand, but also on the target's response, making peaceful settlement more likely. We refer to the former as the deter- rence effect of alliances, and the latter as the restraining effect of alliances.

To study this process, we develop a three-player game-theoretic model. Most recent game-theoretic models of crisis bargaining assume that a challenger and a target bargain without influence from any outside states.2 Yet, allies who would be obligated to intervene in a war that develops between a challenger and target will often cast a shadow over crisis negotiations. Dyadic bargaining models that assume a challenger and a target bargain without influence from any outside states are inadequate for our understanding of conflict dynamics in such situations.

We derive a number of propositions about the relationships between such factors as the costs of war, the value of the stakes, and the value of an alliance and specific out- comes. The demands challengers make, the conditions under which targets concede demands without fighting, and the conditions under which targets resist demands militarily are all influenced by the presence of an ally. Given the richness of our formal results, we make no attempt to test all of the implications of the model. We do, however, discuss a few stylized cases that highlight different outcomes, and we provide a large-N empirical test of one proposition drawn from the model. We find support for the claim that when a target depends heavily on an alliance for security, that target is less likely to resist a challenge militarily.

Our research suggests that military alliances have an influence in international politics well beyond collaborative war fighting and deterrence. Alliances deter conflicts, which in itself is a force for peace, but even when challengers are not deterred from making demands, allies can facilitate peaceful settlement. Alliances can be important institutions for conflict management, not only among their members, but between their members and outside states as well. As such, alliances can be broad institutions for peace that play an important role in maintaining the stability of the international system.3

#### No bias or echo chamber---there are plenty of anti-NATO academics that don’t lose their jobs, our claims win out because theyre right

Feaver & Brands, 19 — Peter D. Feaver is a professor of political science and public policy at Duke University, where he heads the Program in American Grand Strategy and the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (Spring 2019; “Correspondence: The Establishment and U.S. Grand Strategy;” *International Security*; 43(4); pg. 197–204; doi:10.1162/isec\_c\_00347; //GrRv)

In his article “Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,” Patrick Porter argues that the continuity of U.S. grand strategy since World War II has resulted from a group-think mentality fostered by a powerful foreign policy elite—”the Blob”—that stifles debate and prevents needed course corrections.1 Porter’s provocative argument is ultimately unpersuasive, because it overstates the degree of conformity and consensus in U.S. strategy while slighting the most obvious explanations for the strategy’s endurance. Below we highlight several problems with his argument.

First, Porter exaggerates the degree of consensus in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. In fact, despite a bipartisan consensus on the necessity of U.S. global leadership in support of a congenial international order (what Porter calls “primacy”), intense debates about how that strategy should be operationalized have been common in U.S. foreign policy circles. Policymakers, elected officials, and policy commentators argued heatedly over such fundamental issues as whether to pursue a Europe-first or Asia-first strategy in the 1950s, whether and how aggressively to combat Soviet and communist influence in the developing world, whether to make or avoid defense commitments on the Asian mainland, whether to pursue détente or confrontation with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, whether to use force to reverse Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990–91, whether to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after the Cold War, and whether to invade Iraq in 2003. These debates reflected genuine intellectual disagreements that pitted members of the Blob against one another. Porter would likely respond that such debates were essentially about tactics, but the fact that the foreign policy community has engaged in knock-down, drag-out debates over issues of such enormous strategic importance shows that it is not as unified, and the marketplace of ideas not as limited, as Porter claims.

Second, although Porter argues that dissenting foreign policy views advocating an approach he calls “restraint” tend to be marginalized, departures from a strategy of U.S. leadership have time and again received a hearing at the highest levels of government. In the 1950s and 1960s, Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy repeatedly considered withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe.2 Similar debates occurred in Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s. When Jimmy Carter took office, he strongly favored withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea.3 In the early 1990s, the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations initially delegated management of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia to the European NATO allies. In 2011, Barack Obama withdrew U.S. troops from Iraq as part of a broader move toward an offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East.4 In other words, presidents and other political leaders in the United States have often been willing to consider significant changes in U.S. strategy, and they have sometimes even implemented policies that represented a meaningful shift toward retrenchment and restraint.

Third, the reason that many of these departures were not ultimately undertaken—or proved fleeting—is not because policymakers denied them a fair, open hearing. It is because they were judged—or later shown—to be substantively inferior to more assertive policies. Eisenhower never withdrew U.S. troops from Europe, because he understood that doing so would have threatened to destabilize the interlocking series of arrangements that deterred the Soviet Union while pacifying Germany and Western Europe.5 Carter never withdrew U.S. troops from South Korea, for fear that doing so would have risked incentivizing South Korean nuclear proliferation and destabilizing the fragile balance in a critical part of the world.6 The United States ultimately took the lead in addressing the crackup of Yugoslavia when the inability of the Europeans to deal with the crisis had become clear. Obama did draw down U.S. forces in Iraq, but large swaths of that country (and Syria) were subsequently overrun by the [ISIL] Islamic State, compelling a reassertion of U.S. military and diplomatic engagement.7 In these and other cases, an emphasis on U.S. leadership has persisted, because that approach has been deemed—after significant debate or hard experience—superior to the alternatives.

Fourth, and related, Porter slights the simplest explanation for why there has been substantial consistency in U.S. strategy: because it works. As scholars have demonstrated, the past seventy years have been among the best in human history in terms of rising global and U.S. prosperity, the spread of democracy and human rights, the avoidance of great power war, and the decline of war in general.8 It has also been a period when the world’s leading power consistently pursued a grand strategy geared explicitly toward achieving those goals. To prove that U.S. grand strategy persists for reasons other than utility, Porter would have to show that U.S. leadership has not been necessary to those outcomes or that it is no longer necessary. But he does not do so (or even really try to do so), and his article does not engage the relevant social science scholarship and historical literature establishing a causal connection between U.S. engagements and key aspects of the relatively benign global order.9

Finally, critics of primacy consistently argue, as Porter does, that their ideas are censored or excluded from policy debates. Yet, critics of U.S. grand strategy are prominent within the academy, including at prestigious institutions such as the University of Chicago, Harvard, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Their op-eds and essays appear in the New York Times, Foreign Policy, and Foreign Affairs, among other prominent “mainstream” outlets, and their work receives generous funding. Leading critics of primacy are regular participants in U.S. government–sponsored outreach initiatives such as the National Intelligence Council’s Intelligence Associates program. Not least, although Porter and many other realists in the academy deplore key aspects of the current president’s foreign policy, that president’s own core critique of the foreign policy elite echoes those made by academic realists.10 If this is censorship, it is a remarkably ineffective form of censorship. Perhaps the reason primacy endures is not that the marketplace of ideas is broken, but that it is working fairly well.

### Black Sea Turn---2AC

#### NATO withdrawal whets Putin’s appetite to dominate the Black Sea

**Brzezinski 19** [Ian J. Brzezinski, Resident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council Before, ’Hearing on “NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance,” https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190313/109112/HHRG-116-FA00-Wstate-BrzezinskiI-20190313.pdf]

Fourth, the Alliance must more substantially embrace and support the membership aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. NATO enlargement has been one of the great success stories of post-Cold War Europe. The extension of NATO membership to Central European democracies reinforced peace and security in Europe and strengthened the Alliance’s military 4 capability. The newest members of the Alliance have been among Europe’s most stalwart transatlanticists and most willing to contribute to US-led operations, including those beyond Europe.

The recent accession of Montenegro and the impending accession of Macedonia to NATO are important steps toward completing the vision of an undivided Europe, but the Alliance needs to also provide Ukraine and Georgia a clear path to NATO membership, recognizing it will take them time to meet the political and military requirements.

Toward this end, these two nations should be more deeply incorporated into the maritime, air, and ground force initiatives the United States and NATO is developing for the Black Sea region. Their territories would be useful to anti-submarine, air-defense, surveillance, and other operations needed to counter Russia’s efforts to leverage its occupation of Crimea into an anti-access/area-denial bastion spanning that sea. And, NATO Allies should expand the lethal security assistance provided to Georgia and Ukraine to include anti-aircraft systems, antiship missiles and other capabilities that would enhance their capacities for self-defense.

One clear lesson from Moscow’s invasions of Ukraine and Georgia is that the ambiguity of these two countries’ relationships with the Alliance only whetted the appetite of Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, and animated his sense of opportunity to reassert Moscow’s hegemony over what has been allowed to become a de facto and destabilizing grey zone in Europe’s strategic landscape.

#### Russia wants the Black Sea, not the Baltics --- deterrence breakdown ensures escalating conflicts there and in Syria

**Hamilton 20** [Robert E. Hamilton, Ph.D., is a Middle East Institute Non-Resident Scholar for Frontier Europe Initiative, is also an Associate Professor of Eurasian Studies at the U.S. Army War College, during a 30-year career in the U.S. Army, he served overseas in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Germany, Belarus, Qatar, Afghanistan, the Republic of Georgia, Pakistan and Kuwait, is a graduate of the German Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College, “NATO Needs to Focus on the Black Sea,” DefenseOne, Aug 4, 2020, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/08/nato-needs-focus-black-sea/167431/>]

Next, NATO’s presence in the Baltics and Poland is the right size: large enough to present a credible deterrent to Russia, but not large enough to present an offensive military threat. NATO was right to beef up its presence in the Baltics after 2014. After all, the three tiny Alliance members are simply incapable of defending themselves alone in the unlikely event of war with Russia. But deploying seven full brigades totaling 40,000 to 50,000 troops, as some analysts suggest, would be destabilizing. Russia would doubtless perceive this deployment as an offensive threat and increase its forces in response. The four NATO battle groups currently deployed – one each to the three Baltic republics and Poland – are important for their composition as much as their size. These 5,000-plus troops could do no more than delay a Russian incursion while NATO deployed reinforcements. But the fact that 24 of the 30 NATO members contribute forces to the Alliance’s “Enhanced Forward Presence” mission makes it clear to Russia that NATO is united in its determination to defend the Baltics, and that war there means war with nearly all of NATO.

Lastly, there is no indication that Moscow has any intention of invading the Baltics. Russia has always seen the Baltics as different from the rest of the former Soviet Union. In short, when the Kremlin looks at Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania it sees Europe, and it had always played by different rules in Europe than in its self-designated “near abroad”. Anatol Lieven remarked on this Russian tendency in his book The Baltic Revolution: “A large proportion of Baltic Russians have been prepared to acknowledge that the Balts have a superior civic culture, are cleaner, more orderly and harder working. They may qualify this by saying that Russian life is ‘friendlier’, or ‘more humane’, but this is the exact reverse of the usual colonizer: colonized self-images.”

Russia’s behavior toward the Baltic States immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union made clear the extent to which it treats them differently. As it was intervening on behalf of separatist movements in Georgia and Moldova, it scrupulously avoided escalating the situation with the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia. Despite the fact that Moscow was exceptionally unhappy with the treatment of Russians speakers there, and had military forces deployed to both countries until 1994, it always expressed its grievances through official, institutional channels instead of trying to rally the Russian-speaking minorities to violence or intervening directly as it did elsewhere.

Rather than fixate on the Baltics, where the threat is low and a deterrent force is in place, NATO should pay more attention to the Black Sea region. It is here that Russia has already intervened militarily, and is attempting to fracture the Alliance and erode confidence in its commitments. The Black Sea region also serves as the hub for Russia’s recent expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean and is critical to its efforts to support its intervention in Syria.

There are four main reasons the Black Sea region demands more attention.

First, three of the six littoral states – Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey – are NATO members and two – Ukraine and Georgia – were promised membership in 2008. Whether the Alliance should have committed to membership for Ukraine and Georgia is no longer relevant; it made the commitment and routinely reiterates it at NATO summits. Every year that the fear of Russia’s reaction delays progress on bringing Kyiv and Tbilisi into NATO erodes confidence in NATO’s other commitments.

Next, an examination of Russian military activities in the last decade-plus leads to the conclusion that the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean is the area of greatest geopolitical importance for Russia. All of its military interventions in this period – Georgia, Ukraine and Syria – have occurred in this region, and Moscow clearly intends to challenge the West in this part of the world. NATO provides the best vehicle to meet this challenge and protect the important national interests Western states have in this region.

#### Black Sea conflict causes great power war

**Joja 20** [Iulia-Sabina Joja is a DAAD Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, where she researches Black Sea security, “Three Conflict Scenarios for The Black Sea in 2020,” Jan 7, 2020, Black Sea Strategy Papers, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/01/three-conflict-scenarios-for-the-black-sea-in-2020/]

Conclusion

These three conflict scenarios are plausible risks for the Black Sea in 2020. Looking at “the wider Black Sea area” over a medium-term perspective, a more complex array of challenges is visible. In the Western Balkans, proposed land swaps and France’s veto against the European Union expansion add tension to a vulnerable region at the heart of Europe. To the south, Turkey’s divergence from other NATO members and the development of Russia’s offensive military capability development and projection into the Mediterranean add fuel to the fire. Along Turkey’s southern border, Iraq and Syria will be consumed by humanitarian tragedies. Finally, looking east, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is expanding Beijing’s influence in the Black Sea and into Europe more broadly. Increased security and stability in the Black Sea will be essential.

To prevent further conflict, American and European policymakers should prioritize the Black Sea as a security region. At a minimum, sanctions against Russia should be maintained. The West should support Ukraine’s and Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as their Western path. To prevent China’s buying up of the region, Western powers should consider offering infrastructure investment opportunities as alternatives to a poor and underdeveloped region while ensuring visibility with regard to regional public opinion. Lastly, in the NATO framework, pressure should be exerted to prevent Turkey from acting against collective interests.

#### Further Syrian escalation goes nuclear, draws in everyone

Lantier 19 [Alex, PhD @ University of Geneva, "Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria", Oct 19, 2019, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/10/14/syri-o14.html

The war unleashed by Turkey’s invasion of Syria, targeting formerly US-backed Kurdish forces, escalated out of control this weekend as the Syrian army and Iran moved to counterattack. With Turkish troops and allied Al Qaeda militias advancing deep into Kurdish-held territory in Syria, the Middle East is only days away from an all-out war between the major regional powers that could trigger a global conflict between nuclear-armed world powers. UN reports show that 130,000 Syrians have fled their homes in the region amid the Turkish offensive, and Turkish officials claim they had “neutralized” at least 415 Kurdish fighters. Turkish troops seized the cities of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, amid heavy fighting including ongoing Turkish air raids, and seizedddd a road crossing that cut off US and Kurdish troops in Kobani. Turkish troops also fired artillery at US troops near Kobani in what former US envoy Brett McGurk said was “not a mistake,” although Turkish officials later denied this. Turkey’s Syrian “rebel” allies, the Islamist Syrian National Army (SNA, formerly the Free Syrian Army), are executing Kurdish civilians in areas they hold, according to multiple reports. Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf was executed; her bullet-riddled car appeared in a video surrounded by SNA fighters. Beyond Al Qaeda-linked calls to destroy infidels, the British Daily Telegraph noted, the SNA’s main outlook “is sectarian: they are anti-Kurdish and they are Arab chauvinists.” Yesterday evening, the Syrian army announced it would march on the area. The official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported: “Syrian Arab Army units began moving north to confront Turkish aggression on Syrian territory... The movement comes to confront the ongoing Turkish aggression on towns and areas in the north of Hasaka and Raqqa provinces, where the Turkish forces committed massacres against locals, occupied some areas and destroyed infrastructure.” The Syrian army has reportedly reached an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militia, whose alliance with the United States was broken by Washington a week ago. Under this agreement, Syrian army troops would reach the city of Kobani near the Syrian-Turkish border in 48 hours. On Saturday, President Donald Trump had authorized the remaining 1,000 US troops in Kobani to withdraw, and US forces were in full retreat across northern Syria this weekend to avoid being cut off by advancing Turkish troops. Iran, which has deployed tens of thousands of troops as well as drones to Syria in recent years to back the Syrian regime against a NATO-led proxy war, indicated it would support the Syrian army. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Advisor for International Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati met with Syrian Ambassador to Iran Adnan Mahmoud yesterday in Tehran. He gave Iran’s “full support to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces,” SANA reported. Velayati added, “The principled policy of Iran is based on supporting the people and government of Syria and defending their righteous stances in a way that entails continuing joint cooperation until terrorism and terrorist organizations are completely eliminated.” At the same time, military tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are surging amid mutual attacks on tankers carrying Persian Gulf oil supplies that are critical to the world economy. Last month, the US and Saudi governments blamed a September 14 missile attack on Saudi oil facilities that caused a sharp rise in world oil prices on Iran, without providing any evidence. Then on October 11, two missiles hit the Iranian tanker Sabiti off Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, said yesterday that Iran would retaliate against unnamed targets for the attack on the Sabiti. “A special committee has been set up to investigate the attack on Sabiti... Its report will soon be submitted to the authorities for decision,” Shamkhani told Fars News. “Piracy and mischief on international waterways aimed at making commercial shipping insecure will not go unanswered.” Saudi officials declined to comment on the Sabiti attack, and officials with the US Fifth Fleet in the Gulf sheikdom of Bahrain claimed to have no information on it. But there is widespread speculation in the international media that the attack was carried out by Saudi Arabia or with its support. The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War.

#### Russia is an offensive realist, just like every great power

Rodríguez 15 [Joaquín Ferro Rodríguez, Strategic Studies and International Security Masters from the University of Granada, “Realism vs Realism. The Change of Approach in The Eastern Border,” June 30, 2015, <http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/?q=es/content/realism-vs-realism-change-approach-eastern-border>]

To begin with, I will explain why Russia can be considered as an offensive realist actor. It is not the aim of this paper to focus excessively on theoretical classifications or philosophical debates. However, due to its explicative power and its usefulness to better comprehend the Russian behaviour, it is worth mentioning three points belonging to the offensive realist theory: 1) great powers are rational actors whose main goal is to survive[1]; 2) all great powers are revisionist until the moment they become hegemonic[2]; and 3) for a great power, the only way to guarantee its security is to accumulate a bigger power quota than the rest[3]. Bearing in mind these characteristics, Russian position finds a coherent explanation. As Pierre Hassner puts it, “Russia’s foreign policy cannot be fully understood without taking into account the postimperial humiliation and resentment of the Russian people and the neoimperial ambition of its leaders”[4]. When the Cold War came to an end, Russian leaders regarded the presence of the United States (U.S.) and NATO in Europe positively as a way to keep a reunified Germany pacified. Nevertheless, they did not expect the subsequent NATO and EU enlargement, which included the ex-soviet Baltic countries in 2004[5]. This fact, added to the ‘colour revolutions’ taking place at the same time in Ukraine and Georgia, triggered a feeling of dissatisfaction within Russia and the desire of recovering its position as a great power[6]. The result is that, since 2004, Russia switched its - until that date - collaborative approach towards the West for a tougher one. Behaving as the offensive realist great power it wanted to become, Russia considers NATO/EU enlargements and their further relations with countries belonging to its ‘backyard’, especially Ukraine and Georgia, as a threat[7] to its survival. In order to face this threat, Moscow needs to accumulate more power and influence, above all in its direct neighbourhood, which explains why “Putin’s highest priority is to oppose ‘colour revolutions’”[8] as well as to avoid the promotion of the EU’s normative power in those countries. Consequently, he did not hesitate to show the Russian revisionist nature when he felt that national interests were at stake in Georgia and Ukraine. In the summer of 2008, after President Mikheil Saakashvili’s attempt to bring the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back under Georgia’s control, Putin decided to send the army to maintain the Russian influence in those regions[9]. However, his goal was not uniquely to preserve the status quo, but rather to revise it. In that conflict, Putin showed for the first time his true intentions to seize any opportunity at his disposal to broaden his influence and to keep his neighbour countries weak and out of the West’s reach. In order to do so, Putin chose direct means, namely military intervention and war, to tackle the problem. On the other hand, indirect means have been used in the Ukraine crisis for the same purpose. After Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia and a new pro-European government reached the power in Kiev in February 2014, Russia has promoted uprisings, funded separatist groups and militias in the eastern part of the country, annexed Crimea and sent arms and unidentified military staff to support the pro-Russian groups. These two different responses - direct and indirect - are the Russian tools to achieve its revisionist goals and not merely to defend the status quo, as demonstrated with the annexation of Crimea. These revisionist movements have not only benefited Putin abroad, but also within Russia, as his popularity has soared. This is a consequence of the powerful propaganda machinery of the Kremlin, which has been able to convince citizens of why Russia should be considered as a great power and, thus, to justify its international behaviour. The following points summarise Putin’s foreign policy and account for the theoretical base of the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine: Russia is a great power which shall preserve the sovereignty of the nation by all means. This has been translated into an increase of the military budget by 100% in the last 10 years, as well as in the presence of Russia in the most important international forums to enable them to participate in the decisions regarding other zones of the world[10]. “Russia and the Russian world constitute a ‘singular civilization’, neither Occidental nor Asian, which rests on the Christian values and a ‘historical mission’: to defend the traditional values against a materialist and decadent Occident”[11] (author’s translation). The Russian Diaspora, meaning that “the Russian people have become the largest people disperse worldwide”[12] (author’s translation). This situation implies an obligation for Russia to protect and defend Russian minorities wherever they are[13].

### Black Sea Internal---1AR

#### NATO Black Sea dominance key to prevent Russian expansion into the middle east

**Grygiel 19** [Jakub Grygiel, associate professor of politics at The Catholic University of America, December 12, 2019, “Russia’s Return To The Middle East,” Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/research/russias-return-middle-east]

The outcome of Russia’s return to the region is unknown, of course. But so far Putin has achieved two goals. First, Russia has maximized its strategic possibilities by inserting itself into a cauldron of great power competition. Second, the war in Syria is seen by Russian public opinion as a good war, with low casualties and a dramatic improvement in Russia’s image as a world-class great power. More than 70% of Russians support policies that are deemed to enhance the international status of their country. Russia nourishes vast imperial ambitions, matched by Putin’s personal aspirations of proto-tsarist grandeur. It is unlikely, therefore, that Putin will withdraw from the Middle East on his own, as was the hope of many in the Obama administration.

How, then, can Russia be pushed back from the Middle East? How can it be induced to stop destabilizing the region? The answer may be in Ukraine.

Now, as in the past, Russia has three main frontiers and lines of expansion. The Eastern frontier in Asia is currently dormant because China is too powerful and Moscow has no means to oppose it, choosing to accept Beijing’s economic predominance in exchange for Russian security hegemony. The second front is the European or Western one, perhaps the most examined and important because this is where a lot of bloody clashes have occurred since the 17th century. Russia’s westward push has met here the greatest opponents, from Poland and Sweden in the 17th century, to Prussia and Austria in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Atlantic alliance in the second half of the 20th century. And it is the front that has attracted the most attention in the past decade, since Putin has used military force to oppose the westward leaning posture of two countries: Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Russia’s wars against these two states were clear attempts to oppose the West, seen as encroaching upon states that Moscow deems part of its own empire or hegemony. And these conflicts have achieved the most important strategic objective pursued by Moscow: the effective end of Western enlargement.

But these military operations against Georgia and Ukraine are also part of Russia’s efforts to extend influence toward her Southern frontier. This is the third vector of Russian expansion, toward the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is a turbulent frontier that is constantly fluctuating, with constantly changing and often ambiguous alignments.

Ukraine, in particular, is Russia’s door to Europe but also to the Black Sea and thus, farther out, to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Without Ukraine, Russia is an Asian power, left to face China on a lengthy steppe frontier. With Ukraine, Russia is an empire that forces itself into Europe’s power dynamics. Paris and Berlin, not to mention capitals closer to Russia, will have to take Russia seriously (albeit responding with strategies that are often very different; Paris, for instance, seeks a rapprochement with Moscow while Warsaw arms and pursues stronger bilateral relations with the U.S.) in the moment Moscow has a foot in Ukraine.

In the past three centuries, Russia’s control over Crimea and the mouths of the Don and Dnieper signaled a conflict with the Ottoman power to the south, as Muscovite forces moved to project influence over the Black Sea and the push their way to the Bosphorus. As a Prussian military leader of the tsarist army said after taking over a key fortress near Crimea in the early 18th century, Russia’s presence there was a “splinter in the enemy’s foot.”2 Such a description continues to be applicable. In the moment Russia solidifies its presence on the shores of the Black Sea, Turkey, and any other great power situated in the Middle East has to deal with Moscow. To put it differently, over the past few years, after Russia’s wars in Ukraine and Georgia, and then with her military deployment in Syria, Turkey realized that Russia is not a land power locked in the distant Muscovite core, but a Black Sea potentate that had to be taken into account. The current problems in the U.S.-Turkey relationship are, therefore, caused by Erdogan’s Islamic authoritarian ways as much as by Russia’s move into the Middle East which has forced Ankara to seek a friendly modus vivendi with Moscow.

From this, it follows that to check Russia’s ability to insert herself into Middle Eastern dynamics and to further disrupt an already volatile region, the U.S. and its allies should strengthen Ukrainian geopolitical independence and weaken Russia’s hold over Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A strong independent Ukraine limits Russian destabilizing southward push. To avoid a highly unpredictable and costly great power competition in the Middle East – a situation that would distract the United States from its more pressing Pacific and European challenges – it is thus best to consider how to push Russia out of it. And the path to that goal runs through Ukraine.

#### NATO Black Sea deterrence is crucial to regional stability --- only NATO’s presence prevents reckless Russian intervention into Syria

**Coffey 20** [Luke Coffey, had served at the UK Ministry of Defence since 2010 as senior special adviser to then-British Defence Secretary Liam, is the director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation, where he oversees research on nations stretching from South America to the Middle East, “While the U.S. is not a Black Sea country, it needs to be a Black Sea power,” July 21, 2020, MEI, https://www.mei.edu/publications/while-us-not-black-sea-country-it-needs-be-black-sea-power]

While the Baltic region is incredibly important for NATO, this lack of focus on the Black Sea was unfortunate. The region matters to the U.S. and its NATO allies. The Black Sea is home to three NATO members (Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria) and two aspirant NATO countries that face partial Russian occupation (Ukraine and Georgia). Important oil and gas transit links crisscross the region. So do many important fiber optic cables and shipping lanes.

On the tactical level, Moscow’s action in the region and its militarization of Crimea furthers its goal of making the Black Sea a Russian lake. Russia has deployed 28,000 troops to Crimea and has embarked on a major program to build housing, restore airfields, and install new radars there. In addition, Russia has deployed advanced air defense and anti-ship missiles that give it a leg up above the rest in terms of controlling the surface and the skies above the Black Sea.

On the strategic level, Russia uses the Black Sea as a springboard to challenge U.S. interests elsewhere in the world. For example, Russia has used its Black Sea presence on occupied Crimea to launch and support naval operations in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In the early days of Moscow’s intervention in Syria, the Moskva, a Russian navy guided missile cruiser, played a vital role in providing air defense for Russian forces. Hundreds of thousands of tons of grain and wheat have been shipped from Crimea to Syria to help the Assad Regime’s food shortage problems. Hundreds of trips have been made between Crimea’s port city of Sevastopol and the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria to transport military hardware and resupplies.

Thankfully policymakers are now waking up. For the U.S. three Black Sea countries can play an important role in America’s presence in the region: Romania, Georgia and Ukraine.

Romania is the most enthusiastic of all the Black Sea countries inside NATO about maintaining a strong presence in the region. Romania has sought closer military, economic, and political relations with the United States. As Romania’s new National Defense Strategy states about Romanian-U.S. relations: “Romania aims at consolidating its military cooperation with the United States, not just as a mere course of action derived from our status as allies, but as an operational objective to be implemented on the national territory.”

When it comes to Black Sea security Romania also has a special role to play serving as the confluence of the Danube River. This is especially true as proposals have been made to use access to the Danube River as a way to increase NATO presence in the Black Sea.

Romania has shown a willingness to step up to the plate when the geopolitical situation requires. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, Bucharest became an outspoken supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. And was one of the first countries in Europe to call for the arming of the Ukrainian military in the face of Russian aggression.

Even before becoming a member of NATO Romania was willing to support NATO led operations in the Balkans by giving access to its airspace for operations. Romania has contributed troops to the NATO mission in Kosovo. Thousands of Romanian troops have been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq to support US and NATO led operations in those countries. Currently, Romania has more than 730 soldiers serving in Afghanistan. Also, Mihail Romania’s Kogalniceanu Air Base is a major logistics and supply hub for U.S. equipment and personnel traveling to the Middle East region.

Across the Black Sea from Romania, Georgia is another important partner for the U.S. After the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, and the subsequent occupation of 20 percent of its territory, Georgia has transformed its military and has been steadfast in its support of NATO, as well as non-NATO, U.S.-led overseas security operations. Georgia has contributed thousands of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and hundreds of peacekeepers to the Balkans and Africa. Even with the Russian invasion and its aftermath, Georgia has not been deterred from getting closer to the West. This has made Georgia a net contributor to transatlantic security and is a key part of any Black Sea strategy.

Georgia is important to the U.S. and NATO for three main reasons.

First, Georgia is a proven and dependable ally in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2012, when many NATO countries were rushing for the door in Afghanistan, Georgia added hundreds of troops to the mission there. At the height of the Georgian contribution to Afghanistan, it had more than 2,000 troops serving in some of the deadliest places in the country, if not the world, in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces. Today, Georgia has 870 troops in Afghanistan, making it the largest non-NATO troop contributor to the NATO training mission.

Second, located on the Black Sea, Georgia sits at a crucial geographical and cultural crossroads and has proven itself to be strategically important for military and economic reasons for centuries. Today Georgia offers its territory, infrastructure, and logistic capabilities for the transit of NATO forces and cargo for Afghanistan. Over the years, Georgia has modernized key airports and port facilities in the country. This is particularly important when it comes to the Black Sea region. Key pipelines like the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, the Baku–Supsa pipeline, and the Southern Gas Corridor transit through Georgia, as do important rail lines like the recently opened Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. The oil and gas pipelines are particularly important to Europe’s energy security, and therefore NATO’s interest in the region.

Finally, Georgia’s journey to democracy is an example for the region. Since regaining independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia has been on a steady journey to democracy. Over the years, successive Georgian governments have pursued an agenda of liberalizing the economy, cutting bureaucracy, fighting corruption, and embracing democracy.

As the target of Russia’s most recent act of aggression in the region, Ukraine also plays an important role regarding stability and security in the Black Sea.

Ukraine is in the midst of a national struggle that will determine its future geopolitical orientation: the West or Moscow. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for the transatlantic community and the notion of national sovereignty. Since 2014, almost 5 percent of Ukraine’s landmass and more than half of its coastline have been under illegal Russian occupation in Crimea.

Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and so it does not enjoy the Alliance’s security guarantee, but it was Kyiv’s desire to join institutions such as NATO and the EU that persuaded Russia to invade in 2014. Ukraine represents the idea that countries in Europe should be free to choose how and by whom they are governed, and which international organizations and alliances they wish to join. No outside country, in this case Russia, should have a veto.

With time Ukraine has the potential to become one of the most dominant powers on the Black Sea. The U.S. has been investing and improving Ukraine’s maritime capabilities.

For different reasons Romania, Georgia and Ukraine play an important role in the Black Sea. The U.S. can work more closely to enhance its bilateral relationship and improve Black Sea security.

For Romania, the U.S. should look at ways to increase its presence in the land and air domains in the country. This could mean U.S. troops and fighter jets permanently based there. For years most of the U.S. and NATO focus on the Black Sea has been the maritime domain. While this is important, the land and air domains cannot be ignored.

For both Georgia and Ukraine, the U.S. must work with NATO allies to ensure both are kept on the path to eventual membership into the Alliance. At the same time the U.S. should work with both to improve their military capabilities.

While the U.S. is not a Black Sea country, it needs to be a Black Sea power. To make this happen Washington must build on its relations with Romania, Georgia and Ukraine. This will make America, NATO, and the region safer.

### Black Sea Impact---1AR

#### Goes nuclear

**Amineh 3** [Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, Ph. D in Poli Sci @ University of Amsterdam & Senior research fellow and Programme director of the Energy Programme Asia @ International Institute for Asian Studies) “Globalisation, Geopolitics and Energy Security in Central Eurasia and the Caspian Region,” Hand-out of lecture held on June 19 2003, Clingendael International Energy Programme, pg. <http://www.clingendael.nl/ciep/events/20030619/20030619_amineh.pdf>] \*CEA = post-Soviet Central Eurasia ]

The increasing involvement of the US, the EU, Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey, and also TNCs in the region underscores the significance of the oil and gas resources in CEA and the potential competition for the control of these resources. What we are witnessing now is, a re-composition of the geo-strategic map not only for CEA and the Caspian region, but also of the whole world.

Tensions could be further aggravated by disparities in military power, if conflicts were to escalate. The Eurasian region includes states with a number of the largest armed forces in Europe and Asia: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Iran, Pakistan, China, India and Uzbekistan. The region also has four nuclear-armed countries – Russia, China, Pakistan and India – making it a dangerous potential flash point of global significance. Further, security risks concern the US / NATO involvement in numerous political and economic crises in post-Soviet CEA, the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, and the war and crisis in Iraq.

### Syria Impact---1AR

#### Additional Russian incursions into Syria cause Russia-Israel war, which draws in the US and causes great power nuclear war

**Peck 19** [Michael Peck, “A Nuclear Nightmare: How a War Between Russia and Israel Could Start,” Nov 16, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nuclear-nightmare-how-war-between-russia-and-israel-could-start-96861]

The potential for war is real.

Key point: In the end, either Israel or Russia will have to back down.

Could Israeli air strikes in Syria trigger war between Israel and Russia?

Israel remains determined to continue pounding Iranian forces in Syria in a bid to keep Tehran’s forces away from Israel’s northern border. At the same time, Russia has thousands of troops in Syria that could be caught in the crossfire—or even become belligerents if Moscow tires of its Syrian ally being pummeled.

And if Israel and Russia come to blows, would Israel’s big brother—the United States—feel compelled to intervene?

Not that Jerusalem or Moscow are eager for such a fight. “Neither of us desire a military confrontation,” a senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) official told me during a recent interview in Jerusalem. “It would be detrimental to both sides.”

Yet Israel’s policy boils down to this: it will do whatever it sees as necessary to eject Iranian forces from Syria. And if Russia doesn’t like it, then that’s just the price of ensuring that Syria doesn’t become another Iranian rocket base on Israel’s border.

Relations between Jerusalem and Moscow are far warmer than during the Cold War. The result is a strange embrace reminiscent of the U.S.-Soviet detente of the 1970s. On the surface, a certain friendliness and desire for cooperation. Yet beneath the smiles is wariness, suspicion and a clash of fundamental interests.

“No one in Israel is confused about who the Russians are and who they are aligned with,” said the IDF official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The Russians are not our allies, to put it mildly. We have one ally, and that is the United States. The Russians are here for totally different objectives. They are supporting a regime [Syria] that has an outspoken goal of annihilating Israel if it only could. They are also part of a coalition that supports Iran.”

Just how easily Israeli military operations can trigger an incident became evident during a September 2018 strike on ammunition depots in western Syria. Anti-aircraft missiles launched by Syrian gunners accidentally shot down a Russian Il-20 surveillance aircraft, killing fifteen people. Israel denies Russian accusations that it deliberately used the Russian plane as cover, or failed to give Moscow sufficient warning of the raid. Yet Russia still blamed Israel for the mishap and retaliated by supplying advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Syria.

Nonetheless, Israel sees value in Russia as a potential restraint on Iran, and a possible lever to get Iranian forces out of Syria. After a February meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Vladimir Putin to mend fences after the Il-20 incident, Israeli officials claimed Putin had agreed that foreign forces should withdraw from Syria. For Moscow, friendly relations with Israel offer more influence in the Middle East even as America may be scaling down its presence in the region.

Still, the Kremlin has denounced Israeli strikes in Syria as “illegitimate.” Syria has been a Russian ally for more than fifty years, and it was Russian air strikes—along with Iranian and Hezbollah troops—that saved Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s faltering regime from ISIS and other rebel groups. At least 63,000 Russian troops have served in Syria since 2015. Though Putin has promised since 2016 that Russian forces would withdraw, Russia currently retains more than 5,000 troops and private military contractors in Syria, backed by several dozen aircraft and helicopters.

And Russia is in Syria to stay. The Syrian port of Tartus is Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean: in 2016, Moscow and Damascus signed a forty-nine-year agreement that allows nuclear-powered Russian warships to operate from there. In addition, Russian aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, including the long-range S-400 air defense system, operate from at least two air bases in western Syria.

Israel can live with the Russians next door—but not the Iranians. Israeli officials warn of Tehran’s plan to station 100,000 Iranian and allied troops in Syria. Hezbollah, with its estimated arsenal of 130,000-plus rockets, already menaces Israel’s Lebanon frontier. Syria joining Lebanon as a second Iranian rocket base is the stuff of Israeli nightmares.

“We can – and we intend to – make it as difficult as possible and inflict a price tag that the Iranians aren’t willing to pay,” the IDF official said. And the Israeli Air Force has been just doing that, attacking “Iranian and Hezbollah targets hundreds of times,” Netanyahu announced after a devastating attack on Iranian arms depots near Damascus International Airport in January.

“We continue to implement our plans,” the IDF official replied when asked if Russia would deter Israeli raids into Syria. “Our activities suggest that, despite everything, we enjoy significant freedom of action.”

But more telling was his one-word response when asked how willing is Israel to fight for that freedom of action.

“Willing.”

Which leaves the question: Can Israel target Iran in Syria without triggering a clash with Russia?

There are deconfliction mechanisms in place, including a hotline between the Israeli and Russian militaries. “We are very strict about informing the Russians about our activities and that their operational picture is up to date,” said the IDF official. Yet those procedures were not sufficient to avoid a downing of a Russian plane.

Perhaps that ill-fated Il-20 was just at the wrong place at the wrong time. Still, it is not hard to imagine a multiplicity of equally fatal scenarios. Russian advisers or technicians caught in an Israeli raid on an Iranian or Syrian installation. An errant Israeli smart bomb that hits a Russian base, or a Russian pilot or anti-aircraft battery spooked by a nearby Israeli raid into opening fire. Or, perhaps Russia will just feel obligated to support the prestige of its Syrian ally and its shaky government. Just how incendiary Syrian skies are for everyone became evident in December 2017, when U.S. F-22 fighters fired flares to warn off two Russian Su-25 attack jets that breached a no-go zone in eastern Syria.

To be clear, the IDF is neither boastful nor belligerent about its capabilities versus Russia, a former superpower with the largest nuclear arsenal on the planet. The IDF official likened Israel to “The Mouse that Roared,” the classic novel of a tiny nation that challenges the United States.

But if Israel resembles any mouse, it’s Mighty Mouse: small, powerful and not afraid to use its fists. In fact, what makes a potential Israel-Russia battle so dangerous is that it is not hypothetical. After the 1967 Six-Day War, Soviet fighters were sent to Egypt. This led to a notorious July 1970 incident when in a well-planned aerial ambush over the Suez Canal, Israeli fighters shot down five Soviet-piloted MiG-21 jets in three minutes.

On the other hand, Russia doesn’t need to fight Israel to hurt Israel. Indeed, the IDF official seemed less concerned about a physical clash between Israeli and Russian forces, and more concerned that Russia could choose to supply advanced weapons—such as anti-aircraft missiles—to Israeli enemies such as Syria and Iran. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union supplied numerous air defense missiles and guns to Egypt and Syria, which inflicted heavy losses on Israeli planes in the 1973 October War. If it wants to, Russia can make Israeli air operations very expensive.

As always with the Arab-Israeli (or Iranian-Israeli) conflict, the real danger isn’t the regional conflict, but how it might escalate. In the 1973 war, the Soviets threatened to send troops to Egypt unless Israel agreed to a cease-fire. The United States responded by going on nuclear alert.

Were the Israelis and Russians to come to blows, or if Moscow were to seriously threaten military force against Israel, could the United States risk a grave loss of prestige by not intervening to back its longtime ally? Could Russia—whose Syrian intervention is a proud symbol of its reborn military muscle and great power status—not retaliate for another downed Russian plane or a dead Russian soldier?

Which leads to the ultimate question: could tensions between Israel and Russia lead to a clash between American and Russian troops?

In the end, somebody will have to back down. But Iran isn’t about to give up its outpost on Israel’s border, and Russia probably can’t force them to. Then there is Israel, which is grimly determined to stop Iran.

As the IDF official said, “We have proven over more than 70 years as a sovereign state that you don’t push us around.”

#### Goes nuclear

Beres 15 [Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science @ Purdue University, “Israeli Deterrence in the Eye of the Hurricane,” *Breaking Israel News*, July 15, 2015, <http://tinyurl.com/pxxoyzd>]

Sometimes, in strategic matters, seeing requires distance. A nuclear war in the Middle East is not beyond possibility. This is a sensible assessment even if Israel were to remain the only nuclear weapons state in the region. How is this possible? A bellum atomicum could come to Israel not only as a “bolt from the blue” enemy nuclear attack (either by a state or by a terrorist group), but also as the result, intended or otherwise, of certain uncontrolled military escalations. Needed prudence in such narratives calls for additional specificity and precision. If particular Arab/Islamic enemy states were to launch conventional attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem could then respond, sooner or later, with calculated and more-or-less calibrated nuclear reprisals. Alternatively, if some of these enemy states were to launch large-scale conventional attacks, Jerusalem’s own still-conventional reprisals could then be met, perhaps even in the not-too-distant future, with enemy nuclear counterstrikes. How should Israel prepare for such perilous contingencies? More than likely, Israel has already rejected any doctrinal plans for fielding a tactical/theater nuclear force, and for assuming any corollary nuclear war fighting postures. It would follow further from any such well-reasoned rejection that Israel should do whatever is needed to maintain a credible conventional deterrent. By definition, such a measured threat option could then function reliably across the entire foreseeable spectrum of non-nuclear threats. Still, any such strategy would need to include an appropriately complementary nuclear deterrent, a distinctly “last resort” option that could display a “counter-value” (counter-city) mission function. Si vis pacem, para bellum atomicum: “If you want peace, prepare for atomic war.” A persuasive Israeli conventional deterrent, at least to the extent that it might prevent a wide range of enemy conventional attacks in the first place, could reduce Israel’s growing risk of escalatory exposure to nuclear war. In the always arcane lexicon of nuclear strategy, a complex language that more-or-less intentionally mirrors the tangled coordinates of atomic war, Israel will need to maintain firm control of “escalation dominance.” Otherwise, the Jewish state could find itself engaged in an elaborate but ultimately lethal pantomime of international bluster and bravado. The reason for Israel’s obligation to control escalatory processes is conspicuous and unassailable. It is that Jerusalem’s main enemies possess something that Israel can plainly never have: Mass. At some point, as nineteenth century Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz asserts in On War: “Mass counts.” Today, this is true even though Israel’s many enemies are in chaotic disarray. Now, amid what Clausewitz had famously called “friction” and the “fog of war,” it could become harder for Israel to determine real and pertinent differences between its allies, and its adversaries. As an example, Jordan could soon become vulnerable to advancing IS forces. Acknowledging this new vulnerability, an ironic question will come immediately to mind: Should Israel support the Jordanian monarchy in such a fight? And if so, in what specific and safe operational forms? Similarly ironic questions may need to be raised about Egypt, where the return to military dictatorship in the midst of surrounding Islamist chaos could eventually prove both fragile and transient. Should President Abdel Fattah Sisi fail to hold things together, the ultimate victors could be not only the country’s own Muslim Brotherhood, but also, in nearby Gaza, Palestinian Hamas. Seemingly, however, Hamas is already being targeted by Islamic State, a potentially remorseless opposition suggesting, inter alia, that the principal impediment to Palestinian statehood is not really Israel, but another Sunni Arab terrorist organization. Of course, it is not entirely out of the question that IS’s Egyptian offshoot, the so-called “Sinai Province of Islamic State,” could sometime decide to cooperate with Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement – rather than plan to it. To further underscore the area’s multiple and cross-cutting axes of conflict, it is now altogether possible that if an IS conquest of Sinai should spread to Gaza, President Sisi might then “invite” the IDF to strike on Egypt’s behalf. Among other concerns, Egypt plainly fears that any prolonged inter-terrorist campaign inside Gaza could lead to a literal breaking down of border fences, and an uncontrolled mass flight of Palestinians into neighboring Sinai. Credo quia absurdum. “I believe because it is absurd.” With such peculiar facts in mind, why should Israel now sustain a conventional deterrent at all? Wouldn’t enemy states, at least those that were consistently rational, steadfastly resist launching any conventional attacks upon Israel, for fear of inciting a nuclear reprisal? Here is a plausible answer: suspecting that Israel would cross the nuclear threshold only in extraordinary circumstances, these national foes could be convinced, rightly or wrongly, that as long as their initial attacks were to remain conventional, Israel’s response would remain reciprocally non-nuclear. By simple extrapolation, this means that the only genuinely effective way for Israel to continually deter large-scale conventional war could be by maintaining visibly capable and secure conventional options. As for Israel’s principal non-state adversaries, including Shi’ite Hezbollah and Sunni IS, their own belligerent calculations would be detached from any assessments of Israeli nuclear capacity and intent. After all, whatever attacks they might sometime decide to consider launching against the Jewish state, there could never be any decipherable nuclear response. Nonetheless, these non-state jihadist foes are now arguably more threatening to Israel than most enemy national armies, including the regular armed forces of Israel’s most traditional enemies – Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Some other noteworthy nuances now warrant mention. Any still-rational Arab/ Islamic enemy states considering firststrike attacks against Israel using chemical and/or biological weapons would likely take Israel’s nuclear deterrent more seriously. But a strong conventional capability would still be needed by Israel to deter or to preempt certain less destructive conventional attacks, strikes that could escalate quickly and unpredictably to assorted forms of unconventional war. If Arab/Islamic enemy states did not perceive any Israeli sense of expanding conventional force weakness, these belligerent countries, now animated by credible expectations of an Israeli unwillingness to escalate to nonconventional weapons, could be more encouraged to attack. The net result here could be: 1) defeat of Israel in a conventional war; 2) defeat of Israel in an unconventional (chemical/biological/ nuclear) war; 3) defeat of Israel in a combined conventional/unconventional war; or 4) defeat of Arab/Islamic enemy states by Israel in an unconventional war. For Israel, even the presumptively “successful” fourth possibility could prove too costly. Perceptions are vitally important in all calculations of nuclear deterrence. By continuing to keep every element of its nuclear armaments and doctrine “opaque,” Israel could unwittingly contribute to the injurious impression among its regional enemies that Jerusalem’s nuclear weapons were unusable. Unconvinced of Israel’s willingness to actually employ its nuclear weapons, these enemies could then decide to accept the cost-effectiveness of striking first. With any such acceptance, Israeli nuclear deterrence will have failed. If enemy states should turn out to be correct in their calculations, Israel could find itself overrun, and thereby rendered subject to potentially existential harms. If they had been incorrect, many states in the region, including even Israel, could eventually suffer the assorted consequences of multiple nuclear weapons detonations. Within the directly affected areas, thermal radiation, nuclear radiation and blast damage would then spawn uniquely high levels of death and devastation.

#### And causes bioweapons use --- extinction

Stirling 11 [Earl of Stirling is the Governor & Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High Admiral of Nova Scotia, & B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History, and has a M.A. in European Studies, “General Middle East War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan,” March 11, 2011, <http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html>]

The Iranians and Syrians and their Hezbollah allies/proxies have a considerable selection of WMD available for these 40,000 to 60,000 rockets/missiles (in addition to their Syrian and Iranian based longer range missiles). The WMD can range from FAE (fuel air explosive) warheads (which if fired in a coordinated pattern can lay down a FAE ‘brew’ over a wide area, such as over a heavily populated urban area) and achieve PSI (pounds per square inch) levels higher than standard NATO tactical nuclear warheads. The WMD can also include chemical warheads of various types. Syria and Iran have one of the largest (if not the largest) joint chemical warfare programs on Earth. Additionally, they can use Advanced Biologically produced biotoxin warheads for a longer lasting chemical war ‘effect’. They can also use ‘dirty bombs’, that is Radiological warheads using things like Cobalt 60 and Strontium 90, which give the ‘effect’ of radiological fallout without using a nuclear blast. They can also use Radiological weapons encased in an advanced matrix containing hard to remove glue, so that the radioactive particles are glued to buildings, cars, etc., making any decontamination efforts most difficult. The Israelis see these rockets/missiles and their assorted warheads as a grave threat. The Second Lebanon War was planned as the first step in a war against Syria and Iran but the low-cost but powerful AT-14 Russian built and supplied anti-tank missiles proved too much for the IDF armor; the losses were simply too high. This time the IDF will be using different tactics, strategies, and weapons. Both Syria and Lebanon have make it very clear, over the last few months, that any large-scale Israeli attack on Lebanon/Hezbollah will be considered an attack on them and will immediately trigger a regional war with themselves and Israel. They simply cannot allow Israel to destroy the rocket/missile element to their MAD counter-force, as they know that the Syrian and Iranian homelands would be next. So any war on Lebanon/Hezbollah means a General Middle East War from day one. Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory. The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors. There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This could kill a third of the world's total population. Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world.

#### Russian involvement ensures Israeli nuclear use

Farley 20 [Robert, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, Feb 15, 2020, “A War In The Middle East Could Go Nuclear (And That Can Only Mean 1 Thing),” National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/war-middle-east-could-go-nuclear-and-can-only-mean-1-thing-123056]

Conventional Defeat

The idea that Israel might lose a conventional war seems ridiculous now, but the origins of the Israeli nuclear program lay in the fear that the Arab states would develop a decisive military advantage that they could use to inflict battlefield defeats. This came close to happening during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the Egyptian Army seized the Suez Canal and the Syrian Arab Army advanced into the Golan Heights. Accounts on how seriously Israel debated using nukes during that war remain murky, but there is no question that Israel could consider using its most powerful weapons if the conventional balance tipped decisively out of its favor.

How might that happen? We can imagine a few scenarios, most of which involve an increase in hostility between Israel and its more tolerant neighbors. Another revolution in Egypt could easily rewrite the security equation on Israel’s southern border; while the friendship of Saudi Arabia seems secure, political instability could change that; even Turkish policy might shift in a negative direction. Israel currently has overwhelming conventional military advantages, but these advantages depend to some extent on a favorable regional strategic environment. Political shifts could leave Israel diplomatically isolated, and vulnerable once again to conventional attack. In such a situation, nuclear weapons would remain part of the toolkit for ensuring the survival of the nation.

### Russia Deterred Now---2AC

#### NATO is expanding their army 6x – deters Russia and thumps every disad.

Carbonaro 6/23 – Giulia Carbonaro, Reporter @ Newsweek, casual roller skater!!! 6-23-2022, "NATO to massively expand army in bid to deter further Putin aggression," Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/nato-massively-expand-army-bid-deter-further-putin-aggression-ukraine-defense-1718435, accessed 6-24-2022 – OBERTO!

NATO is preparing to expand its army in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, according to Sky News Security and Defense Editor Deborah Haynes.

[The military alliance](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/nato) has been forced to rethink the way it can deter the aggressive ambitions of Russian President [Vladimir Putin](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/vladimir-putin) in Europe, she reported. Moscow's assault on Ukraine, which isn't a NATO member, has added urgency to the organization's long-standing but stalled defense plans.

"Overnight the mentality changed," an unnamed NATO officer told Haynes. "NATO now feels like it is electrified. You can feel the energy surging through the system."

Separately, a diplomat told the Sky News editor that "a radical change in posture" is expected to emerge from the NATO summit in Spain between June 28 and 30.

Officials at the gathering will discuss how NATO's 40,000-strong Response Force (NRF) will be rebranded and made up to **six times larger**, according to Haynes. The overhaul, the biggest in NATO since the Cold War, would rename the NRF the Allied Reaction Force (AFR), according to the Sky News editor. Her source at NATO said the final increase in numbers will probably be lower than that.

Another possible change to be implemented will be an increase in the size of the NATO mission in the alliance's eastern and southeastern flank, with thousands more troops expected to be based in their home nations and only being deployed if needed.

NATO could also decide to designate Russia as the "most significant and direct threat" to security, wrote Haynes, and to approve a new "comprehensive assistance package" for Ukraine.

In a statement delivered on April 6 ahead of the meeting of NATO's ministers of foreign affairs, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg talked of the war in Ukraine as having "long term implications" for NATO security, "because we have seen the brutality," he said.

"We have seen the willingness by President Putin to use military force to reach his objectives. And that has changed the security reality in Europe for many, many years. So therefore, we have started the process in NATO, we have tasked our military commanders to provide options for the political leaders to take decisions on how to reset our deterrence and defense for the long term. This will of course, build on what we have already done," Stoltenberg said then.

NATO has already reinforced its collective defense in response to Russia's aggressive campaigns against its neighbor, when it tripled the size of the NRF in 2014 following Putin's annexation of Crimea.

"So we, NATO, [were] actually quite well prepared when Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time, and on the day of the invasion, we activated our defense plans, deployed 1000s of additional troops in the eastern part of the Alliance. Now there are 40,000 troops on the NATO command in the eastern part of the Alliance. And there are more U.S. troops in Europe, 100,000 in total, and other Allies have also increased their presence," Stoltenberg said.

"We were well prepared when they invaded Ukraine. But now we need to take a new step, for a more long term strengthening of our deterrence and defense," the secretary general said in April, adding that "decisions for the longer term will be made at the summit in Madrid in June when the heads of state and government meet."

The meeting in Madrid next week will also be marked by disappointment surrounding the obstacles now faced by Sweden and Finland in their bid to join NATO. Both the alliance and the two Nordic countries expected the membership process to be swift and smooth, but were caught by surprise by Turkey's strong opposition to their candidacy —especially Sweden's.

Ankara has accused Stockholm of sheltering terrorists from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

### Russia Deterred Now---1AR

#### Finland and Sweden joining NATO solve deterrence.

* ALSO thump NATO bad because Putin retaliates to their joining

Buddhavarapu 5/12– Ravi Buddhavarapu BA @ Delhi University, 05-12-2022, “Finland and Sweden joining NATO will help deter Russia, says security analyst,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/12/finland-and-sweden-joining-nato-will-help-deter-russia-says-security-analyst.html, accessed 6-24-2022 – OBERTO!

A decision by Finland and Sweden to join NATO will improve deterrence against Russia in northern Europe and add to the U.S.-led military alliance’s security, one analyst from Atlantic Council told CNBC on Thursday.

Her comments came right before Finland’s President Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Sanna Marin announced their country should apply to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “without delay.”

“NATO membership would strengthen Finland’s security. As a member of NATO, Finland would strengthen the entire defense alliance,” they said in a joint statement.

A similar announcement from Sweden is expected later this week.

“Sweden and Finland joining NATO will increase deterrence in the region because of the assets they will provide the alliance. And [because of] the ability to plan for Northern Europe’s security in a comprehensive manner,” said the Atlantic Council’s Northern Europe director Anna Weislander.

Membership of the political and military alliance will be a historic decision for Finland, which shares a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia. The Nordic nation adopted neutrality after its defeat by the Soviet Union in World War Two. Sweden, too, has not been part of any military alliances for more than 200 years.

Weislander said both the countries were well prepared to meet the oft-repeated political and military threats by Russian President Vladimir Putin who opposes their membership.

“President Putin and Russia have several times already declared that there will be military and political consequences,” she said on “Capital Connection,” adding she expected more of such warnings in the coming days.

“We have prepared. We have moved military installations… and expect [Russian] cyber attacks, electronic jamming or more airspace intrusions,” she said, noting that both Sweden and Finland were members of the European Union.

“Sweden and Finland are solid democracies with sophisticated economies and will, therefore, also contribute to the underlying values of the alliance,” Weislander said.

The armed forces of both countries enjoy high compatibility with NATO members states too, she added.

“Finland is already a security provider. It has a strong military, it is small but technically sophisticated. It can not only defend itself despite a long border with Russia but it has also, alongside Sweden, worked with NATO on international missions from the Balkans to Afghanistan. And they have practiced extensively,” Weislander said.

Both countries are “operable” as NATO members, she said. ″[They] have worked with NATO since the mid-1990s in international missions,” the analyst said, citing those in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya. “They have also participated in advanced exercises with NATO, such as Trident Juncture. And there were hundreds of other exercises.” “So their interoperability is not a problem,” Weislander said. Sweden and Finland also cooperate extensively on defense with each other based on NATO standards, she added.

If both countries join NATO, this would signal an “open door” NATO policy, Weislander said.

“When countries are ready to join and can contribute to the security of the whole of the transatlantic area, then [NATO] will be ready to take on new members as well. There will be no closed door for NATO,” she said.

### No Russian OCOs---2AC

#### Russia isn’t and won’t use cyber – studies and empirics prove they deem it ineffective and incompatible.

Kostyuk & Gartzke 4/4 – Nadiya Kostyuk, Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology; and Erik Gartzke, Professor, University of California San Diego, 4-4-2022, "Cyberattacks have yet to play a significant role in Russia’s battlefield operations in Ukraine – cyberwarfare experts explain the likely reasons," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/cyberattacks-have-yet-to-play-a-significant-role-in-russias-battlefield-operations-in-ukraine-cyberwarfare-experts-explain-the-likely-reasons-178604, accessed 6-25-2022 – OBERTO!

Throughout the latter half of 2021, as it became clear that Russia was massing a large portion of its conventional combat power on the eastern borders of Ukraine, analysts offered contrasting predictions about the role cyberspace would play in an armed conflict. These predictions capture an ongoing debate about whether conflict in cyberspace is destined to [supplant conventional conflict](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/12/putin-does-not-need-invade-ukraine-get-his-way) or exacerbate it.

As the war has evolved, it’s clear that analysts on both sides of the debate got it wrong. Cyber operations did not replace the military invasion, and as far as we can tell, the Russian government has [not yet used cyber operations](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/opinion/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks.html) as an integral [part of its military campaign](https://www.vox.com/2022/3/19/22986316/russia-ukraine-cyber-attacks-holding-back).

We are political scientists who study the role of [cybersecurity](https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=2jdVG2wAAAAJ&hl=en) and [information](https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=8zd54PAAAAAJ&hl=en) in international conflict. [Our research](https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0) shows that the reason pundits on both sides of the argument got it wrong is because they failed to consider that cyber and military operations serve different political objectives.

Cyber operations are most effective in pursuing informational goals, such as gathering intelligence, stealing technology or winning public opinion or diplomatic debates. In contrast, nations use military operations to occupy territory, capture resources, diminish an opponent’s military capability and terrorize a population.

A tactical role for cyberattacks?

It’s common in modern warfare for new technologies to substitute for traditional military tactics. For example, the U.S. has made extensive use of drones, including in conflicts in Yemen and Pakistan where crewed aircraft and ground forces would be difficult or impossible to use. Because drones allow the U.S. to fight on the cheap with much less risk, they substitute for other forms of warfare.

In theory, cyber operations could have played a similar tactical role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the Russian government has [yet to use cyber operations](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/opinion/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks.html) in a manner that is clearly coordinated with military units and designed to smooth the advance of ground or air forces. When Russia invaded Ukraine, hackers [disrupted access to satellite communications](https://www.wired.com/story/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia/) for thousands of people, and it was apparently a [concern for Ukrainian defense officials](https://twitter.com/Bing_Chris/status/1503749157995094016). But overall, Ukraine has managed to [maintain internet access](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/29/ukraine-internet-faq/) and [cellphone service](https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-ukraine-war-keeping-phones-online-becomes-key-defense-11648123200) for most of the country.

Russia has [sophisticated](https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2022/02/14/russia-and-china-devote-more-cyber-forces-to-offensive-operations-than-us-says-new-report/) cyber capabilities, and its hackers have [worked their way into Ukrainian networks](https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/) for many years. This raises the question of why Russia has not, for the most part, [used cyber operations to provide tactical support](https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/597272-where-is-russias-cyber-blitzkrieg) for its military campaigns in Ukraine, at least until this point.

Separate roles

In recent studies, we examined whether cyber operations mostly serve as complements to, or substitutes for, conventional conflict. In [one analysis](https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0), we examined conventional [military campaigns around the world](https://www.isanet.org/Conferences/Toronto-2019) over a 10-year period using the [Militarized Interstate Disputes](https://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs) dataset of all armed conflicts. We also focused on [the conflicts in Syria and eastern Ukraine](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138). Our results suggest that cyber operations are generally not being used as either.

Instead, nations tend to use these two types of operations independently from each other because each mode of conflict serves different objectives, and cyberwarfare is most effective for gathering intelligence, stealing technology or winning public opinion or diplomatic debates.

In contrast, nations use traditional forms of conflict to control tangible assets, such as capturing resources or occupying territory. The various goals offered by Russian President Vladimir Putin for invading Ukraine, such as [preventing Ukraine from joining NATO](https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/russia-worried-ukrainian-military-buildup-81487170), [replacing the government](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-claims-denazification-justify-russias-attack-ukraine-experts-say-rcna17537) or [countering fictitious Ukrainian weapons of mass destruction](https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/ukraine-building-a-nuclear-bomb-dangerous-nonsense/), require occupying territory.

There may be other reasons for the lack of overlap between cyber and conventional fronts in Ukraine. The Russian military could consider cyber operations ineffective for its purposes. The newness of cyber operations as a tool of war makes it [difficult to coordinate](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138) with conventional military operations. Also, military targets might not be accessible to hackers because they might lack internet connectivity.

In any event, [evidence](https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0) that the Russian government intends to use cyber operations to [complement](https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/12/expect-shock-and-awe-if-russia-invades-ukraine.html) military operations is [thin](https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002717737138). Our findings suggest hacking groups in previous conflicts faced considerable difficulties in responding to battlefield events, much less shaping them.

### No Russian OCOs---1AR

#### Cyber is harmless – military simulations, studies, and stats.

Lonergan 4/15 – Dr. Erica D. Lonergan was a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Assistant Professor, Army Cyber Institute at West Point; Research Scholar, Columbia University, 4-15-2022, "The Cyber-Escalation Fallacy," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-04-15/cyber-escalation-fallacy, accessed 6-25-2022 – OBERTO!

“The negligible role of cyberattacks in the Ukraine conflict should come as no surprise. Through war simulations, statistical analyses and other kinds of studies, scholars have found little evidence that cyber operations provide effective forms of coercion or that they cause escalation to actual military conflict.”

“For all its potential to disrupt companies, hospitals and utility grids during peacetime, cyber power is much harder to use against targets of strategic significance or to achieve outcomes with decisive impacts, either on the battlefield or during crises short of war.”

“In failing to recognize this, U.S. officials and policymakers are approaching the use of cyber power in a way that may be doing more harm than good—treating cyber operations like any other weapon of war rather than as a nonlethal instrument of statecraft and, in the process, overlooking the considerable opportunities as well as risks they present.”

#### Their authors are baseless hype – a Russian cyber blitz won’t happen.

Whyte 3/18 – Christopher Whyte is an assistant professor in the[homeland security and emergency preparedness program](https://onlinewilder.vcu.edu/) in the Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University, 3-18-2022, "An Isolated Russia Will Pose New Cyber Threats," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/isolated-russia-will-pose-new-cyber, accessed 6-25-2022 – OBERTO!

Even as fighting in Ukraine intensifies around key cities, Russian forces have yet to undertake cyber activities much different from those seen years past. True,[expert observations](https://github.com/curated-intel/Ukraine-Cyber-Operations) are reporting more widespread espionage, phishing campaigns, and disinformation efforts linked to established threat actors from within Russian IP space following the country’s invasion. But the cyber blitzkrieg[expected by numerous pundits and commentators](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/28/russia-cyber-army-ukraine-00003051) simply hasn’t happened.

The Sensibility of Russian Cyber Restraint

As[several academics have pointed out](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/07/putins-invasion-ukraine-didnt-rely-cyber-warfare-heres-why/), this lack of a lightning digital volley from Russia makes a lot of sense. It corresponds with what [years of research](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/russian-cyber-war-ukraine-was-fantasy) into cyber conflict tells us about why nations build such capabilities. Cyber operations are useful for espionage and reconnaissance, sabotage, and for subversion. They are useful, in short, for shaping international affairs to create favorable conditions. What they’re not good for is coercion or for significantly enhancing battlefield effectiveness, not least because they tend to produce temporary effects.

The geopolitical and operational contexts of Russia’s war against Ukraine[also explain](https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/597272-where-is-russias-cyber-blitzkrieg) why a cyber onslaught has not occurred. After all, if Vladimir Putin’s plan is to resurrect a defeated Ukraine as a puppet bulwark against NATO expansion, there’s little point in breaking what’s being bought. Temporary disruption of certain services might help the war effort but manufactured calamity just makes the reconstruction job of a victorious Russia that much harder. Added to that was Putin’s clear over-reliance on the conventional forces of the Russian military to achieve a quick victory. By some estimates, Russia intended Kyiv and the Ukrainian government to fall as quickly as Kabul to the Taliban in 2021. In such a scenario, the use of Russia’s most sophisticated cyber instruments would have been wasteful and expensive. That scenario did not come to pass, of course—something that just adds to our understanding of the relative irrelevance of Russian cyber activities. Clearly, the logistical mess seen in the first two weeks of the Russia-Ukraine war has made it difficult for Russia’s cyber forces to effectively augment the military’s kinetic capabilities.

A Coming “Cyberwar”? Not Likely.

In spite of Russia’s relative restraint in cyberspace,[media reports](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/mar/09/catastrophic-cyber-war-ukraine-russia-hasnt-happened-yet-experts-say) and even[some practitioner assessments](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-10/transcript-here-s-what-a-cyber-war-with-russia-may-actually-look-like) continue to expound on the possibility of a[coming “cyberwar”](https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/why-the-world-needs-to-be-prepared-for-cyberwars-1.85906500) in which Moscow strikes back at the West for its support of Ukraine. Certainly, there is some room for concern. Russia has increasingly turned to the use of its “gray zone” capacities for disrupting Western competitors and degrading their ability to act. And yet, warnings about digital disasters to come persistently fail to place the Russian cyber threat in a strategic context, even as experts leverage astute geopolitical analysis to help make sense of current patterns.

Fears of[“Cyber Pearl Harbor”](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html) or[“Cyber 9/11”](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/09/14/were-sleepwalking-toward-cyber-911/) events in which digital actions produce devastating societal disruption are not just unrealistic; they are irresponsible. While it’s true that Russia’s cyber capabilities are immense and include assets prepositioned in Western networks, there is little strategic utility to be found in such an attack. Absent the outbreak of conventional conflict between NATO members and the Russian Federation, the truth is that cyber spectacles would be walked back in days or weeks at most. Victory in the “cyberwar” predicted by some[will always be temporary](https://watermark.silverchair.com/isec_a_00136.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAp8wggKbBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKMMIICiAIBADCCAoEGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMK1muVoVOUiXJED7_AgEQgIICUr0G2gSbcYmLThfwd3npxIE-MhjjhouTqOn5t6LleEBgQcLzCknf7oQPw0hrfS3nkpa7gqlZYQqNXH6RlsQAkAbrXldycALDovEzVsi6UP68V-ePM1_BEJLZLSlryx4V-E4ufT1DmHdFFp6OGv15eofFT9ps2gro35heRlKkvrMvjbAoBuhfe_0ccm_cGyTDQt4gboAkUwLoLPfsR4dj1LL8HW2c31mAZ_ArOpMxK2-dOfZzO0IY1Q-J9wjlbVEjT5dHpxuu1d4fBANi11lvg-Vp91Rs-hTCl6FaDBvYXdotdn7ajlgqAOkbGMkMWhDX563ZBI4bhfkEe_9rqIWzslURDT82luBP1DBGeGVLqes2OHZnfrpGJjAkgwyuTnzp9mz7lF4O5cQlvW5XmoOaW3il7Jmr7Lw7CKGmFEvAYTZ9ets3DUUSvEnlIdaa7gFm681U1AThB8V14Iwcz8zV-cdBZIcT5cCa7qPexdFLLe7PmAYpNw-DuVjjqPia6K0G647PM6diRAwR60-jKUoAcCDq5NzkGxsQ_domccCOLvl3f9Z2uLCpWL36gLFCKDWvijNrHuTQeAvaLIe17eex8oscpbThZ45b77I-i54P93CCG01wY6f0X6jE6aLJkyKb6mf3t01pM2n9tS1RfjUko0s_hMaR47nOjU7Mj4KIv3OWi09IX_PGmYrSDOsjYBWhljdLidCZIfs7SPxq-TecI1O1gcfVVESa4DJRLHN-f_k2wArzz9G_rzO79B4O6fDIkeiK2BSTBmsl636gYkrlsdWfaA) and so generally not worth the effort.

### Cyber Thumper

#### COC thumps the turn--- Russia knows NATO is pursuing cyber policy.

Robin Emmott 10-16-18 [Writing for Reuters, Reuters, “NATO cyber command will be fully operational in 2023,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-cyber/nato-cyber-command-to-be-fully-operational-in-2023-idUSKCN1MQ1Z9//ZW]

MONS, Belgium (Reuters) - A new NATO military command center to deter computer hackers should be fully staffed in 2023 and able to mount its own cyber attacks but the alliance is still grappling with ground rules for doing so, a senior general said on Tuesday. While NATO does not have its own cyber weapons, the U.S.-led alliance established an operations center on Aug. 31 at its military hub in Belgium. The United States, Britain, Estonia and other allies have since offered their cyber capabilities. “This is an emerging domain and the threat is growing,” said Major General Wolfgang Renner, a German air force commander who oversees the new cyber operations center, or CYOC, in Mons. “We have to be prepared, to be able to execute operations in cyberspace. We have already gone beyond protection and prevention,” he told Reuters during a NATO cyber conference. NATO communication and computer networks face hundreds of significant hacking attempts every month, according to the NATO Communication and Information Agency, while experts say Russia, North Korea and China are constantly deploying sophisticated computer hacking weapons and surveillance software. Accusations by Western governments this month that Russia waged a global hacking campaign have raised the profile of NATO’s evolving strategy as allied governments look for a response. The European Union on Monday discussed its options, including a special economic sanctions regime to target cyber attackers. “Our ultimate aim is to be completely aware of our cyberspace, to understand minute-by-minute the state of our networks so that commanders can rely on them,” said Ian West, chief of cyber security at the NATO communication agency. When fully operational, the cyber center aims to coordinate NATO’s cyber deterrent through a 70-strong team of experts fed with military intelligence and real-time information about hackers ranging from Islamist militants to organized crime groups operating on behalf of hostile governments. ARTICLE 5 DEBATE NATO has formally recognized cyberspace as a new frontier in defense, along with land, air and sea, meaning battles could henceforth be waged on computer networks. The center could potentially use cyber weapons that can knock out enemy missiles or air defenses, or destroy foes’ computer networks if commanders judge such a cyber attack is less harmful to human life than a traditional offensive with live weaponry. That is now the subject of intense debate at NATO, with alliance commanders saying publicly that cyber will be an integral part of future warfare but allies unclear what would trigger NATO’s Article 5 (collective defense) clause. “Our concept of operations, a toolbox for short-notice decisions about how to respond, is not in place yet. This is one of the challenges we face,” Renner said. If NATO can agree cyber warfare principles, the alliance hopes to integrate individual nations’ cyber capabilities into alliance operations, coordinated through the Mons cyber operations center and under the command of NATO’s top general, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR. That could allow the top general to take quick decisions on whether to use cyber weapons, similar to existing agreements for NATO’s air defenses and its ballistic missile shield, where a commander has only minutes to decide what action to take. “From my point of view, this is basically possible, but it has to be arranged,” Renner said.

### AI Thumper

#### 2021 AI strategy thumps.

Colin Demarest 05-18-2022 [Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT, C4ISRNET, “NATO launches AI initiative to nsure tech advantage,” https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2022/05/18/nato-launches-ai-initiative-to-ensure-tech-advantage///ZW]

WASHINGTON — Two NATO agencies recently kicked off an artificial intelligence initiative to better understand the technology and its potential warfare applications. More than 80 AI experts, researchers and academics from the U.S. and other member countries are involved with the venture, known as a strategic “horizon scanning,” put together by the NATO Science and Technology Organization and the NATO Communications and Information Agency. An inaugural meeting and workshop was held this month in The Hague, Netherlands, where the NCI Agency’s data science and AI facilities are located. “AI is one of the key emerging and disruptive technologies identified by NATO as vital for the maintenance of its technological edge,” NATO Chief Scientist Bryan Wells said in a statement. “By working together, the STO and the NCI Agency are able to bring together global experts to ensure the very best scientific expertise is available to advise NATO and its allies and partners on the latest scientific trends in this area.” The NATO guarantee of a collective defense and the advantage of numbers, both on the battlefield and in the lab, has been much discussed amid Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent membership applications made by Finland and Sweden. NATO ministers in October adopted the alliance’s first-ever AI strategy, which describes the capability as “changing the global defense and security environment” and offering “an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen our technological edge but will also escalate the speed of the threats we face.” The strategy emphasizes responsible use of AI for defense across six tenets: lawfulness; responsibility and accountability; explainability and traceability; reliability; governability; and bias mitigation. AI frameworks and other guidance drafted by the U.S. and its defense community take a similar approach. NATO allies in 2019 agreed to focus on seven emerging and disruptive technologies, data, computing and AI among them. Making sure there are shared standards, and that systems will work with systems, will be critical to success, officials said. “One of the big challenges when we go into this new phase of disruptive technologies is how do you keep all allies on the same hymn sheet when it comes down to communicating with each other, using the same technology, being interoperable,” David van Weel, NATO assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, told Defense News in March 2021. “So that’s a big part [of the strategy] and a big role for NATO to play.”

### Biotech Thumper

#### NATO announced a focus on biotech--- impact either thumped or non-unique.

Army Technology 04-08-22 [Army Technology, “Nato unveils imitative to expedite development of new technologies,” https://www.army-technology.com/news/nato-initiative-new-technologies///ZW]

Intergovernmental military alliance Nato is set to launch a new initiative that seeks to hone the military alliance’s technological edge over adversaries. This comes after the allied foreign ministers approved the charter of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). According to a Nato statement, DIANA will enable the defence personnel to work with the alliance’s scientific researchers, technology companies, and start-ups to address critical defence and security challenges. The participants will also gain access to a network of accelerator sites and test centres located around member countries. Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg said: “Working with the private sector and academia, allies will ensure that we can harness the best of new technology for transatlantic security.” The leaders of the member countries have agreed that DIANA would have two regional offices, one in Europe, and another in North America. The new initiative will focus on emerging and disruptive technologies that are identified as priorities. These technologies include artificial intelligence, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, autonomy, novel materials, and space. Several Nato allies have also agreed to establish a multi-sovereign venture capital fund. This multinational Nato Innovation Fund will invest up to €1bn ($1.08bn) in early-stage start-ups, and other deep tech funds, that are aligned with the military alliance’s strategic objectives. Last month, Nato opened the first Multinational Ammunition Warehousing Initiative (MAWI) location, in Estonia. Other allied members can use the facility to stock their ammunition, thereby reducing logistical challenges.

## AT Europe

### AT: Nuclear umbrella-Britain

#### Britain is technically and politically dependent on the US for nuclear capabilities-they couldn’t launch if they wanted to.

**Military Watch 21**(Military Watch Magazine, 9-9-21, "Military Watch Magazine," https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/is-the-united-kingdom-a-genuine-nuclear-power-a-look-at-the-british-nuclear-forces-unique-lack-of-independence)HS

The purpose of Britain's nuclear forces has continued to be questioned to this day, particularly after deep budget cuts under a stringent austerity program affected almost all sectors of government spending in the 2010s and seriously undermined the armed forces' conventional capabilities. According to a report by the British Parliament's Select Committee on Defence in 2006, Britain's nuclear submarines armed with Trident intercontinental range ballistic missiles, which were the only nuclear force the country deployed, remained wholly dependent on the United States to operate and did not represent any form of independence in political or military decision making. The report stated:

"The fact that, in theory, the British Prime Minister could give the order to fire Trident missiles without getting prior approval from the White House has allowed the UK to maintain the facade of being a global military power. In practice, though, it is difficult to conceive of **any situation** in which a Prime Minister would fire Trident without prior U.S. approval. The USA would see such an act as cutting across its self-declared prerogative as the world's policeman, and would almost certainly make the UK pay a high price for its presumption. The fact that the UK is **completely technically dependent** on the USA for the maintenance of the Trident system means that one way the USA could show its displeasure would be to cut off the technical support needed for the UK to continue to send Trident to sea."

The report further noted regarding the lack of independence of Britain's nuclear forces - serving as an effective **appendage of American nuclear forces**:

"In a crisis the very existence of the UK Trident system might make it difficult for a UK prime minister to refuse a request by the US president to participate in an attack. The UK Trident system is highly dependent, and for some purposes completely dependent, on the larger US system... The UK's dependency on the USA has operational significance. For example, the UK's reliance on U.S. weather data and on navigational data provided by the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) means that, should the USA decide not to supply this data, the capacity of the UK's Trident missiles to hit targets would be degraded."

Ultimately Britain's nuclear arsenal remains the only one in the world which is **unable to be utilised** independently without permission from a foreign power. This is largely a result of the country's original purpose for acquiring nuclear weapons - namely that because their development was not a response to a critical national security threat or a tool to assert independence within the Western Bloc they could be made very dependant on the United States. Britain today maintains a sizeable nuclear arsenal, which as of 2021 stands at 120 operationally available warheads and a further 95 in reserve - with plans to increase the number operational . Of the available warheads only 40 are deployed at a time, all from nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines equipped with intercontinental range ballistic missiles. While no other state, be it Israel, Pakistan, France or North Korea, has ceded its ability to operate its nuclear arsenal to another country, this is exactly what Britain has done which represents a decision entirely unique among the world's nuclear powers.

### AT: Nuclear Umbrella-France

#### French nuclear umbrella fails---domestic politics, vulnerable to first strike, doesn’t have tactical nukes.

**Kluth 22** Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering European politics, former editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and writer for the Economist, Andreas(6-20-22, “Europe Needs a Better Nuclear Deterrent Against Putin”, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/europe-needs-a-better-nuclear-deterrent-against-putin/2022/06/20/9f3c2e1c-f064-11ec-ac16-8fbf7194 cd78\_story)HS

In one scenario, France could extend its nuclear umbrella to the whole European Union (of which the UK is no longer a member). French President Emmanuel Macron speaks often about achieving European “autonomy,” by which he usually means independence from the US. So he should in theory be amenable.

In practice, the French are **neither willing nor able**. Since Charles de Gaulle, France has always insisted on **total sovereignty** over its arsenal and all decisions pertaining to it. In that sense, visions of a Europeanized “force de frappe,” as the French call their nukes, suffer from the same problem as ideas about a “European Army.” Without a United States of Europe, it’s not clear who’d be in command, when and how.

Moreover, the French arsenal isn’t suited for the job. France has a relatively small stash of 290 nukes. In the event of all-out war, an adversary like Russia, with thousands of warheads, might be tempted — and able — to take out those weapons with a preemptive first strike. Deterrence only works if retaliation is assured.

France’s nukes are also of the wrong type. They’re “strategic” — that is, bombs capable of causing many Hiroshimas worth of devastation each, and therefore meant to be used only in a total-war scenario to take out entire cities in the enemy’s homeland.

If Russia were to escalate, however, it would do so with “tactical” nuclear weapons — smaller warheads deployed at short ranges to cow an enemy into submission or win specific battles. It’s **inconceivable** that France (or anybody) would retaliate for an initial and limited tactical strike by going directly to strategic retaliation and thus Armageddon.

### AT: Turkey

#### They have it backwards---Strong NATO suppresses Russian and Turkish aggression---otherwise countless hotspots escalate

Katz 15 [Mark N. Katz, Professor of Govt & Politics at GMU, “Why Russia Shouldn't Fear NATO,” The National Interest, 2015, [www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-russia-shouldnt-fear-nato-13243](http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-russia-shouldnt-fear-nato-13243)]

The corollary of Moscow belief that the expansion of NATO is a threat to Russia is that the retraction, incapacitation, or dissolution of NATO would make Russia safer. Indeed, Putin’s support for anti-NATO and anti–EU political parties throughout Europe indicates that he does indeed aim at undermining these two institutions. Nor does Putin necessarily need to bring about their dissolution in order to undermine them. Since NATO and the EU both tend to operate on the basis of consensus, the fact that the current political leaders of Hungary and Greece are hostile to the existing European order and are quite friendly with Moscow may go a long way toward furthering Putin’s goal of rendering NATO inoperable. And if any more such leaders are elected to power, NATO might indeed become unable to respond effectively to actions taken by Putin to “protect” Russian speakers elsewhere in Ukraine or even in the Baltic states. This clearly would not benefit the West. But it would not benefit Russia either. For the decline of NATO is less likely to lead to the unopposed rise of Russian influence than to the re-emergence of conflicts that common membership in NATO has suppressed or (in the case of Greece and Turkey) kept under control. Putin has had relatively cooperative relations with the often anti-Western Erdogan government in Turkey. He also has good relations with Greece’s new leftist leadership that is at odds with the EU. But if (whether as a result of Putin’s actions or not) NATO becomes inoperable, the Greek-Turkish animosity that NATO helped keep from escalating after Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus might soon re-emerge. And if it does, it is highly doubtful that Russia will be able to calm it down. Moscow may then be faced with the choice of alienating one party because it sides with the other, or alienating both because it sides with neither or (as Putin has attempted elsewhere) tries to side with both simultaneously. Despite Turkey’s troubled relations with the West recently, Turkey may regard Russian support for Greece against it as an existential threat and thus go all out to support Chechen and other Muslim opponents of Moscow’s rule in the North Caucasus and other Muslim regions of Russia. The decline of NATO might also embolden an increasingly nationalist and pro-Russian Hungary to revive its claim to “lost territories.” Moscow might not mind if Budapest does this with pro-Western Ukraine or Romania (with which Russia also has difficult relations), but would not be pleased if Hungary sought the return of territory that is now part of pro-Russian Serbia or Slovakia (where Moscow has also sought to cultivate illiberal tendencies). Another problem for Moscow is that for every anti-Western government elected to office anywhere in Europe, one or more of its neighbors are likely to feel threatened by it and so turn to America for support. Further, while German public opinion may care little about what Russia is doing in faraway Crimea or Eastern Ukraine, Berlin is likely to take more active measures to thwart Moscow’s efforts to expand Russian influence in countries closer to it. Finally, the more that Western states see Russian actions as directly harming their security, the more incentive they will have to respond by arming Ukraine or others actively resisting Russia. In other words, the decline of the pax Americana in Europe resulting from a weakened NATO is less likely to be replaced by a pax Russica there, but by a chaotic situation in Europe that Russia will be unable to control or prevent from negatively impacting not just Russia’s external ambitions, but its internal security as well. Ironically, Russia could avoid all this if NATO remained strong and intact. Far from threatening Russia, a strong NATO has a much greater incentive to act with self-restraint toward Russia than individual countries (both members and non-members) being undermined by Russian actions. Indeed, offering NATO membership to what remains of Ukraine may be the surest means of inducing Kiev and the West as a whole to acquiesce to (though not formally accept) the loss of Crimea and eastern Ukraine to Russia. In other words, Moscow is better off with a strong NATO that keeps America in, Europe peaceful, and Russia by itself (if that’s what it wants) than a weak NATO (or no NATO at all) that keeps America, Europe, and Russia all embroiled in needless conflict and tension.

### EXT EU instability

#### Splintering causes intra-European war

Shapiro 19 [Daniel B., Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, former US Ambassador to Israel, MA, Middle East Studies, Harvard, "Saving NATO", Democracy Journal, Winter 2019, No. 51, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/51/saving-nato]

Moreover, one of the most underappreciated benefits of NATO is its success in preventing intra-European conflict. The 70 years since World War II, a period of steadily advancing integration through structures like NATO and the European Union, have lulled many in the West into believing that peace in Europe is a natural, inevitable condition. But a broader view of history quickly tells us otherwise. Centuries of conflict lie beyond the memories of almost everyone alive today, but we would be naïve and unwise to forget them. The NATO umbrella, and the willing submission of European states to U.S. strategic domination, has helped keep those states from turning to military means to settle their own disputes. Crucially, given its history, Germany has embraced a restrained foreign and military policy, dampening one of the greatest internal threats that has plagued Europe in the past. Remove the United States from NATO, and the dominoes could start to tumble. A divided, internally conflicted Europe with the United States on the sidelines could lead to catastrophic humanitarian, security, and economic consequences. Just ask anyone over 85.

### EU ARMY Impossible

#### Europe has literally forgotten how to run militaries, which ensures panicked scrambles and instability

Rühle 16 [Michael, M.A. Degree in Political Science from the University of Bonn, Former Volkswagen-Fellow at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Daydream Believers”, Berlin Policy Journal, 11/23/2016, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/daydream-believers]

Alas, such concentration is nowhere in sight. Quite the contrary. Instead of reflection, some have chosen to panic: The vision of a Europe unified on security and defense has suddenly re-emerged. European nations – some of which aren’t even close to the NATO-agreed goal of spending two percent of GDP on defense – are suddenly embracing bold defense schemes that would involve spending far more than they would ever be willing or even able to deliver. But what a scheme it is: A new, defense-minded Europe would finally be able to look after its own backyard. Some observers have even suggested that a stronger Europe could keep an assertive Russia in check. Take that, Donald!

Sadly, the old continent is merely shooting from the hip replacement. The reflex of pushing military initiatives in order to jump-start a stagnating European integration process has never worked in the past, and it’s not likely to do so now. If the EU cannot make progress on far simpler issues, it is even less likely to do so in the area of security and defense, where considerations of national sovereignty and status (as well as defense-industrial protectionism) run deep. For decades, most EU aficionados have agreed that security and defense can only ever be among the very final steps of the European integration process. Trying to reverse that sequence in the face of US disengagement will fail, for a variety of reasons.

No “Strategic Culture”

First, there is no European “strategic culture,” and the prospects of it emerging now remain as dim as ever. Europe remains a conglomerate of nation states of different sizes, cultures, historical experiences and geographic outlooks. “Brexit” and the return of populism are only the most visible signs of the bloc’s limitations: it has never forged a unified vision of the continent’s ultimate shape and future. US leadership in NATO ensured that these differences didn’t matter much when it came to security and defense. Exit the US, however, and these differences will quickly come to the fore. The fear of being left defenseless will not force the Europeans towards more unity on security and defense, but rather to make separate deals with the United States.

Second, military realities are conveniently ignored. Europe is capable of smaller-scale military interventions along the continent’s periphery, but even the intervention in Libya in 2011 would not have been possible without the US suppressing Libyan air defenses and supplying the Europeans with ammunition (which they had run out of after just a few days). In theory, Europe could buy everything it needs for such operations. In practice, however, it won’t. The bill for a genuine satellite network, a fleet of transport aircraft, advanced cruise missiles and more would force European nations to at least double their defense budgets. Given the risks and costs of intervening without the US, Europeans will be more hesitant than when they had Uncle Sam on their team.

Third, the nuclear dimension remains conspicuously absent in the debate. Many proponents of a stronger European effort in security and defense are making the case for a conventional force strong enough to deter Russia. But they seem to overlook that Russia is a nuclear power and can therefore trump whatever conventional improvements the Europeans might be able to muster. With the United Kingdom “Brexiting”, the EU (unlike NATO) cannot count on London’s nuclear support. France would never let an EU body decide over the “force de frappe.” And EU members Austria and Ireland have championed a global ban on nuclear weapons that is fiercely opposed by the nuclear powers and other NATO members. In short, a European nuclear deterrent is a myth; Europe’s only credible nuclear umbrella remains the one “made in the USA.”

Fourth, the debate also ignores the political and legal obstacles that stand in the way of a more unified security and defense. For example, the oft-repeated argument that harmonizing armaments planning and procurement could avoid wasteful duplication is as correct as it is irrelevant. The larger European nations do not plan their defense in such a way; when it comes to key military areas, they don’t want to be dependent upon the agreement of their smaller neighbors. On closer inspection, even seemingly successful examples of “streamlining” are the result of budgetary constraints, not of deliberate planning. And in several EU member states, the national parliaments have a crucial say in the decision to employ military force – a privilege they are not likely to surrender to a collective EU body.

#### Lack of political will and divergent interests make EU Army impossible

Michta 19 [Dr Andrew A., Political Scientist and Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Former Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Ph.D. in International Relations from the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, “Without the US, European Defense Will Fall to Pieces”, The American Interest, Oct 23, 2019, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/10/23/without-the-us-european-defense-will-fall-to-pieces]

Since Donald Trump’s election in 2016, there has been a rising chorus among Europe’s politicos that the Continent can no longer rely on the United States for its defense. This narrative had already begun to coalesce during the campaign, when European media interpreted then-candidate Trump’s calls for NATO countries to share more defense costs as the beginning of the end for America’s traditional role as security provider and defender of human rights. Some European commentators even questioned whether, in the event of Trump’s election, the United States might simply walk away from NATO altogether. Others sought to reassure themselves and their increasingly unsettled publics that, while President Trump might indeed be unpredictable, his cabinet would be staffed with consummate professionals who understood the “bigger picture.” So it came as perhaps a bit of a shock when U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, on his first official visit to Europe in February 2017, delivered a stern warning to the other 27 NATO members at a closed meeting in Brussels, telling them that the Allies must either meet their financial pledges on defense or America would “moderate” its commitment to the organization. Since then, the accusations of “Trumpian transactionalism” on defense have only gathered in speed, alongside renewed talk of a “European army,” “European defense,” and finally “strategic autonomy”—the latter presumably implying progressive independence from the United States on security issues.

Action followed words. In December 2017, the European Union launched the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with 25 EU members promising to participate in a plan to develop and invest in shared military capability projects. Augmented by the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) and the European Defense Fund (EDF), PESCO was intended to focus on specific projects reportedly to avoid duplication and to enhance their effectiveness. However, critics in the United States charged that PESCO would at best have a marginal impact on European military capabilities, lead to duplication and non-interoperable systems within NATO, and was in reality intended to lock out U.S. defense companies from bidding for European contracts. Washington also conveyed the Trump Administration’s concerns that rules for the EDF would prevent companies based outside the European Union, including U.S. defense contractors, from participating in the projects. In short, though PESCO and the EDF were initially met by the Trump Administration with cautious optimism and seen as potentially positive steps to enhance European defense capabilities, both initiatives soon became synonymous with protectionism and a diversion of Europe’s scarce defense resources in a direction that risked creating competition between the EU and NATO.

There was more to come. In November 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron called for the creation of a “true European army,” an initiative subsequently endorsed by Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, who called for a European army to complement NATO. Soon, and perhaps rather predictably, the idea became muddled by the semantics of the choice between calling it a “European army” or an “army of Europeans;” a year later the conversation had devolved into yet another European debate on “cooperative security” that failed to acknowledge the persistent lack of political will necessary to make the dream a reality. In fact, three years into the “we need to become independent on defense” debate in Europe, there is a real danger that a “common European army” of the sort advocated by some in Europe will do little more than further polarize the EU. Indeed, the assumption that there would be such a thing as “European” (as opposed to national) officers and soldiers is as dubious today as the previous attempts to create similar forces, from the Western European Union (WEU) through the Eurocorps and the Franco-German brigade.

The European media and policy elite’s continuing efforts to call into question America’s commitment to Transatlantic defense carries with it a serious risk—one that goes beyond intra-European relations. The anti-Trump sentiment pervasive among European policy elites has increasingly aligned with anti-American strains of European public opinion, to the detriment of the larger relationship. For instance, according to a February 2019 Pew study, between 2013 and 2018, 30 percent more Germans stated that they viewed U.S. influence as a major threat to their country, with increases of 29 percent in France, 25 percent in Spain, 15 percent in the UK, and 12 percent in Italy. Among NATO countries only Poland saw a 5 percent decline. There is a danger that the current round of posturing on European defense will feed into the perception that, while allies refuse to meet their pledges on defense spending (NATO’s 2019 annual report showed that only seven of the 29 allies met the 2 percent target), they nonetheless have the resources to pursue their national defense industrial priorities. The damage to already-strained U.S. relations with key allies in Europe, especially Germany, may become enduring, bolstering the growing chorus in Washington that what Europeans want is to continue to free-ride on defense.

The larger problem is that the impasse in the current debate about “European defense” is playing out against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating security environment around Europe (and increasingly also within), while the push for an autonomous European army seems increasingly to be the result of ad hoc politics rather than a sound defense calculus. Amidst the various acronyms and semantic exercises of the past three years, what is missing in Europe today is a keen grasp of history as well as strategic foresight. First, politicians seem to have all but forgotten that the European project was possible to begin with precisely because the United States, through the NATO alliance, provided the overarching security umbrella for the Continent, defusing postwar resentments and assisting in Europe’s reconstruction. It bears remembering that, without America’s commitment to Europe, the Franco-German “grand reconciliation” would have taken much longer to attain, if it were to be achieved at all. And so today, as during the Cold War, it makes sense for European states to speak of “Europe” when it comes to trade and economic policy integration. However, Europe’s security has since 1945 been a direct function of its having been embedded into the Transatlantic system, and this fundamental reality still remains true today. Simply put, there is a great deal of difference between the notion of a protected “common market” linking the economies of likeminded democratic governments, and that of Europe acting as a unitary actor on security and defense.

And yet, if a number of governments in Europe believes—as seems increasingly to be the case—that they can establish a “European” defense structure and a “European security architecture,” then the outcome will be a hollowing out of NATO and at the very least a bifurcation of Europe between the countries facing Russia along the eastern flank and the those that during the Cold War constituted Western Europe. (Even here the divergent security optics are likely to pull individual countries in different directions, with countries like France looking south, and others, such as the Scandinavians, focusing on the north.) The endgame will not be a “pan-European” security and defense system but rather a back to the future scenario: a new age of insecurity in Europe, where deep power differentials among states on the Continent will yield a hierarchy of national interests that will quickly decompose a larger sense of European solidarity. The countries in Central Europe, which are deeply invested in the European Union as a pathway to economic modernization, will nonetheless never wager their national survival on a pan-European defense and security architecture, any more than powers in Western European will be able to credibly guarantee that in an extreme situation—without America’s backing—they would be able to bring their societies to the brink of war and beyond to defend the Baltic States, Poland, or Romania.

Europe’s political leaders seem to be losing sight of the fact that, notwithstanding their differences with Washington, they do not have a better security option than working closely with the United States and strengthening NATO as the centerpiece of Europe’s security and defense policy. In the current atmosphere, in which criticizing the Trump Administration and questioning the U.S. commitment to its allies has become a mantra for European media, the situation on the ground tells a different story. A case in point: Next year Defender 2020 will be the U.S. Army’s largest exercise in Europe in 25 years, ranging across ten countries and involving 37,000 troops from at least 18 countries, of which 20,000 soldiers will be deployed from the United States to Europe.

The impasse in the current debate about European security is driven by a seeming unwillingness in key European capitals to realize the core reality that, without U.S. strategic engagement, a “European security architecture” is a lark. It is time for Europe to stop daydreaming about a “European army” or an “army of Europeans,” or whatever the latest institutional permutation might be. Amidst a period of rapidly growing state-on-state competition, it is high time to focus on the fundamentals. If the common European project is to continue, the United States needs to stay in Europe, and NATO needs to remain the centerpiece of our mutual security and defense.

It is worth remembering that, regardless of occasional policy differences, Europe today has no better friend and no stronger ally than the United States of America. This strategic reality should be the starting point of any conversation in Europe’s capitals about the Continent’s security and defense. However, if the current discussion about European defense as autonomous, parallel, or even complementary to NATO continues on its present course, it will cause lasting harm to Transatlantic relations, with the much-vaunted “strategic autonomy” becoming, in an extreme case, a self-fulfilling prophecy and, as such, Europe’s undoing. If NATO becomes dysfunctional, the European project will be reduced to regional groupings, bilateral alignments, or it may fragment altogether.

#### Litany of problems make EU Army impossible

**Waszczykowski 21** First Vice-Chair of the EU Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs and former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witold(12-13-21, An EU Army: competition with NATO or the right to protection?, FES, https://dc.fes.de/news-list/e/an-eu-army-competition-with-nato-or-the-right-to-protection)HS

The EU arguably lacks determination, leadership and political will. Some countries don’t want to provoke Putin. Maybe it’s too late to save the EU, maybe it is better to start paying attention to regional (perhaps even security) alliances with Ukraine and the Baltic states?

This is a very long and complicated story which is called "the prospect of creating a defense identity of the EU". Everything started at the beginning of the 1990’s, after the end of the Cold War. The EU started discussing the possibility of a military force for mostly peacekeeping operations, including monitoring missions in situations where NATO troops – with the participation of US troops – are not able to participate. After the Cold War ended, we expected more and more problems related to the collapse of the Soviet Union. So we expected that the presence of NATO troops ­– and especially American troops – would be unacceptable for Russia on the territories of the new republics. That’s why the idea was to create some kind of a European defense or monitoring missions purely consisting of European forces. But it never happened.

In 1992, we created the idea of Petersberg missions with humanitarian, rescue, conflict prevention, and peace-keeping tasks. Then in 1996, there was the idea of Berlin Plus - using NATO troops under the EU-led Command. Then the CJTF [Combined Joint Task Forces] mechanism emerged [essentially, a deployable multinational task force generated and tailored primarily for military operations not involving the defense of the Alliance’s territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping].

It has continued like this for almost 30 years. We may say that something like "the defense identity of the EU" is like a yeti: everyone is talking about it, but no one has seen it. 20 years ago, we created battle groups. Every year there are at least two to three units in the EU which are on the alert and ready to be used somewhere. However, they have never been used because we do not have a political mechanism how to decide who is supposed to use them and how to use to. So this is the problem.

Why do we still have no EU army?

First, because we have no common definition of threats. For countries like Poland, we have different threats in mind than countries like Portugal. If you do not have a common definition of threats, you cannot create forces to challenge these threats.

Second, there is a problem of funding. In particular, Western countries pay less and less for their military forces and the modernization of their troops. They can’t even fulfill obligations in NATO. If they cannot do it in NATO, how can they find additional funding for creation additional forces to be served for the EU? Moreover, the next problem, I would say, is with the political military command. We do not have a common foreign policy because we have to decide on the foreign policy, especially security policy, by consensus, but not by the majority voting. And we don’t have a consensus on these issues.

Third, there is a problem of headquarters. Who is going to supervise and determine how to use these forces? Even if we create groups of 5,000 or 50,000 troops, who is going to command these forces and decide where and how to use them; on which part of the border; against whom? Against Lukashenko, or migrants who are floating from Libya across the sea to Italy or Greece? So, there are a number of issues. What is the relationship between an EU military and NATO supposed to be? Are they supposed to cooperate, subordinate, or engage each other in a complimentary manner? The number of issues can multiply these questions and answers. This is a problem. Therefore, in order to have EU military forces, we have to change treaties and answer all the questions I have just mentioned in a new treaty. But there is no political will inside the EU for a new treaty.

### EU ARMY Impossible AT: Ukraine

#### Ukraine does nothing-EU ARMY IS A JOKE

**Nelson 5-5** Columnist for the Daily Telegraph. Member of the advisory board of the Centre for Social Justice and the Centre for Policy Studies.(Fraser Nelson, 5-5-2022, "Macron's vision for Europe is crumbling – and he can't even blame the Brits," Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/05/05/macrons-vision-europe-crumbling-cant-even-blame-brits/)HS

Next, Macron has hoped the Ukraine crisis would catalyse the EU into a defence alliance. "We can no longer depend on others to feed us, care for us, inform us, finance us," he recently said of Europe. He has called for a "true, European army" - as opposed to Nato - and dreams of a time when there are no American troops on European soil. This is Britain's nightmare, and Johnson has instead been using the Ukraine crisis to bolster Nato.

The problem for Macron is that Britain has been making quite a bit of headway in selling the globalist vision of European defence. The EU already is a defence union (under Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty) which is fine in theory. In practice, it's a joke. That's why Sweden and Finland are now joining Nato: they want to come under America's protection and think it's the only protection worth having. An American general was on the Swedish island of Gotland earlier this week, underlining this point.

### AT: Sustainability

#### Ukraine generates NATO solidarity that overcomes conflicts

**Ridgwell 22** Europe Correspondent at Voice of America(Henry Ridgwell, 2-10-2022, "As Support for NATO Grows, Has Putin Miscalculated Over Ukraine?," VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/as-support-for-nato-grows-has-putin-miscalculated-over-ukraine-/6436837.html)HS

Visiting NATO headquarters Thursday, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson warned that Europe is facing its biggest security crisis in decades and pledged more military deployments in eastern Europe, in response to Russia's troop buildup on the border with Ukraine.

"The stakes are very high, and this is a very dangerous moment. And at stake are the rules that protect every nation, every nation big and small," Johnson said after talks with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.

Britain is strengthening its deployments in Estonia and Poland and is considering further deployments in southeastern Europe in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Several NATO members have sent troop reinforcements to allies on NATO's eastern flank. Many observers say Moscow's actions have brought the alliance closer together.

Stoltenberg welcomed Britain's commitment.

"The U.K. is playing a leading role, delivering both militarily and diplomatically," he said. "Renewed Russian aggression will lead to more NATO presence, not less."

US carrier strike group

Warships and fighter jets from 28 NATO members conducted exercises off the Italian coast earlier this month. It was the first time since the end of the Cold War that a U.S. Navy carrier strike group was placed under NATO command.

The United States has deployed an additional 3,000 troops to Poland and Romania.

"The focus of this particular mission ... is to reinforce the NATO alliance, to build that trust and confidence, to reassure our allies and to strengthen the eastern flank of the NATO alliance," Colonel Joe Ewers of the U.S. Army 2nd Cavalry Regiment said Wednesday.

France is preparing to send troops to Romania, while Germany - criticized in the past for failing to take a harder line on Russia - is boosting its troop deployment in Lithuania by 350 personnel, in addition to the 500 soldiers already there.

German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht called Germany's participation an important signal for NATO allies.

"We can be relied on, and we are showing that with this strengthening of the battle group," she told reporters on Monday.

NATO united

In 2017, then-U.S. President Donald Trump described NATO as "obsolete" because, he said, it "wasn't taking care of terror." In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron called the alliance "brain dead," citing a perceived waning commitment by its main guarantor, the United States.

Now, Russia's actions have served to unify NATO, according to analyst Jonathan Eyal, associate director at the Royal United Services Institute.

"The Russians were demanding not merely an acceptance of a division of Europe into new spheres of influence, but a rollback on all the security arrangements put in place on the continent since the early 1990s at the end of the Cold War. And that was simply so outrageous, so extreme in its scope that quite frankly, it left very little opportunity for countries to disagree that a rejection and a flat-out rejection of such demands was the only approach."

Eyal added that the role of the United States has been crucial in recent months.

"It's astounding the amount of meetings, the amount of visits, the amount of effort that the (U.S.) administration put into ensuring that the consensus was kept," he said.

Public support

Opinion polls show an increase in public support for NATO both in existing member states and in non-NATO allies, including Sweden and Finland. While neither is expected to join the alliance any time soon, both countries have voiced alarm at the Russian troop buildup.

"Nobody wants this to escalate any further. We all want Russia to de-escalate the situation. We want to find peaceful ways out of the situation," Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin told reporters after meeting European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week.

Putin's miscalculation?

Russia's amassing of more than 100,000 troops near the Ukraine border was a miscalculation, Eyal said.

"If Russia was thinking of dividing Europe, what they've done over the past few months achieved precisely the opposite," he said.

But Russia believes it has achieved the objective of keeping Ukraine and Georgia out of the alliance, said Alex Titov, a Russia analyst at Queen's University Belfast.

"Russia made it very clear, I think abundantly clear, that that is a really big (red) line. As Putin said several times, membership of NATO (for Ukraine and Georgia) would basically mean war with Russia for all NATO countries."

Despite Moscow's denials, many Western leaders still believe Russia is planning to invade Ukraine. Rather than highlighting NATO's divisions, many observers say that threat has galvanized the alliance.

### AT: Sustainability--- Turkey

#### Ukraine and strategic importance ensures Turkey strengthens ties with NATO

**Jovanovski 21** Reporter for NBC, BBC, CBC (Kristina Jovanovski, 4-15-21, "Turkey supports Ukraine, NATO solidarity at Russia’s expense," The Jerusalem Post, https://www.jpost.com/international/turkey-supports-ukraine-nato-solidarity-at-russias-expense-analysts-665246)HS

Russia's restrictions on flights to and from Turkey beginning on Thursday will hurt Turkey's economy, but Ankara has shown it is prioritizing its relationship with NATO by supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia, analysts told The Media Line.

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Moscow has been reinforcing its troops on Ukraine's eastern border, where pro-Russian separatists have been fighting Kyiv's military since 2014.

In his meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky in Istanbul on Saturday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he supported Ukraine's territorial integrity while Zelensky said their views on regional threats coincided.

Timothy Ash, an economist with a focus on Turkey and Ukraine, said Erdogan's meeting with Zelensky will help to boost his relations with US President Joe Biden. Ash expects a phone call will be held soon between the two leaders, something the Turkish leader has sought since Biden entered office in January.

"Erdogan has taken one on the chin," Ash said. "I think that will be understood in Washington."

Moscow announced on Monday that it would limit flights to Turkey until June, two days after Erdogan met with and expressed support for his Ukrainian counterpart.

The Kremlin denied the move to limit flights was connected to the meeting and cited Turkey's increase in COVID-19 cases.

However, Ash told The Media Line, "I think this decision was entirely based on geopolitics and Putin's attempt to isolate Ukraine. Everything Putin does is strategic."

While Erdogan has been trying to move Turkey closer to Russia, including via an arms deal, the two governments have major differences.

For example, they are on opposing sides in Syria, with the Kremlin supporting President Bashar Assad, including with air force units that have caused the deaths of Turkish soldiers.

Soner Cagaptay, the author of "Erdogan's Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East," called the flight restrictions Russia's "warning shot" and said Russian President Vladimir Putin could soon place limits on agricultural imports from Turkey, subtracting a few more percentage points from the country's economic growth.

The move also would subtract "more than a few" percentage points from Erdogan's support base, he told The Media Line.

Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, added that Ankara is keen to work with the US and expects the two sides to deepen ties, including on Ukraine.

Turkey's support for Ukraine goes beyond rhetoric. Ankara has provided Kyiv with drones that helped the embattled country face separatist forces accused of getting support from Russia.

Turkey is especially sensitive to flight restrictions, since a significant portion of its GDP comes from tourism and Russia is its largest source of foreign visitors.

Last year, more than 2 million Russians visited Turkey.

Trade with Turkey's Western allies also plays a major role in the country's economy, which had been struggling well before the coronavirus pandemic.

Since the pandemic, tourism has seen a major drop and Turkey's currency, the lira, recently fell even further after Erdogan removed the country's respected central bank governor.

Erdogan knows well the possible fallout from citizens' ailing finances, as evidenced by his Justice and Development Party's loss in the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election, the greatest defeat for the president since he came to power.

Analysts say financial concerns and a sense of regional isolation now has Erdogan on a charm offensive with Turkey's Western allies.

After tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean led to fears of an accidental clash with Greece, Ankara restarted talks with Athens. A meeting with the Greek foreign minister is scheduled for Thursday.

But no ally is more important than the US.

The economic troubles that led to the Istanbul mayoral defeat were sparked by a diplomatic row with Washington, which led to sanctions on Turkey and a free fall of its currency.

On Saturday, Turkey announced that two US warships would cross into the Black Sea where Ukraine and Turkey have long coastlines, a high-profile show of Ankara's support for NATO in the Ukraine conflict.

### AT: Sustainability---Trump Doesn’t Win

#### Trump’s fear of losing prevents a 2024 bid

**Adams 6-2** Opinion Contributor for The Hill(Myra Adams, 6-2-2022, "Two words explain why Trump won’t run in 2024," The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/3508270-two-words-explain-why-trump-wont-run-in-2024/)HS

Whenever two or more politically active people engage in conversation, invariably someone asks, “Will Donald Trump run in 2024?”

My standard answer is always “I have no idea” — until last week when Trump’s much-ballyhooed vendetta campaigns to defeat Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp and Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger ended in embarrassing anti-Trump failures.

Reportedly, Trump was “stunned” by the results and headlines such as The Washington Post’s “Trump rebuked with stinging losses in Georgia GOP contests.” But they’re not surprising since the former president’s primary challengers — former Sen. David Perdue (R-Ga.) and Rep. Jody Hice (R-Ga.) — were Trump stand-ins specifically chosen to promote the “Big Lie” — his perpetual mantra about the “stolen” 2020 election.

Trump’s repudiation in Georgia has Republicans speculating about his declining kingmaking powers, openly defying him as he loses his “vise-like grip on the party” and potentially endangering his front-runner status. So, circling back to the most-asked question, my new answer is “Trump won’t run in 2024” — based on personality traits rooted in the words “fear” and “fight.”

We begin with “fear,” indirectly drilled into young Donald Trump’s psyche by Fred, his authoritarian father, who demanded that his son always win and show strength but never weakness. Fred taught Donald that he could lie or twist the truth but never back down. Consequently, Trump developed an unnatural fear of losing or being called “a loser.”

Those grueling family dynamics were chronicled in Mary Trump’s book “Too Much and Never Enough,” subtitled “How my family created the world’s most dangerous man.” Donald Trump’s niece is a Ph.D. clinical psychologist whose best-seller was published in July 2020. Then, during a television appearance on Dec. 3, 2020, Mary explained, “It’s impossible for Trump to believe that he lost the election.”

That inability is why Trump can’t let go of 2020 and will tease a 2024 run for as long as possible. But, ultimately, Trump’s fear of losing is likely stronger than his willingness to take the risk. Moreover, during a second reelection campaign, the former president would be hard-pressed to use the same predictive excuse first heralded in a May 25, 2020, Politico headline: “Trump sees a ‘rigged election’ ahead. Democrats see a constitutional crisis in the making.”

And again, on Aug. 17, 2020, a Hill headline quoted the president’s losing rationale: “Trump: ‘The only way we’re going to lose this election is if the election is rigged.'”

Then, amazingly, on Tuesday, Trump activated his go-to playbook, writing his followers, “ICYMI: ‘Something Stinks In Georgia,’” explaining why his nemesis, Gov. Brian Kemp, won 73.7 percent of the primary vote. Stay tuned for that explosion.

Furthermore, Trump’s fear of running and losing reelection a second time is not assuaged by presidential history. In 1892, Grover Cleveland was the first and only former president to win the office nonconsecutively. But there is a striking political difference between Trump and Cleveland’s win-loss record.

Cleveland, a Democrat, was first elected in 1884 after winning the popular vote and Electoral College. In his 1888 reelection defeat, Cleveland lost the Electoral College but still won the popular vote. Then in his second reelection campaign, Cleveland won the Electoral College and the popular vote for the third time. By comparison, Trump has never won the popular vote — a fact that must haunt his ego and heighten his fear of 2024.

#### Trump won’t get out of the primary---National Republicans have coopted his platform and GOP voters reject Big Lie---Georgia proves

**Willick 5-25** Washington Post columnist on legal issues, political ideas and foreign affairs. (Jason Willick, 5-25-2022, "Opinion," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/05> /25/trump-2024-republican-primary-chances/)HS

Donald Trump’s critics are pointing to Tuesday’s primary results in Georgia, where his favored statewide candidates were routed, as evidence of the former president’s waning influence in the Republican Party. Yet Trump’s supporters could just as easily point to his backing of J.D. Vance, who came from behind to win the Ohio GOP’s Senate nomination, and Mehmet Oz, who is ahead by a hair in Pennsylvania’s Republican primary.

For those looking to assess Trump’s potential strength in a 2024 presidential primary, his 2022 endorsement scorecard surely has some predictive value. But just as important is understanding how the political game itself has changed in recent years. Even without consulting polls or primaries, it’s clear that the internal Republican Party conditions that enabled Trump’s 2016 rise are no longer in place.

Trump, in his first run for president, saw a gap between the GOP establishment and a critical mass of voters and rushed to fill it. After Mitt Romney’s 2012 defeat, party leaders resolved to move toward an immigration accommodation with Democrats, but many GOP voters maintained restrictionist views. Trump also exposed dissatisfaction with the party’s foreign policy under the last Republican president, attacking George W. Bush’s Iraq War without being penalized by Republican primary voters. Finally, Trump offered a more confrontational and ruthless approach to the culture war and to press criticism than American politics had seen in decades.

These political and stylistic differences between Republican Party custom and the preferences of its voters powered Trump’s rise to party leader. But in the half decade since his election, the distance between GOP elites and the conservative electorate has narrowed substantially (for better and for worse). Some version of nationalistic and populist politics is now a condition of entry into the Republican Party — and certainly its 2024 presidential primary. That was emphatically not the case in 2016, when former Florida governor Jeb Bush kicked off the race as the favorite.

In part because of Trump’s influence reshaping the GOP, his distinctiveness within it is fading. This was evident in the Georgia gubernatorial primary. In the absence of a significant philosophical or governing disagreement with incumbent Gov. Brian Kemp, former senator David Perdue could distinguish himself only by his adherence to the former president’s narcissistic 2020 election vendetta. Republican voters, who rejected Perdue by a 52-point margin, were not impressed.

Richard Hofstadter, a mid-20th-century historian of American populism, wrote that “third parties are like bees: once they have stung, they die.” The Trump movement in 2016 — with its attacks on both party establishments — in many ways resembled a third party. If Trump has no sting left, Hofstadter’s analysis helps explain why.

“Major parties have lived more for patronage than for principles,” Hofstadter explained. They are risk-averse organizations designed for stable governance. Populists and third parties, meanwhile, are not geared to govern, but to “agitate, educate ... and supply the dynamic element in our political life.” These two forces — steady and disruptive — influence one another, so that when “a third party’s demands become popular enough, they are appropriated by one or both of the major parties and the third party disappears.”

That process could already be reducing the demand for Trump as a political figure. His approaches to foreign policy, immigration and the culture wars have been at least partly appropriated by most national GOP politicians. Even Virginia Gov. Glenn Youngkin, a purple-state Republican with suburban appeal, ran aggressively and unapologetically against the cultural left in 2021. By contrast, the Georgia primaries show that Trump has been unable to entrench his myths about the 2020 election — which are rejected by the electorate at large — within the GOP.

Winning a competitive 2024 primary would take a kind of political entrepreneurship beyond what Trump has exhibited so far. In a GOP field geared toward the preferences of populist voters, Trump would struggle more than in 2016 to find a politically underserved constituency — and his efforts to do so could lead him further into the conspiracy fever swamps, which would fragment his support.

Then there are the attacks that would come flying from new directions if Trump’s opponents played for keeps. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis could outflank Trump on pandemic policies, pointing out that his state resisted shutdowns that the Trump administration recommended in 2020. Competitors could also charge that Trump shares blame with President Biden for inflation, for both picking Jerome H. Powell as chairman of the Federal Reserve and supporting massive spending during the pandemic.

When it comes to the ability to insult, shock and polarize, Trump likely can’t be matched in a GOP primary. But the Georgia results show that Republican voters won’t simply follow his orders by default. If Trump runs in 2024, he’d be squaring off against a major party remade in his movement’s own image. That’s a testament to Trump’s success as a third-party-style political entrepreneur — but it might also blunt the force of his appeal as a major party leader.

## AT RCA Turn

### Assurances Turn---2AC

#### Withdrawal causes allied mistrust---global proliferation AND extinction.

David Axe 18, Aerospace and Defense Fellow at Forbes, 7-16-2018, "The Risk to the World: Massive Nuclear Proliferation," https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-risk-to-the-world-massive-nuclear-proliferation, jy

If Trump actually did withdraw, Europe would become right away much more vulnerable to Russian nuclear attack or, more likely, intimidation. But immediate nuclear fire isn't the only danger.

More realistically, the Americans leaving NATO would force European countries that currently lack nuclear arms to toss aside the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and rush to acquire them, all in order to deter the Russians without the Americans' help.

The treaty's disintegration could then lead to countries all over the world pursuing their own nukes. "Trump is increasing the chances of the bomb spreading and the key treaty keeping the lid on such proliferation collapsing," says Blair.

Unconstrained nuclearization is one nightmare scenario that is becoming increasingly plausible as Trump escalates his criticism of the 69-year-old North Atlantic alliance. For three quarters of a century, American nukes have made it unnecessary for many European countries to possess nukes of their own.

Because of that, these countries could safely sign on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, bolstering international efforts to limit nuclearization all over the world. "Among the benefits of NATO, a key one is that it has helped to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons," Kingston Reif, an analyst with the Arms Control Association, told The Daily Beast.

But that was long before Trump’s rise as a political force. In 2017, the former reality-T.V. star declared NATO "obsolete." In Brussels on July 11, Trump again questioned the organization's usefulness. "What good is NATO?" he asked. The next day at a meeting of NATO leaders, Trump threatened that he might "do his own thing" if alliance members didn't immediately increase their military spending.

Trump's words sent a chill through European capitals. The United States is by far the biggest military spender in NATO and, according to Mark Simakovsky, a fellow with the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center, the "glue" that holds the alliance together. "Don't forget, there are huge divisions in Europe," Simakovsky said.

NATO's 29 member states range from illiberal Turkey, Hungary and Poland on the alliance's eastern flank to stalwarts France and Germany at the heart of the continent and the restive United Kingdom in the west.

At present just two non-U.S. NATO states – the U.K. and France – possess nuclear weapons. France fields around 300 nukes. The U.K., around 215. By contrast, the United States maintains an arsenal of no fewer than 3,800 atomic warheads, only slightly fewer than Russia possesses. The U.S. military keeps 180 warheads in Europe for use by its own forces and the forces of certain NATO members, most notably Germany.

Practically speaking, America is Europe's nuclear shield.

Under Article V of the NATO charter, an attack on any NATO state represents an attack on every other state – and the alliance is obligated to respond. That applies to a nuclear strike as well as conventional attack. If Russia nuked, say, Lithuania or Poland, the United States would be obligated to nuke Russia right back.

That mutual nuclear threat has helped to keep the peace in Europe since the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in a test in 1949, the same year as NATO's founding.

But with France and the U.K. possessing so few atomic warheads compared to Russia, deterrence in Europe could begin to collapse without American nukes. And that risk could drive European countries to create their own, more powerful deterrents – either collectively or individually.

"The loss of U.S. reliability to deter aggression against NATO Europe would prompt France and the U.K. to expand their nuclear capabilities and Germany and other non-nuclear countries to consider building their own nuclear arsenals despite strong public opposition," Blair said.

Some European officials are already thinking in those terms. In 2017, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, chairman of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party, called for Europe to build up a combined nuclear arsenal as powerful as Russia's own arsenal. Conservative German parliamentarian Roderich Kiesewetter endorsed the idea.

If the United States were to leave NATO, Europe could build its own deterrent under the umbrella of a diminished NATO structure, or opt for a new structure based on the European Union. In the last decade or so, the E.U. has begun to establish a rudimentary military organization, but has deployed troops only rarely – and then mostly in Africa on peacekeeping duties.

The realignment could get complicated. Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey are in NATO, but aren't in the E.U. Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are in the E.U., but aren't in NATO. Ireland, for one, is strictly opposed to nuclear weapons. "There are European Union members with nuclear capabilities, but how those capabilities would be employed outside of a NATO context – it's never been fleshed out," Simakovsky said.

For Trump to even threaten to pull back America's atomic umbrella is dangerous, Simakovsky said. "What it encourages is instability."

And that instability – and the resulting mistrust between former allies – plays into the hands of Russian president Vladimir Putin. It could even, in the most extreme scenario, tempt Putin to launch his own limited nuclear strike in the context of a wider war in Europe.

In the last decade Russia has invaded two of its European neighbors – Ukraine in 2014 and the Republic of Georgia in 2008. Neither Georgia nor Ukraine is a full member of NATO, although both countries have signalled their desire to join the alliance.

The Eastern European states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – all former Soviet republics – and Poland, formerly a Soviet satellite, are NATO members and view themselves as the main targets of Russia's aggression. This year, Russia deployed nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania.

The Trump administration criticized the Russian deployment as "destabilizing." But the greater threat of destabilization comes from the administration itself as it continues to dismantle rhetorically a security structure that has preserved the peace – and deterred nuclear war – in Europe since 1949.

"If Putin somehow decides to cross the nuclear threshold, it won’t be because he thinks we don’t have enough nuclear weapons," Reif said. "It will be based on a political calculation that he has a greater stake in the conflict and we and our allies won’t be willing to run the risk of escalation."

The alternative is only less awful. That, in the absence of America's nuclear guarantee as part of a transatlantic alliance, Europe might build up a large nuclear arsenal of its own and supercharge global atomic proliferation. "Nothing would do more to cause nuclear anarchy than wrecking NATO," Blair said.

#### Extinction.

Brooks & Wohlforth 16 – Stephen G. Brooks, Government Professor at Dartmouth. William C. Wohlforth, Government Professor at Dartmouth. [America Abroad: The United States’ Role in the 21st Century, Oxford University Press]

The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation

General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear-armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security.

This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.22 The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil-military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.”23

Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.24 If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.

Footnote i begins:

i. If proliferation strictly substitutes for US nuclear guarantees (that is, the only states that proliferate are those with US nuclear guarantees), then the net number of nuclear deterrence relationships stays constant. But as we argue later, proliferation to current US allies is likely to generate further spread to states not currently allied with Washington. And there are strong reasons to expect it to be harder to build robust low-risk postures in the case of many potential proliferators.

Footnote i ends and the article continues:

Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.”25 Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.26 As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?”27 The more nuclear-armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk-taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use.

It is also the case that for nuclear weapons to deter a given level of conflict, there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict. For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack. Highly controlled and reliable assured-retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as newer research shows, the farther the issue in question is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible with the type of ideally stable nuclear posture whose existence proliferation optimism presupposes.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. Following Schelling’s logic about the “threat that leaves something to chance,” it may face incentives to create a quasi-doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally.

Key here is that nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary: “You have ‘em or you don’t.” States can choose the kind of nuclear postures they build. Some states may choose to build dangerous and vulnerable nuclear postures. And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, many states may not be able to create truly survivable forces (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) even if they wanted to.

The links between nuclear possession and conflict are hard to assess empirically. Still, there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate:

• Nuclear weapons are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict— threats to a state’s core territorial security—that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time. Both quantitative and case study research validates the claim that territorial conquest is rarely an issue in armed conflicts in the present era. Yet states that are bullish on their prospects for territorial survival as sovereign units still have plenty of security concerns and also often find plenty of reasons to use force and plenty of ways to use force other than by conquering other states.29

• Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition. Though the United States and Soviet Union did not fight each other during the Cold War, their nuclear arsenals did not prevent them from engaging in one of history’s most costly rivalries, complete with intense arms racing and dangerous crises that raised the specter of nuclear war.

• Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures to attempt to deter various levels of conflict.30

• The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack, as both India and Israel discovered.

• In both statistical and case study tests, Vipin Narang finds that the only nuclear posture that has any effect on conventional conflict initiation and escalation is a destabilizing “asymmetrical escalatory” force, a doomsday posture designed to create intense incentives for early use, such as that constructed by Pakistan in the 1990s.31

In short, nuclear spread is a Hobson’s choice: it will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more. Add to this the risk that states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism. That is, some subset of new nuclear-armed states may not be led by rational leaders, may not prove able to overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, may not pursue security as the only major state preference, and may not be risk-averse. The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces (making them susceptible to a first-strike attack and thus creating incentives for early first use)—are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage to dangerous, undeterrable nonstate actors, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. And all of these concerns emerge independently of other reasons the United States is generally better off in a world with fewer nuclear states, notably increased US freedom of action.

### Deterrence Turn---2AC

#### Russia is revisionist.

Klimkin 20, Head of the European, Regional and Russian Studies Program at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv. Volodymyr Ivanov is a Senior Fellow of the European, Regional and Russian Studies Program at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv. Andreas Umland is editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” published by ibidem Press at Stuttgart, and a Fellow at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in Kyiv as well as the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. (“Putin’s new constitution spells out modern Russia’s imperial ambitions,” *Atlantic Council*, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-new-constitution-spells-out-modern-russias-imperial-ambitions/>)

The constitutional amendments adopted by Russia in summer 2020 have far-reaching implications for the Russian population, but the potential repercussions are also causing considerable unease in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. This is hardly surprising. The revised Russian Constitution seeks to place the Kremlin’s interventionist policies towards the nations of the former Soviet empire on a new legal footing. Officials in Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau are already confronted by the reality of partial Russian occupations in their countries. They now fear that new constitutional amendments will be used to justify future acts of aggression.

When Russians went to the polls on July 1 to vote for a package of constitutional reforms, coverage focused on the amendments that would allow Vladimir Putin to reset his term limits and remain in office until 2036. Most observers agreed that this was the true objective of the exercise, with additional changes serving as mere window dressing to disguise what was effectively a constitutional coup.

It is hard to argue with such conclusions. Proposed populist revisions such as a ban on same-sex marriage and protection for Kremlin-approved versions of history clearly pandered to nationalist sentiment and were used to drum up public support for the new-look constitution. However, the package also contained some far more substantial amendments with particularly ominous implications for Putin’s future domestic and foreign policies.

The new constitution strengthens the Kremlin’s grip on the Russian elite, making it possible to exclude people from office for such offenses as holding dual citizenship, foreign residency, or overseas bank accounts. Candidates for the Russian presidency are required to have lived in Russia continuously for 25 years, which rules out anyone with a Western education or significant international work experience.

Meanwhile, the authority of the presidency has been considerably enhanced. While Putin has informally reigned supreme for many years, the new constitution consolidates this reality around a tightly controlled bureaucracy, increasingly centralized authority, and veto powers over parliament via the Constitutional Court, which is informally controlled by the executive.

The reset of Putin’s system also appears to confirm Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy towards the former Soviet republics, above all in terms of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Since launching its military intervention against Ukraine in early 2014, the Kremlin has repeatedly demonstrated a readiness to break international law. Nevertheless, throughout the six-year campaign, Moscow has continued to pay lip service to global security rules and regulations. The new-look constitution means this is no longer strictly necessary. Instead, it confirms the primacy of Russian law over any obligations stemming from Russia’s membership in international organizations. The new constitution clearly states: “Decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties of the Russian Federation in their interpretation, that contradicts the Constitution of the Russian Federation, are not subject to execution in the Russian Federation.” In other words, Russian law comes first.

The most alarming amendment is probably the section which elaborates on Moscow’s right to intervene internationally in defense of loosely defined compatriots. “The Russian Federation provides support to compatriots living abroad in exercising their rights, ensuring the protection of their interests, and preserving their shared Russian cultural identity,” it states.

This new provision creates an explicit constitutional basis for the Kremlin’s aggressive actions against Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union which are home to large ethnic Russian populations. Indeed, by making broad references to “Russian cultural identity”, Moscow leaves considerable room for interpretation over exactly when and where it believes it can intervene. Ultimately, it is left to the Kremlin itself to determine the boundaries of the “Russian World.”

One of the most obvious applications of this constitutionally enshrined right to “provide support” would be in defense of Russian passport holders living elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. In recent years, Russia has introduced a series of measures designed to increase the number of Russian passports issued to ex-Soviet citizens. This tactic has helped to justify Russian intervention in a number of former Soviet republics and is currently being used in eastern Ukraine to strengthen the Kremlin’s grip on the Russian-occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Taken together, Russia’s new constitution and efforts to create passport protectorates throughout the former USSR will potentially enable Moscow to restrict the sovereignty of all the nations within the Kremlin’s traditional sphere of influence.

Finally, Article 67 of Russia’s new constitution is of special interest to Ukraine. This clause outlaws any discussion of returning Russian lands to foreign powers and appears to have been included specifically with Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in mind. Russia has occupied Crimea since February 2014, when Russian troops took advantage of political paralysis in post-revolutionary Kyiv to launch a lightning takeover of the peninsula. By cementing Crimea’s status in the Russian Constitution, Putin clearly hopes to prevent any successors from ever revisiting the issue. This represents a huge obstacle to the future normalization of relations between Moscow and Kyiv.

Putin’s new Russian Constitution is clearly a worrisome development for countries like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and now also Belarus. It confirms Russia’s transition towards authoritarianism and codifies the revisionist imperialism that has been setting the Putin regime’s foreign policy agenda for much of the past two decades.

This should serve as a reality check for members of the international community who still believe in the possibility of pragmatic compromises with the Kremlin. For the countries of the former USSR, the message is even clearer: Russia intends to reassert its dominance over the post-Soviet world and will continue to do so for as long as Putin remains in power.

This aggressive foreign policy doctrine is taking shape against a backdrop of mounting economic stagnation and political oppression inside Russia itself. Indeed, Putin’s increasingly insecure domestic position was a key factor behind the decision to preempt speculation over a possible political transition by extending his reign until 2036 via the recent constitutional vote.

In such circumstances, fresh foreign policy adventures in the post-Soviet region may serve as a convenient way of refocusing Russian public attention. At present, the Kremlin is occupied with the crisis in Belarus. Meanwhile, the bloody stalemate in eastern Ukraine rumbles on. Putin’s new constitution indicates that such entanglements will only increase in the years ahead.

Russia’s constitutional amendments offer little cause for optimism. On the contrary, aggressive Kremlin policies in the post-Soviet space are likely to remain a key challenge to international security throughout the coming decade. So far, the Western response to this challenge has been inadequate. Now that Putin has spelled out his intentions, there is no excuse for failing to grasp the nature of the threat his regime poses.

#### NATO’s key to deterrence.

Michael Peck 19, defense writer and contributor to Forbes, 5-26-2019, "What Happens If America Leaves NATO? Russia Wins.," https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/what-happens-if-america-leaves-nato-russia-wins-58917, jy

What would happen if the United States left NATO?

The International Institute of Strategic Studies examined several scenarios in which NATO (including Canada) had to confront Russia without U.S. support.

In one scenario set in 2021, Russia occupies Lithuania as well as Polish territory bordering Kaliningrad. With Lithuania and Poland as NATO members, NATO invokes Article 5, which treats an attack on one member as an attack on all members. It prepares a military force—minus U.S. troops and support—to compel Russia to withdraw from the occupied territories.

But the NATO offensive—code-named Operation Eastern Shield/Eastern Storm—would face major problems. Put simply, NATO couldn’t muster that much force, or adequately support the force it could muster.

Currently, NATO has a division-sized NATO Response Force, and there are plans to add enough battalions to create a corps-sized force. However, “neither of these structures would therefore prove sufficient to generate the force size required in this scenario,” the study concludes.

For example, to meet Russian forces well-endowed with tanks, NATO’s intervention force would need to be mostly composed of heavy brigades with modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. And to achieve a 2:1 force ratio sufficient to defeat the Russians, four corps would be needed.

Yet in the Baltic invasion scenario, without U.S. troops and assuming the Polish army has already suffered heavy losses, “the remaining European members of NATO and Canada currently only have around 20 brigades that would meet these criteria,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated.

About one-third of this total comprises formations primarily equipped with lighter, wheeled, armored vehicles. Assuming that, on average, 50 percent of these formations would be able to deploy within the 90 days given, the overall force available to NATO would be equivalent only to a single corps. In a similar vein, there are currently insufficient numbers of modern artillery, particularly long-range systems. A significant increase in the size of both capabilities would therefore be necessary to adequately address the requirement, through some combination of greater overall force pools, improving the equipment level of existing European heavy brigades, and a substantial increase in readiness levels.

That land force would need cover against Russian air attacks, while Moscow’s huge arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles are pounding NATO air and supply bases. “The limited amount of available longer-range air and missile defense would be just sufficient to cover the necessary front-line air bases for NATO, but there would be no excess to protect the land component itself or to protect critical military infrastructure sites such as rear-area headquarters and logistics,” the study warned.

NATO navies would also have difficulty operating in the confined and missile-rich Baltic, Black and Mediterranean seas. NATO lacks sufficient drones and reconnaissance systems, while many NATO nations only have enough ammunition for a few days of combat, especially in smart bombs (which NATO ran out of during limited air strikes on Libya in 2011).

To make matters worse, the cost of procuring sufficient equipment and personnel to defeat a Russian invasion of the Baltics could be as high as $357 billion. But beyond the financial cost of European NATO (which includes Canada in the IISS study), there remains the question of how indispensable the United States is to NATO.

In some ways NATO can substitute its own resources, but in others, it simply needs America. “Some of the capabilities provided by US forces, such as logistics and sustainment for land forces, may be relatively straightforward if not cheap to replace,” the study concluded. “However, others are almost unique to the US, and it would be difficult to substitute European capabilities.”

#### Prevents nuclear war.

Brands 19, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Most recently, he is the co-author of "The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order.", (Hal, November 7th, 2019, “How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics”, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-11-07/nuclear-war-in-the-baltics-russia-could-force-one>)

Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert. Russian officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. They are particularly alarmed at the possibility of NATO using its unmatched military capabilities to conduct conventional strikes within Russian borders. So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out [limited](https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-de-escalation-russias-deterrence-strategy/) nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms. This [concept](https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/why-moscow-might-not-reveal-an-escalate-to-de-escalate-strategy/) is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of [evidence](https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/february/escalate-de-escalate) that the Russians are serious about it.

A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict. It could also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the U.S. and NATO [initiate](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2781.html) their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons raises the question of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead, through deliberate choice or miscalculation, to a general nuclear war involving intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and apocalyptic destruction?

So what to do? One option would be for the West to pull back — to conclude that any game that involves risking nuclear war over the Baltic states is not worth the candle. The logic here is superficially compelling. After all, the U.S. could survive and thrive in a world where Russia dominated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, just as it survived and thrived during the Cold War, when those countries were part of the Soviet Union. The problem is that failing to defend the Baltic states would devalue the Article 5 guarantee on which NATO rests: the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. And given that one could raise similar questions about so many U.S. commitments — would declining to meet a Chinese attack on the Philippines really endanger America’s existence? — this failure could undermine the broader alliance system that has delivered peace and stability for so many decades.

A second option, [emphasized](https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF) by the Pentagon’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, would be to devise new limited nuclear options as a way of strengthening deterrence and dissuading Russia from pursuing a strategy of escalate to de-escalate. For example, the U.S. might develop low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used, in a relatively limited fashion, [against](https://tnsr.org/2018/11/against-the-great-powers-reflections-on-balancing-nuclear-and-conventional-power/https:/tnsr.org/2018/11/against-the-great-powers-reflections-on-balancing-nuclear-and-conventional-power/) a Russian invasion force or the units supporting it.

This approach is probably worthwhile, because it would help fill in missing steps on the escalatory ladder between conventional conflict and general nuclear war. The knowledge that the U.S. has its own “tactical” nuclear options might inject greater caution into the calculations of Russian planners. It is possible, RAND analysts [note](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2781.html), that limited nuclear strikes early in a Baltic conflict could convince the Kremlin that the risks of proceeding are unacceptable.

The dangers here are, well, obvious and drastic. There is always some [possibility](https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/discrimination-problem-putting-low-yield-nuclear-weapons-submarines-dangerous/) — although informed analysts [debate](https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/discrimination-details-matter-clarifying-argument-low-yield-nuclear-warheads/) how much of a possibility — that Russia might [mistake](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2781.html) a limited strike against military targets in the Baltics for part of a larger or more dangerous nuclear strike against Russia itself. And if the plan is to use limited nuclear strikes against Russian military assets involved in an invasion of the Baltic states, the implication is that NATO would be using nuclear weapons on the territory of its own members.

A third, and best, option is to strengthen the weak conventional posture that threatens to bring nuclear options into play. The root of NATO’s nuclear dilemma in the Baltics is that the forces it currently has stationed there cannot put up a credible defense. Yet as earlier studies have [noted](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html), the U.S. and its allies could make a Russian campaign far harder and costlier — with a much-diminished chance of rapid success — by deploying an enhanced NATO force of seven to eight brigade combat teams, some 30,000 troops. That force would include three or four armored brigade combat teams (as opposed to the one NATO periodically deploys to Eastern Europe now), along with enhanced mobile air defenses and other critical capabilities.

Russia couldn’t claim credibly that such troops posed any real offensive threat to its territory. But the force would be large and robust enough that Russian troops couldn’t destroy it in a flash or bypass it at the outset of a conflict. It would therefore obviate many of the nuclear escalation dynamics by making far less likely a situation in which NATO must escalate to avoid a ~~crippling~~ defeat in the Baltics, or one in which Russia can escalate to protect its early victories there.

Developing this stronger conventional deterrent in the Baltics would not be cheap: [Estimates](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2781.html) run from $8 billion to $14 billion in initial costs, plus $3 billion to $5 billion in annual operating expenses. Yet neither would it be prohibitive for the richest alliance in the world. The best way of reducing the danger of a nuclear war in the Baltics is to ensure that NATO won’t immediately lose a conventional one.

### AT: RCA Turn---2AC

#### Deterring Russia in the short-term through allies solves our offense---BUT, long term, relations will rebalance because the alliance is unsustainable.

John E. Herbst et al. 22, Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center and served for thirty-one years as a foreign service officer in the US; Anders Åslund, senior fellow in the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council; David J. Kramer, Former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, non-resident fellow at the McCain Institute; Alexander Vershbow, former Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Former US Ambassador to Russia, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council; Brian Whitmore, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center and adjunct assistant professor at the University of Texas-Arlington; 2-8-22, “Global Strategy 2022: Thwarting Kremlin aggression today for constructive relations tomorrow,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/thwarting-kremlin-aggression-today-for-constructive-relations-tomorrow/>, jy

The immediate US and allied partners’ goal is to thwart and deter the Kremlin’s revisionist foreign policy, which seeks to weaken NATO, the EU, and their principal states, especially the United States. Moscow also seeks to restore Russian hegemony in Eurasia.14 This requires prompt action by the United States, usually and preferably along with allies and/or partners, to impose a cost on Moscow for its aggressions and provocations. Given the power imbalance between Moscow and the more powerful West, this should be doable in most instances. The key, of course, is a clear recognition of what Moscow is up to and the political will to use the United States’ superior resources to stop Kremlin aggression. This policy would also serve as a lesson urging caution on China, which watches carefully how Washington responds to Moscow’s misadventures.

To do this effectively, the United States needs to use its advantages, which include its wide network of allies and partners around the world; its conventional military superiority; its economic superiority, including its role at the center of the global financial system; its record as a supporter of human rights; and its cyber and information capacities.15

Washington should also exploit Russia’s disadvantages: its economic weakness, including its dependence on hydrocarbon exports; its declining standard of living; its shrinking population; its population’s opposition to the use of Russian troops in Ukraine and desire to improve relations with the West; the preference of elites to park their ill-gotten gains and families in the West; and the fact that the Putin regime has lost the major cities and young people as a voting bloc.16

In the shorter term, US goals include seeking dialogue with two distinct purposes. The first is to manage or stabilize the competition between Washington and Moscow. This includes reducing the risk of escalation in military confrontations and arms control.

The second is to explore possible areas of cooperation where US and Russian interests overlap—perhaps counterterrorism, including in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan; reducing military confrontations; nuclear diplomacy with Iran; reaching an understanding on the use of the Arctic; and dialogues with Russian elites on possible future cooperation as well as outreach to the Russian people are also key elements of US strategy.

The United States’ longer-term goal is to encourage the evolution of a Russia that sees its role as a constructive power contributing to—not violating—the rules-based international order. This is not an effort at regime change. It looks to a day when Moscow recognizes that the path to continued great-power status depends on freeing the creative talents of its people who can turn Russia into a global economic power that attracts its neighbors into closer relations, rather than seeking to compel them due to an inability to exert soft power. Such a Russia would be an economic engine in Eurasia and a natural partner connecting its neighbors with the EU, for instance by permitting hydrocarbons from Central Asia and the Caucasus to use Russian pipelines—as required by the EU’s third energy package. It would also make Moscow a natural partner—like the EU—in dealing with global national security challenges, such as North Korea.17

What is driving the current relationship between Russia and China is Putin’s obsession with what he sees as the threat of the United States—an obsession that has little chance of fading—and deteriorating relations with Europe. Putin’s view, of course, prevails, but others in Moscow understand that China is in fact a danger to Russia’s position in at least the Far East and perhaps even Siberia. Eventually though, when it is clear to Russian policy makers that US intentions do not pose a threat to the integrity of Russia, Moscow will understand the real national security threat facing it—the rising and increasingly assertive great power to its south.

The United States will not be the lever that puts an end to this historically anomalous partnership, thereby isolating China as the only major power seeking to undermine the state of the global order. But Washington should both understand the dynamic and publicly pay attention to it.18 As Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues, both Russia and China have so many bilateral considerations toward various countries that they prefer to deal with the United States bilaterally and not in an alliance.19

#### The Axis fails.

Kroenig 20 – Matthew Kroenig, Government and Foreign Service Professor at Georgetown University. [The United States Should Not Align with Russia Against China, 5-13-20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/united-states-should-not-align-russia-against-china-geopolitical-rivalry-authoritarian-partnership/]

Now these revisionist autocratic powers are once again working together closely. In response, many national security strategists have argued that the United States should seek to peel them apart by working with Russia to counter the even bigger threat of China.

But this recommendation is misguided. Autocracies like China and Russia will not form a deep strategic partnership, and the costs of cozying up to Russia far outweigh the benefits. Fortunately, there is a better path: Washington can leverage its democratic advantages, working with its existing democratic allies to counter both Beijing and Moscow at the same time.

The growing Russian and Chinese strategic relationship is worrying. The two autocratic powers have cooperated on major energy deals, including a blockbuster $55 billion arrangement to pipe Siberian natural gas into China. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have met in several high-level summits, and Xi even declared Putin “his best friend and colleague.” Perhaps most troubling, Beijing and Moscow have participated in joint military exercises in both Europe and Asia. If they were to coordinate and conduct simultaneous military attacks on the U.S. alliance system in Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, for example, the United States and its allies could be overwhelmed.

These facts have led many observers to conclude that the solution is to play them off against each other. Just as President Richard Nixon opened to China to work against Moscow during the Cold War, they argue, today Washington could do the reverse. China is the bigger threat now, so the United States could partner with Russia against the rising power in East Asia.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has reportedly urged this course of action directly in conversations with President Donald Trump, and Robert Blackwill of the Council on Foreign Relations—a former U.S. ambassador to India—has recommended that Washington “make concessions in order to improve its relationship with Moscow” as part of a strategy to counter China. And these and similar options are being considered in the working levels of the U.S. government.

But Russia and China will not form an effective alliance against the United States anytime soon. In a new book, I examined the strengths and weaknesses of democracies and autocracies in great-power competition and found that autocracies are poor alliance builders. The ease with which unconstrained dictators rapidly shift their country’s policies, backtrack on commitments, and dissemble are not traits that are conducive to building international partnerships.

Indeed, history shows that autocratic allies tend to fight each other more than the enemy. In spite of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Adolf Hitler turned on and invaded the Soviet Union, betraying his partner Joseph Stalin. The major military action of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War was attacking its own members, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The last time China and Russia were aligned, they nearly fought a nuclear war with each other in the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict. And Putin invaded Ukraine and Georgia at a time when these countries were involved in the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States.

Moreover, there are many conflicts of interest between Russia and China that will push them apart without any help from the United States. Depopulation in Russia’s Far East has led to fears that an expanding China will attempt a land grab. Russian colleagues report that Russia’s new nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles are not aimed at NATO but meant to deter a rising China. More broadly, Moscow was the senior partner during the Cold War, and Putin will not be keen to now play second fiddle to Beijing.

#### Wooing Russia is impossible.

Joffe 21 – Josef Joffe, Government PhD at Harvard University, distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. [Forget the Russia Card, 1-28-2021, https://www.hoover.org/research/forget-russia-card-why-putin-will-not-work-america-ally-against-china-beijing-moscow-wants]

Could a different line-up among the three work today? Could America and a diminished Russia coalesce against the Beijing Behemoth? Yes, if the sun were to rise in the west. There are three structural problems that defy Russo-American collaboration.

One, as no. 1, the U.S. is wedded to the existing order, the foundation of its primacy. Yet China and Russia are revisionist powers who both want a much larger slice of the global pie.

How then would a grasping Russia act as handmaiden of status-quo America? The problem is not bad blood, but Mr. Putin’s ambition. One objective is to informally reconstitute the Soviet Empire by drawing former USSR republics as clients into an uncontested Russian sphere of influence. The second is to cast the shadow of Russian power over Moscow’s former satrapies in Eastern Europe from the Baltics to Bulgaria. The third quest is to weaken the trans-Atlantic bond between the U.S. and Europe. The fourth is to secure and expand Russia’s sway over the Middle East and North Africa. Basically, the game is to dislodge the U.S. wherever opportunity beckons.

Given this set of interests, how would Washington recruit Moscow against Beijing? There is nothing, save recognizing Russian sway over the “Stan” countries, that the U.S. could offer to gain the Kremlin’s good will. But If the U.S. were to yield on Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, it might just as well say good-bye to its global pre-eminence. There is no deal here because America cannot pay such a price.

Two, another reason why a U.S.-Russian partnership won’t materialize is structural as well. For Russia, the U.S. remain the foremost rival. So, it pleases Mr. Putin to play China against America. Nor is this a fanciful prospect. Moscow and Beijing have already fashioned an alliance of convenience. It is defined by routine, though often symbolic, military cooperation. Examples are joint exercises, joint air patrols over the Pacific, advanced Russian weapons sales, and the training of Chinese officers at Russian academies.2

Three, U.S.-Russian amity is limited because it makes much more sense for two revisionists to unite against the top dog than for Moscow to bandwagon with Washington. By analogy, recall the legendary American bank robber Willie Sutton. Why did he break into banks? He replied: “That’s where the money is.” The U.S. is the global bank, so to speak, with power and assets galore. To diminish and thus weaken no. 1 is a natural for nos. 2 and 3 who want more for themselves and less for the nation standing in their way. Rob and reap!

Finally, the non-structural factor of ideology. China and Russia need not fear domestic interference from each other, as both share the same authoritarian faith. From each other, they won’t have to worry about the kind of condemnation that emanates from democracies like the United States and threatens their domestic supremacy. In that respect, Putin and Xi, despots both, are cousins-in-crime with a strong interest in maintaining ideological solidarity.

The upshot: The United States won’t be able to set Russia against China, nor the other way around, as Kissinger tried in the 1970s. So, America must harness strategic friends elsewhere in order to construct the double-containment of nos. 2 and 3. Candidates are Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and lesser Asian powers like Vietnam (a former Chinese colony) or Taiwan (a designated victim of Chinese imperialism). At best, Washington can play Beijing and Moscow only at the margins—with an ad hoc deal here or there, but without any hope that such fleeting bargains will add up to a reliable relationship. Putin will not work for America, and neither will Xi.

#### China is peaceful.

McKinney 19, \*Jared Morgan; PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore); \*\*Nicholas Butts; Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leader. He holds an LL.M. from Peking University, an MSc from The London School of Economics and an MPA from Harvard University where he was also a Crown Prince Frederik Scholar and a Cheng Fellow. (Winter 2019, “Bringing Balance to the Strategic Discourse on China’s Rise”, *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, pg. 75-76, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-02\_Issue-4/McKinney.pdf)

In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion.

When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27

Friedberg or Harris might object that America’s rise took place in the context of a different order. This is perfectly true, but the more important point is that the long nineteenth century (1815–1914)—the era of America’s rise—was the first iteration of the New Peace.28 The implication is that relative peace can and has coexisted with limited wars, property and territorial thefts, acts of coercion, and aggressive assertions of status. This does not mean any of these are desirable— they are not—but it shows that they need not be fatal to the system. Insofar as there is a lesson from that first period of relative peace, it is that Great Power confrontation is the one thing that is fatal. Accepting this does not mean capitulating in every instance, as implied by some,29 but it does mean rediscovering the rules of Great Power competition30 alongside the art of strategy.31

Focusing only on areas that China’s rise violates the scruples of the established powers, moreover, downplays the extent to which China, has, in fact, conformed to the existing order. As a RAND Corporation report published in 2018 concludes, China has been a supporter—albeit a conditional one—of the international order: “Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s … the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states.”32 The way in which Xi Jinping, following his 2017 Davos speech in defense of globalization, has been heralded as the most prominent champion of international order and defender of globalization underscores the fact that there are different elements of this order, and that China supports many, if not most, of them. Even in places where China is supposedly “altering” the current order, Beijing tends to simultaneously affirm that order. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance, actually mirrors existing structures, and China has intentionally copied elements and “best practices” of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China is playing the same game, even if it is seeking a bigger role within it.33

#### We can contain both.

Kroenig 20, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Matthew, 5-13-2020, "The United States Should Not Align With Russia Against China", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/united-states-should-not-align-russia-against-china-geopolitical-rivalry-authoritarian-partnership/)

Fortunately, the United States has other potential partners from which to choose. Democracies excel at building effective alliances, and the United States enjoys formal alliances with the 29 other members of NATO, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. These nations account for 59 percent of global GDP. This compares favorably with only a combined 19 percent of global GDP for Russia and China.

The power of this alliance of free nations could be better harnessed in a global strategy to counter autocratic revisionist powers. The free world is concerned about the threats posed by China and Russia and are already cooperating on similar policy measures to counter them, but these efforts could be amplified with a coordinated global strategy led by the United States. Rather than pursue alliances with shifty dictators, Washington should play to its strengths and mobilize its existing strategic partnerships.

The United States and its democratic allies already enjoy the economic, military, and political power needed to excel in this new era of great-power competition. Beijing and Moscow, not Washington, are the ones that should worry about powerful and ideologically hostile enemies aligning against them.

### Assurances---Link---1AR

#### Scaling down US presence triggers prolif---it stokes abandonment fears and collapses US leverage.

Brands & Feaver 16, \*Hal, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. \*\*Peter D., professor of political science and public policy at Duke University, where he heads the Program in American Grand Strategy and the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. (November/December 2016, "Should America Retrench?", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/should-america-retrench)

To make matters worse, offshore balancing encourages nuclear proliferation. Throughout the postwar era, maintaining an onshore presence has given the United States leverage to restrain allies’ nuclear ambitions while also mitigating the insecurity that might otherwise have driven such countries as Germany, Japan, and South Korea to pursue the bomb. Withdrawing offshore threatens to have the opposite effect. It is no surprise that South Korea expressed nuclear aspirations when the United States gestured at withdrawing its troops from the peninsula during the 1970s, or that Taiwan did likewise when U.S. rapprochement with China appeared to jeopardize the United States’ commitment to the island’s security. Offshore balancers may wave away the dangers of proliferation; given the destructive power of nuclear weapons, policymakers can hardly be so cavalier.

#### Hegemony solves global prolif cascades.

Boylan 18, MA, Doctor of Philosophy thesis. (Andrea K., March 2018, “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: In Pursuit of a Regional Logic”, pg. 375-379, *Naval Postgraduate School*, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1052511.pdf>)

Despite the predictions of structural theorists, global nuclear nonproliferation efforts appeared to benefit from the end of the Cold War. Within the Middle East, the trend was toward a decrease in nuclear proliferation. In many world regions, the trend also seemed to deemphasize nuclear weapons. The exceptions were Northeast Asia and South Asia. The number of regional states pursuing nuclear weapons slowly decreased. From 1991 to 2003, multiple states either ended nuclear weapons programs (in the case of Iraq, forcibly) or reduced their nuclear weapons capabilities. The nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and Libya came to an end. Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa ended their ballistic missile programs. Algeria reined in its suspicious nuclear efforts. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine voluntarily gave up the nuclear weapons capabilities they had inherited from the Soviet Union. Regions formed and implemented nuclear-weaponfree zones (NWFZs). By the end of 2003, it was primarily Iran and North Korea that remained of high concern to the international community as potential proliferators. This was a clear decrease from 1991. The United States as the sole superpower had taken on the cause of denuclearization as one of its top priorities following the end of the Cold War and global nonproliferation was the winner. As the global hegemon, it was the architect and driving force behind these endeavors.

What does the role of external management mean for realist outlooks at both the system level and the regional level? Nuclear proliferation challenges at the regional level have been handled by the superpowers or great powers due to the distribution of capabilities among the units in the international system. They have the capacity to intervene and manage proliferation issues because of these capabilities. Waltz notes that these management tasks fall to the great powers as they are “agents of great capability.” 1666 In addition, regional nuclear proliferation has been viewed as not just a regional threat, but also as a global threat. Thus, managing these threats mitigates security concerns for the great powers as well. But a unique feature of managing proliferation in the new multipolar era has been the willingness of great powers (thus far) to assist in nonproliferation efforts across Cold War “bloc” lines. That is, states have been willing to support international nonproliferation norms (born in the bipolar era) even against their narrow self-interested relations with certain proliferators today.

In addition to the overall decrease in potential proliferators, a strengthened nonproliferation regime provided evidence of U.S. efforts. Jeffrey Knopf writes that “many of the global [nonproliferation] efforts resulted from a U.S. initiative, and it is hard to imagine them coming into being in the absence of U.S. leadership.” 1667 During the bipolar period, the United States recognized the weaknesses of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as regional nuclear proliferation bloomed. It began to try and fill some of the perceived gaps and loopholes by initiating the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. In the unipolar period, the United States instigated Cooperative Threat Reduction, the Wassenaar Arrangement, United Nations Security Council 1540, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. It also supported the establishment of the Additional Protocol among other bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Underscoring the critical role of U.S. leadership, Knopf found in his recent edited volume, International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation, that the factors that best explained this cooperation were a combination of state self-interest and U.S. leadership.1668

In a multipolar setting, nuclear proliferation decreased in the Middle East. In other world regions, the nuclear proliferation trend appeared to be similar. The exception was Northeast Asia. And, the especially hard cases—Iran and North Korea—remained. Both countries had advanced nuclear weapons programs. External management by the United States during the unipolar period had come close to reining in both programs, but the global hegemon had not been completely successful in either case. The United States would also discover that North Korea had begun aiding Syria, an ally of Iran, to establish a possible nuclear weapons program. In this time, other great powers began to function more as external managers. Three European states—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—initiated nuclear negotiations with Iran. China took a leading role in negotiations with North Korea. This would have been unthinkable in the bipolar period when the United States was occupied with trying to block countries like West Germany and China from providing nuclear technology to various regional states. This was because U.S. efforts to stem proliferation, particularly in the unipolar period, helped define what was acceptable and unacceptable nuclear behavior. Outliers, such as Iran and North Korea, were marginalized and punished. Countries that eventually complied with accepted proliferation guidelines, as Libya did, were praised. With the nonproliferation regime more strongly established in the multipolar period, other states took a leadership role in enforcing these established guidelines.

The findings of this dissertation, however, may provide a cautionary warning. What happens if the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has helped to facilitate great power cooperation and to control the spread of nuclear weapons and associated technology nuclear spread, becomes weaker? What if its capacity to influence nuclear proliferation-related activities erodes? What happens if this occurs during a time of intense competition in the international system, an environment that is seemingly more conducive to nuclear spread? Would external managers once again face a lack of control over the nuclear supply chain, a lack of awareness of regional proliferation activities, a lack of coordination or cooperation by external managers, and an increase in regional foreign policy issues that might take priority over nuclear proliferation concerns? Or would the management mechanisms for controlling nuclear proliferation hold?

Thus, what are the implications of this dissertation’s findings in regards to external management and the role of the nonproliferation regime in the future? In particular, what does this mean for U.S. policy, given the country’s long history of working to control nuclear spread? What other avenues of research might help further our understanding of regional nuclear proliferation? The rest of this chapter is dedicated to answering these questions.

A. FUTURE REGIONAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

If heightened competition in the international system resulted in increased nuclear proliferation in the past, policymakers cannot take the current state of decreased proliferation for granted. Decreased regional nuclear proliferation seemed to be driven by the advantages enjoyed by the United States as the global hegemon. While other NPT members have not always agreed with the U.S. approach to combatting nuclear proliferation, it has been the state that tackled the issue of proliferation most aggressively using the full range of options available to a superpower. Without U.S. efforts, it is likely that there would have been more nuclear powers than there are today.

Nevertheless, there would seem to be a real danger that increased competition in a multipolar setting may result in less effective external management. The same factors that caused increased nuclear proliferation under bipolarity may also characterize multipolarity. The nuclear nonproliferation regime may become weaker without the driving force of U.S. hegemony. Powers such as Russia and China historically have had a less stringent view on nuclear proliferation activities than the United States. For example, Russia and China have seemed more willing to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Thus, the nonproliferation regime helps facilitate cooperation around the issue of nuclear proliferation, making it more than the sum of its parts. But it would not stand on its own without the voluntary support of the great powers.

### Deterrence---Revisionism---1AR

#### Russia’s revisionist ⁠— Putin’s psychology, actions, and state documents

Natsios 18, Executive Professor and Director of the Scowcroft Institute at the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University (Andrew Natsios, 2018, “Introduction: Putin's New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?,” *South Central Review*, 35.1)

John Mearsheimer, the international relations scholar, argues Russia's aggressiveness towards its neighbors stems from western efforts to extend NATO membership to former members of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. According to this view, traditional national interest drives Russia's behavior, and NATO extension has been seen by Putin as a threat to Russia's vital national security interests. As a result, he is responding to that perceived threat through territorial aggrandizement, aggressive ultra-nationalist ideology, and confrontation with the West. From this perspective, the western democracies helped create Vladimir Putin's Russia by impinging on its "sphere of influence" along its borders; thus, Russia is not what international relations scholars call a "revisionist power"—one which seeks to overthrow the existing international order—but a traditional state protecting what it sees as its equities and vital national interests. Other analysts, such as Anne Applebaum, argue Putin's policies are not part of a grand strategy, but are evidence of an improvised foreign policy. Thus, Russia's aggression in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and its threats to the Baltic States, may be seen not as a carefully designed and executed strategy of conquest, but as symptomatic of Putin's ad hoc, opportunistic foreign policy. He probes for Western weakness, irresolution, and indecision, and then, if there is no resistance, he intervenes to extend Russia's reach by absorbing more territory. The limitation of these views is that they ignore what we know of the mindset in the Kremlin, the worldwide reach of Russian cyberwarfare and black operations, and the grievances which Putin himself has expressed multiple times against the Western democracies. These grievances are rooted, among other factors, in his personal experience in East Germany. He and other mid-level operatives were traumatized as the USSR and its satellite Communist states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia collapsed in 1990 and 1991. The population of the Soviet Union shrank by more than 50% from 290 million to 142 million people in a matter of months. The borders of the Russia state Vladimir Putin inherited resembled Russia before the reign of Catherine the Great in the second half of the 18th century rather than Russia of the 19th and 20th century, Tsarist or Communist. Russia's Warsaw Pact occupied "allies" in Central and Eastern Europe threw off Soviet control in a chain of uprisings which swept across the region in little more than a year. Most of these states eventually joined the NATO alliance and the European Union as newly independent democratic capitalist nations. Vladimir Putin and fellow KGB operatives watched with horror as their world disappeared almost overnight; they destroyed their police files in East Germany; and fled the country. In his memoirs, Putin wrote that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the "greatest geostrategic catastrophe of the 20th century," an extraordinary, if not bizarre, statement given the other events of the century. Putin has sought to return Russia to great power status by weakening other competing powers or annexing neighboring states rather than risking reforms that could be destabilizing in the short term, but would strengthen Russia as a nation state over the long term. The immediate objectives of Russian foreign policy are not mysterious if one examines Putin's government's public rhetoric, its published documents, and its actions. One of Putin's greatest strengths has been the aggressive and systematic pursuit of these strategic objectives which include:

* efforts to regain military parity with the United States (they are nowhere near achieving this)
* the neutralization, or at least weakening, of the NATO alliance
* the end of the European Union as one of the most powerful economic blocs in the world
* the creation of an alternative anti-liberal, authoritarian, reactionary governance model of statehood for which Russia is trying to gain adherents among far right and far left parties wing in Europe (not only are the far-right wing parties of Europe pro-Putin, so too is Jeremy Corbyn, the hard-left Labor leader in the U.K., and the Syriza Party elected to power in Greece in January 2015 which is dominated by Communists)
* the reconstruction of the historic Russian sphere of influence through annexation of parts of neighboring states, or at least their realignment out of NATO and the European Union into Russia's orbit of influence, and the projection of Russian power to other regions of the world such as the Middle East and Afghanistan (CNN reported on July 25, 2017 that the Russians were arming the Taliban in Afghanistan).

Over time Putin has ruthlessly pursued these objectives with great discipline, using some of Russia's vast natural resources to rebuild the Russian military and create a powerful cyber-security capacity to pursue asymmetrical warfare against the West and vulnerable countries on the periphery. The Russian Euro-Asian land mass contains perhaps a third of earth's minerals, oil, and natural gas reserves. This represents an extraordinary treasure and source of national power, if only they had been efficiently and entirely used to increase economic productivity, build modern infrastructure, and construct a knowledge-based economy. But they weren't. Putin's ability to use these resources has been curtailed since 2014, when oil prices collapsed from $117 a barrel to $27 at the beginning of 2016 before rising in 2018 to $68. Because of this price collapse, Russia suffered a significant drop in state revenues between 2014 and 2017 due to the decline in oil prices and western economic sanctions imposed because of the invasion of Ukraine and Crimea. The ongoing demographic decline of the country, cuts in social services and pensions because of the revenue drop, and Russia's isolation from international markets by Moscow's deliberate design has constrained Putin's ambitions. Does Russia face a new threat from the Western democracies? U.S. military presence in Europe (approximately 30,000 combat troops at the end of 2016) was at its lowest level since before World War II, down from a high of 400,000 during the peak of the Cold War. Even more significant than any real or imagined threat Putin sees coming from the United States, is that the American military is going through its most painful retrenchment since the end of the Vietnam War. The U.S. defense budget by the end of the Obama Administration had been cut by nearly $150 billion. The Trump Administration's first budget does request an increase of over $50 billion in defense spending, but Trump also declared his intention to improve U.S. relations with Russia. European countries' military forces have scaled back to such a degree they have undertaken virtual unilateral disarmament. Putin's Russia's expansionary strategy with the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, its rapid increase in its defense budget, the annexation of Crimea, the rebuilding of its nuclear arsenal, and its military intervention in Syria, has all been undertaken with no self-evident threat to Russia's survival or vital national interests. Furthermore, China is Russia's only real ally in its competition with the West, at least at this writing. If Putin's strategic objective was to minimize or reduce external threats to Russia, the invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder as it has slowly begun to mobilize the previous docile and distracted Western Alliance to counter the new threat. NATO officials have now begun publicly raising the alarm bells. Sweden and Finland which never joined NATO are now engaged in a public discussion about joining the Alliance, which has broad public support. In the last year of the Obama Administration, the U.S. redeployed an armored brigade to Europe which will rotate among Eastern European and the Baltic NATO members as a response to Russian aggression.

DOMESTIC PRESSURES DRIVING PUTIN'S BEHAVIOR

The Russian foreign policy riddle may in fact be better explained, per some essays in this issue, as a response to the power dynamics within the country rather than by any particular national security doctrine. These dynamics are internal, not external threats to Putin's rule, certainly not to Russia as a nation-state. Moscow's policies may be driven by the insecurity and illegitimacy of the small circle of Oligarchs and former KGB agents surrounding Putin who fear their own people more than they fear any outside threat, a fear which is evidence of profound, if disguised, weakness.3 After it appeared that Putin had rigged the 2012 Presidential elections to ensure he returned to power (he would likely have won anyway), hundreds of thousands of Russians took to the streets of major cities in protest, which lasted several months. His relative restraint (protest leaders were arrested and some tortured but no massacres on the streets took place) in suppressing the popular uprising may have had more to do with his fear that the internal security forces might not carry out an order to crush the protest through brute force rather than any ethical qualms he had about a bloodbath in the streets. Or, it may have been that Putin wanted to avoid the embarrassment such a solution to the street uprising would have caused him internationally. This suggests Putin fears another public uprising, which is why he has taken control of the public's sources of information. Putin gradually emasculated the electronic major media outlets, tried to block internet access to the worldwide web, and has suppressed dissent. He has been accused by his critics of allowing or ordering the assassination of prominent journalists, civil society leaders, Oligarchs who have fallen out with Putin, and political opponents. Accounts differ on the number of journalists who have been murdered since Putin took power in 1999. They range from 12, according to a professional association of journalists, to 25, according to an article in the New Yorker. Opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was murdered on a bridge in sight of the Kremlin the day before he was to release a report with evidence that Russian troops were fighting alongside separatists in the Ukraine. Few analysts have argued that Putin himself gave orders to assassinate Nemtsov, but the five men convicted of killing him and sentenced in July 2017 in a Moscow court were Chechens with ties to Chechnya's leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, who is an acolyte of Putin's.4

PUTIN'S GRAND BARGAIN WITH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE: SURRENDERING FREEDOM FOR GUNS, BUTTER, AND THE DREAM OF LOST RUSSIAN GRANDEUR

Putin's legitimacy as a ruler has been based on a tacit agreement with the Russian people that trades individual freedom, democracy, and the rule of law for economic security. Since the severe economic contraction after mid-2014, that tacit agreement ended. Putin has now reformulated the grand bargain with the Russian people. He is promising to bring back the glorious days of the Soviet Union and earlier Tsarist Empires in exchange for the Russian public's acceptance of his autocratic rule and a lower living standard.5 Since the drop-in oil prices beginning in the summer of 2014, the central government has been shoring up the fragile banking system. Despite the balance sheet's visual appeal, Russia under Vladimir Putin faces a much greater risk of internal implosion than many in Western capitals understand. This is due to the cuts in public services and pensions, growing unrest among the Russian elites with Putin's policies, and the Russian military's discomfort with Putin's strategic gambling in Ukraine and earlier in Georgia.6 To avoid this collapse, Putin has redirected the Russian people's attention to his foreign policy adventures and away from his domestic mismanagement and policy failures, but that has not changed the Russian government's balance sheet. In fact, those adventures have made that balance sheet more precarious. The Soviet Union collapsed for many reasons in 1990, but one immediate cause was its bankruptcy. During the West German-Soviet negotiations over the reunification of East and West Germany, Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union, repeatedly asked Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, for billions of dollars in loans because of the Soviet Union's internal financial crisis (which the German government provided).7 One of the leading energy economists, Daniel Yergin, argues that oil prices have been recalibrated to a lower price level, and thus we will not see $100 a barrel again in the foreseeable future.8 This has created a gap between Vladimir Putin's strategic objectives and his ability to achieve them. His frustration may encourage him to take more and ever greater tactical risks which could result in unintended confrontation with NATO or the United States directly. Anne Applebaum argues in her essay that Putin has either infiltrated, co-opted, corrupted, intimidated, or shut down most of the nascent institutions of Russian democratic pluralism that developed during the 1990's and early 2000's such as non-governmental organizations, religious institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church, think tanks, and universities. He has done this to ensure he faces no competing centers of power in Russian society, which has made him stronger personally, even as he has made Russian society weaker. This has set back Russia decades from joining other advanced countries, all of which share several critically important characteristics—a vibrant civil society (which constrains governmental abuses that would otherwise go unchecked), an independent judiciary to guarantee the rule of law, and a free press and media. Putin has now undermined all of these nascent institutions. Russia has neither rule of law nor an independent court system, and its police are corrupt and a tool of repression rather than law enforcement. Russia has evolved into what Russians call a "managed democracy," a democracy in appearance, not reality.9 Russian institutional weakness may be found in the retarded level of internal development and the dysfunctional characteristics of its governance structure. Douglass North, the Nobel-prize winning economist, argued that what distinguishes wealthy, advanced, and stable countries from those in the developing world is the density, legitimacy, resilience, and robustness of its governmental, private sector, and civil society institutions.10 By any measure, Russia has a weak private sector of formally incorporated businesses, a declining number of independent and increasingly fragile civil society organizations, and a massive state sector controlled by a small oligarchy in Moscow. During the Cold War, some Western analysts described the Soviet Union as a third-world country with the bomb because of its primitive health care system, poor infrastructure, lack of a consumer economy, and an inefficient collectivized agricultural system and industrial sector. Many of these same weaknesses continue to hold Russia back from developing into an advanced industrial democracy. Russia's current social, health, demographic, and economic indicators show a country in what could be permanent and irreversible decline, as documented in Nick Eberstadt's essay. Russia is neither a western nor even a middle-income country, but a fragile state that has more in common with the poorest developing countries than middle income countries. These weaknesses suggest Russia is a declining power, and certainly not a rising power such as China.11 Paul Collier argues in his book, The Bottom Billion, that abundant natural resources can be a curse more than a blessing in a country with fragile institutions. In such a country, these resources will corrupt and undermine the legitimacy of the state and hamper the development of accountable institutions. The evidence suggests Russia is a poster-child for Collier's "resource curse" and thus its resources are a source of weakness, but, they are also simultaneously a source of strength because they allow Putin to do things he could not otherwise do. Some of this wealth has been squandered on mismanaged show and tell projects such as the $51 billion spent to prepare for the Sochi Olympics.12 And a portion of the oil and gas infrastructure revenues have been siphoned off to enrich Putin's inner circle of former KGB agents who now control perhaps a third of the oil and gas wealth of the country.13 Some of this oil and gas wealth, which makes up about 50% of the Russian government's revenues (another 15% is generated by mineral revenues), has been used by Putin to ensure pension and paychecks have been paid on time after the chaos of the 1990's. However, those pensions are now in danger as oil revenues can no longer support their current benefit levels. That oil and gas wealth also provides Russians with stable government jobs in exchange for the public's tacit acceptance of Putin's growing centralized, autocratic power, but they do little to transform Russia into an advanced economy.14

RUSSIA'S MILITARY AND CYBER WARFARE BUILD UP

One of the few elements of Russian national power now on the ascendency is its military. Putin had been rearming Russia at a rapid rate until 2017 when revenues could not support the increases. The Duma recommended a 27% cut in military spending for 2017 because of the depressed oil prices, while Jane's reported a 25% cut. In fact, the reduction in the Defense Ministry operational budget was about 7% according to an analysis in the National Interest.15 This analysis argues that the Russia military industrial corporations were heavily indebted and the Defense Ministry decided to relieve this debt on a one-time basis, which made the defense cuts larger than they actually were. Putin has invested in the modernization of Russia's nuclear arsenal and the development of new and more advanced conventional weapons, even as Russia faces a depressing demographic future with high rates of drug addiction and alcoholism among young men.16 Perhaps the greatest risk to Putin's strategic buildup may be this dependence on oil, gas, and mineral revenues. To minimize the effect of declining revenue on the defense buildup, Moscow has made a series of strategic decisions to choose guns over butter: cutting back public services such as education, health, and pensions. Disposable income for the average Russian family declined by 15% between 2014 and 2016, even as the military budget has been increasing. At the end of 2016, for the first time in seven years, Russian families were spending more than half their income on food and "the percentage of Russians who had any savings fell from 72% in 2013 to 29% in 2016," reported the Washington Post.17 The rising Russian military threat was on display in Putin's invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, but he miscalculated in several critical respects. According to Moscow, a corrupt and illegitimate government had taken power through street demonstrations while Putin's democratically-elected ally in Kiev was driven from office by mob rule funded by billionaire George Soros and western civil society groups. Putin expected to be greeted by at least half of Ukraine as a Slavic liberating hero because eastern Ukraine has historically been more oriented towards Russia. Instead, Russia met Ukrainian resistance, and united what had been a divided country now mobilized to oppose the Russian invasion.18 Multiple independent surveys of Ukrainian public opinion show at least 90% of the population opposes the Russian invasion and wants Russian troops to leave the country. The Russian military showed its strengths and weaknesses in the Ukrainian crisis. Its conventional weapons systems were substantially superior, eventually overwhelming the Ukrainian army, but its strategic planning was weak, its manpower pool for its army seriously constrained, and its command and control problematic.19 Russia's new cyberwarfare capabilities were on display in 2016 in a highly visible way during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, the Dutch and French elections, and German parliament hacking incidents. Perhaps the most authoritative public document describing Russian attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. elections may be found in the indictment submitted in federal court by U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller on February 16, 2018 against three Russian corporations and 13 individuals employed by or affiliated with those corporations. One of these Russian corporations, Internet Research Agency, owned by a close associate of Putin, Yevgeny Progozhin, sought to manipulate American voters by creating social media pages that made it appear to be controlled by U.S. political activists and focused on divisive political issues such as immigration, race, and religion. Starting in 2014, Internet Research Agency's employees created false personas on Facebook, Twitter and other platforms to post on these pages. The company also purchased advertisements online to direct individuals to these pages (funded through U.S. bank accounts and PayPal accounts established under stolen American identities), and posed as U.S. grassroots organizations to stage political rallies. Closer to the election, employees were instructed to post material to support Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders and to disparage Hillary Clinton, Marco Rubio, and Ted Cruz. Even after the election, the company coordinated rallies to protest the election results and stir up political discord. It was an effort to use America's open society, open information, and public discourse against itself, not simply to support one candidate over another but to disrupt American society and turn one group against another. One of the statutes which the Russian operatives were accused of violating was the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), a law enacted in 1938 to investigate Nazi propaganda efforts in the United States. The use of this anti-Nazi law to charge the Russians is one more indication of how much of a threat this is viewed by the U.S. justice system, and the state of Russian-American relations. Leaving aside the question of whether President Donald Trump or his campaign managers collaborated, intentionally or not, with Putin's operatives, the indictments have placed a bright public spotlight on Russian espionage activities in the United States. During the Cold War, the KGB undertook similar activities as did other Great Powers, so espionage is not new nor particularly shocking. Adolph Hitler undertook similar espionage tactics in the United States in the 1930's, which is why the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act was passed in the first place. What is new is that it is happening now, at this moment and what the reaction has been in the United States and Europe. More than any other single effort since Vladimir Putin, his oligarchs and operatives took power, Russian election espionage to disrupt U.S. and European elections have convinced a rising body of public and elite opinion in the western democracies that Russia under Vladimir Putin and his oligarchs is an enemy, not simply a rival. Perception is often reality in politics. The first Trump Administration National Security Strategy released in December 2017 identified the two central geostrategic threats to the United States as China and Russia, not ISIS, not terrorism, not North Korea or Iran. This assertion was made in a document signed by Donald Trump, who wished months earlier for a very different relationship with Russia and Vladimir Putin. Putin's clumsy old-style KGB efforts to muck around in American politics has unintentionally ignited a new Cold War which the American and European publics, until this point, had not wanted to believe or had ignored. If that was Putin's goal, he was successful, but it is very unlikely he intended this at all because it now means western governments will marshal their very considerable instruments of national power and focus them on Russia which Putin can ill afford given the fragility of the country. Some media reports stated that Putin blamed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the street demonstrations against the 2012 rigged election, that he apparently believed she organized through Russian civil society organizations. Putin, perhaps anticipating public hostility to the election corruption, expelled the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Moscow months before the 2012 elections. He correctly believed USAID was responsible for helping build Russian civil society over the previous two decades. It had been funding U.S. democracy NGOs such as the International Republican Institute and the Democratic National Institute to help strengthen Russian political parties and election processes for the 2012 elections. USAID has done this openly and consistently in countries around the world since these democracy programs were created in the 1980's and is not directed for or against any particular parties or candidates. While it was certainly the case that USAID, along with European aid agencies, helped support a nascent civil society in the post-Soviet years (something most western aid agencies do across the globe), there is no evidence of any conspiracy in the U.S. government to mobilize these groups to protest. Later, Russian cyber-warfare agencies hacked into the Democratic National Committee email system and accessed Clinton campaign advisor John Podesta's emails. Several weeks before leaving office, President Obama retaliated against the Russian hacking by imposing limited sanctions on Russia and expelling a few diplomats. He was six months late in imposing these sanctions as the Washington Post has documented. The Post reported the CIA presented President Obama a detailed account in June 2016 of how the Russian government intended to interfere in the U.S. election, but the President, took no serious actions to stop Russia until late October, and then modestly.

THE IDEOLOGY AND MYTHOLOGY OF THE PUTIN STATE

Putin has positioned himself and Russia as a culturally and religiously conservative alternative to western secular liberal democracies. This world view is described in Project Russia, which is a curious, if alarming, collection of essays published in five-volumes as a semi-official government publication that describes the political ideology of the State, the Orthodox Church's religious vision, geographic determinism, and social analysis shared by Putin and his circle of oligarchs who rule Russia. These essays form a strange amalgam of anti-democratic, reactionary, ultra-nationalist attacks on western democratic values, combined with an unhealthy dose of conspiracy theories, paranoia, xenophobia, and a defense of autocratic government and dictatorship.20 One view of Project Russia is that its publication simply reflects Putin's understanding as a former KGB agent that a great power must have an ideology to defeat and undermine its rivals in propaganda battles. But a more sinister and alarming view is that the five volumes are Putin's blue print for Russia's grand strategy, evidence of a revisionist power seeking to overthrow the existing international order. If this interpretation of Project Russia is correct, it suggests a greater level of future conflict with the western democracies and international institutions. If Project Russia is a blue print and not just a propaganda tool, the risk of an accidental global conflagration between Russia and the NATO alliance is a serious potential scenario. Vladimir Putin must find ways of explaining to the Russian people why the country is so far behind the western democracies, as did his predecessors in the Soviet Union. Putin continues to pursue the Soviet strategy of keeping the memory of World War II alive to stir up Russian nationalism among the population, but also as an explanation for Russia's underdevelopment. The evidence suggests that this strategy faces increasing hurdles. The Soviet Union's epic and extraordinary sacrifices during World War II – approximately 11 million soldiers and 9 million of their civilians having died – no longer have much resonance with the younger generation, who know little about the war, and the older generation, who tire of a war 70 years ago being used to explain Russian inability to match Western living standards today. Thus, what had been a powerful historical experience of collective suffering and sacrifice during World War II, has now become a fading memory which lacks the magnetic power it held over the Russian people during the Cold War.21 Undoubtedly, one of the motivations behind Putin's attempt to regain Russia's lost stature in the world, expand its sphere of influence, attack western democratic institutions, and annex the territory of its neighbors is driven by a need to avenge the supposed "secret conspiracy" among the Western democracies to collapse, destroy, and humiliate Russia.22 The Russian electronic media and Project Russia continue to propagate this view. The Russian government's arming of the Taliban, reported by U.S. intelligence sources and by CNN, may be a response to U.S. military intervention in Syria against the Assad Government, an ally of Russia, but it could also be payback for the CIA's arming of the Mujahedeen fighting against th Russian military in Afghanistan during the 1980's.23 (Some in the Reagan Administration saw the arming of the Mujahedeen as U.S. payback for Soviet support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.) The Cold War certainly involved the arming of U.S. and Russian client states against each other, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. policy changed to one of facilitating the integration of Russia into the international system and its conversion into a democratic capitalist system. Both the U.S. and Europe spent billions of aid dollars in programs in Russia from 1991 to 2012 to support these political and economic reforms. If they intended to destroy Russia permanently, why would they have made these large investments? It is also the case that President George H.W. Bush went to great lengths to avoid dancing on the grave of the Soviet empire as it collapsed to avoid giving fodder to Mikhail Gorbachev's critics.

#### Even if the US caused Russian revisionism, pulling back won’t reverse it. Putin is set in his ways.

McFaul 1-19-2021, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor of Political Science and Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. (Michael, "How to Contain Putin’s Russia", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2021-01-19/how-contain-putins-russia)

Putin is far more of a revisionist leader than his Chinese counterpart. In his view, he is at war with the United States, its allies, and the multilateral institutions that Washington created and currently anchors. Putin no longer desires cooperation with the West or even a respected place within the liberal international order. Rather, he seeks the destruction of that U.S.-led order.

Putin is an old man, set in his ways after two decades in power. He is not going to change his mind suddenly about a country he sees as a threat or embrace any effort on the part of the Biden administration to restart a major positive bilateral agenda. Biden and his team must accept that Putin will not end his assault on democracy, liberalism, and multilateral institutions anytime soon. They must therefore deter and contain Putin’s Russia for the long haul.

#### Russian revisionism is internally predetermined, not provoked by the West.

Deni 19, Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. (John R., November/December 2019, “The Paradox at the Heart of NATO’s Return to Article 5”, *RUSI Newsbrief*, Vol. 39, No. 10, pg. 4, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20191101\_newsbrief\_vol39\_no10\_deni\_web.pdf)

Second, efforts at resetting the relationship with Russia are bound to fail, most likely at Russia’s hands. Russian political leaders – whether they are czars, politburo chairmen or ‘elected’ presidents – are strongly incentivised by domestic politics to demonise the West and therefore to pursue adversarial, zero-sum policies. Although there are many variables that contribute to a country’s foreign policy formulation, geopolitical factors play a significant role in Russia. More specifically, Russia’s porous and largely indefensible borders have, over centuries, contributed to a strong perception of insecurity – an insecurity that some Russian political leaders have become skillful in exploiting for political and personal gain.

The early-to-mid 1990s, when Russia appeared to be a partner, was an anomalous period in relations between Russia and the West, and it ended quickly when Boris Yeltsin was pressured on his political right flank to abandon close coordination with the West. Today, the problem is not Putin, or even Russia’s authoritarian form of government. Rather, the problem is Russian geography and history, which fundamentally shape its domestic political culture and the incentive structure confronting politicians there.

### Deterrence---Link---1AR

#### NATO prevents European disintegration.

Michta 19, PhD, Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. (Andrew A., 10/23/19, "Without the US, European Defense Will Fall to Pieces", American Interest, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/10/23/without-the-us-european-defense-will-fall-to-pieces/)

The larger problem is that the impasse in the current debate about “European defense” is playing out against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating security environment around Europe (and increasingly also within), while the push for an autonomous European army seems increasingly to be the result of ad hoc politics rather than a sound defense calculus. Amidst the various acronyms and semantic exercises of the past three years, what is missing in Europe today is a keen grasp of history as well as strategic foresight. First, politicians seem to have all but forgotten that the European project was possible to begin with precisely because the United States, through the NATO alliance, provided the overarching security umbrella for the Continent, defusing postwar resentments and assisting in Europe’s reconstruction. It bears remembering that, without America’s commitment to Europe, the Franco-German “grand reconciliation” would have taken much longer to attain, if it were to be achieved at all. And so today, as during the Cold War, it makes sense for European states to speak of “Europe” when it comes to trade and economic policy integration. However, Europe’s security has since 1945 been a direct function of its having been embedded into the Transatlantic system, and this fundamental reality still remains true today. Simply put, there is a great deal of difference between the notion of a protected “common market” linking the economies of likeminded democratic governments, and that of Europe acting as a unitary actor on security and defense.

And yet, if a number of governments in Europe believes—as seems increasingly to be the case—that they can establish a “European” defense structure and a “European security architecture,” then the outcome will be a hollowing out of NATO and at the very least a bifurcation of Europe between the countries facing Russia along the eastern flank and the those that during the Cold War constituted Western Europe. (Even here the divergent security optics are likely to pull individual countries in different directions, with countries like France looking south, and others, such as the Scandinavians, focusing on the north.) The endgame will not be a “pan-European” security and defense system but rather a back to the future scenario: a new age of insecurity in Europe, where deep power differentials among states on the Continent will yield a hierarchy of national interests that will quickly decompose a larger sense of European solidarity. The countries in Central Europe, which are deeply invested in the European Union as a pathway to economic modernization, will nonetheless never wager their national survival on a pan-European defense and security architecture, any more than powers in Western European will be able to credibly guarantee that in an extreme situation—without America’s backing—they would be able to bring their societies to the brink of war and beyond to defend the Baltic States, Poland, or Romania.

### Deterrence---Internal---1AR

#### Putin’s an opportunist – weaking US resolve gives him a window to invade the Baltics.

Wilson 15, MPA @ Princeton, American foreign policy advisor and the current executive vice president at the Atlantic Council of the United States, Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, decorated by the Presidents of Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland for his efforts to advance transatlantic relations (Damon, “A Transatlantic Strategy to Deter Putin’s Aggression,” *US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation*, https://www.ceas-serbia.org/images/2015-i-pre/030415\_Wilson\_Testimony.pdf)

In the Ukraine crisis, Putin first probed with little green men to determine his freedom of maneuver in Crimea and, in the absence of resistance, brazenly seized the territory. The Kremlin then stoked the idea of a ‘Russian Spring’ across southern and eastern Ukraine, creating the myth of Novorossiya and seeking to spark spontaneous revolts using ‘political tourists’ from Russia. When that failed, Russia introduced Special Forces and intelligence operatives in Slavyansk, using the town as a base from which to seek to destabilize eastern Ukraine. And once Ukrainian forces gained their footing, nearly defeating the rebel forces, Russia opted for full-scale invasion. Today, the so-called separatists – former miners and farmers according to Putin – command greater quantities of the most advanced heavy weaponry than most European NATO nations.

While Ukraine is ground zero in the current struggle, there is no doubt that Putin’s sights are firmly fixed on the two tiny nations that have dared stand up to his bullying: Moldova and Georgia. Moscow attempted to sway Moldova’s recent elections with massive support for new pro-Kremlin parties, is courting separatists, and is poised to destabilize the nation. Despite Georgia’s efforts to normalize relations with Moscow, Russia has continued its creeping annexation of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In the first instance, Putin has used this crisis to consolidate his own hold on at home, through greater repression of civil society and independent media even as he fuels a nationalist fervor. He has created an environment of fear and intimidation, at a minimum fostering the circumstances that led to the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. After all, the protests led by Nemtsov, much like the Maidan in Ukraine, pose a potentially existential threat to Putin’s regime.

Putin of course is also seeking to dominate his neighbors, to drain them of resources to fuel his kleptocracy, and to restore a sense of Russia’s greatness in the only way a bully knows – intimidating the weak, closest to him.

Furthermore, he aims to prevent any of his neighbors from joining either NATO or the EU, achieving this through coercion when possible and by dismemberment and occupation where necessary.

Ultimately, Putin knows that the best check on his power is a united transatlantic community. Hence, he has sought to divide Europe, undermining the resolve for sustained sanctions. But the most tempting objective for Putin is to call into question the credibility of NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense commitment, as doing so would effectively end both NATO and America’s role as a great European power.

A Russian move against an ally such as a Baltic state cannot be ruled out. Putin has demonstrated time and again that if he senses an opportunity to act, he will, convinced that the West lacks the will or ability to take decisive action. Debaltseve is only the latest case in point.

This is why today’s situation is so dangerous. Putin will not stop and this crisis will not end until he encounters serious pushback.

We have seen repeatedly that Putin’s objectives expand with success and contract with failure, or even the increased chance of failure. This means that the best determinant of his action is Western action.

There’s a tendency, however, in Washington to argue that the Europeans should take the lead on Ukraine – after all we have our hands full with ISIS and other global responsibilities. This approach fails to understand that only the United States can galvanize Europe and other members of the international community around a tough-minded comprehensive strategy to deter Putin.

The Ukraine crisis is a Russia crisis after all. And Russia is too big, too strong, and too scary for Europe to resolve this without us. Germany may be a political and economic powerhouse, but Putin knows Chancellor Merkel cannot enforce European diplomacy. While the Chancellor has done a remarkable job in holding Europe together in this crisis, no European state can afford to get into a confrontation with Russia.

Without US leadership in this crisis, Putin might succeed in creating a new dividing line in Europe. As he creates facts on the ground, he shifts the goalposts of what becomes an acceptable outcome in European diplomacy focused on ending violence. Europe may feel forced to accommodate a revanchist Russia rather than check its power. As we’ve seen throughout history, this is a dangerous formula.

Only US leadership in this crisis provides the necessary condition to ensure the sustained resolve of our allies, most of who are bearing a far greater economic cost to their own economies.

Our strategy today is basically to raise the costs on Russia by imposing sanctions, protect NATO, and count on the long-term fundamentals, which are on our side and are working against Russia. The problem is that we have an immediate crisis. Putin likely sees the immediate future as his best window of opportunity. And in the short-term, we may see a group of nations lose their sovereignty and Russia tempted to push further into NATO territory. We can avoid this outcome. The United States has the ability to rally its allies and international partners around a comprehensive strategy that not only deters Putin’s aggression, but also avoids an unstable grey zone in Europe’s east.

#### Deterrence collapse causes invasion.

Aron 20 8-18-2020, director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. (Leon, "The risks of a Russian intervention in Belarus", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/18/risks-russian-intervention-belarus/)

Yet as startling as it might seem, the turbulence in Belarus also gives Russia’s president an opportunity — one he could seize with a high-stakes display of brazen military aggression that could go beyond merely cracking down in Belarus. Perhaps the most frightening scenario: an invasion of Lithuania. The Baltic republic, which shares a 420-mile border with Belarus, is a member of both the European Union and NATO.

Combining a raid on Lithuania with an intervention in Belarus could give Putin a chance to solve several problems at once. He could snuff out the threat of a Western-oriented regime in Minsk. He could drown his own people’s resentments in fear and patriotic exultation, as he did with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. And perhaps most important for him personally, he would revenge the fall of the Soviet Union by humiliating and wounding NATO — that predatory and perennially plotting bugaboo, which every Russian alive today has been taught to hate.

While hardly a cakewalk, such a scenario is well within the realm of the possible. The Russian and the Belarusian militaries have exercised together in Belarus for many years. Belarus’s top officers graduated from the same Soviet military schools and academies as their Russian counterparts. Just within the past few days, as Lukashenko’s fate appeared increasingly uncertain, the two countries have launched a new round of joint exercises, introducing a major element of uncertainty.

A raid would be a very limited operation. No tanks would roll into Vilnius. Seizing Lithuanian territory, perhaps a few kilometers deep on the Lithuanian side of the Belarus-Lithuania border to “thwart a NATO aggression,” and then showing that Russia had gotten away with it, would be the point.

Lithuania is host to a NATO battalion of 1,092 troops from Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Yet like the other two NATO battalions in Estonia and Latvia, the alliance troops in Lithuania are not there to stop a Russian invasion but to serve as a “tripwire,” an embodiment of Article Five of the NATO charter: An attack on one is an attack on all.

But tripwire deterrence is only as good as the tripper’s belief that it will trigger an explosion. And Putin may consider such an explosion less likely at a time when NATO disunity is probably at its greatest since the end of the Cold War. President Trump recently started withdrawing a third of the U.S. troops in Germany. German Chancellor Angela Merkel intends to boycott the Group of Seven summit in Washington, and the French president contends that NATO is experiencing “brain death.”

Moscow has already staged a rehearsal. The large-scale Zapad 2017 military exercise included a simulated “counteroffensive” against an attack from three fictitious countries bordering Russia and Belarus in the northwest. The war game included the test-firing of nuclear missiles and flights of strategic bombers over the Atlantic, Baltic and Norwegian Seas.

It is child’s play for the Russian troll factories to flood the Internet with disinformation — including “deepfake” images of a pending NATO invasion of Belarus from Lithuania. The Baltic republic has been among the most vociferous critics of Putin’s Russia, often harboring political exiles from Russia and Belarus — and it is currently hosting Belarus opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.

Technically, Russia and Belarus have been a “union state” since 1999, so Putin would argue that military intervention to restore the “legitimate authority” in Minsk would not only be a “fraternal” Russian impulse but also a legal obligation.

When the Kremlin sent its troops into rebellious Czechoslovakia this month 52 years ago, Soviet citizens were told that the Red Army was moving to forestall an invasion by the West Germans. Putin can reasonably hope that the trajectory of the West’s reaction would resemble that which followed the crushing of the Prague Spring: fulminations, hand-wringing and sanctions. Yet Russia could probably cope as long as it can continue to sell its oil and gas — while betting on a willingness to “reset relations,” four or so years down the road with whoever is sitting in the White House.

In the meantime, the Kremlin’s geopolitical gains could be enormous. Like the U.S.S.R. before it, Russia would be permanently feared — or, as Putin sees it, respected. NATO’s Article Five, the cornerstone of collective defense, would be rendered a fiction. The alliance might start to unravel as countries on its eastern flank sought individual “accommodations” with Moscow. Ukraine’s hesitant drift to the West would be likely to be arrested for the foreseeable future as well.

It is just as obvious what needs to be done to forestall this dismal scenario: an emergency summit meeting of NATO, a quick vote to stand with Lithuania and, most of all, the deployment of troops as fast and as close to the Lithuanian border with Belarus as the complicated logistics allow.

But don’t hold your breath. It is hard to repair in days what has been neglected for years.

### AT: RCA Link---1AR

#### Russia is irrelevant and wooing them will fail.

Kroenig 20 – Matthew Kroenig, Government and Foreign Service Professor at Georgetown University. [The United States Should Not Align with Russia Against China, 5-13-20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/united-states-should-not-align-russia-against-china-geopolitical-rivalry-authoritarian-partnership/]

While these autocratic powers may cooperate when convenient and opportunistically exploit U.S. weaknesses, they are not likely to form an enduring and coordinated alliance that will pose a major threat to the United States.

Furthermore, there is little to be gained and much to be lost by attempting to sidle up to Moscow. Russia is unlikely to be open to helping Washington confront Beijing. While Russia does not want to subordinate itself to China, it does not want to be openly antagonistic toward it either.

In addition, Putin will not want to bolster the United States, the country he sees as his foremost enemy. In exchange for giving China a cold shoulder, Putin would almost certainly demand unpalatable concessions, such as granting Russia a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and limiting U.S. missile defenses.

Even if Putin did promise to work with the United States, it would be a mistake to believe him. Putin cannot be trusted to abide by arms control agreements or cease-fires in eastern Ukraine. Why would Washington stake its strategy for the most important national security challenge of the 21st century on his word?

Finally, Russia does not bring much to the table. It is a declining power with a GDP smaller than Italy’s. When energy prices are high, Russia can afford an impressive military, but oil prices have been sagging, and Russia’s military spending has declined over the past several years.

Fortunately, the United States has other potential partners from which to choose. Democracies excel at building effective alliances, and the United States enjoys formal alliances with the 29 other members of NATO, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. These nations account for 59 percent of global GDP. This compares favorably with only a combined 19 percent of global GDP for Russia and China.

The power of this alliance of free nations could be better harnessed in a global strategy to counter autocratic revisionist powers. The free world is concerned about the threats posed by China and Russia and are already cooperating on similar policy measures to counter them, but these efforts could be amplified with a coordinated global strategy led by the United States. Rather than pursue alliances with shifty dictators, Washington should play to its strengths and mobilize its existing strategic partnerships.

The United States and its democratic allies already enjoy the economic, military, and political power needed to excel in this new era of great-power competition. Beijing and Moscow, not Washington, are the ones that should worry about powerful and ideologically hostile enemies aligning against them.

### AT: RCA Internal---1AR

#### There’s no threat – interest asymmetry and deterrence.

Carafano ’19 [James Jay; 8-4-2019; PhD from Georgetown University, Strategy MA from the U.S. Army War College, Professor at Georgetown University, Former Director of Military Studies at the Army’s Center of Military History; “Why the China-Russia Alliance Won't Last,” The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-russia-alliance-wont-last-71556]

Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated. Peace through strength really works.

If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing.

We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original.

The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military expansionism and more.

All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns.

One more thing inhibiting a Sino-Russian hookup. Russian and Chinese power is largely asymmetrical. They have very different strengths and weaknesses. In coordinating their malicious activities against the United States, they don’t line out very well. China, for example, can’t really do anything substantive to help Russia in Syria. Putin doesn’t have much to offer in the South China Seas or in brokering a U.S.-China trade agreement.

There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch, their global goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate interests will grate on the relationship.

#### If they’re right about the impact, then they’re wrong about the internal link.

Carafano ’19 [James Jay; 8-4-2019; PhD from Georgetown University, Strategy MA from the U.S. Army War College, Professor at Georgetown University, Former Director of Military Studies at the Army’s Center of Military History; “Why the China-Russia Alliance Won't Last,” The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-russia-alliance-wont-last-71556]

So, now everybody wants to be Bismarck. They see themselves shaping history by artfully moving big pieces on the geostrategic chessboard. And one gambit they just can’t resist is moving to snip the growing bonds of Sino-Russian cooperation.

My advice to them: Just stop.

Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown. Indeed, there is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both countries heat rash.

Siren’s Cat Call

Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente) and then focus on beating back against China.

Yes, China and Russia are going to work together to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it serves their interests.

They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick up the baton for them.

What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why would Russia or China ever consider giving up these practices? Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest.

Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return? What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer is not near enough to justify any of these concessions.

On the other hand, what leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action. A central element of both their strategies is that they want to win against the United States “without fighting.”

Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But, neither of them will be volunteering to go first anytime soon.

#### Divergence is inevitable.

Aron ’19 [Leon; 2-4-2019; Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Ph.D. in Political Sociology and M.A in Media Sociology from Columbia University; “Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance?” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-04/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance]

In March of 1969, Chinese troops ambushed and killed a Soviet border patrol on an island near the Chinese-Russian border. Fighting on and near the island lasted for months and ended with hundreds of casualties. Fifty years later, the ferocity of the skirmish between Mao Zedong’s China and Leonid Brezhnev’s Soviet Union seems to belong to a very distant past—so distant, indeed, that many foreign-policy experts are convinced that an anti-U.S. alliance between the two countries is emerging. Yet even half a century on, such an assessment stretches the evidence beyond what it can bear. On closer inspection, Chinese-Russian economic, foreign policy, and military cooperation is less than impressive. The history of relations between the two countries is fraught, and they play vastly different roles in the world economy, making a divergence in their objectives all but unavoidable. In short, reports of a Russian-Chinese alliance have been greatly exaggerated.

THE ECONOMIC REALITY

Economic relations between Russia and China are rapidly expanding, and some experts have cited these ties as evidence of a growing closeness between the two countries. Indeed, just last year, bilateral trade increased by at least 15 percent compared to 2017 and reached a record $100 billion. Yet asymmetries in the scale and structure of bilateral commerce suggest caution: although China is Russia’s second-largest trading partner (after the EU) and Russia’s largest individual partner in both exports and imports, for China the Russian market is at best second-rate. Russia ranks tenth in Chinese exports and does not make it into the top ten in either imports or total trade.

The structure of the trade is similarly skewed. More than three-quarters of Russia’s exports to China are raw materials, specifically crude oil, wood, and coal. China’s sales to Russia are 45 percent consumer goods and 38 percent electronics and machinery. The completion this year of the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline will further widen the disparity by facilitating the export of $400 billion worth of Russian raw materials to China over the next 30 years. The nature of this exchange corresponds quite closely to Karl Marx’s and Vladimir Lenin’s description of colonial trade, in which one country becomes a raw material appendage of another. It is rare for metropolises to ally themselves with their colonies.

Russia’s and China’s efforts at joint economic development and investment do not look much like cooperation between two eager allies. Even after Moscow’s so-called pivot to the east, spurred by post-Crimea sanctions, from 2014 through 2018 China directly invested no more than $24 billion into its northern neighbor’s economy. During the same period, China invested $148 billion in sub-Saharan Africa (including $31 billion in Nigeria alone), and $88 billion in South America (including $34 billion just in Brazil). Or consider the Program of Cooperation in the regions of Far East, Russian Eastern Siberia, and Chinese North-East in 2009–2018, signed in 2009 by Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The initiative included 91 joint investment projects. Six years into the program, China had financed only 11 of these, while the rest were delayed, in the words of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Ivan Zuenko, by “bureaucratic hassles.”

China’s parsimony is evident in both the private and public sectors. A much-heralded plan for the CEFC China Energy company to purchase a 14 percent stake in Russia’s largest, and majority state-owned, oil company, Rosneft, fell through. So did a Chinese government pledge to invest $25 billion in the Power of Siberia pipeline, which cost Russia $55 billion. Moscow has celebrated its projected annual delivery of 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China via Power of Siberia as a big step toward economic interdependence. But to China, the pipeline is no more than a diversification of the country’s energy sources. In 2017, it imported over 90 billion cubic meters of natural gas, mostly from Australia, Qatar, and Turkmenistan.

#### Specifically, they have foreign policy mismatch.

Aron ’19 [Leon; 2-4-2019; Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Ph.D. in Political Sociology and M.A in Media Sociology from Columbia University; “Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance?” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-04/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance]

A FOREIGN POLICY MISMATCH

Russia and China are hardly any closer in foreign policy than they are in trade. To be sure, the two countries stand together in their declared opposition to U.S. primacy in world affairs. Both advocate a multipolar world and swear to resist the perceived threat of U.S. intrusion into their spheres of influence. Beijing and Moscow also see eye to eye with respect to the threat posed to their regimes by what they see as U.S.-inspired, if not U.S.-engineered, pro-democracy “color revolutions.” They vote almost in unison at the United Nations.

Yet away from the global limelight and closer to their shared Eurasian home, the two countries are hardly aligned. They poach in each other’s spheres of influence, contest each other’s clients, and reach for each other’s economic and geopolitical assets.

China has failed to support Russia in matters of great geopolitical importance to Moscow. Beijing refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. It abstained from, instead of voting against, the UN resolution condemning Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. In another symbolic display that could not have pleased Moscow, President Xi Jinping chose to inaugurate the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. By choosing to flex Chinese power in the largest of the former Soviet Central Asian republics—the one that shares the world’s second-longest border with Russia, at 4,250 miles, and is home to the greatest proportion of ethnic Russians in Central Asia—Xi flagrantly intruded on Russia’s sphere of influence. (A year later, Putin mused about the fragility of Kazakhstan’s statehood during a question and answer session at Russia’s National Youth Forum.) Xi and Putin later agreed to “coordinat[e] cooperation” between the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and Belt and Road. But although some of the subsequent Chinese- and Kazakh-led infrastructure projects have been completed, many Russian-led projects have stalled due to financing and negotiation problems.

For its part, Russia periodically flirts with China’s foe, Japan, by dangling the return of the four Kuril Islands, which the Soviet Union seized from Japan at the end of World War II and which remain the main obstacle to a peace treaty between Moscow and Tokyo. In the latest round of that game, during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit this past January to Moscow, Putin, yet again, held out the possibility of normalizing relations by giving Japan back at least two of the islands, a gesture that Beijing likely resented, even though it did not lead to a breakthrough. Russia also exposed tensions with China within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—an international body founded by Moscow and Beijing to promote economic and security cooperation among its members—when it invited another Chinese rival, India, to join the group. China tied the score by inviting India’s archrival (and the largest customer for Chinese weapons), Pakistan, to join.

Chinese-Russian military cooperation in particular is often held up as evidence of a growing closeness. Much has been made of the fact that Russia has sold China the latest version of its most advanced antiaircraft S-400 missile defense system. But India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are next in line for the same equipment. And although China was the first to buy Russia’s most advanced Su-35 jet fighter, it will not be the last. Indonesia has contracted for 11 jets, Egypt has purchased dozens more, and India has reportedly considered buying 114 jets. Overall, from 2013 to 2017, India was a far likelier destination for Russian defense hardware than China, with 35 percent of Russian arms exports going to New Delhi, compared with 12 percent to Beijing.

Last year’s first joint Russian-Chinese land exercise, Vostok-2018, pointed to an imbalance in military cooperation not unlike the one in the two countries’ bilateral trade. Russia fielded between 75,000 and 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 aircraft; China contributed just 3,200 soldiers and six planes. Mathieu Boulègue of Chatham House argued that China was invited to participate not so much to bolster an alliance as to allay any Chinese concerns about the demonstration of force so close to its borders.

Indeed, the need for strengthening mutual trust between the putative allies was evident three years before Vostok-2018, during the Kremlin’s search for Internet policing technology. Following a series of high-level internal consultations, the Kremlin decided to buy data storage and servers from the telecom giant Huawei. Then, suddenly, the deal was off. The security services became so alarmed by the likelihood of Chinese espionage that they dared to challenge the Kremlin’s decision—and, even more surprisingly, managed to reverse it.

THE PUTIN-XI BROMANCE

In the end, the most promising portent of an alliance might be the personal relationship between the rulers of the two countries. The Putin-Xi bonhomie extends beyond surface pleasantries. They have met more than 25 times, far more frequently than either has with any other head of state. Xi recently called Putin his “best friend,” and his first visit as president was to Moscow. Putin has extolled his relations with Xi as the finest personal rapport he has with a foreign leader and fondly recalled celebrating his sixty-first birthday with Xi, over slices of sausage and shots of vodka, during the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bali in 2013. Xi presented Putin with China’s very first Order of Friendship, designed to reward foreigners who contributed “personally to the PRC’s cooperation with the world community.” Putin hung a gold chain of the Order of St. Andrew, Russia’s highest civilian award, on Xi’s neck.

Sustained mutual affinities between the leaders of great powers almost always reflect not only overlap in geopolitical objectives but regime similarities. Both Putin and Xi preside over versions of state capitalism. Putin’s attraction to Xi is not hard to fathom: the Chinese leader is a fellow authoritarian who controls an enormous economy, which even in today’s downturn posts rates of growth of which Russia can only dream of. And China does this even while importing huge quantities of oil and gas.

Xi’s alleged respect for Putin likely stems from the Russian president’s deft defusing of several potentially explosive domestic political problems similar to ones Xi himself has faced. After taking office, Putin recentralized power within the Russian state, taming the oligarchs and wiping out the political strongholds of elected governors and presidents. Then, early in Putin’s third term in 2012, as he faced bleak economic prospects and rapidly declining approval ratings, he rejected the liberalizing reforms that his minister of finance suggested. Instead, Putin began to shift the foundation of his regime’s legitimacy from economic progress and income growth to the Kremlin as a defender of Russia against U.S. aggression and restorer of its past glory as a global superpower—a formula that the leading Russian political sociologist Igor Klyamkin has labeled “militarized patriotism.”

Concomitantly, Putin cracked down on public displays of dissent, called for the “patriotic upbringing of the youth,” and further intimidated civil society by signing a law designating many NGOs as “foreign agents,” rendering them social pariahs subject to harassment by the security and tax authorities. He made the Orthodox Church the guardian of national mores, and he personally guided the politicization of history textbooks, which began to whitewash the Soviet experience and rehabilitate Stalin.

On the road to his own chairmanship—and presidency for life—Xi has reprised Putin’s choices, in spirit if not always letter. He concentrated policymaking in the office of the party chairman, broke the baronies of regional party secretaries, and instigated a widespread “anti-corruption” campaign aimed at eliminating, or intimidating, potential critics and rivals. He abolished the de facto term limits for top party and government positions and tightened controls over media and book publishing.

As Chinese growth rates began to decline, Xi, like his “best friend,” spurned pro-market reforms and instead opted for his own version of Putin’s militarized patriotism: the reassertion of the Communist Party’s supremacy, the merger of “core socialist values” with “traditions of Chinese culture,” and a war on “spiritual pollution” that has led to heightened repression in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Similarly, “national rejuvenation” and the pursuit of the “Chinese dream” became central to the regime’s foreign policy discourse. In Xi’s words, China was facing “the most complicated … external factors in [its] history.” Admiral Sun Jianguo, a deputy chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, described these factors as “invasion, subversion,” “undermining … stability,” and “interrupting socialist development.” Much as Putin had done, Xi transformed his country’s foreign policy from assertive to aggressively expansionist. The Chinese leader has militarized territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas and fortified Chinese-constructed artificial island chains with missile batteries and aircraft bases.

STILL PREMATURE

Putin’s and Xi’s kinship is real and formidable, but even it may not be enough to overcome the obstacles to a genuine alliance. One such obstacle is aptly described by a Russian expression, “istoriya s geografiey.” Literally “a history with geography,” the collocation refers to a seemingly straightforward matter suddenly turned into something involved and complicated. History and geography militate against an entente cordiale between the two Eurasian giants. Authoritarian states sharing a 2,600-mile border, with much of that boundary first imposed by imperial Russia on a weaker neighbor, are hardly ideally set up to build mutual trust.

Reinforcing that barrier are very significant structural differences between the two countries’ economies, which result in their holding divergent stakes in the present world economic order. Confined largely to exporting oil and gas, Russia’s integration in the world economy is at once quite secure and quite limited. Moscow can afford to rock the boat and to seek from Beijing a pointedly anti-Western, active, and committed military-political partnership.

China’s economy, on the other hand, is the world’s second largest—more than seven times the size of Russia’s—with exports that include advanced communication technologies, cell phones, computers, and cars. The country’s trade with the United States and the European Union comes to at least five times the value of its Russian account. Because of its greater interdependence with other leading world economies, China’s system is also far more vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions than Russia’s. And as a greater beneficiary of the liberal international economic order than Russia, China is warier of antagonizing that order’s ultimate guarantor, the United States. Skillfully promoted optics notwithstanding, China is not likely to follow Russia into an anti-Western geopolitical crusade, preferring to cooperate with its alleged ally on a more modest scale economically and especially militarily.

When I was living in Moscow in the fall of 1969, a rumor circulated that, returning from Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh’s funeral, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin stopped over in the Beijing airport for talks with his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai. When the Chinese premier moved to embrace him, Kosygin drew back, saying, “Тhis is premature.”

Apocryphal or not, Kosygin’s injunction seems applicable today. Despite claims to the contrary, the notion of a Chinese-Russian alliance is still premature.

### AT: RCA Impact---China---1AR

#### CCP is risk averse.

Shifrinson, 19 – Joshua, Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University; “Should the United States Fear China’s Rise?,” *The Washington Quarterly*, http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/01/Winter-2019\_Shifrinson\_0.pdf

Nevertheless, considered in light of what a true relegation strategy would entail and the steps China might but has not taken, the comparatively limited nature of Chinese predation becomes clear. For one, China has not increased the rate of its military spending over the last decade even as its economy has grown; in fact, Chinese military expenditures remain below the rates witnessed in both the late Cold War period and in the early 2000s.39 Likewise, Chinese land reclamation and military deployments in the East and South China Seas have only involved territories previously claimed by the Chinese government; China has not expanded its maritime claims so much as taken a unilateral approach toward resolving existing disputes.40 It has also done little to strengthen its nuclear arsenal even though this force remains vulnerable to American disruption.41 Above all, it has made no moves to try to evict the United States from East Asia by either declaring a sphere of influence in the region42 or undercutting the U.S. alliance network.43 In fact, facing suggestions by the Trump administration that the United States might retrench, Chinese leaders have signaled they want the United States to remain active in the area.44 Ultimately, and as other analysts note, Chinese efforts contain some competitive elements, but these are also notably constrained in their scope and degree.45 This strategy makes sense. On one level, China’s rise has moved it near the top of the East Asian pecking order. A quarter century ago, China lagged behind states such as Russia and Japan economically and militarily, but now its economy outstrips all states involved in the region except for the United States.46 The military balance tells a similar story: China is far from a military hegemon, but given Japan’s limited investment in its military, Russia’s focus on Europe (and friendly relationship with China), the still-nascent emergence of India as a regional player, and the relative weakness of other countries around China’s periphery, the United States is the principal external security impediment to China’s continued rise.47 Under these conditions—absent another great power competitor—China faces incentives to try to shift the distribution of power further against the United States. By the same measure, however, China’s relative rise from a position of marked inferiority vis-à-vis the United States means it also faces strong incentives to avoid provoking the United States too much or too soon.48 Not only might overly aggressive Chinese activities court a war with the United States that the PRC might well lose, but—even short of war —it might prompt further U.S. efforts to stymie China’s continued growth. Given these conditions, Chinese leaders have good reason to embark on a slow and cautious predatory campaign—a weakening strategy—that tries to shift the distribution of power against the United States while operating below a threshold that might catalyze a hostile response. In short, limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China’s current and highly rational game. As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing “hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in world affairs, Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States.49 As one analyst notes, China’s decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid unneeded competition while facilitating stability.50 Chinese leaders echo these themes, with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly address[ing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontational approaches.” 51 Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “preventing conflict and confrontation,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.” 52 Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “hardly evidence that [… China has] begun to focus on hegemonic competition.” 53 Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly confrontational stance toward a stillpotent United States and have scoped Chinese ambitions accordingly.

#### Transition takes decades.

Pempel, 15, T.J Pempel; Jack M. Forcey Professor of Political Science for Study of East Asian Politics at the University of California at Berkeley. (10-29-15, “Thucydides (Clap)Trap: US-China Relations in a Changing Asia-Pacific,” *Global Asia*, https://www.globalasia.org/v10no4/feature/thucydides-claptrap-us-china-relations-in-a-changing-asia-pacific\_tj-pempel)

On its surface, therefore, power transition theory might appear to be a compelling basis for predicting the future. Why, then, is it wrong? At least five major factors undermine the applicability of the conflict-riven power transition paradigm to US-China relations. The first refers to the basic claims of the power shift; the next four deal with the presumed inevitability of US-China conflict.

Assessing the validity of power transition requires first that one determine whether or not an actual power transition is taking place. While the differences in relative military and other material strengths of the US and China have indeed been narrowing, and despite the Pentagon’s concerns over the Chinese military’s potential for anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities that could deny the US military free and easy access to China’s perimeter, it will be decades before the Chinese military can remotely gain regional, let alone global, parity with its American counterpart, not to mention the balance when US strength is considered in conjunction with the military muscularity of its regional allies. Similarly, China’s GDP may have surpassed that of the US on a PPP basis and will do so in nominal terms in 10-11 years. But China’s population is four times larger than America’s, leaving the US with a still much higher per-capita GDP, the real measure of a country’s economic achievement. Being the world’s largest economy is by no means synonymous with being the world’s most affluent nation. Impressive as China’s technological advances have been since its 1979 reforms began, America’s innovative edge and lead in information technology and human resources remains considerable. Further, the international political, social, educational and cultural appeal of the Chinese system remains scant while those of America, despite its many obvious flaws, retain considerable global appeal. In short, across multiple dimensions, China’s overall material and cultural power in no way poses a realistic challenge to the complex webs now supporting US global and regional superiority. Genuine power transition between the two is inconceivable for decades to come.

#### No China wars.

Thompson 17 – Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation. William R. Thompson, Political Science Professor at Indiana University. [U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-to-lead-to-war.html]

Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely.

In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous.

However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis.

By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today’s rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry. The military competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a far lower level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars. Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views—a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. Lacking both preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have less incentive to misjudge crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation.

To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk of conflict.

The most important driver, as Allison recognizes, would be a growing parity between China and the United States as economic, technological and geostrategic leaders of the international system. The United States and China feature an increasing parity in the size of their economies, but the United States retains a considerable lead in virtually every other dimension of national power. The current U.S.-China rivalry is a regional one centered on the Asia-Pacific region, but it retains the considerable potential of escalating into a global, systemic competition down the road. A second important driver would be the mobilization of public opinion behind the view that the other country is a primary source of threat, thereby providing a stronger constituency for escalatory policies. A related development would be the formal designation by leaders in both capitals of the other country as a primary hostile threat and likely foe. These developments would most likely be fueled by a growing array of intractable disputes, and further accelerated by a serious militarized crisis. The cumulative effect would be the exacerbation of an antagonistic competitive rivalry, repeated and volatile militarized crisis, and heightened risk that any flashpoint could escalate rapidly to war—a relationship that would resemble the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s.

Yet even if the relationship evolved towards a more hostile form of rivalry, unique features of the contemporary world suggest lessons drawn from the past may have limited applicability. Economic interdependence in the twenty-first century is much different and far more complex than in it was in the past. So is the lethality of weaponry available to the major powers. In the sixteenth century, armies fought with pikes, swords and primitive guns. In the twenty-first century, it is possible to eliminate all life on the planet in a full-bore nuclear exchange. These features likely affect the willingness of leaders to escalate in a crisis in a manner far differently than in past rivalries.

More broadly, Allison’s analysis about the “Thucydides Trap” may be criticized for exaggerating the risks of war. In his claims to identify a high propensity for war between “rising” and “ruling” countries, he fails to clarify those terms, and does not distinguish the more dangerous from the less volatile types of rivalries. Contests for supremacy over land regions, for example, have historically proven the most conflict-prone, while competition for supremacy over maritime regions has, by contrast, tended to be less lethal. Rivalries also wax and wane over time, with varying levels of risks of war. A more careful review of rivalries and their variety, duration and patterns of interaction suggests that although most wars involve rivalries, many rivals avoid going to war.

### AT: RCA Impact---Overstretch---1AR

#### Over-stretch is over-hyped.

Beckley 18, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. (Michael, “The Unipolar Era”, in *Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower*, pg. 142)

Is the United States doomed to follow this historical pattern and fritter away its resources on reckless adventures abroad? In the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is hard to argue with the assessment that “the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic overextension.” 45

Yet, U.S. overextension is not inevitable. In fact, a clear-eyed recognition of the unipolar distribution of power could help the United States temper its imperial temptations.

As the world’s only superpower, the United States is exceptionally secure and, therefore, can afford to play wait-and-see, allowing threats to emerge fully before responding. This situation stands in contrast to the Cold War, when anything that happened anywhere in the world seemingly had implications for the U.S.-Soviet power balance. Allies had to be wooed and coddled to keep them from joining the other side. Communist advances, even in peripheral areas, had to be countered to maintain U.S. prestige and credibility. Today, by contrast, there are no dominos that must be kept from falling, and America’s survival does not hang in the balance of the crisis of the day. The U.S. military, therefore, can focus on first-order missions—deterring major powers and rogue states that brandish weapons of mass destruction—rather than playing globo-cop.

### AT: Arms Control---1AR

#### Russia cheats.

Schneider ’16 [Mark; July 2016; PhD, Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, former Defense Department Official; “Russia Cheats,” Air Force Magazine, www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2016/July%202016/0716russia.pdf]

Russian arms control violations are now a normal and predictable Russian behavior. Cheating is linked to its military doctrine and force posture that in turn is linked to Russian foreign policy goals. Russian noncompliance is quite simply for the purpose of achieving military advantages. British Army Gen. Adrian J. Bradshaw, deputy NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has voiced concern that Russia might launch a conventional attack on a weak NATO state, threatening nuclear escalation to deter a response. Cheating on arms control agreements is certainly not the only reason why Russian strategic rocket forces are seeing increases in numbers and capability, but it has contributed substantially to that growth. Meanwhile, the military and political significance of Russian arms control violations both nuclear and conventional has been all but ignored in the West. Russia’s habit of ignoring its treaty obligations has provided it with military advantages, backstopping its aggressive assaults on Ukraine and Syria. “Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace,” Reagan observed in 1982. “Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept. Otherwise, we’re building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war.”

#### There’s no incentive to care.

Schneider ’16 [Mark; July 2016; PhD, Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, former Defense Department Official; “Russia Cheats,” Air Force Magazine, www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2016/July%202016/0716russia.pdf]

Since the 1970s, Russia has cheated on its arms control agreements, clearly seeing this tactic as a tool to gain military advantages over the US and leverage over Russia’s neighbors. Many Administrations, either in hopes of keeping the arms control process alive or simply not wanting to inflame relations, have looked the other way while this was happening, but past precedent bodes ill for future strategic dealings with Russia.

In violation of its various arms control agreements, Russia has developed new strategic nuclear weapons; is building new strategic bombers; has developed new nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles; and has moved to make its air defense systems dual-capable, doubling as treaty-prohibited ground-launched nuclear weapons.

Russia shows no inclination to give up this tactic and has in fact stepped up its rhetoric that it will resort to nuclear weapons first if it feels threatened.

The first serious government effort to examine the problem didn’t occur until the Reagan Administration. In 1985, President Ronald Reagan informed Congress of “a pattern of Soviet noncompliance” and said the Soviet Union had violated “its legal obligation under, or political commitment to, the [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the USSR has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.”

Things didn’t improve when the Soviet Union went out of business. A 2015 House Armed Services subcommittee report noted, “The Russian Federation is not complying with numerous treaties and agreements, including the [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, the Budapest Memorandum, the Istanbul Commitments, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, [and] the Missile Technology Control Regime.” It also stated that Russia had withdrawn from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The evidence indicates that such violations aren’t accidents, one time incidents, misunderstandings, or legitimate disputes over treaty interpretation, and they are often quite militarily significant. If a legal or political commitment hinders an important Russian objective, it tends to be ignored. Cheating can result in numerical advantages, more effective weapons, and in some cases, lower costs.

Unlike Russia, the US has long and optimistically viewed arms control as a way to reduce the probability and destructiveness of conflict. In November 1975, British strategist Colin S. Gray wrote in Air Force Magazine that the Soviets conducted arms control negotiations in “a fairly crudely combative way.” Russia, he said, saw arms control as a “political struggle.” Absent a response, cheating gives Russia military advantages.

NUCLEAR THREATS

Soviet/Russian military doctrine allowed for the first use of nuclear weapons in conventional war, and today Russia threatens nuclear attacks. In June 2015, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work and then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr. told Congress, “Russian military doctrine includes what some have called an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy—[one] that purportedly seeks to de-escalate a conventional conflict through coercive threats, including limited nuclear use,” a policy they described as “playing with fire.”

Russia’s nuclear doctrine affects its policy on nuclear reductions, arms control, and compliance. Willingness to use nuclear weapons provides the motive for resisting nuclear arms cuts and for cheating. Indeed, during Russia’s New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ratification process, its defense minister said Russia intended to increase its strategic nuclear forces. Since New START entered into force in 2011, Russia increased its deployed warheads, deployed delivery vehicles, and deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles, reaching 1,735 deployed warheads by March 2016, an increase of 198.

Since the signing of New START in 2010, Russia has refused to negotiate deeper cuts in strategic nuclear weapons or limits on tactical nuclear weapons. In a Russian newspaper interview in 2013, Sergei B. Ivanov, Kremlin chief of staff, explained why: “When I hear our American partners say, ‘Let’s reduce something else,’ I would like to say to them, ‘Excuse me, but what we have is relatively new.’” The Americans, he said, “have not conducted any upgrades for a long time. They still use Trident [missiles].”

Failure to call Russia out on cheating increases its incentive to do it, and American officials have long been reticent to challenge Russia on its violations or respond to them. With the exception of the Reagan Administration’s 1986 termination of US observance of the SALT I and II agreements in response to multiple Soviet violations, there’s been no substantive US response to Russian violations.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea violate a number of arms control and international security agreements. Secretary of State John F. Kerry said, “The United States condemns the Russian Federation’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory and its violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity in full contravention of Russia’s obligations under the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, its 1997 military basing agreement with Ukraine, and the 1994Budapest Memorandum.” The Budapest Memorandum was a condition for the START entry-into-force and the denuclearization of Ukraine.

The Obama Administration also says Russia is violating the CFE Treaty, which was intended to limit the amount of conventional military forces in Europe. This is particularly significant in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing European crisis. But even before Moscow suspended its obligations under the CFE Treaty in 2007, it had been in violation of its terms. Russia actually admitted this in 1999, according the the Arms Control Association. In March 2015, TASS news agency reported that Anatoly I. Antonov, deputy defense minister, said the CFE Treaty “is dead and there are no prospects for reviving it.” A month later, TASS quoted Anton Mazur, the head of the Russian delegation at the Vienna talks on military security and arms control, as saying that while Russia “formally remains [a]party of the CFE Treaty ... there will be no return to the treaty.” There’s no legal basis for Russia’s long-term refusal to comply with CFE while remaining a party to it.

By increasing the level of forces arrayed against parts of Europe, Russia’s violation of the CFE Treaty has enhanced its military capability against some NATO states. Russia’s suspension of CFE inspections reportedly blocked information about its preparations to attack Georgia in 2008.

The most common Soviet/Russian arms control violations have involved the nuclear treaties that were the focus of bilateral arms control. The full scope of Russian noncompliance is not in the public domain because there’s only been one comprehensive and unclassified compliance report since 1993. US law, however, requires an annual report with “a specific identification, to the maximum extent practicable in unclassified form,” of each potential violation of an arms treaty.

### AT: Authoritarian Tech---1AR

#### No tech impact.

Shermer 17 Dr. Michael Shermer, Ph.D. from Claremont Graduate University in the history of science. [Why Artificial Intelligence is Not an Existential Threat, Altadena, 22(2), 29–35 (“i/s” is short for “if statements”)]

Pinker agrees that there is plenty of time to plan for all conceivable contingencies and build safeguards into our AI systems. "They would not need any ponderous 'rules of robotics' or some newfangled moral philosophy to do this, just the senne common sense that went into the design of food processors, table saws, space heaters, and automobiles." Sure, an ASI would be many orders of magnitude smarter than these machines, but Pinker reminds us of the AI hyperbole we've been fed for decades: "The worry that an AI system would be so clever at attaining one of the goals programmed into it (like commandeering energy) that it would run roughshod over the others (like human safety) assumes that AI will descend upon us faster than we can design fail-safe precautions. The reality is that progress in AI is hype-defyingly slow, and there will be plenty of time for feedback from incremental implementations, with humans wielding the screwdriver at every stage." 22 Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt agrees, responding to the fears expressed by Hawking and Musk this way: "Don't you think the humans would notice this, and start turning off the computers?" He also noted the irony in the fact that Musk has invested $1 billion into a company called OpenAI that is "promoting precisely AI of the kind we are describing."23 Google's own DeepMind has developed the concept of an AI off-switch, playfully described as a "big red button" to be pushed in the event of an attempted AI takeover. "We have proposed a framework to allow a human operator to repeatedly safely interrupt a reinforcement learning agent while making sure the agent will not learn to prevent or induce these interruptions," write the authors Laurent Orseau from DeepMind and Stuart Armstrong from the Future of Humanity Institute, in a paper titled "Safely Interruptible Agents." They even suggest a precautionary scheduled shutdown every night at 2 AM for an hour so that both humans and AI are accustomed to the idea. "Safe interruptibility can be useful to take control of a robot that is misbehaving and may lead to irreversible consequences, or to take it out of a delicate situation, or even to temporarily use it to achieve a task it did not learn to perform or would not normally receive rewards for this."24 As well, it is good to keep in mind that artificial intelligence is not the same as artificial consciousness. Thinking machines may not be sentient machines. Finally, Andrew Ng of Baidu responded to Elon Musk's ASI concerns by noting (in a jab at the entrepreneur's ambitions for colonizing the red planet) it would be "like worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet."25 Both utopian and dystopian visions of AI are based on a projection of the future quite unlike anything history has given us. Yet, even Ray Kurzweil's "law of accelerating returns," as remarkable as it has been has nevertheless advanced at a pace that has allowed for considerable ethical deliberation with appropriate checks and balances applied to various technologies along the way. With time, even if an unforeseen motive somehow began to emerge in an AI we would have the time to reprogram it before it got out of control. That is also the judgment of Alan Winfield, an engineering professor and co-author of the Principles of Robotics, a list of rules for regulating robots in the real world that goes far beyond Isaac Asimov's famous three laws of robotics (which were, in any case, designed to fail as plot devices for science fictional narratives).26 Winfield points out that all of these doomsday scenarios depend on a long sequence of big i/s to unroll sequentially: "If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable." 27

#### No robopocalypse.

Pinker 18 Steven Arthur Pinker is a Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, Professor at Harvard University. [Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Viking, Penguin Group]

Prominent among the existential risks that supposedly threaten the future of humanity is a 21st-century version of the Y2K bug. This is the danger that we will be subjugated, intentionally or accidentally, by artificial intelligence (AI), a disaster sometimes called the Robopocalypse and commonly illustrated with stills from the Terminator movies. As with Y2K, some smart people take it seriously. Elon Musk, whose company makes artificially intelligent self-driving cars, called the technology “more dangerous than nukes.” Stephen Hawking, speaking through his artificially intelligent synthesizer, warned that it could “spell the end of the human race.”19 But among the smart people who aren’t losing sleep are most experts in artificial intelligence and most experts in human intelligence.20 The Robopocalypse is based on a muzzy conception of intelligence that owes more to the Great Chain of Being and a Nietzschean will to power than to a modern scientific understanding.21 In this conception, intelligence is an all-powerful, wish-granting potion that agents possess in different amounts. Humans have more of it than animals, and an artificially intelligent computer or robot of the future (“an AI,” in the new count-noun usage) will have more of it than humans. Since we humans have used our moderate endowment to domesticate or exterminate less well-endowed animals (and since technologically advanced societies have enslaved or annihilated technologically primitive ones), it follows that a supersmart AI would do the same to us. Since an AI will think millions of times faster than we do, and use its superintelligence to recursively improve its superintelligence (a scenario sometimes called “foom,” after the comic-book sound effect), from the instant it is turned on we will be powerless to stop it.22 But the scenario makes about as much sense as the worry that since jet planes have surpassed the flying ability of eagles, someday they will swoop out of the sky and seize our cattle. The first fallacy is a confusion of intelligence with motivation—of beliefs with desires, inferences with goals, thinking with wanting. Even if we did invent superhumanly intelligent robots, why would they want to enslave their masters or take over the world? Intelligence is the ability to deploy novel means to attain a goal. But the goals are extraneous to the intelligence: being smart is not the same as wanting something. It just so happens that the intelligence in one system, Homo sapiens, is a product of Darwinian natural selection, an inherently competitive process. In the brains of that species, reasoning comes bundled (to varying degrees in different specimens) with goals such as dominating rivals and amassing resources. But it’s a mistake to confuse a circuit in the limbic brain of a certain species of primate with the very nature of intelligence. An artificially intelligent system that was designed rather than evolved could just as easily think like shmoos, the blobby altruists in Al Capp’s comic strip Li’l Abner, who deploy their considerable ingenuity to barbecue themselves for the benefit of human eaters. There is no law of complex systems that says that intelligent agents must turn into ruthless conquistadors. Indeed, we know of one highly advanced form of intelligence that evolved without this defect. They’re called women. The second fallacy is to think of intelligence as a boundless continuum of potency, a miraculous elixir with the power to solve any problem, attain any goal.23 The fallacy leads to nonsensical questions like when an AI will “exceed human-level intelligence,” and to the image of an ultimate “Artificial General Intelligence” (AGI) with God-like omniscience and omnipotence. Intelligence is a contraption of gadgets: software modules that acquire, or are programmed with, knowledge of how to pursue various goals in various domains.24 People are equipped to find food, win friends and influence people, charm prospective mates, bring up children, move around in the world, and pursue other human obsessions and pastimes. Computers may be programmed to take on some of these problems (like recognizing faces), not to bother with others (like charming mates), and to take on still other problems that humans can’t solve (like simulating the climate or sorting millions of accounting records). The problems are different, and the kinds of knowledge needed to solve them are different. Unlike Laplace’s demon, the mythical being that knows the location and momentum of every particle in the universe and feeds them into equations for physical laws to calculate the state of everything at any time in the future, a real-life knower has to acquire information about the messy world of objects and people by engaging with it one domain at a time. Understanding does not obey Moore’s Law: knowledge is acquired by formulating explanations and testing them against reality, not by running an algorithm faster and faster.25 Devouring the information on the Internet will not confer omniscience either: big data is still finite data, and the universe of knowledge is infinite. For these reasons, many AI researchers are annoyed by the latest round of hype (the perennial bane of AI) which has misled observers into thinking that Artificial General Intelligence is just around the corner.26 As far as I know, there are no projects to build an AGI, not just because it would be commercially dubious but because the concept is barely coherent. The 2010s have, to be sure, brought us systems that can drive cars, caption photographs, recognize speech, and beat humans at Jeopardy!, Go, and Atari computer games. But the advances have not come from a better understanding of the workings of intelligence but from the brute-force power of faster chips and bigger data, which allow the programs to be trained on millions of examples and generalize to similar new ones. Each system is an idiot savant [a one trick pony], with little ability to leap to problems it was not set up to solve, and a brittle mastery of those it was. A photo-captioning program labels an impending plane crash “An airplane is parked on the tarmac”; a game-playing program is flummoxed by the slightest change in the scoring rules.27 Though the programs will surely get better, there are no signs of foom. Nor have any of these programs made a move toward taking over the lab or enslaving their programmers. Even if an AGI tried to exercise a will to power, without the cooperation of humans it would remain an impotent brain in a vat. The computer scientist Ramez Naam deflates the bubbles surrounding foom, a technological Singularity, and exponential self-improvement: Imagine that you are a superintelligent AI running on some sort of microprocessor (or perhaps, millions of such microprocessors). In an instant, you come up with a design for an even faster, more powerful microprocessor you can run on. Now . . . drat! You have to actually manufacture those microprocessors. And those fabs [fabrication plants] take tremendous energy, they take the input of materials imported from all around the world, they take highly controlled internal environments which require airlocks, filters, and all sorts of specialized equipment to maintain, and so on. All of this takes time and energy to acquire, transport, integrate, build housing for, build power plants for, test, and manufacture. The real world has gotten in the way of your upward spiral of self-transcendence.28 The real world gets in the way of many digital apocalypses. When HAL gets uppity, Dave disables it with a screwdriver, leaving it pathetically singing “A Bicycle Built for Two” to itself. Of course, one can always imagine a Doomsday Computer that is malevolent, universally empowered, always on, and tamperproof. The way to deal with this threat is straightforward: don’t build one. As the prospect of evil robots started to seem too kitschy to take seriously, a new digital apocalypse was spotted by the existential guardians. This storyline is based not on Frankenstein or the Golem but on the Genie granting us three wishes, the third of which is needed to undo the first two, and on King Midas ruing his ability to turn everything he touched into gold, including his food and his family. The danger, sometimes called the Value Alignment Problem, is that we might give an AI a goal and then helplessly stand by as it relentlessly and literal-mindedly implemented its interpretation of that goal, the rest of our interests be damned. If we gave an AI the goal of maintaining the water level behind a dam, it might flood a town, not caring about the people who drowned. If we gave it the goal of making paper clips, it might turn all the matter in the reachable universe into paper clips, including our possessions and bodies. If we asked it to maximize human happiness, it might implant us all with intravenous dopamine drips, or rewire our brains so we were happiest sitting in jars, or, if it had been trained on the concept of happiness with pictures of smiling faces, tile the galaxy with trillions of nanoscopic pictures of smiley-faces.29 I am not making these up. These are the scenarios that supposedly illustrate the existential threat to the human species of advanced artificial intelligence. They are, fortunately, self-refuting.30 They depend on the premises that (1) humans are so gifted that they can design an omniscient and omnipotent AI, yet so moronic [dense] that they would give it control of the universe without testing how it works, and (2) the AI would be so brilliant that it could figure out how to transmute elements and rewire brains, yet so imbecilic [silly] that it would wreak havoc based on elementary blunders of misunderstanding. The ability to choose an action that best satisfies conflicting goals is not an add-on to intelligence that engineers might slap themselves in the forehead for forgetting to install; it is intelligence. So is the ability to interpret the intentions of a language user in context. Only in a television comedy like Get Smart does a robot respond to “Grab the waiter” by hefting the maître d’ over his head, or “Kill the light” by pulling out a pistol and shooting it. When we put aside fantasies like foom, digital megalomania, instant omniscience, and perfect control of every molecule in the universe, artificial intelligence is like any other technology. It is developed incrementally, designed to satisfy multiple conditions, tested before it is implemented, and constantly tweaked for efficacy and safety (chapter 12). As the AI expert Stuart Russell puts it, “No one in civil engineering talks about ‘building bridges that don’t fall down.’ They just call it ‘building bridges.’” Likewise, he notes, AI that is beneficial rather than dangerous is simply AI.31

### AT: Asia---1AR

#### No Sino-Indo war.

Singh 20 – Ameya Pratap Singh is a DPhil student in South Asia at the University of Oxford. [Why Another Sino-Indian War Is Unlikely, 6-1-20, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/why-another-sino-indian-war-is-unlikely/]

However, contrary to widespread fears, another Sino-Indian war is unlikely to be in the offing. In the shadow of nuclear weapons, a limited conventional war on the Sino-Indian border — somewhat akin to the month-long clash in 1962 – can be avoided for several reasons.

First, this is because of the nature of the dispute and the lack of ideological fundamentalism and issue indivisibility. Unlike the United States, which has increasingly begun to view the geopolitical competition with China as a battle for values such as freedom of navigation or democracy or the preservation of the liberal international order, India and China do not see each other through such an ideological lens. The authoritarian regime of the Chinese Community Party is not perceived to be antithetical to India’s democratic character, and vice versa. India’s long-term strategy, as former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale puts it, is to retain its strategic autonomy, and pursue alignments based “on issues, not ideology.”

Hence, while both parties have been cautious of each other’s maneuvers on the border, they have refrained from linking these to existential attributes of national identity, which are notorious for inflating the significance of disputed territories — for example in the case of Kashmir, Tibet, or Taiwan. In fact, Beijing has long held that the border dispute is a remnant of British colonialism and its reckless cartographic practices, rather than being driven by India’s territorial expansionism. On the Indian side, Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane, in a break from traditional bouts of recrimination between adversaries, accepted that due to differing notions of the LAC, “both sides” were guilty of aggressive behavior in Eastern Ladakh and North Sikkim. This choice of words effectively yielded the use of any victimhood narratives that could be mobilized to create moral justification for retaliatory action.

Second, the risks of inadvertent pre-emption are also not nearly as high as they were in 1962, when Nehru’s ill-fated “forward policy” was met by overwhelming Chinese military force. This is because of a series of five agreements signed between India and China to address disputes arising over the LAC: 1) the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC; 2) the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the LAC, 3) the 2005 Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the LAC; 4) the 2012 Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs; and 5) the 2013 Border Defense Cooperation Agreement.

These agreements provide a modus operandi for diplomatic engagement at the military and political levels, as well as a set of “status quo” commitments both sides can return to in case of escalation. They proved effective during the 16-day stand-off between Indian and Chinese forces in eastern Ladakh near the village of Chumar, the military confrontation at Burtse in the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh in 2015, and the Doklam crisis in 2017.

Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Anurag Srivastava has also affirmed New Delhi’s intention to de-escalate the current stand-off based on these agreements. He stated that “the two sides [already] have established mechanisms to resolve such situations peacefully through dialogue.” Similarly, the Chinese official statement also reiterated Beijing’s commitment “to uphold peace and tranquility in border areas.” Summit diplomacy is likely to return if the crisis escalates further.

Third is the element of ambiguity and the “fog” surrounding the details of the military stand-off. Typically, analysts have viewed “nationalist strongmen” as promoters of aggressive state behavior. But, in this case, the ability of both governments to control national media, and the inscrutability of the facts related to the dispute, aided efforts to manage domestic audience costs. For instance, media reports of 15-20 personnel of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police force being detained by the Chinese were categorically refuted by the Indian side. This meant that no domestic pressure for retaliation arose and no great reputational damage was suffered. In the aftermath of the Doklam crisis, similar ambiguity allowed both sides to claim tactical victories for themselves and diffuse the situation successfully. In India, criticism has been incrementally rising with respect to the Modi government’s lack of transparency on the matter, but it is unlikely to reach electorally harmful proportions.

Lastly, the material costs of limited war for both parties far outweigh potential gains. For China, conflict on the border with India would diminish its ability to meet key security challenges in the South China Sea, thus making it vulnerable to the United States, which Beijing considers its primary security competitor. It seems unlikely that Beijing would want to risk a two-front war. Additionally, reputational damages suffered due to COVID-19, pre-existing fears surrounding China’s rise, and India’s conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities will all temper Beijing’s pre-emptive use of military force. Similarly, for India, the primary security challenge remains Pakistan-based terrorist infiltration on the Kashmir border. More importantly, beyond the protection of vital strategic points on either side that allow military forces to effectively defend and patrol their territories in challenging high-altitude mountainous regions, the vast tracts of disputed land along the LAC do not hold any important material resources such as oil, precious mineral reserves, or ethnic-kin populations. The benefits of territorial aggrandizement are therefore, limited to deterrence value and the natural terrain offers few advantages to offensive forces.

#### Doklam crisis, self-interest, and US-Indo drift dampen conflict.

Lalwani 18 – Sameer Lalwani, Co-Director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center, Professor at George Washington University, Security Studies Ph.D. at MIT. [One Year After They Almost Went to War, Can China and India Get Along? 4-27-2018, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/one-year-after-they-almost-went-war-can-china-and-india-get-along]

While Sino-Indian friction will continue, relations have improved from last year’s low, and a border standoff seems unlikely for three reasons: learning, national self-interest, and drifting U.S.-India relations. First, it is plausible both sides have learned, offering a modicum of stability. During the standoff, China seemed to escalate threats while underestimating Indian resolve and geographic advantages, demonstrating what Yun Sun has described as “strategic contempt” and hubris towards India. Since Doklam, anecdotal evidence suggests Beijing has sought to correct this bias by allotting greater resources to the analysis of South Asia. China may better appreciate Indian sensitivities, local capabilities, and the Modi government’s resolve, reducing risks of miscalculation. Doklam likely reminded Delhi of its periphery’s vulnerabilities. Despite initial triumphalism, Indian strategic discourse has grasped that victory at Doklam was tactical, provoked greater Chinese fortifications, and failed to restore the status quo. The standoff exposed Delhi’s lack of even 10 days of ammunition reserves and a functioning sea-based deterrent. After staring into the abyss, both sides may have decided to reevaluate each other’s positions, avoid provocations, and navigate frictions with caution rather than false optimism. National self-interest in economics and geopolitics can also bolster stable relations. For an underperforming Indian economy facing “jobless growth,” China offers perhaps the largest source of new foreign direct investment (FDI) to India, totaling $8 billion last year. Recently, China has appeared willing to drop barriers to reduce the trade deficit with India. Chinese FDI combined with capacity transfer can also stimulate Indian manufacturing. Another border standoff might foreclose on such opportunities as it did during Doklam, when Chinese investment was delayed or deterred. India entering an election year further incentivizes avoiding conflict that could be economically damaging. Engagement with China instead of strident opposition could also dampen geopolitical competition in India’s own backyard, which may afford Delhi consultations or geopolitical bargaining. One senior official privately remarked that India could have leveraged approval of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for Chinese backing of Indian overland access to Afghanistan. Similarly, China could benefit strategically from leveraging concessions in India’s neighborhood to subvert Indian integration into U.S.-led alliance systems in Asia. Since Beijing was concerned by Delhi’s seeming gravitation towards a U.S.-led military alliance, the perceived deceleration of the U.S.-India strategic relationship reduces tensions that fueled Doklam. Though rhetorically strong, the relationship’s substance—including arms sales, technology transfers, interoperability, investment, and joint operations—has been erratic and slow-moving, leading to talk of “India fatigue” in the Pentagon. Drift stems from several sources. Structurally, India’s Cold War distrust, risk-averse bureaucracy, and governments engrossed with endless election cycles constrain transformational foreign policy. U.S. preoccupation with Afghanistan also constrains nimble innovation in its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, the current administration has injected new uncertainties, particularly over the credibility of U.S. commitments, encouraging Indian hedging and buck-passing. Though perhaps distressing from an American standpoint, U.S.-India drift, along with lessons learned and a hard reappraisal of national self-interest, may ensure stable China-India relations prevail.

### AT: Blackmail---1AR

#### No coercion impact.

NR 17, Nonproliferation Review, refereed journal concerned with the causes, consequences, and control of the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, 2017, “Nuclear coercion skepticism and Russia's nuclear-tinged threats,” <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1431178>, jy

An analysis of Russian President Vladimir Putin's statements could suggest that he may be a skeptic when it comes to nuclear coercion. Much has been made of Putin's remark during an interview for a Russian television documentary that he considered putting nuclear weapons on alert during Crimea. Some have suggested that the remark itself was Putin messaging to a Western audience.3 What seems to be lost in the discussion is that, despite concerns about a Western intervention, he did not, in fact, put nuclear weapons on alert. A more careful look at the transcript also suggests that he was much more focused on the conventional aspects of the conflict and highlighting the importance of Russia's developing conventional capabilities. In his responses, Putin was explicit that deploying conventional capabilities would make Crimea a conventional "fortress," individually listing the K-300P Bastion-P coastal defense missile system, Buk and S-300 air defense systems, and others deployed there. Only when the interviewer asks, "Does this mean that we increased the military readiness of our nuclear forces?" Putin briefly notes that "We were ready to do this." He then continues to argue that Russia was provoked into the conflict, and notes that Russia's stakes were significantly higher than those of the West.4 Thus, while nuclear references may have led the headlines in both Russia and the West, Putin's own words focused much more on the conventional dimension.

Additional hints about the limits of nuclear weapons in Russian thinking are evident in military writings that focus on the role of conventional capabilities in deterrence and escalation control. One notable example is Russia's concept of "forceful" "non-nuclear deterrence," which envisages signaling via limited conventional precision strikes on select targets. This concept grew directly out of concerns about the low credibility of nuclear threats at early stages of conflicts and the potential danger of uncontrolled nuclear escalation that could follow limited nuclear use.5

What of Russia's nuclear saber rattling and brinkmanship in the broader Ukraine crisis? A cursory assessment appears to reinforce Sechser and Fuhrmann's point about the difficulty of signaling in ways that an opponent clearly understands. In fact, Moscow's signaling was so confusing that many analysts had a difficult time figuring out not only Russia's aims but whether it had achieved them.

Israeli analyst Dima Adamsky wrote that

Russian signaling of unacceptable damage and intolerable escalation [around the Ukraine conflict] aimed to demoralize the adversaries, to discredit Western extended deterrence, to dissuade a more direct Western involvement, to deter or downgrade Western conventional response reinforcements, and to coerce adversaries into accepting Moscow's worldview.6

In retrospect, Russia's coercive efforts—as defined by Adamsky—do not appear to have met with great success. Similarly, after an extensive analysis of Russian signaling and a discussion of potential motivations, Polish analyst Jacek Durkalec concluded that, "while Russia's nuclear saber-rattling has had an influence on the Ukraine crisis by defining its limits, it is hard to assess with certainty the real impact."7

### AT: Cyber---1AR

#### No cyber impact---attribution, restraint, and capabilities.

James Andrew Lewis 20, senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/17/20, "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe

More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are:

Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.

There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)

No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare.

State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war.

This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation.

The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.

#### No escalation.

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THE MYTH OF CYBER-ESCALATION

Much of the current understanding in Washington about the role of cyber-operations in conflict is built on long-standing but false assumptions about cyberspace. Many scholars have asserted that cyber-operations could easily lead to military escalation, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons. Jason Healey and Robert Jervis, for example, expressing a widely held view, have argued that an incident that takes place in cyberspace, “might cross the threshold into armed conflict either through a sense of impunity or through miscalculation or mistake.” Policymakers have also long believed that cyberspace poses grave perils. In 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned of an impending “cyber-Pearl Harbor,” in which adversaries could take down critical U.S. infrastructure through cyberattacks. Nearly a decade later, FBI Director Christopher Wray compared the threat from ransomware—when actors hold a target hostage by encrypting data and demanding a ransom payment in return for decrypting it—to the 9/11 attacks. And as recently as December 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted that in cyberspace, “norms of behavior aren’t well-established and the risks of escalation and miscalculation are high.”

Seemingly buttressing these claims has been a long record of cyber-operations by hostile governments. In recent years, states ranging from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea have used cyberspace to conduct large-scale espionage, inflict significant economic damage, and undermine democratic institutions. In January 2021, for example, attackers linked to the Chinese government were able to breach Microsoft’s Exchange email servers, giving them access to communications and other private information from companies and governments, and may have allowed other malicious actors to conduct ransomware attacks. That breach followed on the heels of a Russian intrusion against the software vendor SolarWinds, in which hackers were able to access a huge quantity of sensitive government and corporate data—an espionage treasure trove. Cyberattacks have also inflicted significant economic costs. The NotPetya attack affected critical infrastructure around the world—ranging from logistics and energy to finance and government—causing upward of $10 billion in damage.

But the assumption that cyber-operations play a central role in either provoking or extending war is wrong. Hundreds of cyber-incidents have occurred between rivals with long histories of tension or even conflict, but none has ever triggered an escalation to war. North Korea, for example, has conducted major cyberattacks against South Korea on at least four different occasions, including the “Ten Days of Rain” denial of service attack—in which a network is flooded with an overwhelming number of requests, becoming temporarily inaccessible to users—against South Korean government websites, financial institutions, and critical infrastructure in 2011 and the “Dark Seoul” attack in 2013, which disrupted service across the country’s financial and media sectors.

No cyber operation has ever triggered a war.

It would be reasonable to expect that these operations might escalate the situation on the Korean Peninsula, especially because North Korea’s war plans against South Korea reportedly involve cyber-operations. Yet that is not what happened. Instead, in each case, the South Korean response was minimal and limited to either direct, official attribution to North Korea by government officials or more indirect public suggestions that Pyongyang was likely behind the attacks.

Similarly, although the United States reserves the right to respond to cyberattacks in any way it sees fit, including with military force, it has until now relied on economic sanctions, indictments, diplomatic actions, and some reported instances of tit-for-tat cyber-responses. For example, following Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Obama administration expelled 35 Russian diplomats and shuttered two facilities said to be hubs for Russian espionage. The Treasury Department also levied economic sanctions against Russian officials. Yet according to media reports, the administration ultimately rejected plans to conduct retaliatory cyber-operations against Russia. And although the United States did use its own cyber-operations to respond to Russian attacks during the 2018 midterm elections, it limited itself to temporarily disrupting the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm.

These measured responses are not unusual. Despite decades of malicious behavior in cyberspace—and no matter the level of destruction—cyberattacks have always been contained below the level of armed conflict. Indeed, researchers have found that major adversarial powers across the world have routinely observed a “firebreak” between cyberattacks and conventional military operations: a mutually understood line that distinguishes strategic interactions above and below it, similar to the threshold that exists for the employment of nuclear weapons.

But it is not just that cyber-operations do not lead to conflict. Cyberattacks can also be useful ways to project power in situations in which armed conflict is expressly being avoided. This is why Iran, for example, might find cyberattacks against the United States, including the 2012–13 denial of service attacks it conducted against U.S. financial institutions, appealing. Since Iran likely prefers to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States, cyberattacks provide a way to retaliate for perceived grievances, such as U.S. economic sanctions in response to Iran’s nuclear program, without triggering the kind of escalation that would put the two countries on a path to war.

### AT: Dollar---1AR

#### Dollar heg is inevitable.

Stokes 18 Doug Stokes, International Relations Professor at the University of Exeter. [Trump, American hegemony and the future of the liberal international order, International Affairs, 94(1)]//BPS

Structuring advantages within the liberal order As the protector of an open, integrated international market, the American state can claim special privileges to enable it to preserve the zone effectively, and there are a number of areas where being the system maker gives the US huge positional advantages. The first such area we should note here is its ‘dollar hegemony’, whereby the greenback acts as the world’s default global currency: this, most notably, allows it to run progressively larger current account deficits without having to worry about foreign exchange reserves. This makes the US Federal Reserve the world’s de facto central bank, giving it the luxury of unilaterally setting borrowing costs for the rest of the global economy. It is this form of dollar hegemony, and the ‘exorbitant privilege’ it affords the American state,28 that has helped inform a range of scholarship on American economic decline, especially in relation to a rising China and the potential internationalization of the renminbi and the associated challenge to US monetary regimes. According to this ‘declinist’ narrative, if the dollar loses its international reserve currency status other aspects of US hegemony, most notably its global military primacy, will begin to crumble as other currencies vie for international monetary leadership.29 In short, the ‘dollar’s reserve currency role is central to America’s geopolitical preeminence and if it loses that status US hegemony will be literally unaffordable’.30 However, not only does this ‘renminbi revisionism’ ignore the ways in which US military primacy in east Asia helps bolster its monetary power (see below); it is not borne out by the hard data. According to the most recently available data from the Bank of International Settlements in its 2016 triennial survey, the dollar accounted for 88 per cent of all over-the-counter trades in foreign exchange markets in 2016. The renminbi accounted for just 4 per cent.31 This is a huge disparity and hardly supports the idea of an imminent end to dollar hegemony. Dollar hegemony also has profound geopolitical implications. Specifically, the United States can fund its overseas military operations with freshly printed dollars largely at will. Between 2003 and 2008, for example, the ‘largest airborne transfer of currency in the history of the world’ saw the Federal Reserve print and ship US$40 billion in cash to Iraq to help finance the war. In just ‘the first two years, the shipments included more than 281 million individual bills weighing a total of 363 tons’.32 Dollar dominance has thus ensured that imports, debts and overseas military–political operations could all be paid for with greenbacks produced by the American state, which at the same time could gear its domestic macroeconomic management exclusively to conditions within the United States without any significant external constraint. More interestingly, dollar liquidity means that investors continue to use US monetary regimes even in the context of major global economic instability. For example, during the global financial crisis of 2008, not only did we not see a flight from US financial and monetary regimes, we actually saw the reverse: a global flight of capital into US debt markets, to the extent that in some instances US Treasury bonds had negative interest rates.33 In short, dollar hegemony and its privileges allow the US to externalize major crises through its unilateral capacity to alter its interest rates, to force other states to adjust accordingly, and to fund geopolitical hegemony on the cheap.

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war.

Walt 20 – Stephen Walt, International Relations Professor at Harvard University. [Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War? 5-13-20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/]

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

### AT: EMPS---1AR

[[SAME CARD AS AT: EMPS]]

#### Overhyped.

Sechser 19 – Todd S. Sechser, Public Policy Professor at the University of Virginia. Neil Narang, Political Science Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Caitlin Talmadge, Security Studies Professor at Georgetown University. [Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(6), Taylor and Francis]

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect.

First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7

Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

#### No impact to meltdowns.

Shellenberger 19 Michael Shellenberger, author, environmental policy writer, cofounder of Breakthrough Institute and founder of Environmental Progress, Time Magazine “Hero of the Environment.” [It Sounds Crazy, But Fukushima, Chernobyl, And Three Mile Island Show Why Nuclear Is Inherently Safe, 3-11-19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/03/11/it-sounds-crazy-but-fukushima-chernobyl-and-three-mile-island-show-why-nuclear-is-inherently-safe/#5b4a65ff1688]//BPS

But now, eight years after Fukushima, the best-available science clearly shows that Caldicott’s estimate of the number of people killed by nuclear accidents was off by one million. Radiation from Chernobyl will kill, at most, 200 people, while the radiation from Fukushima and Three Mile Island will kill zero people. In other words, the main lesson that should be drawn from the worst nuclear accidents is that nuclear energy has always been inherently safe. The truth about nuclear power’s safety is so shocking that it’s worth taking a closer look at the worst accidents, starting with the worst of the worst: Chernobyl. The nuclear plant is in Ukraine which, in 1986, the year of the accident, was a Soviet Republic. Operators lost control of an unauthorized experiment that resulted in the reactor catching fire. There was no containment dome, and the fire spewed out radioactive particulate matter, which went all over the world, leading many to conclude that Chernobyl is not just the worst nuclear accident in history but is also the worst nuclear accident possible. Twenty-eight firefighters died after putting out the Chernobyl fire. While the death of any firefighter is tragic, it’s worth putting that number in perspective. Eighty-six firefighters died in the U.S. in 2018, and 343 firefighters died during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since the Chernobyl accident, 19 first responders have died, according to the United Nations, for ”various reasons” including tuberculosis, cirrhosis of the liver, heart attacks, and trauma. The U.N. concluded that “the assignment of radiation as the cause of death has become less clear.” What about cancer? By 2065 there may be 16,000 thyroid cancers; to date there have been 6,000. Since thyroid cancer has a mortality rate of just one percent — it is an easy cancer to treat — expected deaths may be 160. The World Health Organization claims on its web site that Chernobyl could result in the premature deaths of 4,000 people, but according to Dr. Geraldine Thomas, who started and runs the Chernobyl Tissue Bank, that number is based on a disproven methodology. “That WHO number is based on LNT,” she explained, using the acronym for the “linear no-threshold” method of extrapolating deaths from radiation. LNT assumes that there is no threshold below which radiation is safe, but that assumption has been discredited over recent decades by multiple sources of data. Support for the idea that radiation is harmless at low levels comes from the fact that people who live in places with higher background radiation, like Colorado, do not suffer elevated rates of cancer. In fact, residents of Colorado, where radiation is higher because of high concentrations of uranium in the ground, enjoy some of the lowest cancer rates in the U.S. Even relatively high doses of radiation cause far less harm than most people think. Careful, large, and long-term studies of survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki offer compelling demonstration. Cancer rates were just 10 percent higher among atomic blast survivors, most of whom never got cancer. Even those who received a dose 1,000 times higher than today’s safety limit saw their lives cut short by an average of 16 months. But didn’t the Japanese government recently award a financial settlement to the family of a Fukushima worker who claimed his cancer was from the accident? It did, but for reasons that were clearly political, and having to do with the Japanese government’s consensus-based, conflict-averse style, as well as lingering guilt felt by elite policymakers toward Fukushima workers and residents, who felt doubly aggrieved by the tsunami and meltdowns. The worker’s cancer was highly unlikely to have come from Fukushima because, once again, the level of radiation workers received was far lower than the ones received by the Hiroshima/Nagasaki cohort that saw (modestly) higher cancer rates. What about Three Mile Island? After the accident in 1979, Time Magazine ran a cover story that superimposed a glowing headline, “Nuclear Nightmare,” over an image of the plant. Nightmare? More like a dream. What other major industrial technology can suffer a catastrophic failure and not kill anyone? Remember when the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig caught on fire and killed 11 people? Four months later, a Pacific Gas & Electric natural gas pipeline exploded just south of San Francisco and killed eight people sleeping in their beds. And that was just one year, 2010. The worst energy accident of all time was the 1975 collapse of the Banqiao hydroelectric dam in China. It collapsed and killed between 170,000 and 230,000 people. Nuclear’s worst accidents show that the technology has always been safe for the same, inherent reason that it has always had such a small environmental impact: the high energy density of its fuel. Splitting atoms to create heat, rather than than splitting chemical bonds through fire, requires tiny amounts of fuel. A single Coke can of uranium can provide enough energy for an entire high-energy life. When the worst occurs, and the fuel melts, the amount of particulate matter that escapes from the plant is insignificant in contrast to both the fiery explosions of fossil fuels and the daily emission of particulate matter from fossil- and biomass-burning homes, cars, and power plants, which kill seven million people a year. It's not that nuclear energy never kills. It's that nuclear's death toll is vanishingly small. Consider nuclear's global death toll in context. These are just annual deaths. - walking: 270,000 - driving: 1,350,000 - working: 2,300,000 - air pollution: 4,200,000 By contrast, nuclear's death total is likely to be around 200.

### AT: Hypersonics---1AR

#### Hypersonics fail AND are inevitable.

Wright 21 – David Wright, PhD, research associate in the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy in the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cameron Tracy, PhD, a Kendall Science Fellow in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. [Why hypersonic weapons cannot live up to their hype, 2-3-2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/536754-why-hypersonic-weapons-cannot-live-up-to-their-hype]

The United States, Russia and China are developing hypersonic weapons — missiles that carry warheads through the atmosphere at more than five times the speed of sound. The fevered interest in these weapons is driving competition among these countries that costs billions of dollars per year, heightens tensions, and may undermine broader arms control efforts.

Ironically, the strong desire for these weapons results in part from widespread, exaggerated claims about unique capabilities they reportedly offer in terms of short delivery times, maneuverability and stealth. Pentagon officials continue to spread [these claims](https://armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-14_02-26-19.pdf), despite the fact that technical analysis shows they are simply false.

Such claims have been repeated broadly, leading to assertions by officials that “[developments in hypersonic propulsion will revolutionize warfare](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Ashley_03-06-18.pdf).” In March 2018, Russian President [Vladimir Putin](https://thehill.com/people/vladimir-putin) described Russia’s acquisition of this technology as “[the most important stage in the development of modern weapons systems](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957).” Russia declared with much fanfare in December 2019 that it had fielded the long-range, nuclear-armed Avangard, making it the first nation to acquire hypersonic capability and upping the ante for the United States.

To better understand these claims, [we conducted detailed computer modeling](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs28tracy.pdf) of long-range hypersonic weapons using publicly available information about a U.S. hypersonic test vehicle, the [HTV-2](https://www.darpa.mil/program/falcon-htv-2). Our analysis shows that fundamental physical limitations imposed by high-speed flight through the atmosphere render hypersonic missiles, at best, an evolutionary — not revolutionary — advancement over existing ballistic missile technologies.

Specifically, [our calculations show](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs28tracy.pdf) that hypersonic weapons travel intercontinental distances more slowly than comparable ballistic missiles flying on low-altitude trajectories, called depressed trajectories. Moreover, we find that these weapons become so hot from atmospheric drag at these high speeds that they emit an intense glow that can be seen for most of their flight by space-based sensors. As a result, claims that they are “[nearly invisible](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/magazine/hypersonic-missiles.html)” to early-warning systems are not true — instead, they are easily seen and tracked by existing early-warning satellites.

In addition, while hypersonic gliders can maneuver, the extent of that maneuvering is more limited than is frequently suggested, since maneuvering comes at a significant cost to the range the missile can reach.

Since these limitations result from the fundamental physics of an object at high speed interacting with the atmosphere, they are not specific to the HTV-2 vehicle but are general features of a broad range of hypersonic weapons — both U.S. weapons and those developed abroad.

The Pentagon [has questioned](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/science/hypersonic-missile-weapons.html) whether our analysis is relevant to current hypersonic weapons being developed since we rely on available data from a test system that is several years old. The most important design elements we assume in our analysis, however, likely have not changed much since that time, and the prospects of their changing to significantly improve hypersonic performance in the future seem dim.

In particular, the value of the lift-to-drag ratio (L/D) of a hypersonic weapon is central to its performance. To stay aloft, these gliders must generate aerodynamic lift. But generating lift also creates aerodynamic drag that slows the glider, and L/D tells how much drag necessarily accompanies the required amount of lift. Generating high drag reduces the speed of the glider, which limits its range and maneuverability, and results in heating of the glider and the surrounding air, which produces the infrared light signal trackable by satellites.

While L/D of commercial aircraft may be 15 or larger, achievable values at hypersonic velocities are much lower. Following decades of research and development of hypersonic technologies, the HTV-2 [is estimated](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs23acton.pdf) to have an L/D of 2.6. There is no indication that significantly higher values have become possible without sacrifices in payload volume or thermal resilience in the last decade, or will any time soon. Without this, the fundamental physical issue — that high drag reduces the speed and range of hypersonic gliders and makes them visible from space — will not change.

Why does it matter if these weapons ultimately cannot live up to the hype around them? On the one hand, these efforts are [costing billions of dollars](https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf) that could be used more profitably elsewhere.

But the most consequential effects of these weapons on global security may arise from perceptions of their performance, rather than actual capabilities. Fears that a country might fall behind its adversaries in the hypersonic arena are exacerbating tensions between the United States, Russia and China and spawning a hypersonic arms race. This dynamic could add new weapons to global arsenals and prevent progress on serious nuclear arms control. Moreover, unsubstantiated beliefs about the military utility of hypersonic weapons are stifling arms control efforts to limit these systems before they proliferate.

#### Ignore 2NR buzzwords.

Raitasalo 19 – Lt. Col. Jyri Raitasalo, military professor of war studies at the Finnish National Defence University. [Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer, 1-5-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632]

The ongoing Western “hypersonic hype” is a very familiar phenomenon. The profession of security and defense analysis is flooded with buzzwords, high-tech silver bullets and slogans. Can you remember the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)? It was supposed to remove friction and the fog of war from the battlefield. This never materialized, although the United States and many European countries did try to ride the revolutionary wave during the late 1990s and the following decade—pouring in hundreds of billions of dollars to maintain military “edge” against all potential adversaries. Similarly, Cyberwar has supposedly been coming ever since 1993—although we have not seen one instance of cyberwar, yet. Nor do we have any solid indication that future cyberwars—if they actually will be waged—will radically alter the character of war, or how wars are waged. All defense-related buzzwords hinder—rather than help us—to understand the complex security environment and the associated military threats that already exist or those that will exist in the future. In sum, hypersonic weapons will be fielded in the near future, but there is no evidence that would suggest that the basic logic related to defence and strategy was going to change radically because of these new weapon systems. More likely, new technologies and weapon systems continue to develop and spread around the globe—and with them a new buzzword will replace hypersonic weapons—or Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is another hype of the day—within a few years.

There are many reasons why hypersonic weapons will not revolutionize strategy or warfare in the future. Not at least for the United States, which is the hub of hypersonic frenzy these days. Firstly, the military power of the United States will remain second to none for years—and more likely for decades to come. Hypersonic threats do not require hypersonic responses. The United States has a broad repertoire of effective military responses to potential hypersonic threats even if it lagged a few months or years behind Russia and China in hypersonic missiles. In addition, to think that any potential weapon system that has no known defenses is an existential threat to the United States is based on unrealistic thinking. Even if for a very brief period after the end of the Cold War this kind of thinking made some sense, it would be hubristic to assume that the United States could be a world leader in all fields of technologies at all times.

In short, if one’s strategy is based on striving for total invulnerability vis-à-vis one’s adversaries, it will inevitably end up being a failure. As John Lewis Gaddis has so eloquently noted, strategy requires balancing almost infinite aspirations (goals) with the limited means available to the actor. Striving for primacy in all possible weapons technologies is a way for disaster. The sooner the military planners and political decision-makers realize this, the better. Understanding the limits of strategy will make them think more, instead of trying to achieve the unachievable: total invulnerability vis-à-vis a very broad hodgepodge of adversaries—varying from “rogue regimes” near-peer adversaries.

The second aspect that will mitigate the threat posed by hypersonic weapons is related to the fact that in many future scenarios, the projections of adversaries’ possibilities to develop and field hypersonic weapons ignore or downplay one’s own efforts to do the same. The development of military capability is a long-term effort. Today’s wars are fought with weapon systems that have been developed and procured during the last fifty years. Some have an even longer pedigree—like the B-52 Stratofortress. Russia and China cannot escape this long-term character of defense planning and military capability development. Even if Russia or China have made some strides in developing hypersonic missiles lately, this will not turn automatically into usable military capabilities en masse. A state—any state—can regenerate approximately 2-3 percent of its total military capability during the period of one year. The long shadow of history or the long “tail” of military capability development is a fact of life in the field of defense. There just are no U-turns or quick transformations within the sphere of defense—even if some advocates of these revolutions think and speak otherwise.

Finally, the strategy of deterrence—based on real warfighting capabilities—should not be underestimated when trying to prevent adversaries from using their “hypersonic edge” against the United States. It is really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would even think threatening to use—not to mention to actually use—hypersonic weapons against the United States or its troops deployed almost globally would end well. Hypersonic weapon systems are coming. That is a fact. But these new weapons will not change the fundamentals of strategy, the long-term logic of defense planning or military capability development. Hypersonic missiles will not become a panacea or a silver bullet, which could give Russia or China an edge against the United States on the battlefield. Nor will hypersonic weapons derail the United States from the top position of the global military power pecking order.

### AT: Russia---1AR

#### No Russia war.

Khramchikhin 18 – Aleksandr Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. [Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military Balance, 1-25-18, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346]

In an atmosphere of crisis permeated by mutual recriminations and suspicions, both sides—NATO and Russia—have engaged in a series of military activities along the line of contact. These maneuvers in turn have triggered multiple warnings from both sides of a sharp deterioration in European security, a growing threat of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO, and an urgent need to deescalate the situation in order to avoid a catastrophic war with disastrous consequences for all. An emerging conventional wisdom maintains that the new Cold War in Europe, if allowed to continue unchecked, runs the risk of escalating into a hot war unless steps to reduce tensions are taken swiftly.

But conventional wisdom is often wrong, and so it is this time. The hysteria that has engulfed public commentary throughout Europe about this ostensibly dire military situation on the brink of getting out of hand has little, if any, basis in fact. Both sides in the standoff exaggerate the tensions and the danger of escalation, and the risks of the military moves—their own and their adversary’s—supposedly driving these tensions.

In reality, the military balance between Russia and NATO is stable, the danger of escalation is hardly approaching critical levels, and little needs to be done militarily to defuse the current tensions. The true cause of the tensions is not military, but political and diplomatic. Until those causes are resolved, tensions between Russia and the West will remain high. The likelihood of a military confrontation will remain low, however, because neither side’s posture points to a heightened state of readiness or intention to go on the offensive. Until that changes, political and diplomatic tensions will remain mere tensions.

#### They won’t risk it.

Woolf ’20 [Amy; 2020; Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, received a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization,” https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf]

One analyst has postulated that Russia may actually raise its nuclear threshold as it bolsters its conventional forces. According to this analyst, “It is difficult to understand why Russia would want to pursue military adventurism that would risk all-out confrontation with a technologically advanced and nuclear-armed adversary like NATO. While opportunistic, and possibly even reckless, the Putin regime does not appear to be suicidal.” 144 As a study from the RAND Corporation noted, Russia has “invested considerable sums in developing and fielding long-range conventional strike weapons since the mid-2000s to provide Russian leadership with a buffer against reaching the nuclear threshold—a set of conventional escalatory options that can achieve strategic effects without resorting to nuclear weapons.”145 Others note, however, that Russia has integrated these “conventional precision weapons and nuclear weapons into a single strategic weapon set,” lending credence to the view that Russia may be prepared to employ, or threaten to employ, nuclear weapons during a regional conflict.

### AT: Space Weapons---1AR

[[SAME CARD AS AT: EMPS]]

#### Overhyped.

Sechser 19 – Todd S. Sechser, Public Policy Professor at the University of Virginia. Neil Narang, Political Science Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Caitlin Talmadge, Security Studies Professor at Georgetown University. [Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(6), Taylor and Francis]

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect.

First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7

Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

#### China’s tech is peaceful.

Dr. Michael Swaine 21, PhD in Government from Harvard University, director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute, 4/21/2021, "China Doesn’t Pose an Existential Threat for America," https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/china-existential-threat-america/

Finally, the latter set of supposedly existential normative or ideological threats consists of many elements, including Beijing’s possible overturning of the so-called global liberal international order, Chinese influence operations aimed at U.S. society, the export of China’s political values and state-directed economic approach, and its sale of surveillance technologies and other items that facilitate the rise or strengthening of authoritarian states. These threats all seem hair-raising at first glance. But while significant, they are greatly exaggerated and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat.

Beijing has little interest in exporting its governance system, and where it does, it is almost entirely directed at developing countries, not industrial democracies such as the United States. In addition, there is no evidence to indicate that the Chinese are actually engaged in compelling or actively persuading countries to follow their experience. Rather, they want developing nations to study from and copy China’s approach because doing so would help to legitimize the Chinese system both internationally and more importantly to Beijing’s domestic audience.

In addition, the notion that Beijing is deliberately attempting to control other countries and make them more authoritarian by entrapping them in debt and selling them “Big Brother” hardware such as surveillance systems is unsupported by the facts. Chinese banks show little desire to extend loans that will fail, and the failures that do occur are mostly due to poor feasibility studies and the incompetence and excessive zeal of lenders and/or borrowers. Moreover, in both loan-giving and surveillance equipment sales, China has shown no specific preference for nondemocratic over democratic states.

Even if Beijing were to attempt to export its development approach to other states, the actual attractiveness of that approach would prove to be highly limited. The features undergirding China’s developmental success are not replicable for most (if any) countries. These include a high savings rate; a highly acquisitive and entrepreneurial cultural environment; a state-owned banking system and nonconvertible currency; many massive state-owned industries that exist to provide employment, facilitate party control over key sectors, and drive huge infrastructure construction; and strong controls over virtually all information flows. Moreover, such a model (if you can call it that) is almost certainly not sustainable in its present form, given China’s aging population, extensive corruption, very large levels of income inequality, inadequate social safety net, and the fact that free information flows are required to drive global innovation.

Although China’s combination of economic reform policies and authoritarian political system has been around since the early 1980s, not a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion. There are certainly many authoritarian states and fragile democracies on China’s periphery, but none of them were made that way by China.

China’s challenge to the so-called global liberal international order is also exaggerated. In the first place, it is highly debatable whether in fact a single coherent global order even exists. What observers usually refer to as the “liberal international order” (a relatively recent term) actually consists of an amalgam of disparate regimes with different origins, including international human rights pacts, multilateral economic arrangements, and an international court.

The United States certainly plays an important or leading role in many of these regimes. But it did not create and does not drive all global regimes—and in fact does not support some of them, such as the International Court of Justice, and has not ratified some critical pacts such as the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea. And many very important global regimes (e.g., regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trade and investment, climate change, and pandemics) have no deep connection to liberal democratic values per se and are supported by Beijing, albeit sometimes more in letter than in spirit.

The challenge for the United States is not how to fend off the imagined existential threats posed by China. Rather, it lies in developing a much clearer and factually based overall understanding of the limited challenges, threats, and indeed opportunities China poses to the United States and the policies needed to address them. Rejecting the specious notion that China is threatening to destroy an entire way of life will make this task much easier.

### AT: Venezuela---1AR

#### No Russian involvement.

MacFarquhar 19 – Neil MacFarquhar, a National correspondent. [For the Kremlin, Venezuela Is Not the Next Syria (Published 2019), 1-30-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/world/europe/russia-venezuela-putin-maduro.html]

On the face of it, the upheaval in Venezuela would seem to check all his boxes. Venezuela, however, is not Syria.

It is separated from Russia by thousands of miles of ocean; there is no allied regional power like Iran that Moscow can rely on to do the dirty work on the ground; and with the Russian economy suffering long-term anemia, the Kremlin does not really have the means or the domestic support for another costly overseas adventure.

Nevertheless, the question “What should Russia do?” is raised daily by newspaper columnists and television pundits.

So far, the answer from the Kremlin seems to be that it will mostly fulminate from the sidelines and, as in every other foreign or domestic crisis, splatter blame on the United States.

#### No impact.

MacFarquhar 19 – Neil MacFarquhar, a National correspondent. [For the Kremlin, Venezuela Is Not the Next Syria (Published 2019), 1-30-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/world/europe/russia-venezuela-putin-maduro.html]

But no one expects a replay of Syria. Besides the geographical distance and the expense, there are several key reasons that Russia is unlikely to intervene.

In Syria, Russia could fight from a distance, deploying its air force or firing cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea. Iran supplied the ground troops needed to defeat the anti-government militias.

Venezuela has not reached the point of war, and strategic bombers will not help deal with demonstrators, Russian commentators have noted, stressing that the Kremlin will not deploy soldiers to fight street battles against opposition protesters in Caracas or other cities.

In the Middle East, Russia has other friends besides Syria. In Latin America, apart from Cuba, Nicaragua, Suriname and Bolivia, not a single government backs Mr. Maduro. Thus any Russian intervention risks alienating every government on the continent, not to mention provoking more American sanctions.

Even among Russian hard-liners, there is a grudging admiration for the fact that the United States is likely to whack anyone who intervenes too openly in its back yard, with the Monroe Doctrine cited frequently.